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Abstract 
The thesis offers an examination of a distinct chapter in the era of economic reforms in India 
- the case of the state of West Bengal - and narrates the politics of an economic policy 
transition spearheaded by the Left Front coalition government that ruled the state from 1977 
to 2011. In 1991, the Government of India began to pursue a far more liberal policy of 
economic development, with emphasis being placed on non-agricultural growth, the role of 
the private sector, and the merits of foreign direct investment (FDI). This caused serious 
political challenges for the Communist Party of India - Marxist (CPIM), the main party in the 
Left Front. Historically, the CPIM was committed to pro-poor policies focused on the 
countryside and had spoken out strongly against privatisation and FDI; however it could not 
ignore the stagnating industrial economy of the state, and was thus compelled to court private 
investment and take advantage of the liberalised policy environment. The nature of this 
dichotomy – one that characterised the political economy of West Bengal over the last two 
decades – is studied in this research as a set of why-how questions. Firstly, why did the 
CPIM/Left Front take upon itself the task of engineering a transition from an erstwhile land-
reform and agriculture based growth model to a pro-market development agenda post-1991? 
And secondly, how was such a choice justified to/negotiated with the various stakeholders 
(the rank and file of the CPIM itself, other coalition member parties, trade unions, the 
industrial class, etc.) while sustaining the party’s traditional rhetoric and partisan character? 
In examining the second part, the thesis also ventures into the recent cases of huge opposition 
to land acquisition for industrial plants at Singur and Nandigram, and demonstrates how the 
mandate of the top brass of party leadership in Calcutta was being implemented, translated or 
contested at the local levels. On the whole, this thesis attempts a reappraisal of the political-
economic history of the Left Front regime and particularly that of its majority partner, the 
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CPIM, over the last two decades. It also places the case in a broader Indian context and 
contributes to wider debates on the changing nature of federalism in India and the politics of 
economic reforms.   
 
Keywords: India, West Bengal, Left Front Government, CPIM, economic liberalisation, 
policy negotiation, politics, federalism. 
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Prologue  
Overview  
On the morning of 14
th
 March 2007, fourteen people were killed and hundreds injured in an 
indiscriminate police action in Nandigram, a small cluster of villages in the East Midnapore 
district of the Indian state
1
 of West Bengal. Local people had been protesting since January 
2007 against a proposal to acquire land in Nandigram and adjoining areas for the construction 
of a chemical hub by an Indonesian conglomerate. Between January and March, the area had 
become a self-governing fortress with barely any state agency presence. The main arterial 
road that connected the villages was dug up so that police vehicles could not access the area 
and other roads barricaded. In retaliation, the state government (allegedly) let loose armed 
party cadres and police forces, who engaged in indiscriminate shooting, torture, and even 
sexual assaults, all documented by journalists, independent enquiry commissions, the 
National Human Rights Commission of India (NHRC), and the Central Bureau of 
Investigation (CBI) (Sarkar and Chowdhury, 2007).  
 
The Nandigram episode happened in the midst of a similar ongoing bitter dispute between the 
state and the peasants of Singur - a similar cluster of villages in the Hooghly district of West 
Bengal, approximately 140 km from Nandigram - over the acquisition of 1000 acres of prime 
arable land to build a car factory. Though not as intense as Nandigram, Singur also witnessed 
sporadic eruptions of violence during the days of acquisition and compensation disbursement. 
In the face of severe criticism and fierce local, regional, and even national protests, both 
projects were eventually abandoned.  
                                                          
1
 The term ‘state’ is used here to denote the regional provinces in India, and not the entire nation. 
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Though the Singur-Nandigram stories have attained cult status in the development-
displacement tales of India - owing to the fact that the state, in both cases, eventually 
capitulated in the face of protests led by the poor peasantry – they were neither the first (a 
study by the Indian Council for Social Science Research estimated the level of displacement 
between 1951 and 1990 at about 21.3 million people)
2
, nor the last (struggles much larger in 
scale than Singur-Nandigram continue to rage in several Indian districts, for example, near 
the Posco steel plant project at Orissa). However, the bitter and violent feuds at Singur-
Nandigram are unique in a different context. They took place in West Bengal, a state that was 
ruled by a communist government - the Communist Party of India- Marxist (CPIM) led Left 
Front coalition - from 1977 to 2011, a remarkable instance of political stability, especially 
when placed in the wider context of caste/religion/ethnicity based politics and frequent 
regime changes elsewhere in India (Banerjee, 2010). The Left Front’s development record is 
also substantial. Not only did it bring in significant land reforms, but it was the first among 
Indian state governments to take the mantle of democratic decentralisation seriously, and 
gained unprecedented popularity as a government for the poor. Even in the state elections 
held as recently as 2006, the government earned a historic majority, but the Singur-
Nandigram events followed immediately afterwards, and for the first time in over thirty 
years, the Left Front steadily lost its electoral support base and was eventually ousted from 
office in 2011
3
.  
 
This dramatic turn of events that has characterised the political-history trajectory of West 
Bengal over the last six years, kindled two types of responses. The first was an emotional 
one, which Mukharji succinctly summarises as: 
                                                          
2
 Source: http://www.hindu.com/2006/04/14/stories/2006041406331500.htm ; accessed 24
th
 September 
2012.   
3
 See Appendix 6 for Left Front’s electoral records. 
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[t]he events at Nandigram and Singur in West-Bengal were such that it forced many 
— if not most — of those who follow South Asian affairs to seriously re-think their 
beliefs and positions. The manifest contradiction of the naked oppression unleashed 
— both through official and unofficial channels — by an allegedly Communist 
government upon an impoverished peasantry, in the interests of big-industry, was so 
obvious, that it forced many to ask: “after all how could this happen?”... All of us who 
had callously tossed around [the] words (‘reactionary’, ‘radical’, ‘bourgeois’, 
‘communist’ etc) seemed to have learnt our dictionaries wrong. The words seemed 
now to mean exactly the opposite of what we had thought they meant (2009:86-87). 
 
It is, however, the second response – a rather more fundamental one – that prompted this 
research. As Mukharji continues: 
 
…this change could not and did not happen over-night... Its roots go much further 
back, and the changes that made Singur and Nandigram possible were in motion long 
before 2007. Its roots lay in fact in the very nature of the CPM’s politics in Bengal 
since their rise to power in the late 1970s (ibid.:87). 
 
 
It is necessary to contextualise this observation. During the 1980s and 1990s, almost all 
countries in the global South embarked on a path of ‘transition’, initiating economic reforms 
and competing to attract foreign direct investment according to the strictures of global 
capitalism. Particularly interesting cases of transition are those states that explicitly legitimise 
their rule in terms of communist ideals, the general alliance of peasants and workers toward 
an egalitarian society, and whose ideological pillars historically include a pro-poor 
redistributive land reform
4
 (Steur and Das, 2009). West Bengal can be seen as a part of this 
communist transition brigade. From an erstwhile commitment to land reforms and agriculture 
centric growth – a model that not only served the CPIM/Left Front’s ideological orientation 
but also paid rich electoral dividends throughout the 1980s, as the CPIM successfully 
entrenched itself in even the remotest corners of the state - the government initiated a gradual 
effort to adopt a pro-market development strategy from the early 1990s. However, there is a 
crucial difference. Unlike the others, West Bengal is not a nation-state in itself, but a part of 
                                                          
4
 Such as China, Vietnam, Russia and several Eastern European nations.  
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the Indian federation which historically has been dominated by centrist or left-of-centre 
political forces. India itself had entered an era of economic liberalisation in 1991, and that 
placed the Left Front, and particularly its dominant partner - the CPIM - amidst an intriguing 
dichotomy. On one hand it had to remain subservient to federal compulsions in terms of 
policy orientation, whilst on the other maintaining a largely contrasting political-ideological 
line, while still justifying its own eagerness to adopt a pro-market stance to its core support 
base in order to minimise allegations of ideological deviation, and possibly, resultant 
electoral losses.  
 
This research, which is focused on economic transition in West Bengal, is set against the 
backdrop of such larger national and international trends, but at the same time consciously 
tries to refrain from the common pitfall of broader studies that try to map such trends across 
nations: that of over-generalisation in macroeconomic terms. Instead, it concentrates on the 
micro-affairs, or to be precise, on the ‘local’ political trends that governed the transition 
process in West Bengal. However, a study of this sort, embedded within a particular set of 
regional political dynamics, can also provide important insights for the macro-process of 
economic transition, both in India and elsewhere.  
 
Given such a thematic orientation, the major objectives of this thesis can be identified as a set 
of why-how questions. Why did the CPIM/Left Front take upon itself the task of engineering a 
transition to a pro-market development agenda post-1991 from an erstwhile land-reform and 
agriculture based growth model? And how was such a choice justified to/negotiated with the 
various stakeholders (the rank and file of the CPIM itself, other coalition member parties, 
trade unions, the industrial class, etc.) while sustaining the party’s traditional rhetoric and 
partisan character? On the whole, this thesis attempts a reappraisal of the political-economic 
history of the Left Front regime and particularly that of its majority partner, the CPIM, over 
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the last two decades. The roots of the contradictory state of affairs – as manifested in the 
Singur-Nandigram incidents – lay in such a reappraisal.  
 
A Map of the Thesis 
 
This research takes shape against the wider discourses of economic transition. Key literature 
is reviewed in Part I (Chapter 1). It is established that this research is more sympathetic 
towards ‘local’, or ‘micro-level’ accounts of political trends in investigating the transition 
imperatives for a particular economy, such as Jenkins’s (1999) account of the politics of 
economic reform in India, than it is to larger comparative studies of generic macro-economic 
factors and/or institutional settings: it is in the political logic of negotiating transition 
initiatives that determinants of its future trajectory can be found, rather than evaluating 
individual reform measures via a pre-determined set of economic and political indicators. 
Therefore, having discussed the wider discourses, the chapter reviews the sub-
national/regional roots of reform politics in India. However, it is not the main purpose of this 
work to adjudicate carefully between these competing arguments, or to set up rigorous 
empirical tests of their major claims. Instead, it is largely persuaded – as Part I articulates – 
by Jenkins’ argument that the focal point of studying economic transition, particularly in a 
large and diverse democratic politic such as India, lays in the sub-national variation in its 
political-economic conditions, and the different political strategies pursued by regional elites 
in response to the reforms.             
 
Therefore, the major purpose of the thesis is to identify the precise nature of the political-
economic conditions as they evolved in West Bengal, and the series of adaptive political 
tactics that the CPIM leaders pursued in response. There is also an additional dimension of 
ideological transformation that characterised the CPIM as it slowly warmed to private 
  
25 
 
entrepreneurs and foreign capital. It is important to trace this transformation, as for any 
communist party the ideological discourse provides not only a source of philosophical 
affinity, but a legitimising yardstick for all its actions. Therefore, as a precursor to the 
changing tactics, the party had to modify its traditional discourse, and understanding the 
nature and magnitude of such a transformation will provide the foundation on which the 
eventual reappraisal of the state’s political history will be built.  
 
Part II (Chapters 2 and 3) of the thesis prepares the conceptual map that is necessary for this 
task. Chapter 2 commences with a brief historical overview of the growth of the Left 
movement in colonial Bengal and subsequently (post-partition) in West Bengal, followed by 
a detailed narrative of the Left Front regime, focusing particularly on its early development 
initiatives. It then recounts the two contrasting sets of literature that focus on West Bengal – 
the traditional or institutional school, primarily based on the works of Atul Kohli (1987, 
1990, 1994), and the party-society argument, based on Partha Chatterjee’s description of the 
political society (1997, 2004, 2008), and further developed by Dwaipayan Bhattacharya 
(2004, 2009, 2010). Chapter 3 presents the first major contribution of this research: a 
theoretical reassessment of the CPIM. Drawing from the basic tenets of the party-society 
thesis as well as Milovan Djilas’ critique of the Soviet Communist Order (1957), it provides a 
comprehensive account of the political rationale of the CPIM, which traces the contours of 
the ideological discourse of the party and its associated plethora of political tactics.  
 
Given that the focus of this research is to understand the politicisation of the transition 
process in West Bengal via the why-how questions defined earlier, Part III of the thesis 
(Chapters 4, 5 and 6) is organised as follows. Chapter 4 deconstructs the why question, which 
has received limited attention in existing discourses - which have usually followed the 
standard explanations of federal and economic compulsions as voiced by the CPIM. 
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However, Chapter 4 examines the political-economic conditions that prevailed in West 
Bengal both before and during the early years of transition (c.1991-2000), and highlights a 
series of ideological negotiations that took place within the CPIM on the issue of reforms, 
and a certain degree of political astuteness exhibited by Jyoti Basu, the Chief Minister of 
West Bengal (1977-2000). It is the combination of these factors that explains why the 
CPIM/Left Front undertook transition initiatives in the first place.   
 
 
Chapters 5 and 6, together, address the how question. Chapter 5 argues that transition 
initiatives in West Bengal became politicised both in intent and meaning. It maps, firstly, the 
gradual ideological transformation (and resultant contradictions) that took place within the 
CPIM as it tried to negotiate with the changing imperatives of the political-economic order of 
the day, and also to legitimise the necessity behind the transition in its own theoretical terms. 
The chapter draws from the first part of the political rationale of the CPIM as developed in 
Chapter 3, i.e. the traditional ideological discourse of the party, in order to document the 
nature of such transformations. It also examines to what extent the higher echelons of the 
CPIM engaged with its own rank and file, and also with other Left Front coalition partners, to 
negotiate/justify the changes. Chapter 6, the final empirical chapter, argues that the transition 
initiatives were deeply politicised not only in intent and meaning, but also in the process of 
execution. It returns the story to the Singur-Nandigram events, and presents them not as 
standalone incidents, but rather as the culmination of the series of inherent contradictions 
embedded in the way the CPIM went about managing the transition. It also shows how the 
party channels translated execution initiatives into exercises for political benefit 
maximisation. The chapter establishes the importance of negotiation in underpinning any 
attempt at economic transition, in the absence of which, by the time the party message arrived 
at grass-roots level, it had been significantly distorted. Chapter 7 presents a brief conclusion, 
which summarises the key arguments of the earlier chapters, and presents them in the context 
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of the sustainable reform process within the Indian democratic establishment as a whole, and 
also relates them to some of the wider theoretical puzzles referred to in Chapter 1.      
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Chapter 1 
 
The Politics of Economic Transition: Puzzles, Perspectives, and the 
Indian Experience 
 
“Until recently there were a First, a Second and a Third World. The notion of the second 
world is now losing its substance. What remains is a huge amount of debris and ruins which 
is a combination of the first and third worlds: by its aspirations and longing to create a 
democratic political systems and prospering market economy it relates to the first world, a 
part of which it would like to become; however, by the state of the economy and the types of 
national and social problems it often resembles the third world.” 
              Vaclav Havel, President of the erstwhile Czech and Slovak Federal Republic 
(opening speech of the International Forum for Culture and Democracy, Prague, 4
th
 
September 1991)
5
  
 
1.1 Introduction  
The immediate starting point of this thesis is echoed in part in the above observation, that 
over the last three decades efforts to engineer a shift towards a market economy across the 
developing world have led to situations that only partially resemble a liberal image, and 
continue to be dominated by localised socio-political conditions. Countries in Latin America, 
sub-Saharan Africa, Eastern Europe, South and Southeast Asia engaged in such economic 
transition exercises, have come to display trends where the broader economic thrusts have 
been reshaped into distinct trajectories by domestic socio-political compulsions. The story 
that unfolds in this thesis is of one such case, possibly unique in its own right, as unlike other 
stories of economic transition in the developing world, this one is of a regional Left 
government within a larger federal jurisdiction dominated by centrist political coalitions.              
                                                          
5
 Source: http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0009/000911/091190eb.pdf; accessed 10
th
 October 2012.  
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The economic transformation of the developing world during the last few decades of the 
1900s has been widely studied and debated. The state-led, inward-looking approaches 
(commonly known as dirigisme) that dominated developing nations for the best part of the 
last century were sorely tested during the prolonged phase of economic turbulence during the 
1970s and early 1980s
6
. In conditions even worse than those of the Great Depression, 
countries in the global South fell victim to the external economic shocks, and suffered serious 
macroeconomic instability throughout the 1980s and early 1990s. The response was a 
profound shift in development strategy, away from dirigiste modes of planning toward 
emphasis on the market, private ownership, and greater openness to trade and foreign 
investment (commonly referred as neoliberalism or neoliberal economics
7
). While the pace 
of such transformations varied across countries, the broader direction of change was 
unmistakable (Haggard and Kaufman, 1995).  
 
However, as Lavigne (1999) points out, the approach to studying economic transformation in 
the developing world has changed in recent times. Attention has shifted away from broad 
macroeconomic assessments
8
 to micro-economic investigations based upon specific case 
studies. Such trends took off, particularly towards the end of 1980s, when much of the 
socialist bloc in Europe was experiencing pressures to transform and liberalise their 
economies. Mired in debt crises, the bureaucratic-authoritarian governments in these 
countries “…found their quasi-nationalist, quasi-socialist conditions dissolving in 
                                                          
6
 The period saw two oil price increases - quadrupling in 1973-74 and doubling again in 1979-80 - and 
associated instability in the international financial markets; balance of payments imbalances in the developed 
economies; a transition to a floating exchange rate system from an earlier dollar based adjustable peg 
exchange rate regime; high inflation and rising interest rates (see Nelson, 1990; and Cerny, Menz, and 
Soederberg, 2005 for detailed discussions of the 1970s’ economic crisis).   
7
 The blanket policy prescriptions that early proponents of neoliberalism used to provide across developing 
countries included the following: flexible exchange rate arrangements, increased real interest rates, incentives 
to promote export-oriented industrialisation, rationalisation of public sector investment programmes, 
tightened revenue collection, reduction in subsidies, dismantling of trade restrictions, tax reforms, 
privatisation of state enterprises and cuts in public sector employment (Nelson, 1990).   
8
 Such studies were prevalent in the 1980s, conducted by the World Bank/IMF and early exponents of 
neoliberal economics such as Bauer (1981, 1984); Krueger (1992); Lal (1983, 1992), and Little (1982).   
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hyperinflation and crony capitalism…the rapid industrialization taking place in 
many…developing countries, fuelled by globalization, creat[ing] a demand for neoliberal 
policy innovations” (Cerny, Menz et al, 2005:14). The economic stagnation in these countries 
led to massive protests – helping to bring down the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the collapse of 
the Soviet Union in 1991 - transforming old socio-political conditions and creating an 
environment for new coalitions to emerge and undertake a wide variety of neoliberal 
experiments. This process of transformation of former socialist economies, labelled 
transition economics, has emerged as a specific research field within the larger gamut of 
studies on neoliberal transformation. Transition economies, as Roland asserts, are one of the 
most important economic features of the twentieth century, epitomising the “specific contest 
that took place between the socialist and capitalist systems, and for the defeat of the former 
by the latter” (2000:xviii). Examples of economies in transition are many and diverse, with 
32 former centrally-planned economies - accounting for nearly 30% of the world population 
and over 17% of the world’s GDP - involved in the process (Lai, 2006:1). While some 
countries had a history of market reforms even before the onset of (post cold war) transition - 
Hungary (abolishment of mandatory planning in 1968), Yugoslavia (introduction of self 
management in 1965), Poland (substantial increase in enterprise autonomy in early 1980s) 
and even the USSR (with a series of economic reforms under Gorbachev) - others such as the 
German Democratic Republic, Czechoslovakia and Romania did not (ibid.:11). The transition 
process, however, has not been restricted to Europe alone, but was also under way in several 
Asian countries. The most prominent and successful example is, of course, China, with a 
reform process more than three decades old. Vietnam was next, with a policy of doi moi 
(renovation) in 1986, followed by Mongolia, and India in the 1990s.  
 
  
32 
 
Studies in transition economics have also shown another distinct trend in recent times. 
Turning away from pure economic explanations, the focus has been on how political 
institutions and processes impact on economic conditions and policy formulations. In other 
words, it has shifted to studying the political management of economic change via detailed 
examination of individual cases, rather than formulating generalised theoretical discourses 
embedded in macroeconomic analyses. This thesis will follow a similar path, where the 
politics of policy transition in West Bengal will be explored in detail, marking a departure 
from the existing subject literature that focuses primarily on the economic dimensions. 
However, before turning to West Bengal (see Chapter 2), or even to India (see later sections 
in this chapter), it is important that the thesis first addresses itself to more general bodies of 
work on the politics of economic reformism. Accordingly, the aims of this chapter are 
threefold: (1) to provide a brief review of the wider thematic trends in the literature on 
politics of reform; (2) to examine the manifestation of those trends in a few selected cases of 
transition; and (3) to present India as a special case, as the kind of political compulsions that 
emanate from its federal-democratic structures and influence the regional governments are 
rarely witnessed elsewhere.   
 
1.2 The Puzzles of Transition 
 
In spite of being a dominant part of mainstream economic discourse since the 1980s, and 
upheld by the World Bank/IMF-inspired stabilisation, adjustment and restructuring 
programmes for indebted developing nations for much of the 1980s and 1990s, neoliberal 
policy prescriptions increasingly came to be questioned due to a series of unexpected 
outcomes throughout the 1990s. The surprises (Rodrik, 2006:975; emphasis added) include, 
the failure of large parts of sub-Saharan Africa to induce growth despite significant economic 
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reforms in the 1980s, with success stories (Uganda, Tanzania and Mozambique) few and far 
between; continuing financial crises in Eastern Europe, Russia and Turkey; and the short-
lived recovery of the Latin American economies in the 1990s, with even the poster-states for 
neoliberalism - Chile and Argentina  - showing clear signs of downturn by early 2000. On the 
other hand, the 1990s also witnessed a reduction in absolute poverty levels in China and India 
as a result of rapid economic development, but paradoxically, although these two economies 
did embark on liberalisation programmes, most of their policies remained highly 
interventionist.  
With high levels of trade protection, lack of privatization, extensive industrial 
policies, and lax fiscal and financial policies throughout the 1990s, these two 
economies hardly looked like exemplars of the Washington Consensus
9
. Indeed, had 
they been dismal failures instead of the successes they turned out to be, they would 
have arguably presented stronger evidence in support of Washington Consensus 
policies (Rodrik, 2006:975).  
 
The transition economies also presented fresh puzzles. At the onset of transition, many had 
predicted a slight slowdown - a ‘transformational recession’ (Kornai, 1993) in response to 
price liberalisation measures - that would phase out after one or two years, followed by stable 
structural transformation. However, even in the moderately successful central European 
countries (Poland, Hungary, the erstwhile Czech and Slovak Republics) reduction in output 
was drastic, with structural changes continuing for years. In Eastern Europe (Bulgaria, 
Romania, the three Baltic countries as well as the USSR), the outcomes were even worse 
(Lavigne, 1999). Electoral backlash in many transition economies with the communists 
returning to power (such as Lithuania in 1992, Poland in 1993, Hungary and Bulgaria in 
1994) also puzzled many. A similar surprise came in the form of the disintegration of 
Yugoslavia, the Czech and Slovak Republics, and the USSR soon after the transition process 
                                                          
9
 The formal embodiment of neoliberal economic principles - including fiscal disciplinary measures, tax reform, 
financial and trade liberalisation, etc. - originally summarised by John Williamson (1993) in an article on 
economic reforms in Latin America.  
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began (Roland, 2000:xvii). The biggest surprise of all was the success of the Chinese 
economy vis-à-vis the failure of Russia. China had embarked on a reform programme in 
1978, but its strategy was very different from the shock-therapy approach advocated by some 
Bretton Woods’ economists. According to many observers the Chinese economic policies 
continued to exhibit a highly interventionist character. China’s GDP had more than 
quadrupled from 1978 to 1998, growing at an average annual rate of 9.5%. Russia, however, 
was suffering from an economic disaster post-transition, mired in declining output, high 
inflation, falling exchange rates, increasing fiscal deficit, asset diversion, capital flight and an 
increase in organised crime (ibid.).  
These outcomes significantly contradicted the position taken by economists such as Aslund 
(1991), Kornai (1992, 1993) and Sachs (1989, 1990, 1993) that: 
a reform reduces the power of the bureaucracy by definition…therefore, a successful 
reform must break the power of anti-reform bureaucracy…to break the power of the 
party and state bureaucracy might be seen as the key problem of a reform…the 
collapse of communist one-party rule [is] the sine qua non for an effective transition 
to a market economy” (Aslund, 1991:14).  
 
Gorbachev therefore deserves “undying merit” (Kornai, 1992:574) for dismantling the 
communist bureaucracy in Russia, while China’s Deng Xiaoping is a villain for having 
continued with communism (Nolan, 2004:133). Even in the early 1990s, transition orthodoxy 
(or hard-line neoliberalism) continued to maintain that: 
Soviet system reforms had ‘succeeded’ and China’s had ‘failed’, due to the 
destruction of the bureaucracy in the one and the sustaining bureaucrats’ power in the 
other…[and] ridiculed the possibility that a ‘gerontocratic’, ‘hard-line’ communist 
bureaucracy might possess the skills successfully to lead a communist transition…to 
the market (Nolan, 2004:134).  
 
By the second half of the 1990s, the reality had turned out to be just the opposite. Contrary to 
the claim that the “correct ‘sequence’ of system reform in communist countries was seen to 
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be: first, an anti-communist revolution, second economic liberalization” (Nolan, 2004:133) it 
gradually became evident that the “large scale institutional changes involved in transition are 
among the most complex economic and social processes one can imagine” (Roland, 
2000:xviii).  
These events triggered intense debates among neoliberals, structuralists and the political 
scientists: how can apparently similar initial conditions (communist bureaucratic structures) 
lead to divergent outcomes in various transition economies? The questions at the heart of this 
debate are aptly summarised by Lavigne: “Why did the Soviet model collapse so quickly 
following the beginning of the transition process? Why is economic transition to the market 
well under way in Asian socialist countries while communism remains as an ideology and a 
political regime? Can one derive lessons for the transition from the beginnings of socialism?” 
(1999:15-16).  
These questions, expectedly, have evoked diverse opinions over the last two decades, and 
continue to do so today
10
. Responses range from ideational (cultural) explanations (focusing 
on individual nations’ apathy for state-intervention given policy failures of 1960-70s, such as 
Kahler, 1992), and rational-choice arguments (focusing on policy-makers’ choice of drastic 
shock programmes during crises in order to minimize the political costs of structural 
adjustments, such as Przeworski, 1991 and Geddes, 1994b), to cognitive-psychological 
arguments (focusing on the risk-seeking/aversion behaviour of political leaders as well as 
ordinary people in supporting/opposing reform programmes, such as Weyland, 2002). The 
next section provides a brief review of the most dominant responses - which dwell primarily 
                                                          
10
 There has been a tentative rapprochement between the two sides of the argument with an emphasis on 
broad-based eclectic approaches, thematically classified as neo-interventionism (Nonneman, 1996; Chowdhury 
and Islam, 1993; Mosley, Harrington et al, 1991; Woodward, 1992; Wade, 1992). Another similar category  of 
literature has also surfaced under the label market socialism (Bardhan and Roemer, 1993). 
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on the technicalities of reform implementation and institutional effectiveness - before 
proceeding to the central argument of this thesis, the politics of transition.  
 
1.3 The Technical-Institutional Perspectives 
The initial debates surrounding the economic crisis of the 1980s and 1990s arose from the 
technical complexities of economic adjustment. The early advocates of adjustment 
programmes had envisioned two distinct yet intertwined tasks to be undertaken by individual 
nations - stabilisation and structural change. The former involved immediate measures to 
reduce balance of payments deficits and inflation to levels compatible with resumed and 
sustainable growth, aiming for relatively quick results within a year or two. The latter was 
designed to encourage foreign exchange earning/saving activities and, more generally, to 
improve incentives and efficiency for sustainable growth. Structural changes required longer 
time horizons than stabilisation efforts, with typical programmes designed over three to five 
years, often longer (Nelson, 1990). Both measures, over time, provoked intense controversy. 
Deep differences emerged among economists about the: 
 
conditions under which demand restraint should be the major thrust of stabilization 
efforts, the time frame within which deficits should be contained, the costs and 
benefits for longer-term growth prospects of austerity programs sustained over many 
years...The bitterest debates on structural change  [were] on the pace and sequencing 
of measures to open economies to international markets, the appropriate roles and 
limits of states and markers in promoting growth and other national objectives, and 
the allocation of transactional costs (ibid.:4). 
 
Thematically, these early debates over the speed and sequencing of economic reforms took 
two distinct forms. In what came to be known as a big bang or shock therapy approach, hard-
line neoliberal economists argued that the optimal reform path should involve a radical 
overhaul of the planned economy with all its institutions, the initiation of immediate and 
complete liberalisation, privatisation, deregulation, as well as closure of all inefficient state- 
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owned enterprises (SOEs). Various Eastern European countries adopted variants of this 
approach, namely Russia, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Slovakia, Romania, Ukraine and Bulgaria. 
The opposing viewpoint was that of a gradualist or incremental approach, and scholars 
advocating the latter pointed to the uncertainties in the reform process, and emphasised the 
necessity of procuring enough political and institutional support for the reforms. They 
maintained that a gradual or incremental approach was preferable, which would allow time 
for new institutions to take shape. The Chinese economic success, the gradualists argued, was 
due to a large extent to their patient efforts to gradually phase out old components of the 
command economy, actively promote market players, and incrementally build governmental, 
legal and economic institutions that supported the market economy (Lai, 2006). 
 
The hardliners and the gradualists differed on four key economic attributes: uncertainty, 
complementarities of reforms, focus of reforms, and the reform of state firms (Roland, 2000). 
Advocates of the former effectively ruled out the possibility of any uncertainty in reform 
outcomes, with a(n) (often misplaced) confidence in their knowledge of market behaviour 
and ability to engineer a market economy. Proponents of the incremental approach, on the 
other hand, believed that reform initiation is akin to treading in complex and uncertain areas, 
and knowledge accumulation can only happen by conducting the reforms themselves 
(Murrell, 1991; Stiglitz, 1999). Secondly, hard-line neoliberals argued that reform measures 
are complementary and interlocked, i.e. a single reform cannot succeed until the entire set of 
corresponding reforms have been implemented, and reform processes must therefore be 
comprehensive (Ickes, 1990; Lipton and Sachs, 1990). Incrementalists argued that a few 
transitional measures and institutions can lead to more efficient allocation of resources. The 
focus should therefore be on an initial introduction of a few appropriate reforms in a handful 
of targeted sectors, instead of unleashing the complete range of reforms across the entire 
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economy in one go (Chen, Jefferson and Singh, 1992; Pomfret, 1997). In the same vein, 
shock therapists also maintained that if trade liberalisation, financial stabilisation, and SOE 
privatisation were all undertaken at once, markets would spontaneously develop (Lipton and 
Sachs, 1990; Wolf, 1991). The gradualists on the other hand suggested that only three aspects 
of transition should be emphasised: (1) an improved incentive structure for entrepreneurs and 
officials; (2) liberalised entry and competition in the markets to foster new private enterprises 
and increase SOE competitiveness; and (3) developing institutions necessary to facilitate a 
market economy (Gelb, Jefferson and Singh, 1993; McMillan and Naughton, 1993; Qian, 
2003). Finally, the hardliners advocated that inefficient SOEs should be closed down 
immediately in order to avoid resource misuse and debt aggravation. The incrementalists 
however, argued in favour of restructuring the SOEs to improve their performance in the 
short-term, while promoting the private sector so that the absolute dominance of SOEs could 
be reduced in the future (McMillan and Naughton, 1993; Naughton, 1996; Stiglitz, 1999).  
 
Apart from the scope of reforms, the two schools also differed considerably on four political 
aspects: irreversibility of reforms, degree of reforms, democratisation, and role of the state 
(Roland, 2000). The shock therapists advocated a comprehensive reform package in order to 
pre-empt possible delays from popular opposition and conservative coalitions, thus ensuring 
irreversibility in reform implementation (Fischer and Gelb, 1991). Incrementalists, on the 
other hand, argued for adopting a specific sequence in reform implementation, so that 
continuous support from all quarters could be ensured (Dewatripont and Roland, 1992). 
Secondly, the former group rejected the idea of partial reform implementation, arguing that 
this would encourage rent seeking, corruption, crony capitalism and possibly even cause 
decay in state institutions in the long run (Aslund and Dimitriev, 1990; Murphy, Shleifer, and 
Vishny, 1992; Shleifer and Vishny, 1998). On the contrary, incrementalists argued that 
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“through permitting growth of market players, progressive rectification of inefficiencies, and 
right sequencing of reforms or right institutional arrangements partial reform can sustain 
popular support and its own momentum and can progress over time” (Lai, 2006:4). Thirdly, 
big bang scholars maintained that reform programmes could be sustained naturally if political 
and economic reforms went together, as empowering large sections of population through 
increasing democratisation would ensure large-scale social support. The evolutionary school 
however, suggested that such approaches entailed great risks and that piecemeal changes 
could generate enough political support for liberalisation from their various beneficiaries (a 
rising middle class, private entrepreneurs, local governments, and even bureaucrats) (Roland, 
2000; Lai, 2006). Finally, the two schools diverged on the role of the state in executing 
reforms. Fearing that a strong state would disrupt markets with its interventionist and 
conservative policies, and, at best, only support partial reforms, the shock therapists proposed 
minimising the power of the state and its bureaucracy (Lipton and Sachs, 1990). The 
incrementalists admitted that the state needed to stay relatively autonomous, but also argued 
that it had a crucial role to play in guiding markets through adequate law enforcement and 
securing property rights (Murrell, 1991; Stiglitz, 1999).   
 
On the whole, as Lai (2006) suggests, the incrementalist perspective seems to fit better into 
the real experience of transition economies in terms of the significance of institutions, the 
lengthy process of institutional evolution, and the disruptive effects of a comprehensive 
economic shock therapy. However, both approaches concentrated primarily on the economic 
philosophy and measures in reforms, while sometimes ignoring the subtle political strategies 
that underpin the adjustment trajectories of individual economies. In the Chinese case, for 
example, the reformists had to overcome stern opposition from influential conservative 
leaders, and Deng Xiaoping installed young power-holders to back his economic reforms. 
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China’s reformists also made careful fiscal arrangements for initial liberal experiments in 
selected provinces in order to demonstrate to other provinces the appeals of reform. Such 
practical examples from the Chinese economy as well as a number of other developing 
nations establish that - as Lai argues - the technical debates about the scope, timing and 
phasing of reforms barely highlight the “political, fiscal and local arrangements [that] enable 
reforms to take off” (ibid.:2-3) in individual economies.  
 
These criticisms, along with the puzzles thrown up by the transition economies, eventually 
led to a fundamental shift in the focus of reform programmes. Moving away from the 
technical explanations, the emphasis came to rest on institutions. One of the decisive 
arguments that highlighted the inadequacy of the technical approaches was that of William 
Easterly. Introducing free markets from top down, Easterly points out: 
 
…overlooks the long sequence of choices, institutions, and innovations that have 
allowed free markets to develop in the rich Western economies…markets everywhere 
emerge in an unplanned, spontaneous way, adapting to local traditions and 
circumstances, and not through reforms designed by outsiders (2006:53-54). 
 
The idea of the West designing a comprehensive reform package for poor nations is, as 
Easterly argues, fundamentally flawed. Free market opportunities in any given society 
depend on a series of bottom-up social choices of adequate norms and institutions that 
Western planners usually do not understand or appreciate.  
Trying to change the rules all at once with the rapid introduction of free markets [will] 
disrupt the old ties…while the new formal institutions…still too weak to make free 
markets work well. Gradual movement to freer markets would [give] the participants 
more time to adjust their relationships and trades (ibid.:89).  
 
Easterly attributes this assertion - that the West cannot successfully design a policy 
programme for the poor countries - to Western policy advisors’ lack of knowledge of and 
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inability to appreciate the importance of various institutions underpinning a successful 
capitalist economy
11
. Coming from advanced capitalist states, where these institutions are 
already in place, the policy-makers take them for granted and therefore they are not factored 
in to the resource spend - while in reality institutional conditions are much worse in 
developing nations. As Roland (2000: xix) argues: “if anything, the experience of transition 
shows that policies of liberalization, stabilization and privatization that are not grounded in 
adequate institutions may not deliver successful outcomes”. Such a shift in analytical 
emphasis - from the traditional economics of market and price theory to the interplay and 
complementarities between the various constitutive institutions of capitalism as well as the 
dynamics of large scale institutional change - has reinforced what Roland calls the 
evolutionary institutional perspective (ibid.). 
Even committed neoliberals such as Krueger have admitted that economic adjustment 
programmes have failed to create the necessary institutional changes to facilitate market 
economies (2004). Rodrik points out that such admissions though implicit, in themselves are 
a repudiation of the original version of the Washington Consensus, as it did not feature 
institutional reforms of the kind even Bretton Woods’ economists came to emphasise later on. 
Complementarities across reform areas and their background institutional conditions were 
also widely recognised: 
 
...trade liberalization would not work if fiscal institutions were not in place to make 
up for lost trade revenue, capital market did not allocate finance to expanding sectors, 
customs officials were not competent and honest enough, labor-market institutions did 
not work properly to reduce transitional unemployment, and so on (Rodrik, 2000: 
978).  
 
                                                          
11
 For example, some of the crucial local institutions that can determine the outcome of reforms include 
incentive structures for markets, private property rights, legal arrangements, etc. - all of which vary from 
country to country.   
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A significant body of empirical literature also emerged by c.end 1990-early 2000, 
emphasising the importance of adequate institutions to underpin long term economic growth. 
For example, secure property rights were re-established as a prime determinant of national 
wealth and prosperity in a pioneering work by Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001). In 
another study, Easterly and Levine (2003) argued that the quality of domestic institutions can 
influence any independent effect that policy reforms might have on economic growth. In 
addition, the Washington Consensus itself was augmented with a long list of second-
generation institutional reforms, including corporate governance initiatives, anti-corruption 
measures, flexible labour markets, targeted poverty reduction, etc
12
.   
 
The institutional perspective, however, also carries with it a potential risk of degenerating 
into a perpetual cycle of improving institutions with little or no effect on growth, particularly 
on the following grounds. Firstly, institutions are deeply ingrained in respective social forms 
and therefore not prone to frequent changes. Institutional structures, especially in poor 
countries, sometimes change significantly only in the aftermath of political upheaval (war, 
revolution, etc), and therefore are not a realistic agenda to promote economic growth. A 
comprehensive institutional reform agenda is therefore hardly effective policy advice, akin to 
telling developing nations that the “only way to develop is to become developed!” (Rodrik, 
2000: 980). Secondly, it is also an open-ended agenda, as the supporting literature remains 
unable to establish any correlation between particular forms of institutional design and 
economic growth. In Easterly and Levine’s (2003) study, for example, introducing 
institutional indicators in growth regressions nullifies the effects of reforms on economic 
                                                          
12 See Rodrik (2000) for detailed discussion. 
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performance, but shows little evidence that large scale institutional change itself plays any 
role in inducing growth. 
 
Rodrik thus warns policymakers of ‘institutional fundamentalism’: continually pressing for 
institutional reforms with no idea of what the right levers are. They instead may be 
 
...better served by targeting the most binding constraints on economic growth- where 
the bang for the reform buck is greatest- than by investing scarce political and 
administrative capital on ambitious institutional reforms…institutional reforms will be 
needed eventually to sustain economic growth. But it may be easier and more 
effective to do that when the economy is already growing and its costs can be spread 
over time (2000: 980).  
 
The technical-institutional perspectives highlight the plethora of complex economic-
institutional and development planning centric issues that are posed by economic adjustment 
processes. However, these debates only provide lip-service to the more intractable political 
challenges that also lie at the core of adjustment programmes. As Nelson wrote: 
 
Strikes and demonstrations in response to increased food prices and falling real wages 
are only the most visible repercussions. Less open but equally bitter and more 
tenacious struggles rage inside governments and between governments and interest 
groups over issues such as liberalizing trade, reallocating government expenditures, or 
reducing governmental regulation and subsidization of private economy activity. Not 
only vested economic and political interests, but also fundamental ideological 
convictions are engaged. All these domestic pressures interact with an array of 
international demands, advice, and bargaining (1990:xi).  
 
Unfortunately, while the crisis of the 1980s generated a flood of economic analyses both 
North and South, ranging from broad theory to highly specific and operational issues, the 
political dimensions received much less attention (ibid.).  
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1.4 The Politics of Economic Transition 
Evidently, appropriate adjustment strategies in the face of economic crisis are subjects of 
both debate and uncertainty. However, even without resorting to any form of orthodoxy, there 
is a variety of possible adjustment paths and a number of ways - such as those advocated by 
the neo-interventionist and the market socialist schools - in which the state can continue to 
intervene fruitfully to correct market failures and promote equity. Also, it is generally agreed 
that stable macroeconomic policy and trade/price reforms are important determinants for 
long-term growth (Fischer, 1993; Levine and Renelt, 1992). The distributive effects of 
initiating and sustaining these policy changes constitute the heart of the politics of economic 
adjustment. As Haggard and Kaufman (1995) point out, all regimes in mixed economies rest 
on some explicit or implicit bargain between political leaders and key support groups. 
Economic conditions will determine how stable and robust that bargain is. Good times 
generate support. Economic crisis, by contrast, creates incentives for the private sector to 
defect from that bargain, increases the likelihood of political protests from below, and reduces 
the capacity of ruling elites to manage the resulting distributive conflicts. 
 
Surprisingly, the politics of reform has been a relatively under-researched topic. Initially, the 
Bretton Woods’ development discourse left politics entirely out of its analytical realm. In one 
of the first analyses of its kind, Ferguson (1994) showed how during the early years of 
adjustment programmes, World Bank planners assumed a country’s society and economy to 
be under complete control of a neutral, unitary and effective government, and therefore 
ideally suited for the reform blueprints. ‘Development’, Ferguson wrote, was seen as an 
outcome of impartial state action in providing social services and engineering growth; and 
‘underdevelopment’ was a result of government neglect. Economic growth, by definition, 
thus became a direct function of how well a government was able to implement its 
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development plan. Such interpretations suffered from the problem of depoliticisation - or 
taking politics out of development. The Bank’s development discourse excluded  
 
the political character of the state and its class basis, the uses of official positions and 
state power by the bureaucratic elite and other individuals, cliques and factions, and 
the advantages to them of bureaucratic ‘inefficiency’ and corruption. The state 
represents ‘the people’, and mention of the undemocratic nature of the ruling 
government or of political opposition is studiously avoided. The state…[has] no 
interests except ‘development’ (ibid.: 177).  
 
On the contrary, experiences from transition economies have shown political constraints to 
play a crucial role. For example, Russia saw a continuous political stalemate over key reform 
issues from 1992-2000; in Poland, the parliament objected to the mass privatisation plan for 
three years; and geographical concentration of political opposition to privatisation and 
economic restructuring played a crucial role in the eventual disintegration of Czechoslovakia. 
The varying impact of political constraints in opposing restructuring/deregulation processes is 
evident across all transition economies – from attitudes promoting rent-seeking (Krueger, 
1974), corruption-dominating regulation (Peltzman, 1976), protectionist tariff policies 
(Nelson, 1989), to failed plans to “drastically cut subsidies to state-owned enterprises…Fiscal 
subsidy cuts to firms, required by the IMF, were often transformed in hidden subsidies taking 
the form of bank credit and inter-enterprise arrears…heavy worker resistance to closing 
inefficient state enterprises…and many other examples” (Roland, 2000.: 26).     
 
It is, however, important to recognise that there is no general theory of the politics of 
economic adjustment. Several bodies of research over the years have highlighted different 
facets of the topic, but fall well short of an overarching conceptual scheme (Nelson, 
1990:17). Individual case studies thus have become an important way to study, firstly, the 
adjustment experience, particularly the way it unfolds in decision-making circles, the 
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interaction between government and external stakeholders, and the broader arena of domestic 
politics; and secondly, how the structure of political institutions, patterns of leadership, 
support bases, political coalitions, and role of external agencies are shaped in the process 
(ibid.). The two crucial political variables that act as key determinants in this process are 
interest groups and coalition structures, and political institutions.    
 
1.4.1 Interest Groups and Coalition Structures    
 
Conflict between different interest groups usually results from three factors - how the costs of 
reforms have been assigned to individual groups (Alesina and Drazen, 1991); individual 
groups’ preferences contingent on the likelihood of policy change (Roubini, 1991); and the 
strength of opposing social forces (Nelson, 1990). These lead to the three most common 
forms of political impediments to reform - (1) collective action problems; (2) distributive 
conflicts; and (3) the discounts that decision-makers attach to the payoffs from successful 
reform (Haggard and Kaufman, 1995:156).  
 
1. Collective action problems: these emerge when economic reforms are seen to possess 
properties of public goods. Depending on whether a particular interest group is the 
recipient of the benefits or costbearer of the reforms, their actions would vary 
accordingly. Haggard and Kaufman illustrate this by referring to inflation control and 
trade liberalisation. In most high inflation settings, a majority would gain from greater 
price stability. However, the cooperative behaviour needed for stabilisation might be 
unobtainable because of the incentives for individuals and groups to defend their 
incomes. In the case of stabilising very high levels of inflation, the risks of accepting 
de-indexation can be substantial if other sectors are not making similar and 
simultaneous sacrifices. In the case of trade liberalisation, a large array of potential 
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beneficiaries may lack incentives to organise and lobby, either because they are 
weakly organised or because they could not be excluded from the gains brought about 
by a general reduction in trade barriers. Collective action problems therefore arise 
from uncertainty about future payoffs that potential beneficiaries may face during 
reform initiation, and hence the lack of incentives to join forces. Supporters of earlier 
policies, however, are afraid of the adjustment process and immediately organise in 
resistance.  
 
Usually it is during the reform initiation phase that collective action problems emerge. 
Several studies including Haggard and Kaufman (1995), Waterbury (1992), and 
Williamson and Haggard (1993) argue that a centralised executive authority is 
necessary to overcome this problem. A successful initiation of reforms would depend 
on “rulers who have personal control over economic decision- making, the security to 
recruit, and back a cohesive ‘reform team’, and the political authority to override 
bureaucratic and political opposition to policy change” (Haggard and Kaufman 
1995:9). 
  
2. Distributive conflict: in a collective action model, all parties would prefer a 
cooperative outcome but are blocked from it by incentives to defect. In a distributive 
model, however, the reforms are supported by potential winners and opposed by 
potential losers, the outcome depending on the balance of political power between the 
respective coalitions. For example, in the case of trade reforms and devaluations, 
though both might increase aggregate social wealth and incomes of certain groups, 
they are likely to encounter opposition from import-competing interests and the non-
traded goods sector respectively.  
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In such circumstances, losers may prevail over winners more often than not, even 
though the reforms are optimal for society as a whole. One classic problem with 
reforms is that the cost tends to be concentrated, while benefits are diffuse, producing 
perverse organisational incentives. It is therefore natural for losers to be well 
organised, while prospective winners face daunting collective action problems, and 
therefore lack the necessary organisational coherence. In principle, a reform that 
generates a net social gain should be politically viable if a portion of the gains are 
used to compensate the groups experiencing losses, yet such compensatory 
mechanisms rarely exist, and are fraught with controversies where they do. There may 
be additional difficulties - as Fernàndez and Rodrik (1991) point out - regarding the 
uncertainties surrounding the reform outcomes. Not only are prospective winners 
likely to be poorly organised, they may not even know who they are.    
 
3. Short term incentives for decision-makers: both the collective action and distributive 
conflict approaches to policy reform assume that policy is ultimately the result of 
conflicts among contending social groups. A third set of problems arises when the 
incentives faced by the government decision-makers themselves are examined. While 
theoretically politicians should be willing to undertake reforms that provide net social 
gains, institutional and political impediments may lead him/her to discount future 
gains, perhaps because of impending elections or the fear of demonstrations or riots. 
Given the institutional and political constraints that characterise most economies, it 
may be natural that the time horizons over which the politicians assess the political 
cost and benefits of reform are too short for the reform to constitute a viable policy 
equilibrium.    
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Taken together, these three problems suggest that the political and institutional prerequisites 
of successful reform can be daunting, particularly in situations where economic difficulties 
are severe. As Bianco and Bates (1990) argue, solving collective action problems requires 
either leadership or institutional mechanisms that coordinate the actions of different parties 
and provide credible assurances. Haggard and Kaufman point out further, that: 
 
Managing distributive conflicts requires either the resources to effectively compensate 
losers...or the political capacity to override their objections. Finally, some degree of 
security of tenure would appear to be a minimal requirement of successful reform, 
since a high degree of insecurity shortens time horizons and increases the discount 
assigned to future payoffs (1995:158).  
 
One of the key tasks for politicians to facilitate reform implementation - particularly during 
the phase of reform consolidation - is therefore to form coalitions. To reduce the uncertainty 
of reform outcomes triggered by collective action and distributive problems, the way 
government intentions are perceived by reform beneficiaries would need to be stabilised. This 
can be done by imposing checks on the discretionary authorities of government leaders and 
delegation of responsibility to professional policy-making agencies, but more importantly, as 
Haggard and Kauffman argue, reforms must also appeal to a “new coalition of beneficiaries. 
No reform can be consolidated in the absence of the organization of such groups and the 
establishment of effective networks of support and communication between them and state 
authorities” (1995:10). Of the representative mechanisms that might achieve these goals, 
political parties are the most crucial of all, especially in democracies, where they can provide 
institutional legitimacy to the support bases that are required to consolidate the policies.        
 
Theorising coalition politics in a diverse society is a daunting task, with state, market and 
civil society all reflecting variegated and shifting coalitions of parties, interests groups and 
even regions (Brett, 2008). Formal coalitions, political as well as institutional, are rarely the 
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full story, as coalitions can form at much deeper cultural and social structural planes, with 
industrial and agrarian capitalists, professional middle classes and working classes all 
differentially constructed, regionally/nationally as well as at the levels of supranational, 
regional and global integration (Singh and Mishra 2004: 21). Vivek Chibber’s comparative 
study of India and Korea demonstrates the cruciality of the support of business class. State-
building exercises by several Indian governments were largely stunted due to a “highly 
organized and concerted offensive launched by the business class against the idea of 
disciplinary planning…because in the import-substituting model that India was undertaking, 
it was rational for capital to do so” (2003:29-32). However, these were successful in Korea, 
because the political elites there were able to build a successful coalition with a leading 
segment of the business class. For labour-based governments, a convergence into 
neoliberalism has important consequences for its coalition building efforts - especially with 
the labour unions. Victoria Murillo (2001), in her theory of union-government interaction, 
highlights how the complex dynamics of a transition from closed to open economy has 
important distributive consequences for union-government interaction, with union reaction 
ranging from “active resistance to passive quiescence. Some unions endorsed policies that 
hurt their constituencies and organizations. Others rejected market-oriented reforms despite 
their alliance with governing parties” (2001:2). On the other hand, an authoritarian regime’s 
interest in allowing liberalisation may stem from a conscious decision by the regime itself or 
its elites for several political motives. As Nonneman (1996) points out, if liberalisation 
measures ‘from above’ in such regimes can be combined with civil society pressures, it may 
lead to far-reaching liberalisation of democratisation. However, as authoritarian regimes 
generally intend to maintain the essential controls themselves, one specific reason for 
introducing reform measures may be to push through the regime’s chosen measures against 
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the opposition of anti-reform factions, thus aiming for a legitimisation of the regime in times 
of economic crisis
13
. 
 
The above discussion highlights that the capacity to manage the political pressures associated 
with the initiation and consolidation of economic reforms is not simply a function of 
economic circumstances, but is also dependent on the way political institutions aggregate the 
preferences of contending social groups and empowered executives. The functioning of 
political institutions therefore requires a closer look. 
 
1.4.2 Political Institutions 
 
Lai (2006) provides a comprehensive summary of the various political institutions that play a 
key role in initiating and consolidating economic reforms. These include autonomous or 
executive political leadership (Haggard and Kauffman, 1995), technocratic competence 
(Nelson, 1990), legislative delegation, insulated agencies, decision-making rules (Snyder, 
1999), election cycles (Nelson, 1990), and accountability of state institutions (Manzetti, 
2003). However, in a paradigmatic piece of academic literature, Haggard and Webb (1994) 
focus on political party systems as the key institutional arrangement in ensuring reform 
sustainability. Political parties serve two important functions. Firstly, parties can impose 
checks on discretionary authorities of government leaders, thereby reducing uncertainty in 
reform outcomes, and secondly, they can also facilitate coalition formation, by establishing 
effective networks of support and communication between various interest groups and state 
authorities (ibid.).  
                                                          
13
 This was a crucial motivation behind political liberalisation in Algeria, as well as, to varying degrees, in Egypt, 
Jordan, and Tunisia (Nonneman, 1996). 
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Managing party behaviour in transition economies in particular has increasingly come to be 
seen as a highly complex and challenging task: 
 
[the] decline of mass production and expansion of the tertiary and informal sectors 
weakened industrial labor organizations, limiting their capacity to deliver the votes, 
resources, and social peace that had been the foundation of the traditional party-union 
‘exchange’. These changes created an incentive for labor-based parties to rethink their 
programs, redefine their relationship with unions, and target new electoral 
constituencies (Levitsky, 2003:1).  
 
 
However, such adaptive strategies ensuring a successful reform programme “generally run 
counter to the parties’ traditional programs and perceived interests of many other 
constituencies, party leaders often prove unwilling or unable to carry out such strategies. Yet 
if they do not adapt, labor-based parties face the prospect of electoral decline and 
marginalization” (ibid.). Therefore, individual political party responses to these challenges go 
a long way in explaining the diverse outcomes in different transition economies. For 
example, the Argentine (Peronist) Justicialist Party (PJ) was able to adapt quickly and 
successfully, and thus led to the positive trajectory of the Argentinian economy during the 
1990s. On the other hand, parties like the Aprista Party in Peru and Democratic Action in 
Venezuela were largely unsuccessful (Burgess and Levitsky, 2003).  
 
Given such variation in political parties’ ability to respond to economic pressures, it is 
important to understand the factors behind such divergence. Burgess and Levitsky (ibid.) 
provide a useful framework for the purpose.  
 
Party leaders are placed at the intersection of two crucial dynamics which shape the 
incentives to formulate adaptive strategies - external environment and intra-party structure. 
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The first level of analysis is the environment in which parties operate, two important aspects 
of which are crucial in explaining adaptive strategies: electoral and economic environment. 
 
Electoral environment: party strategies are heavily determined by the structure of the 
electorate and party systems, as electoral defeat leads to a loss of resources and 
support bases for party leaders (Downs, 1957; Panebianco, 1988). Thus the incentive 
to adapt is directly proportional to the magnitude of the electoral threat to parties’ 
support bases. For contemporary populist parties, electoral threat mainly takes two 
forms. Firstly, electoral ghettoization - where parties face the risk of being confined 
to a declining support base of working and lower classes, with centrist/centre-right 
oppositions having eroded support from the middle class electoral base. Adaptive 
strategies under such circumstances include distancing from organized labour groups, 
softening class-based appeals and attempting to regain the middle-class electorate 
with media-friendly and issue based campaigning. Secondly, a challenge in their own 
electoral flanks by other populist parties or more radical left wing opposition, in 
which case the main adaptive strategies would constitute a significant leftward move 
in terms of policy orientation. The location of the electoral threat thus plays a 
significant element in shaping party adaptation.  
 
Economic environment: macroeconomic conditions are the second important 
determinant of party adaptive strategies. A crisis-ridden economy would have both 
“reduced the resources available for carrying out traditional pro-labor policies and 
raised the potential costs (in terms of domestic inflation and access to international 
finance) associated with these policies” (Burgess and Levitsky, 2003: 886) thus 
pushing populist parties towards an adoption of market-oriented policies. In cases of 
extreme crisis, such a move becomes absolutely essential, as “the electoral cost of 
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failing to resolve the crisis is often greater than the cost of ‘betraying’ traditional 
populist programs” (ibid.: 887). In cases of moderate/short-term crisis however, the 
pro-market incentives are considerable weaker, and policy makers have a choice of 
manoeuvre vis-à-vis opting for international aid.   
 
While the environmental factors highlight the why, or potential incentives to adopt a certain 
policy direction, they do not explain how parties actually respond to these incentives and their 
adaptive capacities. This is achieved in the second level of analysis, the intra-party structure. 
Two factors of the party organisation are of crucial importance, leadership fluidity and 
leadership autonomy. 
 
Leadership fluidity: leadership turnover in parties is usually an important source of 
changes in party strategy (Harmel and Janda, 1994; Panebianco, 1988). However, the 
possibility of leadership renovation depends considerably on whether a party is 
characterised by bureaucratised hierarchies (which inhibit reformist trends and prefer 
to retain old guard leaderships) or more open with loose structures
14
 (which facilitate 
fresh blood infusion). 
 
Leadership autonomy: the second crucial organizational factor is the strategic 
autonomy of party leaders, particularly the chief executive, for decision-making 
purposes. Situations demanding quick and decisive actions require flexibility in party 
norms allowing the leaders room for manoeuvre, without extensive consultation with 
lower level authorities/affiliated unions. “Such flexibility depends on the degree to 
which office holding leaders are subject to institutional mechanisms that make them 
answerable to party authorities and/or trade union leaders, as well as whether these 
                                                          
14
 Levitsky (2003) provides a detailed explanation of how institutionalization of party structure is inversely 
proportion to leadership fluidity. 
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intraparty actors have independent sources of power vis-à-vis office holding leaders 
(e.g., regarding legislative votes or candidate nomination procedures)” (Burgess and 
Levitsky, 2003: 887). 
  
Frameworks such as these are crucial in understanding party behaviour under diverse 
economic conditions. However, in comparison to large macroeconomic analysis and the 
technical-institutional perspectives literature, the politics of transition literature is relatively 
restricted in scope and does not constitute a cogent theory-building exercise. Moreover, the 
literature focuses mostly on political liberalisation or democratic transition instead of the 
politics of economic transition. While it does offer a range of rich arguments on the political 
character of reform initiation and consolidation, and brings the role of the party system to the 
forefront, it also suffers from a number of serious shortcomings (Lai, 2006). First, with a few 
exceptions (such as Waterbury, 1989), little attention is paid to the political strategies adopted 
by the reformers. Instead, the literature focuses on why reforms proceed differently and what 
structural and predetermined factors and economic strategies led to contrasting processes and 
outcomes. With such extensive focus on ex-ante and ex-post political conditions
15
, 
inadequate attention is given to how reformers launch and sustain reforms, i.e., how political 
leaders in different countries actually outmanoeuvre opposition, manage setbacks, ensure and 
sustain large-scale support from grass root levels, etc. There is a large amount of material that 
has yet to be explored regarding the political finesse of individual economies such as China, 
Russia and India. 
   
                                                          
15
 Ex-ante conditions- feasibility constraints that block decision making; 
    Ex-post conditions- constraints of backlash and reversal after decisions have been made and outcomes 
observed (Roland, 2000).   
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Second, while the literature illustrates the role of social and political preconditions for 
economic transitions (e.g., Przeworski, 1991; Bates and Krueger, 1993) and highlights 
collective action problems and distributive conflicts (e.g., Nelson, 1990; Haggard and 
Kaufman, 1995), it largely fails to demonstrate how policy makers’ choices can turn these 
preconditions or current social and political conditions into advantages. For example, the 
existence of a large rural population may be a favourable pre-condition for economic growth, 
but does not guarantee it. It is only through sensible and effective policies - often calibrated 
against political returns - that an economy can tap into, and exploit, the favourable conditions 
(Lai, 2006).      
 
Third, the existing literature also does not demonstrate how reform strategies “help the rise 
and consolidation of market-enhancing institutions including an efficient government, as well 
as market-enhancing norms and laws to emerge and consolidate…[which] could in turn 
produce an incentive structure that rewards creative and productive economic activities on 
behalf of officials, localities and enterprises” (ibid.:10-11). While there is an extensive focus 
on decentralisation, Lai goes on to argue that the existing analyses are too general to be either 
persuasive or empirically illuminating. For example, the oft-repeated argument that China’s 
decentralisation has stimulated provincial reform efforts (especially by giving all provinces 
fiscal discretion and claims to residual surplus) is too simplistic. In practice, contrary to the 
general perception that the centre gave the same amount of fiscal discretion to all provinces, 
the arrangements were significantly varied and complex.  
 
However, taken together, these gaps in the existing literature reinforce the larger argument 
regarding the centrality of politics in economic reform studies. As Fisher and Gelb observed 
as early as 1991: 
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economic theory offers relatively little guidance on some important questions…[such 
as] the extent to which the state should play an active role…The most important 
strategic choices arise, however, out of the interplay between economics and 
politics…technocratic solutions for optimal transitions cannot be designed without 
taking account of the political constraints” (1991:103).  
 
 
A similar view is echoed by Gelb, Jefferson, and Singh (1993:127): “perhaps the most 
important lesson...is that political economy, rather than simply economic theories, lies at the 
heart of socialist transition”. Stiglitz observes in even blunter terms: 
 
 
textbook economics may be fine for teaching...but not for advising governments 
trying to establish a new market economy...while due obeisance was paid to ‘political 
process’- and insights into the political process were often put forward in justification 
of particular courses for reform- in fact, little understanding of these political 
processes were evidenced...Policy advisers put forth policy prescriptions in the 
context of a particular society- a society with a particular history, with a certain level 
of social capital, with a particular set of political institutions, and with political 
processes affected by (if not determined by) the existence of particular political 
forces. Interventions do not occur in a vacuum (1999:3-4).  
 
 
It is therefore crucial for a study on economic transition to pay adequate attention to political 
processes, constraints, leaders’ choices in circumventing those constraints, stimulating reform 
efforts, and maintaining reform momentum (Lai, 2006).          
  
1.5 The Political Economy of Liberalisation: evidence from the BRIC 
nations 
It is important to contextualise the above arguments by briefly examining the varied political 
backdrops in a number of economies on the path of reform, before proceeding to a detailed 
review of the same in India. The countries chosen are the remaining BRIC nations (i.e. 
Brazil, Russia and China), as together they present the largest, significantly varied, and the 
most widely discussed reform experiences in the world over the past few decades. However, 
an exhaustive and up-to-date analysis of policy transitions in these countries is naturally not 
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the objective of this work, and the following discussion will remain confined to the political 
trajectories during the early years of reform initiation and consolidation. The key argument of 
this chapter, i.e. the centrality of politics in reform processes, is well supported even by the 
initial course of events in each of these nations.     
1.5.1 The First Decade of Reform in the Brazilian Economy 
Of the major Latin American economies, Brazil was the last to embrace market reforms. 
From the 1940s-1980s, the country had followed a state-led ISI oriented development model 
with very high growth rates and so there was neither a tradition nor any political will to 
support a market-driven economic model
16
. The first (partial) triumph for market reforms 
came in the 1989 presidential election. Brazil was teetering on the brink of cyclic 
hyperinflation (Baer, 2008), and Fernando Collor de Mello, reputedly inspired by 
Thatcherism, won on a liberal economic platform that denounced the traditional, bankrupt, 
and corrupt dirigiste development model. It seemed that the Brazilian electorate was finally 
willing to experiment with neoliberal reform measures (Roett, 2003).  
On assuming power, Collor immediately announced a dramatic anti-inflation programme, 
liberalised the exchange rate regime, encouraged external competition, introduced 
privatisation and trade liberalisation measures, and other stabilisation measures. Even more 
controversially, eighty percent of all deposits in the overnight market and savings accounts 
that exceeded $1300 (or equivalent) were frozen for eighteen months. Though inflation was 
significantly reduced, the concomitant sharp decline in liquidity led to a pronounced fall in 
economic activities, industrial production fell by 15.4%, and the GDP went into a negative 
growth rate (Bauer, 2008). However, while ineffective in stabilising the economy, Collor’s 
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 See Baer (2008) for a detailed discussion of the Brazilian economy.  
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programme is still noteworthy as the first post-1945 orthodox stabilisation measures in 
Brazil.  
Naturally, such outcomes could not generate the necessary support for the second phase of 
reform measures. The public, at best, were sceptical, and the traditional political elite who 
were among the prime beneficiaries of the erstwhile ISI model, remained outright hostile. 
Collor was impeached and forced to resign by 1992, and vice president Itamar Franco, took 
over as first interim and then full-time president. He also proved ineffectual in providing 
political and economic leadership and it was not until the appointment of Fernando Henrique 
Cardoso as Finance Minister in May 1993 that the largely stalled reform programme once 
again gained some momentum. Cardoso’s structural adjustment programme, revealed in June 
1993, proposed a $6 billion cut in government spending, tightening of revenue collection, and 
resolving the messy financial relationships between the federal government and the deeply 
indebted state governments (Dillinger, 1995). The second stage of the reform process (the 
Real Plan), a new currency pegged to the dollar, the Real, was formally put into circulation in 
July 1994.  
A well known academic, Cardoso was a member of the new Brazilian Social Democratic 
Party (PSDB) - an offshoot of the traditional Brazilian Democratic Movement Party (PMDB) 
- which had succeeded in creating new coalitions by attracting younger and more progressive 
members of the old party, principally from the more urban and industrial areas of the country. 
Buoyed by this support, Cardoso then resigned as finance minister and announced his 
candidacy for the 1995 presidential race. His Real Plan was largely successful, as inflation 
was low, purchasing power had increased, and the economy was relatively stable when 
compared to the hyperinflation conditions of the 1980s or the price freezes and other 
experiments of the Collor regime. Cardoso won the election and took office in January 1995.  
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Predictably, the reform process picked up pace in 1995. Along with regular fiscal adjustments 
and trade liberalisation measures, the Brazilian economy also started to attract a sustainable 
flow of foreign capital in important sectors such as minerals and petroleum, 
telecommunications, etc. Cardoso’s programme managed a clever combination of the use of 
democratic tools of negotiation and the traditional political practices based on the selective 
allocation of funds and state patronage, as demonstrated in 1995 by negotiating a partial 
liberalisation of Petrobas, the state oil monopoly, despite it being a sacred part of the 
nationalist litany since the 1950s and dominated by powerful unions. The degree to which the 
reform programme was politically consolidated was demonstrated in 1997, when in the face 
of the East Asian crisis, Congress legislators not only supported the president, but also 
promptly approved an emergency package (including civil service reforms, tax increase, and 
fiscal stabilisation - all potentially risky political moves). Ensuring such political commitment 
to structural reform was one of Cardoso’s major successes, and the process continued with 
the privatisation of Telebras (the state telephone holding company) in 1998, auctioning 
wireless telephone licenses to private firms in 2001, etc. During the 1998 presidential 
elections, Cardoso’s standing was high due to the growing public perception that finally 
market reforms were delivering for Brazil. Union protests and demonstrations, once generally 
endorsed by the public, drew less support, and opinion polls indicated that the median voter 
believed - for the first time in decades - that s/he was now better off and the future would be 
even better (ibid.). However, the second Cardoso administration (1999-2003) was largely 
disappointing in terms of consolidating the reform agenda further. Focused on avoiding 
contagion from the economic uncertainties in Argentina, the primary concern was 
macroeconomic stability, and there was little progress on second generation reforms such as 
liberalising labour markets, or tax and civil service reforms. By 2001, the erstwhile political 
consensus had also started to wane in the face of currency devaluation, a serious energy 
  
61 
 
crisis, and a series of political scandals. Cardoso’s popularity continued to plunge, and the 
government had minimal political support in Congress for further reform measures (ibid.). In 
2003, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, a former trade union leader and head of Brazil’s Workers’ 
Party (PT) replaced Cardoso in office
17
. 
 
The story of the first decade of the Brazilian reform process demonstrates the importance of 
sustainable political support behind the consolidation of reform programmes, as Cardoso was 
able to hold his three-party plus coalition together for more wins than losses since 1995. In 
addition, as Remmer argues, Brazil also demonstrates “the mutually reinforcing nature of 
market-oriented reform and political democracy in contemporary Latin America...[and] the 
process of economic liberalization...has thus proceeded less at the expense of democracy than 
because of democracy” (2003:51). On the whole, the Brazil experience adequately supports 
the theoretical claims made earlier, that the nature of political leadership and coalition-
building initiatives through political strategies are crucial determinants of reform outcomes. 
Therefore, it is interesting to observe how such internal political dimensions can give reform 
programmes a completely divergent trajectory, as witnessed in the next example of a reform 
economy - China.    
1.5.2 The Chinese Development Miracle  
China’s success in engineering an economic transition over the past three decades has been 
extensively written about - euphemistically labelled a development miracle - and the growth 
                                                          
17
 Lula’s victory was perceived by many - particularly domestic and foreign investors - as portending a dramatic 
shift to the left. The actual experiences of Lula’s regime have been largely contrary, with the macroeconomic 
policy stance of the government being widely praised in international financial markets and multilateral 
agencies. The Cardoso regime had sought legitimacy for its market reform agenda primarily by linking it to low 
levels of inflation, but other important areas such as poverty levels, public services, social security nets for the 
poor and marginal communities had largely languished. Lula’s regime, on the other hand, has done a credible 
job of continuing with market-based polices and also brought in significant reforms in the social security 
system. However unemployment, low real wages and serious inequity in income distribution levels continue to 
plague the Brazilian economy (Baer, 2008).   
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figures have indeed been phenomenal. The reform programme started in 1978, and the 
average annual growth rate of real GDP was 9% from 1978-1994 and 10.7% from 1990-
1999. Even in the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis, China recorded an 8% growth rate 
in 2000 (So, 2003), and 10.3% from 2001-2011 (calculated from World Bank Data 
Indicators). Between 1978-2004 per-capita GDP grew at 8% a year, and in the countryside 
alone the numbers in poverty decreased from 40% in 1980 to 14% by the mid 1990s (Lai, 
2006). In 2004, the vice-president of the World Bank for the Asia-Pacific Region 
commented: “since 1980, China has achieved poverty reduction on a scale that has no parallel 
in human history” (Lai, 2005:6).  
 
There is little dispute over the fact that, at least in economic terms, China has outperformed 
all other transitional economies. However, there are serious disagreements about the nature 
and direction of the reform programme. The advocates of the big bang approach, for 
example, differ considerably from the incrementalists in assessing the way reforms were 
unfurled. The former group saw a large rural sector in China as a sufficient pre-condition for 
the reforms to ensure growth, argued that the Chinese reformers carried out their own mini 
big-bang in conducting critical reforms such as a drastic decollectivisation of the agricultural 
sector, and went on to claim that China’s conditions were so favourable that even a mindless 
strategy could have produced wonderful results (Sachs and Woo, 1994; Woo, 1994). The 
latter group, on the other hand, credited much of the success to a gradualist strategy and a 
number of delicate institutional arrangements, such as the removal of inefficiencies in a few 
chosen sectors at a time rather than comprehensive assaults of the command economy all at 
once (Lin and Cai, 1996; Putterman, 1992, 1996), creating attractive incentive structures for 
local governments through fiscal decentralisation (Montinola, Qian, and Weingast 1995; Oi, 
1999), etc. In addition, there is a string of literature providing testimony to the political skills 
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of the Chinese reformers in mobilising local support and the constructive role of local 
government in consolidating the reforms (Shirk, 1993; Huang, 1996; Yang, 1997; Chung, 
2000; Zweig, 2002). However, there still remains a gap in the existing accounts of the reform 
strategies and the reform-accelerating institutional arrangements. Firstly, as Roland (2000) 
points out, what were the political constraints and conditions that shaped the reform process; 
and secondly, what were the political economic factors that drove the Chinese national and 
provincial reform policies? In addressing this gap, Lai (2006:13) summarises:  
 
the Chinese economic reform was incremental and successful because of the 
reformists’ strategic and tactical choices to overcome political and economic 
constraints...Confronted with constraints such as factional conflict among decision 
makers and a backward economy, Chinese reformists liberalized the economy 
incrementally, skilfully managed elite conflicts..., selected as early starters provinces 
that had a higher likelihood of success, and made delicate fiscal arrangements to 
induce a few provinces to launch pilot reforms. 
 
Historically, the major political constraint to the reform process was strong opposition from 
the majority of influential veteran leaders against thorough marketisation. During the early 
years of reform initiation, the political elites in China were primarily divided into two camps 
- the reformists vis-à-vis the conservatives. The latter group did support limited 
marketisation, but withdrew support when liberal policies created economic, political and 
social problems, seriously undermined central planning, or if they perceived the possibility of 
losing political control (Baum, 1996). In addition, in the central group of the first-tier leaders 
during 1978-1994, only two (Deng Xiaoping and Yang Shangkun) were clear supporters of 
the reform process, while the rest were by and large conservative in the matter of reforms. 
Managing conflict with conservatives thus constituted a crucial yet delicate issue for 
reformists (Lai, 2006). Given such opposition, Chinese reformists, especially Deng Xiaoping, 
followed a zigzag reform path. When conditions were favourable, Deng pushed for dramatic 
liberal policies, when they were not, he retreated temporarily and waited for fresh 
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opportunities. When conservative policies did not work out, Deng would step up the 
criticisms of conservatism, and launch a new round of reform. This calculated strategy of 
‘two steps forward, one step back’ allowed the reformists to maintain the direction of 
incremental reforms despite adversities, and also helped them circumvent the initial 
discontent that surfaced with sluggish income growth, high unemployment and inflation. 
When confronting inflationary pressures due to economic liberalisation, reformists tactically 
retreated from their agenda in order to retain popular support, and stepped out to argue for the 
need of reforms once a conservative programme resulted in economic stagnation. 
 
Another crucial strategy was to purposefully allow reforms to start in a handful of chosen 
provinces via carefully designed fiscal measures, so that the level of personal consumption 
would increase rapidly and new jobs would be created. The measures included endowing 
provinces with certain fiscal capacities and asking only for a moderate remittance to the 
centre, so that a higher revenue share could be retained locally. Not only did such careful 
selection of particular provinces prevent possible chaos and waste of resources in an 
unmanaged reform exercise nationwide, but the success of these provinces was a compelling 
lure which other provinces would then wish to follow. This was a sophisticated political 
tactic employed by the reformists, as provinces varied in their inclination towards reforms, 
depending on how each was positioned to construct a market economy. The reformists had to 
design a strategy that would motivate provinces to undertake reform measures and reward 
them to do so. They did this by initiating competition and announcing a winner for provincial 
reform in order to create a domino effect. For example, Guangdong, a province adjacent to 
Hong Kong, was opened up first to provide the entrepreneurs from Hong Kong with cheap 
labour and new markets. The central government also encouraged the development of light 
industries and non state businesses in the province. As a result, local fiscal revenue increased 
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rapidly as both consumption levels and employment opportunities grew. Other provinces 
were impressed with the success of Guangdong and demanded similar policies from the 
national government.      
 
A third important factor that played a significant role in consolidating the reforms was the 
political dominance of the party and the coordinating authority of the central government. 
While political domination may be seen as a liability in the pursuit of reforms, in China the 
party played a major role in coordinating and sanctioning reforms in the provinces. In fact, 
Deng managed to consolidate the support from conservative veterans for his paramount 
leadership by forging an alliance with them and supporting the party’s monopoly of power. 
Such efforts, in turn, also demonstrated that he was genuinely committed to salvaging the 
political regime rather than undermining it (ibid.). Other important strategies that 
consolidated the initiatives were the recruitment of young technocratic and liberal leaders, 
demoting Maoist provincial cadres, and installing liberal reform-minded cadres in top 
national positions. In promoting provincial leaders, the central government adopted their 
ability to induce reforms and generate growth as the primary criterion for judging 
performance, thus giving tremendous incentives to local officials to adopt marketisation 
measures and liberalise the local economies. Many of the provincial leaders (such as Qiao Shi 
and Li Ruihuan) rallied behind Deng’s call for bold marketisation in 1992, and continued the 
agenda steadily even after him.  
 
Evidently, as Lai (2006) argues, how to start and sustain incremental reforms has been 
arguably the most daunting task for Chinese leaders. They needed to make wise political 
decisions regarding the sequencing of reforms and the choice of localities for implementation 
that were appropriate in the existing economic settings. And the choices made - with an eye 
to turning political constraints to advantages, mobilising support for each major reform 
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measure, and locking reform into a set direction - have been highly fruitful over the years. 
However, this political management of reforms was executed in a specific way, while 
rejecting other alternatives. Deng supported marketisation but opposed democratisation, 
fearing that the latter would generate chaos, weaken the state’s governing capacity and 
undermine the party’s power. He opted for compromises with the conservative factions, and 
carefully steered clear of the path of political reforms that Gorbachev tried in the Soviet 
Union (with completely contradictory outcomes). Therefore, like the Brazilian case, the 
contrast between the Chinese and the Russian transition experiences (both being one-party 
states) once again underline the importance of political strategies and coalition formation, not 
only during the initiation-consolidation phases, but also in determining reform outcomes.    
1.5.3 The Russian Crisis of the 1990s  
Since its re-emergence as a sovereign state in 1991, Russia has been heavily engaged in both 
economic and political restructuring strategies. Unlike China, where the reforms were 
unfurled at a gradual pace and in a zigzag manner, the collapse of the USSR presented Russia 
with an urgent need to adapt its economy, political and social institutions to the laws of an 
open economy. The newly exposed failures of the Marxist-Leninist foundations of the state 
also meant that ‘soft’ reforms - attempting a compromise between marketisation and social 
needs - were rejected outright as ‘remnants of the past’ and thus ‘hostile’ to the aspirations of 
new Russian democracy (Reddaway and Glinski, 2001; Tsygankov and Tsygankov, 2004). 
The Russian reformists - under President Boris Yeltsin - thus engaged in a radical reform 
programme formulated by three powerful groups of intellectuals: western economists 
including Sachs, Fisher, Summers and Lipton; Russian economists such as Gaidar; and the 
Bretton Woods Institutions (Aslund, 2002). In January 1992, the Yeltsin government 
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liberalised the majority of prices practically overnight, and freed foreign trade and financial 
markets from state control later in the year.  
 
The government had hoped that the free price mechanism would rectify the distortions of 
central planning. However, a sequence of big-bang reform measures focused on consumption, 
external trade and finance, while leaving other crucial facets of the economic system such as 
domestic prices for raw materials and the rigidities in the labour market untouched, led to 
severe hyperinflation. Annual inflation levels reached 2500% in 1992 alone, and in the 
absence of tangible productivity, trade and price liberalisation created an environment of 
intense financial speculation (Nesvetailova, 2005). For example, when the state price of oil in 
Russian was only 1% of the world market price, domestic prices of other commodities were 
about 10% of world prices. Furthermore, as Stiglitz (2002) notes, managers of state 
companies bought raw materials from state enterprises they controlled, acquired export 
licenses and quotas from corrupt officials, arranged political protection for themselves, and 
then sold the commodities abroad at world prices. Trade liberalisation combined with 
distortions in the domestic economy also meant that cheap imports flooded the markets 
destroying domestic producers. And with stagnating industrial production, income levels 
almost perpetually lagged behind inflation. On the whole, Russia’s shock therapy approach to 
economic reforms not only aggravated the economic crisis of the late Soviet period, but 
transformed it into a profound economic depression, with the economy contracting by 15% 
from its 1989 levels in 1992 alone (Nesvetailova, 2005). Throughout the 1990s annual capital 
flight out of Russia averaged $25-26 billion per year, while annual FDI in the economy only 
averaged $4-6 billion (Aslund and Dimitrev, 1999; World Bank, 2002). The recession 
continued for the next eight years, and was one of the deepest in Eastern Europe (Kolodko, 
2001).    
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Naturally, political support for Yeltsin quickly waned against the backdrop of such 
devastating socioeconomic conditions, and he had little chance of re-election in 1996. 
However, despite explicit corruption, undemocratic actions and feeble results from economic 
reforms, Yeltsin successfully negotiated with the IMF to disburse its largest loans to Russia, 
totalling $5.5 and $3.8 billion respectively (Smee, 2004). He was also able to bring in 
international political consultants to support his presidential bid in the name of ‘saving the 
world for capitalism’ (Nesvetailova, 2005). As Sussman and Galizio (2003:326-7) wrote: 
 
Consultants...worked under cloaked arrangements for Yeltsin’s camp...They boasted 
of saving Yeltsin from certain defeat and Russia from a return to the Cold War, and 
admitted to using a host of dirty tricks in their advertising strategy to sow fear among 
Russians. The political ads...warned that a Zyuganov victory would bring back a 
command economy and a climate of terror. Ignored were the out-of-control economy, 
Yeltsin’s own predilections for autocratic control, and his broad use of repressive 
tactics while serving as an unelected head of state.  
 
Yeltsin also managed to ensure the backing of influential domestic elites, particularly a select 
group of Russian bankers who had capitalised on the post-1992 market opportunities and thus 
controlled substantial financial assets. They agreed to lend the government enough funds to 
meet the budget deficit, but in return acquired managing control over various state 
enterprises, mainly in the oil and natural gas industries (Nesvetailova, 2005). This became a 
de-facto privatisation mechanism for large scale state companies and one that was to all 
intents and purposes free, as the amounts initially paid to the government were nowhere near 
the real value of the enterprises (Bedirhanoglu, 2004). The resulting extreme polarisation of 
wealth gave rise to the term oligarch in Russia, which became closely linked with the re-
elected Yeltsin government in 1996 (Buiter, 2000; Freeland, 2000). By the late 1990s, 
oligarchic groups represented a firmly established form of control in the Russian political 
economy, with three or four groups controlling no less than 70% of the economy (Yavlinsky, 
1998).  
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By 1998, the Russian economy was in severe financial crisis with its entire budget deficit 
being financed by external borrowing. Even an IMF rescue package did not work, and 
Moscow had to devalue the rouble and ultimately default on its debts (Buchs, 1999). 
Moreover, there were intense speculation that part of the IMF loan had ended up in the 
foreign bank accounts of certain members of the Russian government, and even the World 
Bank (1999) observed that elaborate schemes of money laundering, involving foreign banks 
and offshore accounts, were constructed with the assistance of Russian oligarchic structures. 
The August financial crisis
18
 came as an enormous international shock, exposing the 
disembedded nature of Russia’s neoliberal project. As Nesvetailova (2005:248) observes: 
 
Throughout the decade Russia’s reformist governments quite naively understood 
‘neoliberalism’ as a package of economic liberalization, privatization, and stern 
restriction of the aggregate demand. Such vision led to the emergence of a mutant, 
quasi-market type political economy. While the central elements of 
neoliberalism...have been imported into Russia, they did not facilitate a 
comprehensive transition from planned to market economy...Not only was the actual 
implementation of neoliberal restructuring hampered by Russia’s structural and 
political crisis; the perils of building capitalism were aggravated by institutional 
failures, power conflicts and global economic volatility.  
 
 
The Russian shock-therapeutic neoliberal experiment of the 1990s under Yeltsin thus led to 
severe social discontent, with poverty, social polarisation, unemployment, crime and 
corruption becoming tantamount to the efforts to build capitalism in the country (ibid.). The 
future course of reforms in Russia, as witnessed during Vladimir Putin’s regime post-2000, 
tried to re-establish the centrality of the federal government in the political system of the 
country, attacked some of the most conspicuous oligarchs of the previous decade, and above 
all, worked towards securing political legitimacy and a social base for Russian market 
economy. Market economy, Putin argued, “should be founded on the central role of the state 
                                                          
18
 The Russian financial crisis (also called the "Ruble crisis") hit Russia on 17 August 1998. 
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in negotiating private and public interests, on the rule of law, on developed civil society, and 
crucially, on social stability...” (2004)19.      
The above accounts, taken together, present a diverse and often contradictory turn of events 
during the course of reform initiation/consolidation in each of these nations. The Brazilian 
and Chinese examples demonstrate the effectiveness of a gradualist approach, and at the same 
time bring the importance of forming coalitions and devising political strategies to the 
forefront. The Russian case highlights the dangers of adopting a blanket approach which 
ignores domestic political-economic trends, and also testifies to the role of influential interest 
groups, particularly backdoor political collusions, in determining reform outcomes. On the 
whole, while divergent in their individual rights, all three cases bring forth the centrality of 
politics in the management of economic reforms. No nation/economy engaged in similar 
transition initiatives can afford to ignore the core political issues, such as distributive 
conflicts, the winners and losers of the process, how they organise (or fail to) the necessary 
negotiation to create consensus and coalition, etc.  
There is, however, something to be said about the analytical scope of these narratives, and 
also that of a wide range of case studies on the lines of ‘the politics of economic reform in 
country X’20. While the importance of a generic set of political processes and institutions is 
highlighted, they tend to suffer from an analytical shortfall of, firstly, a restrictive conception 
of politics, which limits the area of inquiry only to specific measures, rather than to reform, 
conceived broadly as a redirection of policy orientation (Jenkins, 1999). In their efforts to 
                                                          
19
 The Russian economy over the past decade has shown significant signs of revival. Since 1999, the GDP has 
been growing steadily according to World Bank Data Indicators. Employment, real wage and foreign reserves 
have also been on the rise, and the federal budget largely in surplus (Nesvetailova, 2005).  
20
 Many such studies have been cited earlier, such as Nelson (1989, 1990), Meier (1991), Haggard and Kaufman 
(1992, 1995), Bates and Krueger (1993), Williamson (1994), Haggard and Webb (1994), Nonneman (1996), etc. 
They present extensive case studies on countries from Latin America, Eastern Europe, to the Middle East, sub-
Saharan Africa and Eastern Asia.  
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present a generic hypothesis, most of these studies tend to prioritise reform measures which 
seem to have enough universal importance (usually ‘the big four’ of fiscal, monetary, 
exchange rate, and trade policy), and in the process lose the ability to convey the specificities 
of individual cases. The loss is not only that of local flavour, but also of the chance to put 
forward a holistic explanation why some countries are able to sustain a general reorientation 
of economic policy, since many less visible reform measures contribute to the political 
sustainability of the ‘big four’ reforms themselves. This happens when, for instance, 
politicians operating at lower levels of the political system are implicated in the reform 
process, forced by political implications stemming from the ‘general’ reorientation of policy 
to pursue ‘minor’ reforms within their jurisdictions. Rendering the lower-level political actors 
responsible for these ‘small’ (or, ‘important but not universal enough’) reforms leads to a 
limited understanding of the political processes that play a key role in undertaking the micro-
reforms upon which overall policy reorientation, not to mention successful economic 
outcomes, crucially depends. The second problem is an inadequate characterisation of 
political institutions. Stemming from the theoretical hypothesis “that polarized party systems, 
in which wide ideological differences separate the main political contenders, encourage 
bidding wars between competing political forces and produce destabilizing swings in policy’ 
(Haggard and Webb, 1994:9), the sole focus seems to be on assessing how differences in 
parties, electoral systems and bureaucratic organisations can affect the choice of policy. 
While these are all areas worthy of study, a universal conceptualisation based on their 
fragmentation or polarisation does little to advance the understanding of why the aims of 
reformers are sometimes thwarted and sometimes achieved, even if the institutional 
arrangements are not necessarily conducive (i.e. not fragmented or polarised respectively). 
There are many cases (particularly India - see next section) which contradict such 
generalisations. The third and final problem is the way in which the issue of ‘building 
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coalitions for reform’ is treated. While the fundamental question of how to construct a base of 
political support for policy is well-recognised, focusing on the ‘near universal’ reforms limits 
the search for instances of compensation almost exclusively to within the ambit of such 
selective issues. This misses the types of compensation that not only are far more varied, but 
also offered in many cases to rather narrowly defined sections of large and diverse interest 
groups, and in policy arenas far removed from the big ticket reforms.  
The above criticism derives largely from Jenkins’s (1999) work, where he posits India as a 
counter-example, both unique and intriguing in its own right. In India, as in most state-
dominated economies, there are powerful groups and individuals with a strong interest in 
maintaining the status quo. These include bureaucratic and political elites who have 
prospered as gatekeepers of economic and political sovereignty; their accomplices in the 
private sector who are not only well-off financially (largely as a result of the privileged 
positions they have occupied within the controlled economy), but also extremely well 
organised; influential farmer lobbies fearing the loss of subsidies; protected industrialists 
fearing foreign competition, and so on. On the other hand, the groups that might stand to 
benefit from liberalisation tend to be poorly organised and lacking in influence. They are of 
little use to reformers seeking a constituency with which to counter the inevitable resistance. 
Furthermore, a democratic setting is believed to add to the difficulties of bringing about 
sustainable policy reorientation, as political leaders are usually disinclined to foment unrest 
among powerful opponents of reform who have strong vertical linkages with electoral 
constituencies which can be mobilised in opposition. Attacks on a reforming government’s 
‘capitulation’ to international forces, and its ‘betrayal’ of the ‘socialist’ commitment to 
economic justice are also particularly effective. Such a theoretical aversion to change that a 
democracy such as India should possess was evident during the 1970s and 1980s, when 
Indira Gandhi and Rajiv Gandhi’s efforts to ‘modernise’ and ‘liberalise’ the economy had 
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only a limited impact. But liberalisation eventually returned to India in a much more dramatic 
and lasting fashion during the 1990s under the P. V. Narasimha Rao led Congress 
government, and exhibited a political durability that ran:  
 
... counter not only to much of the experience in the rest of the developing world, but 
also to India’s own lacklustre track record. How can we explain the ability of liberal 
reform to become rooted in India despite the daunting array of political obstacles 
placed in its path? India is not only a democracy; it has been one continuously for the 
past fifty years: unlike newly democratising countries in the developing world, or in 
the former Eastern Bloc, there are no discredited authoritarian regimes on which past 
failures can be blamed...The two coalition governments which succeeded 
Congress...had campaigned on anti-liberalisation platforms. That both ultimately 
pressed on with reform – substantially deepening its content – makes reform’s 
political durability all the more intriguing (ibid.:3).  
 
1.6 Economic Liberalisation in India 
 
The transition of the Indian economy from an era of dirigiste development spanning more 
than four decades to a period of economic liberalisation has been a recurring topic in 
academic debates ever since India embraced an era of concerted economic reform in 1991
21
. 
“India has fundamentally altered its development strategy”, announced the World Bank in 
1996, and went on to comment that the New Economic Policy (NEP) of 1991 had 
                                                          
21 By early 1991, India was suffering from a massive economic crisis: a deep fiscal deficit juxtaposed with an 
almost unmanageable balance of payments scenario and acceleration in inflation rate (Nayyar, 1996). The 
origins of this crisis, Nayyar wrote, could largely be traced back to the large and persistent macro-economic 
imbalances during the 1980s - mounting fiscal deficit being met by borrowing at home and persistent current 
account deficits in balance of payments, financed by borrowing from abroad. Exogenous factors such as the 
Gulf War crisis also had an impact on the situation. By the summer of 1991, India barely had sufficient reserves 
to pay for two weeks’ worth of imports, and was finally compelled to adopt a structural adjustment 
programme. Reforms were introduced in the industrial regulation structure (removal of licensing and other 
barriers to entry), trade regime (devaluation of the rupee, removal of export subsidy), opening up to foreign 
direct investments, etc. The task of restoring stability was shouldered by Dr. Manmohan Singh, economist, ex-
governor of the Reserve Bank of India and Finance Minister in the Narasimha Rao led Congress government 
(and the current Prime Minister of India), and the Indian reform process is dated to his presentation of the 
Union budget to the Lok Sabha (lower house of parliament) in July 1991 (Corbridge and Harriss, 2000).  
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restructured the basis of the Indian economy and “ended four decades of planning 
and…initiated a quiet economic revolution” (World Bank, 1996). 
Advocates of liberalisation have long argued that the reforms not only attracted foreign 
investment to India and rescued the country from economic doldrums, but also brought about 
a sea change in ideas about the role of the state and markets in the economy (Parikh, 1999). 
Within two years of Manmohan Singh’s first budget in the Lok Sabha, Jagdish Bhagwati 
wrote: 
The energy, talents, and worldly ambition of India’s many millions...need merely an 
appropriate policy framework to produce the economic magic that Jawaharlal Nehru 
wished for his compatriots, but which, like many well-meaning intellectuals of his 
time, he mistakenly sought in now discredited economic doctrines. We finally have 
thus elusive policy framework within our grasp (1993:98). 
 
By the mid-1990s India could reasonably be described as an emerging market (Corbridge and 
Harris, 2000), and the Economist newspaper acclaimed the reforms as “nothing less than a 
repudiation of India’s distinctive approach to development - a repudiation, that is, of Nehru’s 
vision of socialist self-reliance” (The Economist Survey of India, 1997). However, while they 
commended the reform process, the neoliberals also maintained that “the initial seed and 
scope of reforms in India were just about right” (Bhagwati, 1998:37). They encouraged the 
government to undertake further reforms - particularly in the public sector that was crying out 
to be privatised, and in the archaic labour laws (ibid.:38; emphasis added) - which would 
recognise that “globalisation is an irreversible process” (Lal, 1999:46).      
With the benefit of hindsight it can be said that the reforms that were initiated in 1991 and 
continued unevenly through the next fifteen years, significantly transformed India’s 
relationship with the global market place. At the same time, however, it also should be 
recognised that the government in New Delhi never embraced the shock-therapy that was in 
fashion for a while in the ex-Soviet Union states or parts of Latin America. This did not mean 
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that further rounds of reform were not tried or could not gain political support (Corbridge and 
Harris, 2000). In fact, there has been relatively little political backlash against reforms (as 
opposed to occasional rhetorical skirmishes), and many political leaders, irrespective of 
which party they belong to, have supported liberalisation (Bardhan, 1998). However, much of 
this is missed in the neoliberal account. An insistent preference for ‘markets’ over ‘states’ has 
blinded its adherents to the politics of economic liberalisation (save for the view that politics 
- in the form of vested interests - is an impediment to reform), both in terms of the 
mainsprings of reform and of its social and spatial consequences (Corbridge and Harris, 
2000).  
Jenkins’s (1999) work does much to bring forward the fact that economic liberalisation in 
India has not only been more radical and continuous than most of its critics allow, but also 
demonstrated a quality which has surprised many observers – staying power. This raises an 
important question - how did the reforms attain political consolidation
22
 despite a daunting 
array of structural obstacles? The answers are limited, and while some explanations hold a 
democracy’s salesmanship qualities as the chief reason (as proposed by aid agencies), they 
“neglect the capacity of democratic governments to usher in policy reform by engaging in 
underhanded tactics, one of the salient features of the Indian case” (ibid.:4; emphasis added). 
This makes the Indian reform experience unique, as existing theories of democracy and 
development (with a pre-occupation with newly democratised nations) are unable to capture 
the complexities of the politics of economic liberalisation in India. 
 
 
                                                          
22
 Jenkins defines political consolidation as the reforms having attained self-sustainability, generating a chain of 
demand for more reforms from the domestic political arena (1999:15). 
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1.6.1 Liberalisation by Stealth, Inter-Jurisdictional Competition and Provincial 
Darwinism 
The unique feature of reform implementation in India, Jenkins argues, lies in its gradual 
approach. This does not just imply that reforms unfolded at a slow rate, but rather followed: 
 
...a strategy of carefully laying a foundation by using less transparent means of 
initiating change in an effort to avoid direct political confrontation for as long as 
possible. The objective is to provide more conducive circumstances under which 
further changes can be effected at a later date, when potential supporters of change are 
more likely to prove politically useful, and opponents less capable of mounting 
resistance (ibid.:14). 
 
Jenkins’s wider argument is that, disguised under a slogan of continuity, the reforms were 
pushed through quickly and consistently. The process was guided by politicians who were 
experts in coalition-building, and worked behind the scenes in India’s democratic polity to 
“blunt the edge of opposition to reform” (ibid.:160). The governing elite of India, Jenkins 
noted, were attracted by the potential of liberalisation to provide new sources of patronage, 
substituting some of the ones forfeited by the shrinkage of the state’s regulatory role, and also 
the possibility to create new interest groups and be more responsive to the changing political 
scenario. Politicians from a wide range of party lines - such as Narasimha Rao and Sharad 
Pawar (Congress; though Pawar broke away from Congress in 1999 to form the Nationalist 
Congress Party) to Deve Gowda and Biju Patnaik (Janata Dal) - had sought to capture such 
benefits by means of obfuscatory and manipulative tactics with an eye towards neutralising 
opponents. There was outright pilfering by the power brokers, and also tactics such as: 
 
Shifting unpleasant responsibilities and blame to political opponents, surreptitiously 
compensating selected interests, concealing intentions, reassuring and then abusing 
the trust of long-time political allies, and obscuring policy change by emphasising 
essential continuity (ibid.:9). 
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This is the essence of liberalisation by stealth, a political game of giving the impression that 
the reforms are far short of what is required and the really important and difficult decisions 
have yet to be made, whilst quietly continuing the process.    
 
The understated nature of what has been taking place in India... [is] the chief reason 
why policy changes with such far-reaching implications could escape the political 
minefield that democracy lays in their path: that is, stealthily introduced reforms 
succeed largely because of the stealthy means through which they are introduced 
(ibid.:16; emphasis added).  
 
As noted by Corbridge and Harriss (2000), Jenkins takes issue with the proponents of 
‘democracy-in-general’ (such as Przeworski, 1991; Haggard and Webb, 1994; Haggard and 
Kaufman, 1995) or ‘good governance’ (such as World Bank, 1992; 1994) who seem to think 
that democracy is primarily about open and competitive politics, accountability and 
transparency, and who bemoan the meddling of politicians in matters ‘economic’. Instead, 
Jenkins maintains that the reform-initiating state in India is at once a democratic state and a 
dirty state, and therein lays the source of the political consolidation of the reform process.      
A second aspect of the reform process that deserves attention is its impact on the Indian 
federal structure. A salient feature of the reforms is the divergence it brought to the different 
regional states’ economic performance, and “the concentration of foreign direct inflows into a 
few states…[which] has raised concerns about the aggravation of financial disparities among 
states. The concern about asymmetric development between different regions in developing 
countries has been long-standing within the literature on economic development” (Sáez, 
2002:16). The liberalisation policies, Sáez argued, have had a long lasting repercussion on the 
Indian federal structure, having changed the federal relations from “inter-governmental 
cooperation towards inter-jurisdictional competition among states” (ibid.:135). Historically, 
centre-state fiscal relations in India have often been acrimonious, primarily due to unequal 
resource transfer by the central government between the states. Although the introduction of 
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the NEP did not bring about any particular change in the central government’s financial 
relationship with the states, there was a gradual reduction in the states’ dependence on central 
government as their primary source of revenue, owing largely to the influx of foreign 
investment. The central government, at the same time, started to encourage states to be more 
fiscally responsible
23
, but the effect of this was not uniform across the country, and 
“economic liberalization policies have had the effect of pinpointing foreign investment 
magnets and foreign investment laggards”24 (ibid.:146). The result was an increasing 
polarisation among the states in terms of economic development, thus altering the federal 
relation between the central government and the states from an erstwhile cooperative 
structure to one with a diminished significance of the central government and increased inter-
state competition.  
In a similar vein, Jenkins also recognises the increasing importance of states in managing the 
economic reforms. In post-1991 India, states came to act as agents – both championing 
regional interests, and inaugurating new political alliances and accommodating initiators in 
the process of incremental reforms. Pro-liberalisation scholars often argue that delegating 
responsibilities to state governments would hinder efficient implementation of economic 
reforms, due to the multi-tiered political administrative system that characterises Indian 
federal structure, but Jenkins points out that it is precisely this multiple level federal political 
system that has helped to make the reform programme sustainable. There are three main ways 
in which this process operated. Firstly, policy decisions by central authorities were designed 
deliberately to aggravate inter-state divisions and interests: while states which gained from 
the reforms had little motivation to oppose them, states which suffered had fewer allies with 
                                                          
23
 For example, the National Development Council under the BJP-led coalition government outlined reform 
packages for each state with the aim of reducing untargeted subsidies, unproductive expenditures and 
subsequent borrowing.  
24
 As Sáez shows, three states (Maharashtra, Gujarat and Tamil Nadu) and the union territory of Delhi 
accounted for nearly 50% of all FDI approvals made in India from 1991-1998.   
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whom to pose a serious challenge to the liberalization process. Secondly, the political engines 
of economic interests were also fragmented by the central authorities along regional lines, 
which reduced the political potency of such economic opposition. And finally, certain non-
Congress state governments were lured by the central authorities into supporting the reform 
agenda with political incentives
25
, thus once again reducing the potency of any remaining 
political resistance (Jenkins, 1999).  
Jenkins defines this process as Provincial Darwinism: utilisation of the variation in 
performance among states to fragment political and economic opposition to reforms along 
distinct regional lines, and thus in turn reducing the potency of such resistance from a variety 
of state level political elites (1999:133).  
This analysis rests on the fact that under the reforms, states’ economic performances 
continued to differ. Why did some states either choose not to, or prove unable to take full 
advantage of the liberalised economic regime? Jenkins explains:  
 
[t]his happens for two main reasons. The first has to do with the initial conditions 
which prevail in various states: both the economies and political complexions of 
different states vary considerably, affecting the relative cost and benefits of individual 
reforms, as well as the capacity of interests to influence state-level responses. The 
second reason is…that state-level governing elites pursue different strategies for 
coping with the changed policy environment wrought by central government reforms. 
This encompasses economic policy as well as tactics of political management, both of 
which are affected by the differences in initial conditions mentioned above” (ibid.: 
138).  
 
This above idea - of sub-national variation in political economic conditions, and different 
political strategies pursued by the regional elites in response to the reforms - brings this 
chapter to the focal point of this thesis, that of the course of events in one such regional state - 
West Bengal. The political dilemma that the ruling elite in West Bengal faced when 
                                                          
25
 Examples include the then Shiv Sena Chief Minister of Maharashtra- Manohar Joshi and Janata Dal Chief 
Minister of Bihar- Laloo Prasad Yadav.   
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confronted with the economic reforms was not only unique in its own right, but also presents 
a fascinating study of how large-scale economic reforms can create localised political ripples, 
a study which in turn aids the understanding of the wider process of reform sustainability, 
particularly in a diverse, fragmented and vigorous democratic polity such as India. While 
Jenkins’s work has its drawbacks26, the pluralist view of Indian politics that informs his 
arguments stands as a welcome contrast to the more anodyne accounts of state and politics 
that are to be found in some neoliberal writings of liberalisation (Corbridge and Harriss, 
2000). It is this notion of ‘politics’ that provides the conceptual core of this thesis in narrating 
the story of West Bengal.  
 
1.7 Conclusion 
The objectives of this chapter were as follows: to highlight the larger theme of – along with 
the wide array of puzzles that are associated with - economic transition from dirigisme to 
neoliberalism; emphasise the centrality of politics in such transitions, both in theoretical and 
empirical terms by drawing evidence from a number of countries across the global South; 
sharpen the focus on to the politics of liberalisation in India; and finally, to enter the domain 
of West Bengal. This thesis addresses the politics of policy transition in West Bengal, 
embedded within the overarching arc of its political history over the past two decades. 
However, it is not just a story of a set of regional dynamics within the Indian federal structure 
with little resonance for a wider political-economic audience. Rather, West Bengal represents 
a microcosm in which we may study a set of puzzles that has much to say about similar 
economic transitions elsewhere, particularly with regard to the translation of large-scale 
                                                          
26
 Jenkins’s work suffers from one major drawback. It fails to recognise the partiality of the reform processes 
(Corbridge and Harriss, 2000), i.e. the way they have been consistently phrased to address the concerns of 
India’s urban and industrial (and even agricultural or political) elites, with little regard for the impact of 
structural adjustment upon the poor or upon the sustainability of the reforms themselves.    
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macroeconomic policy decisions into distinct trajectories at ground level, and how such acts 
of translation are intensely political both in agency and outcome. The narrative also shows 
how transition initiatives can be contested/subverted in the realm of ideas and discourse, how 
their consolidation depends upon vertical as well as horizontal negotiations (i.e. across 
political levels and hierarchy), and how their execution transgresses consensus-building and 
becomes a political process in its own right. The West Bengal story demonstrates that 
transition is not just about policy formulation, reform measures or economic indicators. It is a 
challenge far more complex, capable of mobilising intense political forces at various levels of 
a democratic polity, transforming ideologies, and becoming an agent of not only socio-
economic changes, but also violence, hegemony, and morality.  
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Chapter 2 
 
From the Party of Bhadraloks to Party-Society: Trends in Bengali 
Left Politics 
 
“The sweeping victory which the Left Front registered in West Bengal in the Vidhan Sabha 
elections last June was not an accidental flash in the pan. It merely confirmed, in the form of 
an external evidence, a truth which the quasi-fascist terror of the past half-a-dozen years had 
succeeded to blur, but could not obliterate...the Left Front government in West Bengal 
embodies a corpus of dreams and hopes...it would captivate the imagination of the millions 
who constitute India's exploited majority and pulsate them into an all-compassing drive for 
social revolution.”  
(Mitra, 1978:3-8) 
“Once a political movement becomes an object of public hatred and derision, it presages the 
erosion of its base and forecasts the eclipse of its credibility. Sad to say, the Left movement in 
West Bengal is hanging under such a threat... The germs of intolerance, insecurity and 
pugnacity with which it was contaminated at its birth, turned into a full blown aneurysm.”  
 
(Banerjee, 2007:1240) 
 
 
2.1 Introduction  
 
The stark contrast between the opinions above aptly mirrors the swing in the popular 
perception of the Left Front government in West Bengal over thirty years. While long-serving 
political regimes across the world have often grappled with challenges to their ideological 
core, the criticisms that surfaced against the Left Front in its last few years were not only 
acute, but also surprisingly sudden. Allegations of ideological bankruptcy and a loss of moral 
legitimacy had been growing (particularly against the CPIM) and, hand in hand with a “series 
of poll debacles following a thumping victory in the West Bengal assembly elections in 2006 
[which] has left the ruling Left Front in West Bengal completely shell-shocked. [Still] it did 
not quite anticipate the tide of popular mood to cause almost a lateral shift in its electoral 
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base in the urban, and most dramatically in the rural, areas of the state”, initially, the Left 
leaders could react with only disbelief (Bhattacharyya, 2010:51). 
 
The sudden political decline of the Left Front (coupled with a marginalisation in the national 
political landscape) since 2008
27
 presents a rather interesting puzzle. Why was a Left 
government with a pro-poor image and prolonged record of electoral success suddenly faced 
with charges of ideological bankruptcy as well as governance deadlock?  
 
It is a puzzle that should be contextualised against the political history of West Bengal, and 
needs to be seen as the culmination of a series of inherent contradictions embedded in the 
path of economic development charted by the Left Front since the beginning of economic 
liberalisation in India. The emphasis of this research will therefore be on a reappraisal of the 
political economic history of the Left regime and particularly that of its majority partner, the 
CPIM, over the last two decades. Two distinct areas will be examined: the conditions 
necessitating the transition from an erstwhile agricultural-based growth model to a more pro-
market economic agenda post-1991 and the political strategy employed to manage the 
transition, attract private capital and at the same time sustain the party’s traditional rhetoric 
and partisan character. The key to understanding the recent political developments in West 
Bengal lies in these twin narratives. 
 
As argued in the following chapters, there was a series of contradictions both in the 
ideological adjustments and operative style of the CPIM post-1991, which continued to 
accelerate underneath a much publicised strategy of industrial development. Though these 
contradictions emerged from some of the basic defining features of the party, the traditional 
literature on West Bengal - formulated primarily during the 1980s - does little to highlight 
                                                          
27
 The Left Front suffered its first major loss in the state panchayat elections of 2008, and also left the UPA 
(United Progressive Alliance) coalition at the centre in the same year.     
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them. More recent accounts by authors such as Harihar Bhattacharyya (1998), Moitree 
Bhattacharya (2002), Dwaipayan Bhattacharyya (2004, 2009, 2010), Sinha (2005, 2007), 
Sarkar (2006, 2007), Roy (2002, 2004), and Khasnabis (2008), have successfully brought 
much of the implicit dynamics of the regime to the fore, but as yet there is no comprehensive 
account of its ideological modifications, operative style and factional struggles in the wake of 
economic reforms. However, to understand the politics of transition in the most stable 
democratic Left regime in the world, creating a narrative of its “structures of mediation, 
legitimacy, control and autonomy” (Bhattacharyya, 2010:52) is absolutely essential.         
 
The aims of this chapter are thus threefold: to present a brief account of the emergence and 
trajectory of Left politics in colonial Bengal and subsequently in West Bengal; to review the 
dominant discourse of the Left Front that has emerged since 1977 (although due to the 
quantity of literature available, the focus will be on its shortfalls) and to review a different 
analytical construct - the party-society thesis (Bhattacharyya, 2009, 2010) - which will 
provide the research with the point of departure for its own narrative.  
 
2.2 A Brief History of Left Politics in Unified and West Bengal    
 
West Bengal is the 13
th
 largest state
28
 of the Indian Union, with a population of 
approximately 91 million
29
. It is one of only three states where the Indian Left parties have 
had repeated electoral success (Kerala and Tripura being the other two, though neither of 
them display similar patterns of concerted political stability). However, while West Bengal 
became synonymous as a Left bastion owing to its uninterrupted (and unprecedented) Left 
rule post-1977, historically, the growth of communism was not the sole political identity of 
                                                          
28
 Geographical area - 88752 sq km; see Appendix 2 for other demographic details. 
29
 2011 census data (Source: http://india.gov.in/knowindia/state_uts.php?id=29); accessed 16
th
 November 
2012. 
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the state, rather only one aspect of a complicated political situation that has existed since the 
1850s. As Marcus Franda writes: 
 
Politicization of Bengalis into modern forms of organization began almost from the 
inception of British rule in India, and was quickly accentuated...by the first partition 
of Bengal in 1905 and the shifting of the capital of British India from...Calcutta 
to...New Delhi in 1912. In response to these two events Bengal’s political leadership 
launched a number of political movements, some directed against the British, some 
directed against the Gandhians in the Indian National Congress, almost all seeking to 
reclaim the dominant position in India’s political life that Bengal had attained in the 
late nineteenth century. Political activity reached a peak of intensity in the early 
1940s, when Calcutta and its surrounding areas were being occupied by more than 
200,000 Allied troops, the Muslim League was agitating for partition, and the 
Congress and Marxist-left parties were engaged in a Quit India movement that drew 
heavily on the terrorist tradition of Bengali political life (1969:279).  
 
 
Bengal was among the most affected provinces when India attained Independence, its 
partition leading to the formation of ‘West Bengal’, followed by an influx of more than five 
million refugees from East Pakistan over the next two decades (ibid.). It is therefore not 
surprising that many political movements originated in Bengal
30
. The state has been 
associated with various radical movements since the 1920s, which gradually laid the 
foundation for a steady political shift to the Left in the 1950s and 1960s. Some of the notable 
were the Anushilan and Jugantar movements in the 1920s, the nationalist movement under 
Subhash Chandra Bose
31
 in the 1930s, tebhaga in the 1940s, and naxalbari in the 1970s. In 
addition to a growing culture of Leftism, the Congress Party, despite being the only major 
national party, failed to establish itself in Bengal
32
. This further helped the communist 
movement to flourish there.   
                                                          
30
 Since 1947, more than 50 parties have contested in elections in West Bengal. 
31
 Bose was also the founder of the All India Forward Block - a leftwing nationalist party and a partner in the 
Left Front coalition. 
32
 See John Gallagher (1973) for a discussion on the decline of the Congress in Bengal. 
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A complete review of the political history of Bengal is beyond the scope of this dissertation, 
but a brief overview of the growth of the Left parties and their rise to electoral prominence is 
necessary in order to appreciate the post-1977 political patterns
33
.  
 
2.2.1 The Three-Phase Party Formation and the Decade of Chaos 
 
The Communist Party of India (CPI), founded by M. N. Roy in the Soviet Union in 1921, 
from its beginning displayed an elitist character, possibly owing to the fact that its leadership 
was drawn from rich, intellectual and highly respected Bengali families, and its most 
consistent followers came from groups that were relatively well established in the social 
structure (Franda, 1971). While the growth of communist movements elsewhere in India 
depended considerably on support from low-status groups (for example, the Ezhava caste in 
Kerala), an elite leadership and following became one of the distinguishing features of 
Bengali communism. This unique course in the communist movement in Bengal is attributed 
to the Bengali bhadralok (literally meaning ‘respectable people’ or ‘gentlemen’) - an elite 
class of regional intelligentsia unique to the Bengali-speaking area. Franda describes them as: 
“[n]either a single class nor a single caste...a privileged minority most often drawn from 
the...highest castes...usually landed or employed in professional or clerical occupations 
(which they have maintained by caste and ritual proscriptions and by the avoidance of manual 
labor), very well educated, very proud of their language, their literacy, and their history” 
(ibid:7).    
 
Having previously enjoyed the highest level of prominence among Indian professional 
classes and government circles, by the early twentieth century bhadralok influence had 
waned considerably; this played a crucial role in their eventual turn to Marxism as a political 
                                                          
33
 See Mallick, 1994, for a critical analysis of Indian Communism. 
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creed in the 1930s, attracted by its rejection of electoral politics, denigration of orthodox 
Hindu ideas (at a time when Bengalis were becoming increasingly disenchanted with the 
Hindu revivalism via the shift of the nationalist movement to the Hindi-speaking Brahmanic 
heartland), and promise of a modern society not only free from imperial control, but where 
the intellectual would have a more prominent position over the trader and merchant
34
. The 
CPI first experienced effective growth after a successful recruitment drive among the 
bhadralok terrorists (political activists since the partition of Bengal in 1905) in the jails of 
Bengal in the 1930s. They were later joined by Bengali intellectuals returning from England, 
young university graduates, and eventually large numbers of urban Bengali bhadralok living 
in and around Calcutta (ibid:13). In 1946 the CPI saw the election of two MLAs (Members of 
Legislative Assembly) and, despite factional struggles, won more than a third of the votes in 
both the 1957 and 1962 state assembly elections along with other smaller Left parties.   
 
The internal differences of the CPI ultimately led to a split between its moderate and Left 
factions in 1964, when 32
35
 of 65 members withdrew from the CPI to form the Communist 
Party of India (Marxist) (CPIM). The origin of the split is usually attributed to a series of 
regional, national and international events in the 1950s. The two factions differed 
considerably over the issues of urban insurrection and guerrilla warfare, and while the 
intellectual leadership of the CPI owed ideological allegiance to the CPSU (Communist Party 
of Soviet Union), the deviating Left faction was attracted to the CCP’s (Chinese Communist 
Party) alternative model. They also differed on their assessment of the Nehru government; the 
moderates adopted a pro-Congress stance, influenced by the CPI’s recent impressive electoral 
records while the Left viewed this as siding with the bourgeois forces and publicly 
                                                          
34
 For a complete discussion on the bhadraloks see Broomfield (1968), Franda (1971) and Chatterjee (1997).  
35
 These members were primarily Bengali leaders who formed the organisational apparatus of the party in 
West Bengal. Key members included Pramode Das Gupta, Jyoti Basu, Hare Krishna Konar, Muzaffar Ahmed, 
Abdul Halim and Saroj Mukherjee.  
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condemned the party leadership. Other events that widened the gap between the factions were 
the Tibetan revolt and the first Sino-Indian border clashes (the Left refused to condemn the 
Chinese), the declaration of President’s rule in Kerala in 1959 (thus removing the earlier 
compulsion for both factions to work together in order to sustain the government in Kerala 
where the CPI had come to power in 1957 for the first time), and the food crisis in West 
Bengal (when they opposed each other on the issue of supporting Congress’s food 
policy).The split left the CPI considerably weaker, and within three years of its formation, the 
CPIM had replaced the CPI as the leading Left party in West Bengal
36
.  
1967 saw the beginning of the decade of chaos in West Bengal (Kohli, 1990:276). 
Theoretical differences aside, the CPIM, CPI and a number of other Left parties formed the 
first United Front coalition government which lasted under a year. It was followed by two 
months of Congress-led coalition, and then Presidential rule. After the 1969 assembly 
elections, the Left parties briefly formed a second United Front government, again followed 
by Presidential rule and another, also short-lived Congress-led coalition in 1971. It was only 
after the Bangladesh war in 1971 that Congress managed to return to power with a 
comfortable majority - albeit under allegations of serious electoral fraud. This Congress 
government ruled till 1975 when it was superseded by the National Emergency and normal 
democratic processes only resumed after the 1977 elections.  
 
                                                          
36
 See Appendices 3 and 4 for electoral records of the CPI and CPIM between 1951-1977.  
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Figure 2.1: Political Map of West Bengal
37
 
 
 
                                                          
37
 Source: http://www.mapsofindia.com/maps/westbengal/westbengal-district.htm; accessed 28
th 
January 
2013.  Paschim & Purba Medinipur, and Uttar & Dakshin Dinajpur refers to West & East Medinipur, and North 
and South Dinajpur respectively.  
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The two United Front experiments created difficult conditions for the CPIM, which now had 
to deal with serious factional alignment problems of its own with a number of factions within 
the party accusing the leadership of neo-revisionism. The criticisms intensified in the first 
few months of the 1967 United Front government and triggered organised resistance in the 
summer around the Naxalbari peasant agitation which eventually took the form of one of the 
most radical Left-wing movements in the country. Initially launched as a peasant movement, 
it soon started became sectarian (attacking all who refused to support) and adventurist 
(organising armed resistance, its party literature openly speaking of murdering landowners) in 
nature. The Naxalbari movement has continued to furnish substance for political debate in 
India ever since in the form of the much wider Naxalite movement. For the communist 
movement in India, “Naxalbari is somewhat of a watershed, for it furnished the rallying cry 
for a Maoist revolt that eventually led to the formation of India’s third Communist party” 
(Franda, 1971:162), the Communist Party of India-Marxist-Leninist (CPIML). The formation 
of the CPIML was announced in May 1969, its leadership derived from the younger members 
of the anti-revisionist CPIM faction and former members of both CPIM and CPI. Contrary to 
the CPIM/CPI, the CPIML rejected the “hoax of parliamentarianism”, and operated as an 
underground party, fighting to bring about an “immediate revolution...through revolutionary 
people’s war” (CPIML, 1969:4-16). Through militant mass action, agitation, and propaganda, 
the CPIML managed to gain a significant following in a relatively short span of time, 
particularly among urban Bengali youth, who had been brought up idolising a romantic 
legacy of the Bengali revolutionary spirit.        
 
The Naxalbari movement and the formation of the CPIML are vital chapters in the history of 
Indian communism (see Franda, 1969a; 1971 for in-depth discussion). The movement 
however was repressed violently by the state during the first half of the 1970s, and though a 
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large number of political organisations exist till date in many states whose roots can be traced 
back to the CPIML, most of them have abandoned the path of armed revolution, and retain 
very limited political authority (with the notable exception of the Communist Party of India – 
Maoist, which remains committed to armed struggle).  
 
A few further points need to be highlighted with regard to the decade of chaos and the two 
United Front governments. The United Front coalitions treated their stints in power as 
political experiments en route to socialism (Kohli, 1990) and the CPIM defined the task of 
the government as that of fomenting radical mobilization along a revolutionary line. In 
practice this led to:  
 
a two-prolonged political strategy; neutralizing the tendency of the state to be an 
agent of ‘class repression’ from above, and using its party organization to mobilize 
the lower classes from below. The CPIM repeatedly sought and eventually gained 
control over the ministries of labor, land and land revenue, and home (which 
controlled the police). An important aspect of the CPIM’s ruling strategy- an aspect 
that eventually would contribute heavily to the fall of the UF government - was to 
order the police not to interfere in ‘class struggles’. The CPIM thus neutralized the 
regional state apparatus as an agent of political order (ibid:277-78).  
 
Such class based fragmentation (with the tacit support of the state) led to dramatic labour 
problems in the urban/industrialized areas
38
, and political violence/riots became the order of 
the day. In rural areas, excessive land grabbing and forced redistribution led to numerous 
clashes, with a section of the CPIM leadership clearly favouring such practices as integral to 
the party’s revolutionary ideal. The violence showed no signs of abating even after the 
collapse of the first United Front coalition, but rather changed direction under severe state 
repression. The Congress coalition that followed the President’s rule was reported to be 
                                                          
38
 Lockouts and gheraos (a common practice of encircling the manager by a group of labourers and refusing to 
let him leave until their demands are met or some favourable decision is taken) became almost daily 
occurrences during this period. Between 1964 and 1967, labour-management disputes almost doubled, and 
union membership trebled, and the number of man-days lost owning to labour problems quadrupled (Kohli, 
1990:282).   
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infested with widespread rigging and fraud, with anti-social elements backed both by the 
police and the party unleashing severe atrocities on citizens, particularly supporters of the 
revolutionary Left.  
 
The 1977 post-Emergency West Bengal state assembly elections brought a new coalition to 
power. This marked the beginning of what eventually became an exception in Indian, and 
indeed the world’s political landscape - the longest-lived, democratically elected Communist 
government in the world - the CPIM led Left Front coalition government
39
.     
 
In summary, during 1967-77, West Bengal experienced what Kohli describes as a severe 
governability crisis - which marked a serious decay in the political culture of not only the 
state, but the country as a whole. The main features of this decay were coalition instability, 
policy ineffectiveness and escalating political violence. However, post-1977 most political 
commentators, including Kohli, praised the Left Front rule for exactly the opposite - a 
peaceful social environment, absence of caste/communal conflicts, and orderly functioning of 
political life. However, as argued in the following chapters, while the governance crisis 
considerably abated and democratic processes were revived, the Left Front (and particularly 
the CPIM) developed its own unique operational characteristics to push forward its political 
agenda over the next three decades, albeit in much subtler ways than before.  
 
2.2.2 The Early Years of the Left Front Regime  
Bhattacharyya (2009) divides the Left Front regime (1977-2011) into four distinct periods, 
the first two of which are the focus of this section. The first (1977-mid-1980) was 
                                                          
39
 The Left Front is a nine party coalition, the CPIM being the majority party. Other members are: All India 
Forward Block (FB), Communist Party of India (CPI), Revolutionary Socialist Party (RSP), Marxist Forward Block 
(MFB), Revolutionary Bengali Congress (RBC), Democratic Socialist Party (DSP), Revolutionary Communist Party 
of India (RCPI) and West Bengal Socialist Party (WBSP). The Left Front returned to power for a seventh 
consecutive time in 2006, and finally lost to the TMC-Congress coalition in 2011.    
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characterised by a large scale land reform programme and institution of a system of local 
governance - the panchayats or panchayati-raj - across the state. The second (mid-1980-
early/mid-1990) was relatively short, but marked by significant growth in agricultural 
production. The third and fourth periods, from mid-1990-2006 and 2006-2011 respectively, 
are explored in Chapters 4, 5 and 6.  
The twin initiatives of land/tenancy reforms and panchayati-raj, along with rapid agricultural 
growth, are hailed as the hallmarks of the regime’s pro-poor development policy, as these 
made “West Bengal’s rural political economy – marked by a small-peasant economy and a 
dense partisan network – distinctly different from the rest of the country” (ibid:59). A 
substantial literature exists on all of these, and therefore only a brief summary will be 
provided here
 40
. 
 
On coming to power in 1977, the Left Front announced a 36 point Common Minimum 
Programme (CMP), promising “radical changes in the land reform laws to do away with all 
forms of concentration of land holdings and to give substantial relief to bargadars 
(sharecroppers) and landless peasants and agricultural workers” (CMP, point 16, quoted in 
Ghosh, 1981). The changes were indeed radical in both design and impact, and distinguished 
the programme not only from its earlier versions
41
, but also similar attempts in other Indian 
states. Its salient features were: 
 
 
1. Quick recording of sharecroppers’ names and securing legal entitlements via 
Operation Barga, the main administrative component of the programme. It was a 
massive drive to “(1) identify areas with a concentration of sharecroppers; (2) to send 
                                                          
40
 For detailed descriptions of these institutional reforms, see SenGupta, (1979), Kohli (1987), Nossiter (1988), 
Webster (1992), Lieten (1992), Mallick (1993), Banerjee and Ghatak (1995),  
41
 The two United Front governments had also initiated land reform programmes, but with limited results. See 
Lieten (1992), Franda (1968, 1969), and Mallick (1993) for detailed discussions. 
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in teams of bureaucrats and members of the party...to meet, inform and the politicize 
the sharecroppers; and (3) eventually, after verification...register the sharecroppers as 
legal” (Kohli, 1987:124)..  
2. Distribution of already available ceiling surplus vested lands (commonly referred as 
benami) among the landless and the land-poor rural workers with the active co-
operation of the panchayat (Bandopadhyay, 2007:61). 
3. Drive to detect and vest more ceiling surplus lands through quasi-judicial 
investigative machinery with the help of rural workers’ organisations and 
panchayats
42
 (ibid.). 
 
 
Begun in 1978, by 1982 the government had successfully registered about 1.2 million 
sharecroppers (Mallick, 1993) and vested 1.25 million acres of agricultural land – one quarter 
of the all India total (Nossiter, 1988:140). This was considered by many as nothing short of 
spectacular, especially in comparison to the previous three decades when the total number of 
sharecroppers registered was a mere 60,000 (Kohli, 1987). Schneider stated in his report to 
the Club of Rome (1988) that the Left Front had carried out a genuine land reform exercise, 
and Nossiter described it as “a truly remarkable accomplishment” (1988:124). 
 
In addition to land reforms, the regime also had an ideological commitment to decentralise 
decision-making and encourage popular participation: 
 
The panchayats, which were controlled by the rural exploiters, instead of being 
utilised for the purpose of rural welfare, as they should have been, were converted 
into instruments of exploitation...Through the panchayats, the Left Front intends to 
unleash the initiative of the rural masses and inculcate in them a spirit of self-
confidence so that a mass movement is gradually built up against age-old exploitation 
(People’s Democracy, 4th June 1978:1-5). 
 
                                                          
42
 See Bandopadhyay (2007) for details.  
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The Left Front made the West Bengal Panchayat Act (1973) operative
43
 in 1977, and the first 
panchayat elections took place in 1978. The regime won an overwhelming majority
44
, and 
this victory marked the onset of arguably its biggest achievement - genuine reform of local 
governance institutions, ensuring and encouraging effective decentralisation though popular 
participation. Previously, development planning “below the state level was a disjointed and 
somewhat uncoordinated affair, prone to unevenness and frequent organisational breakdown” 
(Webster, 1992:33), but post-1978 the panchayats were directly involved in all development 
schemes, worked in close co-operation with the funding departments, and also had 
representation in other development agencies. By 1985, all other autonomous agencies were 
tied to the panchayat framework, and this took the  
 
operation and role of the panchayats into the mainstream of politics and planning in 
the state so that today they possess an administrative and political authority radically 
different from that inherited by the Left Front government at the time of its election. 
The fact that this framework has been implemented stands as a symbol of the 
ideological intent of the Left Front parties and the CPIM in particular (ibid.:35-36).  
 
 
The panchayati-raj succeeded in bringing government from its previously rarefied status 
down to a more visible and accessible level, and thus made the rural population more 
politically attentive. The widespread support for this system ensured an overwhelming 
majority for the CPIM in all panchayat elections over the next fifteen years.      
 
There were also significant improvements in agricultural productivity and conditions of the 
rural poor. Following decades of stagnation in agricultural production
45
, West Bengal now 
achieved the fastest growth rates in agricultural production in the country; from 1981-82 to 
                                                          
43
 The Act provided for direct elections to the panchayat bodies and introduced a three-tier system: the gram 
panchayat (village level), panchayat samiti (block level) and the zilla parishad (district level). Although passed 
in 1973, it went unused by the earlier Congress government. The Left Front also brought in a series of 
amendments aimed at structural reforms of the panchayat system. Four amendments were passed in 1978, 
and fifteen more over the next 10 years. 
44
 See Appendix 5 for results.  
45
 See Bose (1993, 1999) and Boyce (1987) for further details. 
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1991-92 its annual growth rate was an impressive 6.9% (Sen and Sengupta, 1995). The 
proportion of the rural population living in poverty fell dramatically to well below the 
national average (see Table 2.1) and mean per capita consumption also rose steadily (Ozler 
and Datt, 1996). It is commonly believed that an improved agricultural situation had “a 
positive impact on the rate of decline of important aspects of rural poverty. Factors that led to 
growth also contributed towards greater participation in the growth process by the poor. 
Wages of agricultural labourers closely shadowed changes in output, and redistributive land 
reforms further widened the base over which benefits of the growth were shared” (Gazdar 
and Sengupta, 1999:85).  
 
Table 2.1: Head-Count Ratio of Rural Poverty in West-Bengal  
 
Year West Bengal India 
1973 60.51 55.36 
1978 56.25 50.60 
1983 49.21 45.31 
1987 34.10 38.81 
1988 34.87 39.60 
1992 28.15 43.47 
Source: Ozler and Datt; 1996  
 
Agricultural growth and general economic well-being had a positive impact on other human 
development indicators. Infant mortality rates in the state fell from 95 per 1000 in 1981-83 to 
72 per 1000 in 1990-92, the fifth lowest in the country (Gazdar and Sengupta, 1999:75-76) 
and literacy rates for the rural over-sevens were also well above the national average by the 
early 1990s: 68% (male) and 47% (female) against the national average of 64% (male) and 
39% (female) (Census, 1991)
 46
.     
 
                                                          
46
 See Gazdar and Sengupta (1999) for a much broader discussion on well being. 
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In reality, these claims were often contested. The arguments of reform-led growth often rest 
on the assumption that land redistribution has a positive impact on agricultural growth - as 
small family-run farms are then able to achieve higher productivity than large labour-hiring 
ones (Dasgupta, 1993). However, on closer scrutiny - as Harriss (1993) argues - this 
argument finds little support. Though the land reforms were impressive in terms of the 
number of landless families benefited, the total amount of land redistributed was less than 
6.5% of the state total cultivated. Mukherji and Bandopadhyay (1993) similarly claim that 
land reforms were over-rated as a possible explanation of agricultural growth. The key engine 
of growth, according to Harriss, was significant development in groundwater irrigation, 
which was not a result of public/co-operative action, but rather made possible by 
entrepreneurial individuals responding to market demands. Mallick (1993), concluded 
(perhaps rather harshly) that the CPIM could achieve neither a radical redistribution of land, 
nor that its record in registering the sharecroppers was any better than either the British or 
Congress
47
. Sweeping attacks were also launched by Ratan Khasnabis and Ashok Rudra on 
the CPIM’S ideological and theoretical premises as early as 1981. Khasnabis accused the 
party of having compromised shamelessly with the state structure, thereby reducing an 
“erstwhile revolutionary programme to an ordinary reformist one...”, the political will of the 
party being “conditioned and constrained by the will to serve the institutions of the class 
society where they run the government” (Khasnabis, 1981:A44-45). Rudra argued in his 
widely cited article One Step Forward, Two Steps Backward that the CPIM had achieved 
nothing more than just maintaining the same trends as experienced during the Congress 
government, and in doing so had betrayed “the most exploited and most oppressed section of 
the rural masses” (Rudra, 1981:A-61).   
                                                          
47
 Harriss provides a strong criticism of Mallick’s argument on the grounds that it accepts informants’ 
statements at face value, and allows their interpretations of data to be influenced by their ideological 
presuppositions. Compared to the extensive analyses of Kohli or Nossiter, Mallick draws his conclusions from 
highly selective data and his arguments are largely conjectural. See Harriss (1993) for details.  
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On the whole, as Rogaly, Harriss-White et al (1999) point out, there are claims that both 
oversell (e.g., Lieten, 1996) and deride (e.g., Mallick, 1993) the importance of institutional 
reforms among the accumulated literature. A balanced opinion comes from Harriss, who 
argues that:  
 
even this regime's keenest sympathisers would not claim that it has offered, in 
practice, more than modestly reformist social democratic policies, but its record is still 
a matter of considerable interest. It has appeared to a good many observers, some of 
them (such as the World Bank) not at all sympathetic in general to Left-wing regimes, 
that the Left Front government has been remarkably effective, in the context of South 
Asian rural society, in bringing about changes which have been of benefit to poor 
rural people (1993:1237).  
 
At the very least, the regime has demonstrated the redistributive possibilities within India's 
contemporary democracy via its land reform programme. 
  
Criticisms aside, most early observers were unsurprised at West Bengal’s transformation 
from one of India’s most chaotic states in the 1960s to one of its better-governed ones over 
the course of the 1980s. It was undeniable, writes Kohli, “that a reform-oriented, disciplinary 
party has generated moderately effectively government in West Bengal” (1990. p294-96). A 
stable coalition government, better growth record than most other states, a distinctively 
superior redistribution record, and above all a restoration of political order, without 
repression, were seen to be the main achievements of the regime (Kohli, 1990.).  
 
 
2.3 West Bengal as a Special Case? A Critique of Kohli’s Governability 
Thesis 
 
Turning towards theoretically informed approaches, the first prominent discourse of the Left 
Front is based on Kohli’s work (1987; 1990; 1994), along with others such as Lieten (1992), 
Nossiter (1988), and Webster (1992). Their reading of post-1977 West Bengal provides not 
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only a detailed description of the complex socio-political realities of the state, but also a 
coherent analytical framework of the political variables at play.  
Kohli’s analysis of West Bengal is situated in his description of a governability crisis which 
plagued most Indian states in the mid-1960s. A fragmented and ineffective state apparatus, 
erosion of order and authority, and “widespread activism outside of the established political 
channels that often leads to political violence” (1990:5) all characterised this crisis. In an 
attempt to locate the key variables responsible for this breakdown, Kohli emphasised the role 
of political elites and the decay of political organisation, and in particular the organisational 
decline of the Congress, thus eroding the existing patterns of authority that had sustained 
political order in the 1950s and early 1960s. The result of this decay, Kohli summarised, were 
twofold - violent politicisation of social conflict, with political parties allying with criminal 
forces and using state apparatus for partisan interests; and a growing vacuum at the core of 
India’s political space, where individual leaders came to replace institutionalised mediatory 
structures of power with partisan behaviour and petty cronyism
48
.  
 
Given the nature of the crisis, at the heart of the rectification process should therefore have 
been a rebuilding of political parties, replacing violence with political debate. This could only 
be brought about by a vision of alternative growth, and redistribution based social conditions. 
It is in this respect that Kohli sees West Bengal as something of a special case. The state was 
plagued by the governability crisis in the 1960s and 70s, but after coming to power in 1977 
the Left Front not only managed to reverse the trends of breakdown and growing disorder, 
but also honoured its commitment towards institutional reforms by revitalising the 
panchayati-raj and initiating large-scale land reforms, brought a spectacular rise in 
                                                          
48
 For a detailed discussion of the crises of governability thesis, see Kohli (1990), Chapter 2, and Williams 
(2001). 
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agricultural production and managed to reduce poverty levels significantly. Kohli called these 
results nothing short of dramatic and exceptional, and wrote:  
 
The CPM has thus achieved what no other Indian political force has been able to 
achieve as yet, namely, comprehensive penetration of the countryside without 
depending on large landowners. From this perspective, it may not be an exaggeration 
to argue that the politics of West Bengal are undergoing a fundamental structural 
change. While the class structure remains intact, not only has institutional penetration 
been achieved but also institutional power has been transferred from the hands of the 
dominant propertied groups to a politicized lower strata (1987:113). 
 
The success of the coalition rested on the organisational strength of the CPIM itself. The 
party, Kohli argued, reformed and rebuilt itself as a disciplined, left-of-centre party with both 
the capacity and the political will to push for redistributive reforms. It built up a network of 
loyal and disciplined cadres and maintained a significant organisational coherence through 
the principles of democratic centralism. As a result, not only did the CPIM manage to fill the 
organisational vacuum left by the collapse of the Congress party in West Bengal, but it was 
also able to create a truly modern political institution within a relatively short space of time. 
Four political characteristics in particular are important in understanding the CPM’s reformist 
capacities:  
 
First, the rule is coherent. A unified leadership allows not only clear policy thinking, 
but also sustained political attention to developmental tasks. Second, the ideological 
goals as well as the disciplined organizational arrangements of the CPM do not allow 
direct access to the upper classes… Third, the CPM’s organizational arrangement is 
both centralized and decentralized. While the decision-making power is concentrated, 
local initiative and knowledge can be combined within the framework of central 
directives. And fourth, the CPM’s ideology is flexible enough to … [make] the 
prospect of reformism tolerable for the socially powerful (Kohli, 1987:143).  
 
The governability thesis provides one of the most useful analytical templates for studying 
West Bengal, particularly during the early years of the Left Front regime. As noted in earlier 
sections, Kohli’s observations on the institutional initiatives of the regime have been 
reinforced by others such as Nossiter (1988), Lieten (1992), Webster (1992) and Harriss 
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(1993). However, most of this work was based on field research completed during the early-
mid 1980s, when the panchayats were newly constituted and the land reforms in full swing. 
While most of the observations were at least partially true at the time, the Left Front outgrew 
the characterisation of good governance over the next fifteen years. It is therefore necessary 
to re-examine this narrative - as Williams (2001) argues - in light of the regime’s 
development records and operational characteristics during the 1990s and 2000. Such a 
characterisation is crucial in order to appreciate how the Left parties (and CPIM in particular) 
reacted to the drastically changed national policy environment in the 1990s.  
 
The intellectual emphasis of Kohli’s narrative is on establishing the importance of 
independent political variables - an exercise which is often neglected in structural 
functionalist or Marxist accounts of society and state as dependent on a complex array of 
socioeconomic forces, eclipsing the agency of political institutions (Kohli, 1990:28). The 
institutional narratives, on the other hand, engage in a crucial theory-building exercise, 
treating society and state as complex and multi-dimensional categories. Projects that address 
the gap in the current academic literature on the question of political agency in developing 
countries are important and necessary (Williams, 2001). It is, however, also important to 
maintain a balance and style of analysis - thus reducing the risk of overemphasising certain 
political variables and neglecting others. The traditional discourses on West Bengal suffer 
from this precise problem. In their eagerness to establish CPIM as the key enabler of political 
change, authors such as Kohli overemphasise the party’s organisational coherence and 
marginalise the rest of society. Williams identifies three specific areas where this problem 
occurs. 
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Coherent Organisation vs. Translatory Character 
 
The overarching emphasis of the governability thesis is the explanation of how the CPIM 
with its coherent and well disciplined organisational arrangements established a system of 
good governance in West Bengal. This organisational coherence is believed to provide an 
efficient mechanism to effectively disseminate both political ideas and public policy from 
‘top’ to ‘bottom’. What tends to be ignored in this analysis is that a state is comprised of 
various arenas and interest groups, and the nature and effectiveness of a political regime 
cannot be judged purely from the actions of those at the top (Migdal, Kohli et al, 1994:11-18; 
quoted in Williams, 2001). The first problem of the narrative thus lies in its neglect of these 
various groups, as it focuses solely on political parties. Secondly, the true test of a political 
regime is not in its own organisational discipline, but in how well it manages to integrate and 
work together with these various forces, achieving integrated domination (Migdal et al, 
1994)
49
. It is this very exercise of joining interest groups together that is a key source of a 
state’s power. While Kohli emphasises the coherent rule of the CPIM as the only form of 
“‘glue’ that will hold integrated domination together” (Williams, 2001:606), how the CPIM 
operates on the ground is a function of several acts of translation during the transmission of 
ideas/policies through its hierarchy. As a result, instead of an unchanged downwards 
transmission of instructions, this repeated “Chinese Whispers” results in not only changed 
instructions, and consequently, changed outcomes.  
 
 
 
                                                          
49 Migdal defines ‘integrated domination’ as: “The state, whether as an authoritative legal system, or a 
coercive mechanism of the ruling class, is at the center of the process of creating and maintaining social 
control. Its various components are integrated and coordinated enough to play the central role at all levels in 
the existing hegemonic domination. That domination includes those areas of life regulated directly by the 
state, as well as the organizations and activities of society that are authorized by the state within given limits” 
(Migdal, Kohli et al, 1994: 27). 
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Compartmentalisation of Societal Forces 
 
As a result of overemphasising the organisational capacity of political parties, other societal 
forces tend to be marginalised in the institutional accounts. Williams points out how Kohli 
continues to highlight “the ‘autonomous’ significance of political structures and process” 
(Kohli, 1990:19), and perceives the rest of the societal forces as problems that the political 
system needs to deal with. The fundamental difficulty with this approach is that “it posits a 
rather too neat separation of ‘political institutions’ from ‘society’: parties aggregate and 
accommodate a set of pre-defined forces and interests ‘out there’ in society. Among other 
problems this ignores political parties’ role in creating interest groups” (Williams, 2001:607). 
For example, Kohli only treats violence as a form of outcome when societal pressures are not 
channelled through political parties. Once they are, society is considered to be peaceful. The 
absence of large-scale agrarian as well as communal conflicts in West Bengal is therefore 
interpreted as the CPIM being able to successfully represent all forms of social interests. But 
violence - as Williams argues - is a constitutive part of the process of creating interest groups 
by political parties, not necessarily a symptom of party failure. Many cases of covert political 
violence have been reported in West Bengal over the decades
50
 which corroborate Williams’s 
observations. Also missing from the institutional account is the case of state-sponsored 
violence, and though it seems contrary to the political ideas of a Left government, the recent 
incidents of Singur and Nandigram testify otherwise.  
 
Absence of a Cultural Discourse 
 
Williams’s third and final criticism of Kohli’s account is based on the lofty version it ascribes 
to - “a vision of ‘proper’ political discourse where ‘right versus left’ debates are appropriate, 
but the ‘populism’ of appealing to alternative bases of identity, such as caste, is not” (ibid.). 
                                                          
50
 For example, the Marichjhnapi, Anandamargi and Suchpur massacres. See Namboodri (2006).   
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Williams argues that such westernised ideas are not relevant to an analysis of India’s political 
history, or indeed, in any post-colonial context. In the case of West Bengal, while such ideas 
might concur with the visions of urbanised Bengali intelligentsia, it does not reflect the 
complete picture. “The perception of West Bengal as a ‘modern’ society where political 
parties can organise on class lines, and the ‘primordial loyalties’ of caste, ethnicity and 
religion are residual categories... is a highly selective one. West Bengal’s political discourse 
is, inevitably, inseparable from its wider culture: ideas of class are important here, but in no 
way crowd out ‘primordial loyalties’, and ‘good governance’ takes on local meanings 
drawing on a variety of sources” (ibid.).  
 
In light of these criticisms, it is evident that an alternative assessment of the regime is both 
possible and necessary. While the central themes of the governability thesis would definitely 
contribute to any such assessment, the translatory characters within the CPIM, creation of 
interest groups through political competition and a complete political discourse embedded in 
the local culture of the state all need to be re-examined.  
        
2.4 From the Polity to the Party: Political Identity in West Bengal   
 
Political discourses built around the Left Front over the first fifteen years remained 
dominated by narratives of its institutional initiatives. Debates and criticisms, though 
increasingly forthcoming, were restricted to methodological and technical aspects, and did 
not provide an alternative intellectual hypothesis.  
 
It was only in the late 1990s that a new line of argument emerged, focusing on a culture of 
political mediation embedded in the operational character of the CPIM. It is not party 
discipline or ideology - it was argued - but rather in the “party’s mediation between the 
government and the population in a field of popular transactions” that the secret of the 
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durability of the regime lies (Bhattacharyya, 2009:60). According to this new argument, well-
orchestrated party machinery was not a channel to bring governance to the people, but an 
instrument for mediation aimed at strengthening its electoral position.  
 
The concept of political agency as a mediator of popular transactions is based on Partha 
Chatterjee’s description of political society (1997, 2004, 2008). Following an increasing 
“governmentalization of the state”51 in the 20th century, Chatterjee argues that a new set of 
conceptual connections has emerged in politics in addition to the classical associational forms 
of civil society with nation-states as per democratic political theory. This new line connects 
“population to government agencies pursuing multiple policies of security and welfare” 
(Chatterjee, 2004:37), and gives rise to a new form of political relationship between the State 
and its population. These new relationships and processes constitute the political society. 
 
Examining the Indian context, it is clear that the classical ideas of popular sovereignty 
embedded in the Constitutional depiction of the relationship between the State and civil 
society fall short of ensuring an adequate representation for all sections of the population. 
Many population groups (especially the poor and marginal sections) continue to remain 
outside the elitist realm of civil society and the juridical sanctity of private property due to 
lack of education, wealth and associated social and cultural capital. However “as populations 
within the territorial jurisdiction of the State, they have to be looked after and controlled by 
various government agencies” (ibid:39). This act of looking after establishes a new form of 
political association between the population and the state - which does not conform to the 
Constitutional standards - and is therefore a point of departure from standardised 
associational forms of civil society with nation-states. This is the domain of political society, 
which constitutes the “poor and marginal population groups which – in absence of citizens’ 
                                                          
51
 Chatterjee defines the governmentalization of the state as the domain of policy increasingly reaching out to 
larger sections of the population (2004:34-35).  
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rights – protect their livelihood demands along the lines of communities (not primordial but 
strategic solidarities in response to concrete governmental policies) as they negotiate with the 
state and the civil society” (Bhattacharyya, 2009:60). A successful negotiation with 
governmental agencies (in order to protect or avail their livelihood demands) therefore has to 
be via an expression of solidarity and number, in the hope that this will give them a common 
identity, significant enough for the government to recognise them as a legitimate community 
for which the state is responsible. Even if marginal, once a population group manages to 
legitimise themselves as such a ‘category’, they can then start to negotiate their entitlements 
with the state and civil society. This is how the political society functions (ibid.). 
 
2.4.1 From Political-Society to Party-Society 
 
The idea of political society can be slightly recast in seeing how the transactional spaces 
between the state and the margins have come to be constructed in West Bengal. At its core, 
the concept of politics of the fringe is about widening the arena of political negotiations - 
going beyond urban civil societies - and engaging all forms of marginal groups of the 
population. The transactional spaces where different parties compete to offer the best forms 
of representation can be constructed through a multitude of channels such as caste, class, 
religion, ethnicity and even civil societal associations. The key enablers of this process are, of 
course, the political parties, who spearhead wider negotiations (and associated political 
mobilizations) prompted by electoral considerations
52
. The degree and sustenance of various 
negotiations is a direct function of the organisational coherence of the individual parties. 
  
It is in this context that the idea of a political society needs some rethinking in West Bengal. 
Transactional spaces between the state and the fringe under the Left Front have gradually 
                                                          
52
 It is interesting to note, as Chatterjee points out, that such proliferation of activities in the arena of political 
society is often criticised in progressive elite circles. (ibid:48).   
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come to be dominated by a single form - political allegiance and association. Chatterjee’s 
description of a political society emphasises the importance of co-operation based on shared 
interests, and assumes such co-operation as a valid basis of entering into a negotiation with 
the state. But in West Bengal, no negotiation is allowed, or even recognised, unless it is 
backed by a recognisable party allegiance or has a distinct party identity of its own. So 
entrenched is this practice in the political culture of the state, that all parties, irrespective of 
size or strength, are compelled to conform to it. It is, however, the Left parties - especially the 
CPIM - that have been most successful in “its day-to-day management of the...society with 
the help of a well-orchestrated, locally embedded and vertically connected party-machinery” 
(Bhattacharyya, 2009:60). Obviously, local governance institutions (the panchayats in 
particular) cannot escape this degree of politicization and become vulnerable to strong 
partisan incursions, eroding their autonomy and independence. It is this specific form of 
sociability that Bhattacharyya (ibid.) calls the party-society - a specific form of political 
society in the West Bengal countryside - where the validity of negotiations is pre-determined 
by political identities of the population.     
 
The concept of the party-society is rooted in Bhattacharyya’s work (2004, 2009, 2010), where 
he draws upon empirical evidence from political change in six villages in the state. The basic 
premise is: it is the production and sustenance of a unique social environment in West 
Bengal, particularly in the countryside, that took shape under the Left Front; an environment 
where spaces of popular transaction and negotiation outside the realm of urban civil society 
came to be constructed largely on the basis of an individual’s or community’s party-identity.     
2.4.2 The Perpetration and Consolidation of the Party-Society  
By definition, the party-society exists outside the realm of civil society and constitutes mainly 
marginal groups at the fringe. It is therefore only natural that it has its roots among the rural 
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poor - farmers, sharecroppers, landless peasants and agricultural workers, Muslims (not 
because of their religious minority status, but because the Muslim community forms a largely 
backward/deprived section of society in West Bengal), and the tribal population. Those who 
have a privileged socio-economic status manage to find loopholes within the party rule or 
make some arrangements with it. However, while it may be straightforward to identify who 
constitutes the party-society, how it came to perpetrate and consolidate itself among these 
groups demands an explanation.  
Firstly, unlike most other states, West Bengal has remained relatively free of communal 
disharmony since partition. This, Bhattacharyya asserts, is because the traditional 
‘flashpoints’ of caste, class, ethnic or religious groupings have never been of any special 
interest to the Lefts, or any other major political party in rural West Bengal. As a result, 
popular transactions naturally assume a political mode as the sole remaining criterion.  
 
Secondly, Bhattacharyya also points out the complete institutional control enjoyed by the 
CPIM post-1977. The dual policy plank of the regime - land reforms and the panchayati-raj - 
were critical legislative steps, and much ahead of the state of affairs elsewhere in India. 
However, contrary to popular perception, the enactment of this legislation faced stiff 
opposition from those facing losses (in the form of revenue, power or land ownership) - such 
as local chieftains, lower bureaucracy and the landed class. This opposition demonstrates the 
limits of traditional legislative procedures, as even though the initiatives did ensure a greater 
good, the combined opposition would have cast a serious doubt over its success had the 
government adhered to legislative modalities alone. The CPIM overcame this by stepping 
beyond the boundaries of straightforward legislative governance and began to act as “genuine 
custodians of the legal rights of the beneficiaries... [as] it soon became evident that reform 
laws do not work unless backed by a robust political will...at the ground level” (2009: 54). 
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This political will, or the act of custodianship, took the form of maintaining a constant vigil 
over rural society using a network of well-disciplined party cadres, entrusted with the task of 
ensuring proper implementation of these initiatives, by force if necessary, as the opposition 
was also often brutal
53
. Such a strategy required party cadres to be located at the ground at all 
times. With the largest and the best organisational machinery among all the Left parties, this 
was no problem for the CPIM, and it managed to establish a significant presence in the 
countryside within the first term of its rule.    
While the democratic credentials of such social vigilance may be doubtful, the CPIM did 
manage to translate its overwhelming presence in the countryside into general social 
acceptance, as the poor truly came to perceive the party as the genuine custodian of their 
rights. This perception went a long way to gaining the party its pro-poor image and the Left 
Front the praiseworthy tagline of government of the poor. However, this popular presence 
was not restricted to monitoring governance initiatives, as with almost exclusive control over 
all local institutions, local party figureheads started to extend their custodianship into every 
aspect of village life. Within a few years the local party cadres and figureheads became the 
only mediating channel between local communities and the state/official bureaucracy. As a 
result, “the social and political interaction in the village changed substantially. Now political 
parties, assuming centrality in the rural public life, foreshadowed other actors” (ibid.). This 
also inculcated a tendency among party workers to function as moral guardians of society, in 
both the public and private spheres. As a result, “partisan contestation on almost every 
political issue is not only frequent here, rather more significantly, all types of 
opposition...(familial, social or cultural) tend rapidly to assume partisan forms” (ibid: 53). 
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 Bhattacharyya provides an interesting quote from an old landless labourer to explain how the political will 
actually manifested itself at ground level: the party had to operate with “lathi (sticks), guns and flags”, 
symbolising the use of force, violence, political rhetoric and persuasion against all opposition. This was indeed 
the modus operandi of the CPIM across the state to ensure (initially) implementation of legislative reforms, 
and (eventually) all kinds of administration and political decisions, as the two were often intertwined.      
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The political parties have become the only channel of negotiation for almost everything - be 
it private affairs such as marrying one’s daughter (the party might question the choice of 
groom depending on political allegiance), family feuds (property affairs), building a house 
(choice of contractor) and larger social/administrative issues such as getting a ration card 
(much quicker if you belonged to the ‘correct’ party), etc. Local sports and welfare clubs, all 
kinds of cultural associations, even schools and colleges were brought under the political 
umbrella and the party also began to enjoy the last word in all matters of right and wrong 
within local communities. By the mid-1980s, the party-society was firmly and exclusively 
entrenched in West Bengal.   
 
Together, these conditions have contributed to the production, perpetration, and sustenance of 
the party-society in rural, and even to a certain extent, urban areas of the state. The political 
parties were naturally at the forefront of it, given their dual role in providing a moral identity 
to a negotiating group and a monopoly over all channels of public transaction. Now, which 
party would manage to generate the maximum popular appeal largely depended on “its 
capacity to represent this community effectively and manage its regular demands almost on a 
daily basis. With the help of its well-orchestrated, locally embedded and vertically connected 
party machinery, the CPI(M) in West Bengal has been better than others in fulfilling this 
crucial function. This explains to a large extent the Left’s long and unbeaten innings in West 
Bengal” (ibid.).  
 
Examining the consolidation of the party-society, Bandyopadhyay (2009) highlights two more 
factors - a clientelist behaviour and a desire to repress all forms of opposition. While agreeing 
with the broader thrust of Bhattacharyya’s analysis, Bandyopadhyay states rather bluntly: 
 
One needs to be associated with a political party to live and sustain a livelihood in 
West Bengal...because here a party not only rules the state, but also the society. 
Almost all state institutions as well as civic associations are politically motivated and 
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party controlled, and so is the private sphere of one’s family. There is no way one can 
live outside a party’s shadow. Even if one suffers due to the party’s doings, he still 
has to run to the party for help in times of need...This party-dominated state of affairs 
is most pronounced in rural West Bengal, where the local party in power enjoys 
complete domination over the entire society (2009: 19-20, translated).  
 
He then proceeds to analyse these twin factors, which originate from a common source - 
control over panchayats.  
 
In post-1977 rural West Bengal, the panchayats emerged as the main foci of power. The 
party in power in a panchayat would practically rule over the entire locality, not only in its 
capacity as an interface between the higher echelons of bureaucracy and the local community, 
but also because of its role in dispensing developmental resources, consulting villagers on 
common issues, and breaking barriers between caste-localities. As previously mentioned, 
while the panchayati-raj had largely made governance a local affair, it eventually ended up 
meddling in all kinds of disputes, establishing an almost totalitarian control structure. Firstly, 
the panchayats had the ability to favour a selected few. This might take the form of allocating 
temporary jobs, facilitating loan applications, settling property disputes, etc. In an ideal world 
these would be objective administrative processes, but in reality relied on visible political 
support
54
. Thus develops a network and culture of clientelism - a process that eventually 
gives rise to a new class of political beneficiaries - while the people outside this network 
continue to survive in deprivation. This has been a key aspect of the political economy of 
West Bengal over the last thirty years, and is explored in further detail in Chapter 3. 
Secondly, a ruling party can also discriminate on the basis of political allegiance, or even just 
in the absence of visible political support. Examples include refusing different permissions 
and entitlements on obscure administrative grounds, disconnecting water/electricity and 
humiliating or even terrorising a family, especially the women, etc. The wrath of the ruling 
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 Visible political support could include organising/taking part in political rallies, campaigning, giving regular 
donations, etc.  
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party becomes especially severe in cases of known supporters of opposition parties, who are 
blacklisted to such an extent that no one would even marry them
55
. As Bandyopadhyay writes, 
“the rule of the party survives in rural West Bengal via these two hands - one distributing 
administrative favours, the other keeping a tight control over the population - some are 
brought in line by the first, some by the second” (ibid:22). The consolidation of the party-
society is thus complete
56
.        
 
Consolidation on its own does not guarantee sustenance of a system, unless it manages to 
garner some popular support. This is exactly where the success of the party-society lies. 
Though its style of operation may be dubbed paralegal, undemocratic or even amoral in civil 
society quarters, it gave the poor access to government institutions and a way to deal with the 
complex web of administrative regulations and judicial processes. “The underprivileged and 
illiterate rural population needed these parties to protect their rights and entitlements, 
achieved after a series of violent campaigns, if not legally then by the deployment of the 
force of number” (Bhattacharyya, 2010:54). The perpetration and consolidation of the party-
society was therefore perceived by significant sections of the rural poor as a favourable 
regime change, especially emerging from the decade of chaos. Bhattacharyya provides 
several examples of how it marked a distinct political phase in the life of rural peasants and 
their consequent change in perception - as they draw a clear distinction between the past and 
the time since the Left Front. The time since, or the new regime, with a garib-dorodi-dal (a 
party sympathetic to the poor) in power is “one of better wages, of moderate improvement in 
the living conditions and, most importantly, of the replacement of the landlord families by the 
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 As a result of such discrimination, even opposition supporters would rarely dare to express their allegiances 
in public. This sentiment is aptly expressed in an often heard Bengali proverb: jole theke kumirer saathe bibad 
na korai bhalo, which literally means one should not enter a fight with the crocodile while living in water.  
56
 A party can also predict and even ensure electoral success via these tactics, at least in the panchayat 
elections, as it knows exactly who its supporters are. This is the main reason that political parties have sure 
seats. All seats a party contests in are usually classified as to the probability of winning, with sure and 
impossible being the two ends of the continuum.  
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institutional order of the village panchayat” (ibid.). A similar conclusion is expressed in 
Majumdar’s (2009) study, where she notes that the change was perceived as “the eclipse of 
the erstwhile feudal ethos of power, yielding place to institutional politics with a broader 
social base”. 
 
2.5 Conclusion 
 
 
In this chapter, an effort has been made to contextualise the puzzle that has eclipsed the 
electoral decline of the Left Front - as spelled out at the onset - against the wider backdrop of 
the political history of the Indian Left movement leading up to the formation and early years 
of the Left Front regime. The two contrasting narratives that have dominated this discussion, 
the traditional/institutional account and the party-society thesis, both illuminate certain 
fundamental features of the CPIM/Left Front, especially regarding its institutional initiatives 
and operating styles. However, for the purpose of this research, it is the latter perspective that 
will help to build a theoretical platform allowing an enquiry into the internal contradictions 
that the party came to be besotted with during its attempt to negotiate a transition to a pro-
market mode of economic development. Therefore, the idea of the party-society needs to be 
explored further, particularly in regard to its ideological orientation and structures of 
mediation, before the contradictions can be examined. The next chapter engages in this 
theory-building exercise, taking its cue from two questions asked by Bhattacharyya 
(2010:53): “in what way does the party-society relate with Left wing politics in the state?” 
and “what are its modes of persuasion and coercion?” 
 
An attempt to answer these two questions would build an exhaustive characterisation of the 
CPIM (as the party had always dominated decision-making within the coalition, being its 
majority partner). Such a profile, created along the dual lines of ideology and tactics, would 
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then allow an understanding of how and to what extent the party eventually deviated once it 
commenced with the transition initiatives in the wake of economic liberalisation in India 
during the 1990s.            
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Chapter 3 
The Political Rationale of the CPIM 
 
“Every revolution...creates illusions and is conducted in the name of unrealizable ideals. 
During the struggle the ideas seem real enough...by the end they often cease to exist. Not so 
in case of a Communist revolution. Those who carry out the Communist revolution as well as 
those among the lower echelons persist in their illusions long after the armed struggle. 
Despite oppression, despotism, unconcealed confiscations, and privileges of the ruling 
echelons...the Communists- retain the illusion contained in their slogans...They cannot 
acknowledge this even when forced to execute a policy contrary to everything promised 
before and during the revolution. From their point of view, such acknowledgement would be 
an admission that the revolution was unnecessary. It would also be an admission that they 
had themselves become superfluous. Anything of that sort is impossible for them.” 
                                                                             (Djilas, 1957:50-52)      
3.1 Introduction 
 
Djilas made the above observation more than five decades ago, in his classic analysis of the 
Soviet communist order. Indian communism at the time was still in a formative stage, having 
just constituted the first ever government in Kerala, seven years prior to the formation of the 
CPIM, and a good decade before the Left parties had their first brush with governance in 
West Bengal. However, Djilas’ characterisation of the CPSU (Communist Party of the Soviet 
Union) not only remains pertinent for the Indian communist movement in general, but also 
provides a relevant framework to study the evolution of the CPIM. 
The previous chapter presented two contrasting perspectives on the political economic 
scenario of West Bengal. The traditional (or institutional) account remains the dominant 
perspective, and highlights a moderately effective form of governance, significant growth in 
agricultural productivity and a fall in rural poverty levels as the key features of Left Front 
rule. It also argues that the repeated electoral successes of the Left parties were a cumulative 
effect of these governance initiatives, complemented by a peaceful democratic environment. 
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However, most of these observations (emanating from the records of the early years of the 
Front) are rather outdated, especially in the context of the post-1990 transitional policy 
environment. A theoretical departure based on the second perspective - the party-society 
thesis - provides a deeper understanding by shifting the focus of analysis to a party (primarily 
CPIM) devised strategy of effective political mediation and negotiation in the day-to-day 
management of the lives of the poor and marginal groups. Such mechanisms, often executed 
through informal and even paralegal means, made the political economy, as well as the 
governance institutions of the state, vulnerable to strong partisan incursions. The party-
society literature identifies the effects of such incursions in great detail, and describes how 
the social contours of both rural and urban West Bengal were transformed as a result, 
eventually giving rise to a unique form of sociability not witnessed elsewhere in India.  
 
However, there remains a significant gap in this literature. Though it describes the effects of 
the partisan-sociability in great detail, it does little to highlight what actually constitutes this 
sociability. It also raises two important questions: “in what way does it [the party-society] 
relate with the left wing politics in the state?” and “what are its modes of persuasion and 
coercion?” (Bhattacharyya, 2010:53). Using these points of enquiry as the conceptual core, 
this chapter will try to address this gap, and provide a comprehensive account of the 
evolution of CPIM from Kohli’s description of a reform oriented disciplinary party into a 
complex political organisation, one that uses a particular variant of Marxian ideology and a 
set of unique operational practices to maintain the status quo in the face of administrative, 
political and ideological challenges. It is important to build this characterisation at the very 
onset, as the policy responses of the Left Front - operating under a federal jurisdiction but at 
the same time struggling to keep a distinct and contrary ideological fabric buoyant - cannot 
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be studied in isolation without understanding this basic character of its majority stakeholder, 
the CPIM
57
. 
The CPIM has organised itself around a dual core: ideologically it propagates the idea of a 
people’s democratic revolution as the only way to a socialist transformation of India, and sees 
the formation of a regional Left government as an interim stage in building the People’s 
Democratic Front (PDF). Operationally, it has devised a series of ground level operational 
manoeuvres, targeted at building structures of political hegemony. These manoeuvres and the 
ideological doctrines went hand-in-hand while the party was in power, with the latter 
endorsing and providing legitimacy to the former. Together, these two elements formed a 
sophisticated political rationale which the CPIM has put to successful use since 1977. Under 
the compulsions of economic liberalisation post-1990, certain adjustments had to be made to 
both components of this rationale, but political control was not relinquished, and the party’s 
ambition of establishing a political hegemony remained intact (see Chapters 5 and 6 for 
details).  
 
An examination of the twin components of the political rationale and the resultant 
subjugation of all forms of governance channels to political control will therefore form the 
crux of this chapter. It is based on a growing body of literature that throws a more critical 
light on the Left regime than the institutionalist accounts, as well as drawing parallels from 
the concept of the new class first developed by Djilas in his analysis of the CPSU (1957). 
Djilas argued that, contrary to the claims that a communist revolution leads to a classless 
society, it actually gives rise to a new ruling class, which comes to exercise complete 
authority over the means of production by virtue of collective political control. Djilas’ study 
is based on the CPSU and the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, and there are, of course, 
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 While the Left Front is a nine party coalition, apart from the CPIM, only CPI, RSP and FB have any say in 
policy decisions. The rest of the parties pay lip service only, owing to their small sizes.  
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crucial differences between his characterisation of a post-revolutionary society and the 
CPIM’s idea of dictatorship by the proletariat. However, this study still provides a suitable 
analytical lens to examine West Bengal, as the formation of a new political ruling class and 
its subsequent administrative and intellectual monopoly over Bengali society remain the most 
distinct characteristics of the Left Front rule.  
 
3.2 The Ideological Discourse of the CPIM 
3.2.1 The People’s Democratic Front and the Formation of a Mass-Based Party 
 
In the 7
th
 Congress of the CPSU, Lenin emphasised that a socialist revolution is rarely 
preceded by a complete development of socialist principles in a society. Rather - “to the 
extent that a country which had to begin a socialist revolution, because of the vagaries of 
history, is backward, the transition from old capitalist relations to socialist relations is 
increasingly difficult…” (quoted in Djilas, 1957:20). This however leads to an apparent 
contradiction - “if the conditions for a new society were not sufficiently prevalent, then who 
needed the revolution? Moreover, how was the revolution possible? How could it survive in 
view of the fact that the new social relationships were not yet in the formative process in the 
old society?” (ibid.:21).  
 
Thus the need arises for a ‘vanguard’ (a role the communist party comes to adopt), who 
would not only lead the revolution and ensure its success under unfavourable conditions, 
but also take on the responsibility of building socialism in the new society. In reality this 
translates to a belief that communist leaders are in a position to lay out a blueprint for a new 
society, and then start to build it. This was the underlying character of the October 
Revolution in Russia, the Cultural Revolution in China, and other socialist revolutions 
elsewhere.  
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There remains a fundamental difference between the notion of a post-revolutionary society 
as per the above conceptualisation, and the state of affairs in West Bengal. The CPIM itself 
asserts that the formation of the Left Front is only an interim stage in the path to socialism. 
However, the overall thrust of the CPIM’s ideological discourse is no different in character 
from this vanguard identity. As a party of the working class, the CPIM formulated its 
foremost responsibility as uniting all the progressive forces of the nation and leading the 
working class movement. The party programme declares: “the revolution cannot attain 
victory except under the leadership of the working class and its political party, the 
Communist Party of India (Marxist). Historically no other class in modern society except 
the working class is destined to play this role and the entire experience of our time amply 
demonstrates the truth” (Article 7.5: Updated Party Programme, 2000:40).     
 
The party programme, however, acknowledges certain unique conditions that exist in Indian 
society, and clearly admits the impossibility of attaining socialism in the immediate future. 
Unlike advanced capitalist countries where capitalism developed only after the pre-capitalist 
society was destroyed by the rising bourgeoisie, capitalism in India was superimposed on its 
pre-capitalist social structures. Neither the British, nor the Indian bourgeoisie on assuming 
power after Independence, attempted to abolish the ingrained feudal structures. The present 
Indian society, therefore, is a peculiar combination of monopoly capitalist domination and 
caste, communal and tribal institutions. Capitalism itself cannot flourish under such 
conditions, let alone a subsequent transition to socialism (ibid.:30). Abolishing the ingrained 
feudal remnants thus remains the unfinished task of the Indian revolution. However, the 
present state and its bourgeois-landlord government can never accomplish this task, as 
despite being in power since Independence, they have bolstered their class position at the 
expense of the masses on one hand, while compromising and bargaining with imperialism 
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and landlordism on the other. The CPIM aims to replace the present bourgeois-landlord State 
by a State of People's Democracy or a People’s Democratic Front (PDF). Only then can the 
unfinished democratic tasks of the Indian revolution finally be achieved and the ground for an 
eventual transition to socialism prepared. It is also important to point out that the PDF does 
not represent the traditional concept of bourgeois democratic revolution as expressed in 
Marxian literature, it is anti-feudal, anti-imperialist, anti-monopoly and democratic, and 
essentially a new type of revolution organised and led by the working class: 
 
The establishment of a genuine socialist society is only possible under proletarian 
statehood. While adhering to the aim of building socialism in our country, the 
Communist Party of India (Marxist), taking into consideration the degree of economic 
development, the political ideological maturity of the working class and its 
organisation, places before the people as the immediate objective, the establishment 
of people's democracy based on the coalition of all genuine anti-feudal, anti-
monopoly and anti-imperialist forces led by the working class on the basis of a firm 
worker-peasant alliance (Party Programme, Article 6.2, ibid.:31).   
 
The PDF, evidently, is a key component in the ideological discourse of the CPIM - and also 
gave the party a way to reconcile its internal apprehensions about participating in a 
parliamentary system. When the party programme was first formulated in 1964, there were 
debates about what attitude the party should adopt in relation to the functioning of the state 
governments and how far a bourgeois parliamentary system could be used as an instrument to 
effect social transformation. Admittedly, the question of participating in parliament was 
never a central issue - as the Indian communists have been a part of the mainstream political 
system since 1936-37, the only exception being the Naxalite faction - but the PDF gave an 
ideological legitimacy to electoral participation. It established a link between the idea of a 
revolution and the party’s various electoral slogans58. Among the most notable were those 
that called for the formation of the two United Front governments, the Left Front government 
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 In this context, the term ‘slogan’ (borrowed from party literature) means the political agenda to set up state 
governments rather than catchphrases/straplines, etc. 
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in West Bengal, and the Left Democratic Front (LDF) in Kerala. These (interim) party 
slogans diverged somewhat from the ultimate goals of the PDF, and led to criticisms (even 
among Leftist quarters) that the CPIM had deviated from its higher goal of people’s 
revolution and become engulfed in mainstream electoral politics. A reconciliation was 
attempted at the 10
th
 Party Congress, where a resolution clarified that the party’s struggle to 
build these governments was not based on ministerial ambitions, but rather was an essential 
step on the road to socialism.  
 
How, then did the CPIM evolve over time? An important parallel can be drawn from the 
history of communist movements elsewhere, where the grand ambition of building a new 
social order usually results in the transformation of the communist party itself. Generally in 
the pre-revolution period, only a minority with strong ideological affiliations responds to 
the call for a revolution
59. Successful revolution, however, demands “centralization of all 
forces…not only all material means but all the intellectual means must fall in the hands of 
the party, and the party itself must become politically, and as an organisation, centralized to 
the fullest extent. Only communist parties, politically united, firmly grouped around the 
center, and possessing identical ideological viewpoints, are able to carry out such a 
revolution” (Djilas, 1957:24). While the revolutionary atmosphere calls for constant 
vigilance and ideological unity as well as political and ideological exclusiveness in a 
communist party, the demands for centralism are bound to intensify after the party assumes 
control
60
.      
The CPIM charted a similar path: 
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 For example, at the time of the October Revolution the CPSU had about 80,000 members. The Yugoslav 
Communist Party began the 1941 revolution with about 10,000 members.  
60
 Lenin wrote: “In the present epoch of acute civil war, a Communist Party will be able to perform its duty only 
if it is organized in the most centralized manner, only if iron discipline prevails in it, and if its party center is a 
powerful and authoritative organ, wielding wide powers and enjoying the universal confidence of the 
members of the party” (Lenin, 1936). 
  
123 
 
…it is essential to build a mass revolutionary party to wage the struggle on all fronts 
and to direct the revolutionary movement. Such a Party must constantly expand its 
base among the people by developing its mass movements and commensurately 
consolidate its influence politically and ideologically. This requires a strong, 
disciplined Party based on democratic centralism…the Party must constantly 
educate and reeducate itself, renew its ideological-theoretical level and build up its 
organisational strength (Article 8.4, Updated Party Programme, 2000:46).  
 
The programme also provided guidance on the class composition of such a consolidation of 
forces:  
…the core and basis of the people’s democratic front is the firm alliance of the 
working class and the peasantry…The agricultural labourers and poor 
peasants…will be basic allies of the working class. The middle peasantry too…[will 
be] reliable allies. The rich peasantry is an influential section of the peasantry…at 
certain junctures, they can also be brought into the people’s democratic front and 
play a role in the people’s democratic revolution despite their vacillating 
character….The large number of white-collar employees, teachers, professionals, 
engineers, doctors and new strata of intelligentsia constitute a significant and 
influential section…every attempt should be made to win them for the revolution 
(ibid:40-41).  
 
Furthermore, the CPIM aimed at not only numerical, but also political and ideological 
consolidation - “each and every worker and member of the party should be educated in the 
principles of Marxism…the political education of the party cadres is extremely important in 
the present times” (13th West Bengal State Congress of the CPIM, 1978:448).  
 
These directives were put to use soon after the Left Front government was formed. In a 
plenum at Salkia in 1978, the party announced that its primary duty would be working 
towards a significant increase in membership, and the cumulative effect of its consolidation 
drives over the next few years was overwhelming. The 14
th
 Congress of the CPIM (1993) 
provided a summary of the initial growth of the main wings of the party:  
 
 Party membership: over 100% increase between 1977-1981 
 Trade union membership: almost 30% increase between 1977-1979 
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 Farmers’ association: 200% increase between 1977-1980 
 Students’ association: 40% increase between 1978-1980 
 Youth organisation: 106% increase between 1978-1980 
 Women’s organisation: 106% increase between 1979-1981.  
 
Such intense demands for consolidation continued to fuel the political agenda of the CPIM 
well into the 1980s and 1990s. The effects of this consolidation went far beyond a 
numerical extension of the party umbrella: it provided the building blocks of the party-
society in the West Bengal countryside. As observed earlier, the consolidation of the party-
society was prompted by the CPIM’s political agenda of taking up a custodial role which 
translated into maintaining a constant vigil over rural society. The demands for 
centralisation - which as Djilas argues is a fundamental trend in all revolutionary parties - 
served the party by creating the necessary organisational machinery and mass bases to take 
up a vanguard position. 
 
3.2.2 The Subordinate Role of the State to the Party 
Once the CPIM established authority, how did the state operate under it? In Djilas’ 
characterisation of a post-revolutionary communist society, the state machinery abandons 
all forms of autonomy and objectivity, and acts only as an instrument of the party. In truth, 
“everything is accomplished in the name of the state and through its regulations. The 
Communist Party, including the professional party bureaucracy, stands above the 
regulations and behind every single one of the state’s acts” (ibid.:35). Whether one agrees 
with such an extreme observation or not, the party-society thesis or even a cursory glance at 
the state of affairs in West Bengal would corroborate that under the Left Front, most state 
institutions were turned into political instruments. However, it is important to note that 
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operating under a system of parliamentary democracy the CPIM was compelled to adopt a 
more complex and nuanced approach towards its governance duties. Parliamentary 
participation was deemed necessary by the CPIM, but essentially in “bad faith as it did not 
aim to achieve any substantial move towards its promised transition” (Mukherjee, 2007:4). 
Instead, the party wanted to use the democratic opportunities the Constitution offered only 
for its own political gains. The reason behind this ‘bad faith’ can be found in a crucial 
caveat announced in the party programme, justifying its choice of methods: 
“The formation of such governments will strengthen the revolutionary movement of 
the working people and thus help the process of building the people's democratic 
front. It, however, would not solve the economic and political problems of the 
nation in any fundamental manner” (Article 7.17, Updated Party Programme, 
2000:44; emphasis added).  
 
This is an extremely important assumption, and one that forms the backbone of the CPIM’s 
political rationale. If it is impossible to solve the fundamental problems of the nation as long 
as it remains a bourgeois-landlord controlled one, what will be the task of the state 
governments that the party might form? Operating under a federal jurisdiction, these 
governments will obviously be unable to bring about the larger political changes that the 
party aspires to. What would then be their priorities?  
The CPIM stated that it felt that certain opportunities did exist within a parliamentary 
democratic system which state governments should be able to exploit, and thereby achieve 
three crucial objectives. As instruments of struggle, they would aim to create conditions 
conducive for the revolution, educating the masses on the need to establish a new state based 
on the firm alliance of the working class with the peasantry. They would bring about limited 
agrarian reforms, putting an end to semi-feudal landlordism. And finally, although they 
would have to perform certain duties in the realm of governance and development, these 
would be restricted to carrying out a “programme of providing relief to the people” (CPIM 
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Party Programme, 1964). As the situation did not provide any opportunity to address the 
fundamental problems of the nation, state governments could do much beyond providing 
some relief to the people to tide them over their immediate difficulties
61
. Governance, by 
definition, thus became a limited activity for the CPIM, as it believes no amount of 
governance or development work can bring an end to the suffering of the people under the 
present conditions.    
Such an understanding of the role of state governments sets the CPIM fundamentally apart 
from all other mainstream political parties in India. Government, it maintains, is a vehicle to 
realise the political interests of the party, and ultimately a tool for revolution. While 
regional/parochial political interests do influence government functioning to a certain extent 
in all Indian states, only the CPIM has managed to lend it an ideological legitimacy. The 
political-organisational report of the CPIM’s 14th State Congress, held soon after the 
formation of the Left Front, states:  
this is our own government, and it is our political duty to protect it...It must not be 
forgotten that through governance and reform initiatives we have to strengthen our 
party and mass bases and make them politically conscious of our long term 
tasks...While the government takes its policy decisions only after a consultation with 
the party and the left front, there is still a need for a collective effort to ensure that the 
government’s decisions become exclusive party properties (CPIM 14th West Bengal 
State Congress, 1981-1982:806-808).  
 
                                                          
61
 ‘Relief’ - as Sanjay Mukherjee notes - is an interesting term, lifted straight from the colonial bureaucratic 
discourse, where it meant giving handouts to people during natural disasters to prevent discontent. As none of 
the real socio-economic problems of the state were addressed by the government, the rural poor came to be 
almost entirely dependent on the provision of periodic relief, which, however, was only available in return for 
visible political allegiance. This was a key strategy for the consolidation of party-society in the early 1980s 
(Source: http://counterviews.org/Web_Doc/econ/rethinking_development_in_Bengal.pdf ; accessed 3rd June 
2012).  
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The report goes on to emphasise the need to ensure party approval at all stages and all levels 
of governance work:  
the Chief Ministers and most cabinet ministers usually take decisions only after a 
consultation with the party. But it needs to be emphasised that no provision has yet 
been made for the party to politically assess how certain ministers, members of the 
Parliament (MPs), members of the legislative assembly (MLAs), gram panchayat 
heads, chairpersons of the panchayat samitis or zilla parishads function...It is 
extremely important for the state and district leaderships to organise assessment 
exercises for the government employees at various levels of administration (ibid:842).  
 
Evidently, not only did the state machinery become subordinate to the party, but the CPIM 
also successfully ensured through controlled and nuanced approaches that the purview of its 
governance efforts remains proportional to the political mileage gained in return. 
3.2.3 The Emergence of a New Political Ruling Class 
 
The image of rural prosperity conjured by the Left Front based on agricultural productivity 
and land reforms has often been a source of contention, with the dominant discourse of 
“virtuous cycle of higher production…[with] a decrease in poverty and polarization” (Lieten, 
1996:111) being challenged by concerns about “how the Midas touch of growth and reforms 
might have left structures of poverty and marginalization untouched” (Roy, 2002:28; Rogaly, 
Harriss-White et al, 1995). The dissenters have long argued that not only is the agrarian 
structure in West Bengal both inequitable and inefficient (Boyce, 1987), but it has also 
persistently excluded the rural poor from the largesse of the state (Mallick, 1993). Roy (2002) 
observes that there is only one point of consensus among the divergent views - that the 
primary beneficiaries of the Left Front’s agrarian reforms have been middle peasants who 
own small plots of agricultural land (usually under five acres) - but this is where the 
consensus ends. Authors such as Kohli (1987), Nossiter (1988) and Lieten (1996) feel that 
such prosperity among certain sections of rural poor is indicative of a shift to a more 
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equitable agrarian structure, but more recent authors argue that this beneficiary class 
constitutes a new agrarian elite enjoying economic and political hegemony (Webster, 1992; 
Echeverri-Gent, 1992; Mallick, 1993; Bhattacharya, 1993, Ruud, 1994; Beck, 1994; Rogaly, 
1994; Roy, 2002). This difference in conceptualisation stems from, as Roy points out, the 
former group’s concern with the disappearance of the large landowners and an assumption of 
unity of interest among all other peasants vis-à-vis the observation of the latter group that the 
entire middle peasantry section cannot be lumped together with the large mass of agricultural 
wage labourers (Bhattacharyya, 1993). Bhattacharya, and other critics of the Left Front also 
point out that the state’s middle peasants are in fact a dominant class in their own right - West 
Bengal’s kulaks (Roy, 2002) - but unlike the kulaks in Marxist narratives, an evanescent 
presence in the modernist progression from agriculture to industry, they have not withered 
away (ibid.). On the contrary, the Left Front has played a crucial role in reproducing and 
perpetuating this class, especially by channelling development resources through the 
panchayats, which they mainly dominate (Westergaard, 1986; Herring, 1989; Webster, 1990; 
Bhattacharyya, 1993; Mallick, 1993). Even Kohli acknowledges this development:  
 
[l]ike any political party, the CPIM seeks to win and consolidate power. In contrast to 
most other Indian parties, the CPIM intends to accomplish this political goal by 
building its power base primarily on the lower and lower–middle classes. This 
necessitates involving these groups in the political process, as well as transforming 
some of the benefits of the power to them. Old institutional arrangements didn’t 
facilitate the pursuit of this type of left-of-centre type of politics...Thus the 
CPIM...decided to restructure local government. The strategy has been to control the 
local panchayats through ‘CPIM sympathisers’, while leaving the disciplined party 
cadres to play crucial supervisory role over local government institutions (1987:109-
10). 
 
The emergence of the kulaks/agrarian elites/middle peasantry in West Bengal as a new 
political ruling class finds a resonance in the larger framework of Djilas’ analytical 
construct of a new class, outlined below. 
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Given the subordinate role that the state comes to play in post-revolutionary communist 
societies, it is the professional party bureaucracy who assumes sweeping control. Its 
monopolistic control of national income gives it a privileged position, where it can assume 
the charge of executing any reorientation of existing social/property relations and use the 
state machinery both as a cover and an instrument (Djilas, 1957:35). If ownership can be 
defined as a right to profit and control, then the “Communist states have seen…the origin of 
a new form of ownership or of a new and exploiting class” (ibid.). This is the new class. 
Given the anti-capitalist tendencies of a communist state and the revolutionary party 
championing the cause of the working class, it is only natural that the new class arises out of 
the proletariat. On its way to power a communist party not only seeks support from the 
proletariat and the poor, but also unites their ideas, interests and hopes, thus gradually 
achieving an intellectual monopoly over the entire proletariat. Once in power this 
intellectual control automatically transforms into an administrative one and as the new class 
translates its monopoly of authority into a totalitarian social structure, it “attains a more 
perceptible physiognomy, the role of the party diminishes…The once live, compact party, 
full of initiative, is disappearing to become transformed into the traditional oligarchy of the 
new class…The party makes the class, but the class grows as a result and uses the party as a 
basis” (ibid:40). Membership of the new class is naturally an attractive proposition - not just 
because of ideological affinity - but to enjoy the fruits of ownership as evidenced “in the 
changes in the psychology, the way of life and the material position of its members, 
depending on the position they held on the hierarchical ladder” (ibid:57). The class remains 
interested in the proletariat and the poor only to the extent necessary to develop and sustain 
its subjugation of all forms of social forces. Finally, it derives legitimacy from its theoretical 
discourse that without the efforts of the party, society would regress and founder. However, 
for all practical purposes, ideological affinity barely plays any role other than legitimising 
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ownership privileges in the class’s own consciousness. Consequently, while membership in 
the communist party before revolution meant sacrifice, post-revolution it becomes very 
lucrative
62
.  
 
The state of affairs in West Bengal concurs with most of Djilas’ observations, as this new 
ruling class contributed enormously to the consolidation of the party-society. Entrusted by the 
party leadership with the task of fostering political allegiance in the countryside, by virtue of 
domination over state institutions local party chieftains quickly became the sole benefactors 
of rural socio-political lives, carefully monitoring the political returns of any governance 
initiatives The composition of this class cut across all forms of traditional class, caste, 
religion and other social boundaries in Bengali society. Drawing upon an identity solely 
inherited from political allegiance, its membership initially centred on full-time party workers 
and local leaders, but then extended to a much wider circle of ‘proletariats’ as identified by 
the party. This included government employees, school teachers
63
, and government 
contractors, as well as middle and rich peasantry. The sustenance and well-being of this class, 
particularly its middle class core, was derived from the state and the social surplus. 
Mukherjee points out that:  
this ruling class, unlike the bourgeoisie, lives off the social surplus but is itself unable 
to organize or lead the production of wealth. This makes it a parasitical class, which 
could lead to a major contradiction between its unsustainable surplus extraction 
process and its need to retain its power and legitimacy by winning elections, which is 
a crucial precondition of its political and social power. The strength of such a political 
ruling class lies in its unity and organization, which is largely achieved by a party-
controlled unionization at every site and sphere (2007:4).  
                                                          
62
 See Chapter 6 for examples of a similar development in West Bengal.  
63 School teachers initially were an important element of this class, as they lent a veneer of moral legitimacy to 
the regime but their pre-eminence as the primary connection between an already marginalised civil society 
and an emerging party-society was short-lived, as they lost touch with the community due to their high income 
from salaries and other sources (mainly private tuition). See Bhattacharyya (2001, 2004).   
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Since ground level political control was left to the members, their priorities and demands 
eventually came to control the priorities of the party itself. The demands of this class also 
formed one of the ‘push’ factors behind the government’s policy decisions, and its members 
came to enjoy - in Djilas’ words - a ‘privileged’ position. The demand for economic 
prosperity originating from this class was one of the main driving factors behind the 
transition to a pro-market development model in 1991.          
In summary, the first component of the CPIM’s political rationale - its ideological discourse - 
consists of the following key elements: (1) the PDF and the call to form a mass-based party; 
(2) the subordinate role of the state to the party; and (3) the emergence and perpetuation of 
the new political ruling class. Together, these elements provide an intellectual framework to 
examine the CPIM’s operational practices. A study of the post-1990 political economy of the 
state would need to draw much from this framework, as significant proportions of the 
CPIM’s efforts went into adjusting this discourse according to the changed economic 
scenario. Furthermore, it also answers the crucial question raised by Bhattacharya of how the 
party-society relates to the Left political discourse. The ideological discourse of the CPIM 
was the key determinant of the political roadmap the party eventually embarked upon, the 
unique socio-political environment of the state described in the party-society thesis being but 
a natural manifestation of the process.  
A final point before proceeding to the second element of the political rationale: though the 
ideological discourse as discussed above forms the backbone of the CPIM’s approach to 
governance and development, it would be an exaggeration to claim that the entire rank and 
file of the party remained convinced and motivated by the idea of revolution or the PDF - 
something the party itself admitted in several of its reports. The 1967 party central 
committee report states:  
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theoretically, only a centralized and well organised communist party can lead the 
revolution against the bourgeoisie-landlord controlled state machinery. But for all 
practical purpose, such a consciousness is lacking among our party workers, and is 
being replaced by a more federal perspective. Leaving aside party workers, it has 
become a common practice even among the party leadership to display a ‘stateless’ 
attitude and lack of national consciousness (CPIM Central Committee Report, 
1967).  
 
These tendencies were further aggravated by the departure of the Naxalite faction, and as a 
result, the revolutionary tone of the CPIM had significantly mellowed by the time it 
participated in the Left Front government. The Salkia plenum report states:  
 
The important weaknesses and deficiencies of the party as pointed out both in the 
1967 and 1973 central committee reports - especially the dangerous tendencies 
towards federalism - are yet to be rectified. In fact they have increased even further. 
The kind of political and ideological unity that should have been fostered between 
our party members and party committee leadership continues to elude us… (Salkia 
Plenum, 1978:664-668).  
 
The plenum also observed that while the party membership had increased manifold after 
1964, most of the new members did not have the experience of fighting against reformist 
tendencies, and therefore could easily err and deviate from the revolutionary line (ibid:669).  
Similar warnings continued to make cursory appearances in party meetings over the years, 
but as the new class strengthened its political control and the party entrenched its electoral 
power in the state, ideological debates became increasingly marginalised. It was only after 
the 2007/8 Nandigram/Singur incidents, that a reassessment of the CPIM’s ideological 
coherence formed a significant component of mainstream political debate in the country. 
Criticism was harsh, and ideological dilution identified as a long-standing and insufficiently 
addressed problem. Mukherjee observed: 
 
The CPM made a historic compromise with the Indian state, capitalism and 
imperialism. And it is this defeated left that came to power in 1977, a left that had 
given up its militancy against the dominant classes, a left that had given up its 
struggle to make a revolution. The interesting point is that the left could not create 
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an alternative imaginary of historical change and development. So, in 1977, it was 
not only a defeated and mellowed force, it was also a cautious left, lest it face 
dismissal from office. It was a left that abjectly failed to critically and creatively 
think and dream the impossible (2009:2).
64
  
 
Most of the above observations will be revisited in Chapters 5 and 6 in order to map the 
post-1990 shifts in the party’s ideological discourse. For now, it is sufficient to point out 
that these ideological debates, though prevalent in the early days of the government, were 
gradually sidelined as the CPIM turned its attention to translating the government into an 
instrument of struggle. Though the theoretical discourse continued to provide legitimacy to 
the modus operandi of the party, the latter eventually came to dictate and in fact subsume 
the ideological coherence. Ideology was gradually reduced to mere populist rhetoric, 
designed to justify party actions.  
 
3.3 The Creation of Hegemonic Structures 
 
The notion of ‘daily renewal of legitimacy’ (Chatterjee, 1997) embedded in the party-society 
thesis raises important questions about the modes of persuasion and coercion that make such 
renewals possible. This is an area that has rarely been explored amidst the dominant 
discourses of a gentlemanly order propagated by the Left and lauded by Kohli, Nossiter and 
others (Roy, 2002). The successful agrarian populism of the Left Front led to a mythicisation 
of a prosperous peasantry and an image of a quiescent Calcutta, proud of its intellectual and 
cultural heritage, while attributing the de-industrialised predicament of the state to the 
parochial attitude of the central government (see next chapter for details). While the party-
society thesis challenges this narrative, bringing the hegemony enjoyed by the party-
supported rural elite to the forefront, it does not show how this hegemony was produced and 
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 Source: http://counterviews.org/Web_Doc/econ/rethinking_development_in_Bengal.pdf ; accessed 3rd 
June 2012.  
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legitimised. There are insights; in Bhattacharyya’s work on the cultural forms of patronage 
(1993), Ruud’s (1994, 1995) and Bandyopadhyay’s (2009) anthropological explications of the 
clientelist structures, Rogaly’s (1994, 1995) analysis of labour management and Roy’s (2002) 
ethnographic account of the mechanisms through which order is generated and acquiescence 
secured. It is crucial to discuss these mechanisms in some detail, as not only were they 
instrumental in establishing the hegemonic structures, but they also played an important role 
in the CPIM’s attempt to negotiate and implement the policy transition during the second half 
of the 1990s and 2000s.  
 
These mechanisms were essentially a variety of political management tactics which allowed 
all negotiation opportunities between the regime and the citizenry to be framed in a single 
dimension, that of political allegiance. Negotiations could be for the delivery of land, 
housing and other public services, access to resources and healthcare, settlement of family 
disputes or for almost any matter pertaining to normal civic lives. The result of framing such 
diverse negotiation spaces along the lines of allegiance was a successful transformation of an 
unreliable citizenry into an accessible public, thus propagating the hegemonic structures 
(Roy, ibid.). It is, however, important to note that while in the vocabulary of the party all such 
tactics are legitimate for a greater good, being a political ruling class in a constitutional 
democracy, winning elections had also become a crucial element in the CPIM’s bid for 
legitimate rule. Only by virtue of electoral victory - rather than the usual coercion 
mechanisms of a totalitarian regime - could the CPIM claim to represent the majority of the 
people.  
 
This makes democracy, defined in exclusively electoral terms, central to its 
hegemonic strategy. The Left has mastered the fine art of winning elections by a 
strategy of controlled and disciplined mobilization of the people aimed at 
manufacturing consent in its favour... the left has both unleashed the democratic 
process but has simultaneously been able to tame and domesticate democracy through 
innovative techniques of governmentality (Mukherjee, 2007:7).  
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This art, or innovative techniques, form the core of the CPIM’s structures of hegemonic 
control, involving an astute translation of control over state institutions into popular political 
support. 
 
Roy (2002) defines three key theoretical markers that can be used to gain a deeper 
understanding of this. The first is populism - indicating clientelist strategies of popular 
mobilisation and disciplinary control, deeply embedded in all forms of commercialisation, 
and involving a wide range of agents and institutions. The most common form in West 
Bengal is a culture of patronage, where under the guise of upholding class interest, various 
patronage structures have surfaced as the dominant force in maintaining stability in societal 
relations. The second is informality - signifying a realm of regulation where ownership and 
user-rights are established, maintained and overturned through elaborate extralegal systems. 
Roy emphasises that informality is a technique to maintain discipline and exert power, and 
thereby is both an outcome and a process. Its significance lies in the inherent ambiguities of 
the informal which sustain the dynamics of constant negotiation and negotiability. The third 
is regime - a specific structure of power predicated on the simultaneous deployment of legal 
and extralegal mechanisms of control and discipline. Taken together, these ideas present an 
institutional ensemble by which hegemonic alliances are created, and through which power is 
mediated and expressed to sustain the alliances. Roy goes on to observe that while “the bulk 
of studies on West Bengal have been concerned with assessing the static effects of the Left 
Front rule, then the idea of a regime breaks with this emphasis, shifting the inquiry to how 
socio-political apparatus of the Left is constituted, maintained and challenged” (ibid.:141). To 
examine the manifestations of such an institutional ensemble, one needs to first look at the 
specific sites where they are located and controlled from, and then how they are propagated. 
In other words, the creation of hegemonic structures can be understood through (1) the sites 
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and networks of patronage distribution, and (2) the subjugation of institutions to political 
diktat.   
 
3.3.1 The Sites and Networks of Patronage 
 
As discussed in Chapter 2, the panchayati-raj institution has been the main vehicle for 
change in rural West Bengal since 1978. However, in line with its principles of retaining 
political control, the CPIM never allowed elected panchayat representatives to assume 
absolute decision-making authority. According to Article 20 of its Constitution, at the local 
level the elected representatives would work under the appropriate party committee or branch 
in strict conformity with the party line, its policies, and directives (CPIM, 1989:16-17). As a 
result, panchayats were largely controlled by local/district party headquarters and decisions 
simply conveyed to the local elected representatives with implementation instructions. 
Moitree Bhattacharya provides a stark admission from a CPIM representative about the exact 
nature of the party’s control:  
 
...there is a Parichalak [organising] Party Committee of CPIM which is responsible 
for taking all decisions regarding panchayats. It is this committee that takes all 
decisions at the party level and passes it on to the Panchayat Sub-Committee. 
Panchayat Sub-Committee consists of a few selected members of a gram [village] 
panchayat who, at the panchayat level, establish the link between the party and gram 
panchayat. When they come to know about party’s decision, they convey it to the 
gram panchayat representatives elected on CPIM ticket. This decision is then 
formalised by the elected representatives at the gram panchayat meetings. The elected 
representatives act as mere rubber-stamps. Many a time they don’t even come to 
know why a particular decision has been taken. They only formally endorse what the 
party decides (Bhattacharya, M, 2002:175).  
 
 
The control was no less complete in the policy implementation stage. A group of party cadres 
and supporters (generally referred to as the gram committee) worked actively in the villages 
under the direction of the party branch committee, maintaining contact between the villagers 
and the party, and monitoring the implementation of development works undertaken by the 
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gram panchayat. As Moitree Bhattacharya (ibid.) points out, in most cases these gram 
committees ended up exerting complete control over the development programmes, while the 
elected representatives went about their daily lives.  
 
Candidate selection for panchayat elections provided the party with another way to enforce 
its authority. Candidates were usually either party members or close to the party organisation, 
and ordinary villagers rarely had an opportunity to participate. The party does not approve of 
individual campaigns and introduces the candidates to their respective electorates only a 
week or two before the elections. The party cadres/gram committee members are entrusted 
with the campaigning activities, so that the views expressed in all three tiers of the 
panchayats across the state remain consistent. As a result, once elected, representatives are 
more indebted to party leaders than the electorate.  
 
...Right from the stage of nomination, followed by campaigning and then occupying 
the seats of power, it is the party that has the maximum control and influence. People 
have no say either in nomination or in decision-making, and after election they do not 
even have any power of removing the elected representatives unless the bureaucracy 
or the party takes any action. Thus the representatives develop a tendency of ignoring 
the common villages to a great extent” (ibid:180-81).  
 
 
Such an attitude goes completely against the spirit of democratic decentralisation, the 
declared objective of the panchayati-raj institution. 
 
A number of studies have also analysed how panchayat membership used to be drawn largely 
from the political middle class that surfaced during Left Front rule. In a 1983 survey, Kohli 
showed that the majority of panchayat members owned between two to five acres of land 
(Kohli, 1987). Mallik used the same survey to demonstrate that the overwhelming majority of 
the members were small to middle peasants who employed hired rather than family labour 
(Mallick, 1993). Acharya showed that gradually teachers also came to form a significant 
proportion of panchayat members (Acharya, 1994) and a seminal study on panchayats by 
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Mukharji and Bandopadhyay (1993) established that the candidature was formed not only 
from ‘middle peasants’ but from a ‘middle category of society’, constituting small and middle 
peasants as well as school teachers.   
 
As a result of panchayat membership being dominated by a middle class with a specific 
political affiliation, there has been a continuous estrangement of the general public from 
panchayat activities over the years. Despite implementing significant agrarian reforms and 
other development programmes, increasing politicisation of the panchayats has inculcated a 
strong we vs. they sentiment among the common people. The majority of the masses has lost 
faith in the proclaimed non-partisan character of the panchayats. Moitree Bhattacharya’s 
study traces the roots of this perception among the rural population, and concludes:  
 
...far removed from a ‘we-feeling’ towards panchayats...when they feel that panchayat 
representatives are more interested in obliging the party leaders rather than the 
electorate, they get disenchanted with the very panchayat system itself. Instead of 
consulting people in selection of beneficiaries and process of implementation of 
development works, the panchayat representatives accept the decision of the party 
leaders, people have come to stand at the receiving end. They could not be made the 
participants of development activities (ibid.:184)
65
.     
 
 
Patronage cycles are also deeply embedded within panchayat practices. Where control over 
panchayats equates to consolidation of rural power base, attempts to gain support are made 
by using the panchayat forum to distribute patronage. This usually takes the form of sanction 
of government grants, bank credit facilities and ration cards, allotment and registration of 
land in the name of sharecroppers, provision of employment under various government 
schemes, etc. The panchayats, Moitree Bhattacharya concludes, are appropriate forums “to 
extend such patronage, thereby buying the support of the beneficiaries. It is this support 
which the political parties buy in course of distributing patronage. The common people lured 
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 On average, 85% of the total interviewees in Bhattacharya’s study expressed an absolute lack of interest in 
the panchayat’s activities, and 96% (with no declared party affiliation) said they did not attend meetings.     
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by the possibility of receiving some sort of benefit from such political parties do not oppose 
the party which showers such patronages the most” (ibid:186). Other studies cited earlier, 
such as Mukherji and Bandopadhyay (1993), Bhattacharyya (1995), Ruud (1995), and Roy 
(2002) have shown how the middle class’ dominance over the panchayats establishes and 
maintains rural hegemony: the phenomenal growth of money/developmental resources 
controlled by these bodies, lack of financial accountability, and cosy alliances between 
bureaucracies and the panchayat ruling class, with the former group being largely controlled 
by the latter. Roy (ibid.) has also shown how in the eyes of a vast majority of rural poor, there 
is a widespread dismissal of panchayats as inevitably and undeniably corrupt.  
 
In effect, as the lines between party and government slowly faded away, the real authority in 
rural West Bengal came to be vested in the hands of party leaders in villages, local 
committees and district headquarters. Not only did the execution of policy decisions lie with 
them, but the overriding criterion to gauge the effect of such decisions was the extent to 
which they manufactured political consent. Thus, the CPIM was able to create and retain an 
almost impenetrable political force dominating the rural landscape of West Bengal.  
 
In contrast, the sites and structures of patronage in urban centres were far less visible, and 
derived mainly from a context of regulatory ambiguities that allowed the state and political 
parties tremendous flexibility in controlling the poor and lower-middle class citizenry. Roy 
(ibid.) provides one specific example - that of a continuous narrative at the fringe, involving 
re-territorialisation of squatter settlements from scattered urban locations to specific, 
circumscribed spaces. There was (and still is) continuous and heavy migration from rural 
destitute households in the state (as well as Bangladesh) to Calcutta (Dagupta, 1992; 
Jagannathan and Halder, 1988), and the CPIM had been actively engaged in resettling them 
into colonies – a political as well as geographical move, converting poor migrant peasants 
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into an organised and captive urban electorate. Roy provides a detailed description of how the 
patronage relationship was being reproduced on an everyday basis in these colonies through 
party offices (and local clubs which are usually under party control) that oversaw every detail 
of daily lives.  
 
It is the party office that mediates state intervention, as in the provision of 
infrastructure...establishes rights to the informal use of electricity...distributes ration 
cards creating official identities...establishes committees to draw and redraw 
boundaries, regulates the selling of plots with appropriate commissions, and moves 
families at random from colony to new colony, from settlement to new 
settlement...Party offices constitute a crucial point of social control. Here, whom one 
votes for is guaranteed, pre-fixed and it is this surety that ensures access to shelter... 
(Roy, 2002;150-51).  
 
 
In addition to the daily subjection to the party authorities, there is a fuzziness surrounding 
ownership rights to the colony lands. Residents were allowed to establish de facto use rights 
but without any legitimate ownership, making it possible for the party to reclaim the plot at 
any time, something the settlers would do well to remember at election time.  
 
The colony example demonstrates the uneven, volatile and informal nature of patronage 
structures at urban centres, where instead of a specific site such as the panchayat, control was 
mitigated through an exhaustive monopolisation of all state institutions by political forces. 
Some of the other most visible manifestations of such control are described below.     
 
3.3.2 Control over State Institutions 
 
Traditionally, the Indian Left harbours suspicion and hostility towards liberal constitutional 
principles and arrangements. The checks and balances in the Indian Constitution, the CPIM 
argues, are the rearguard of bourgeois rule, upholding class interests and private property 
accumulation. As Article 5.14 in the updated party programme states:  
 
Fifty years of bourgeois-landlord rule have corroded all the institutions of State 
power. The administrative system being based on a highly centralised bureaucracy 
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reflecting the growth of capitalist development, power is concentrated at the top and 
exercised through privileged bureaucrats who are divorced from the masses and who 
obediently serve the interests of the exploiting classes. The enormous growth of the 
bureaucracy, its strong links with the ruling classes and the rampant corruption of the 
bureaucracy are factors weakening the democratic structure of society (2000:26).   
 
 
Misinterpretation, distortion and even violation of Constitutional rights - according to the 
CPIM - demonstrate the continuous bourgeois incursions in Indian society, and must be 
thwarted at all costs in the interests of the working class. The only way to do so, as Article 
5.34 in the party programme claims, is by skilful utilisation of the democratic institutions in 
combination with extra parliamentary activities (ibid:30). In reality, such ‘skilful utilisation’ 
translates into the practice of subjecting the institutions to complete political demands. In 
fact, the extent to which the CPIM came to control both the state and the society closely 
mirrors Djilas’ assertion that material as well as intellectual monopolisation is a fundamental 
demand of a communist party in power. Hardly any institution of importance - as Harihar 
Bhattacharya writes in one of the most well documented studies of the CPIM’s control 
mechanisms – was beyond its penetration and control.  
 
The party’s seriousness and sincerity in this endeavour is beyond doubt. It’s no 
wonder that elections of the members of the schools’ managing committees in a 
district town take on the character of a general election. For all these and many more, 
the design of the party remains the same: systematic penetration and control of 
institutions in social, cultural, economic and political spheres (Bhattacharya, H, 
1998:7).  
 
It was in establishing control over all-important public institutions that the organisational 
strength of the party came into play. Following the initiatives to increase the mass base of the 
party begun in the 1970s, the CPIM made significant progress over the next few decades, 
amassing almost fifty-five million members by 2008 (as noted in the 19
th
 Party Congress) 
This vast network is effectively managed by the party through a highly centralised structure, 
using control mechanisms such as discipline, punishment and surveillance which successfully 
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enabled it to become an all-pervasive entity in both rural and urban Bengali society. The 
party’s presence and control structures range from formal systems in public and private 
sectors and state institutions, to the informal in the various marginal communities that exist at 
the fringes of society- street hawkers, permanent dwellers and squatters, informal workers 
(especially migrant labourers), shanty town dwellers, schedule caste/tribal communities, etc. 
In most cases these communities suffer from a dubious legal status (as in the case of 
colonies), and their survival is only ensured by submitting to the local party supremos, who 
protect them from the police/judiciary in return for political allegiance.        
 
These various mass organisations were not only the most important components in the CPIM 
election machinery (Chatterjee, 1997), but were also entrusted with ground-level political 
negotiations. This was achieved by turning most formal bodies within various state 
institutions into unions/sub-committees/associations of one or the other of these mass 
organisations. Instances of such unionisation are numerous, especially those affiliated to the 
trade union wing of the party - the CITU (Centre of Indian Trade Unions). For example, 
several Employees’ Coordination Committees (ECCs) which were nothing but party fronts 
came to dominate the public sector services
66
. As with the panchayats, here also the party 
used the formal power of the government to distribute patronage, thereby coercing public 
sector employees into toeing the party line. Keeping with the party’s ideological discourse of 
relief provision, this included small favours such as promotions, choice postings, allocation 
of subsidised land plots, foreign tours, family benefits, etc
67
.  
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 Other major public sector unions in West Bengal are the Confederation of State Government Employees 
(CSGE), Yukta Committee, and various Joint Councils and Steering Committees.  
67 One of the most prominent examples of such practices is the case of Justice Bhagwati Prasad Banerjee, a 
retired Calcutta High Court judge. He was given a highly subsidized plot of land in Salt Lake (an up-market area 
of Calcutta) in return for a favourable judgment in a petition which had challenged the government’s right to 
distribute subsidised plots in an arbitrary fashion. In 2004, the Supreme Court of India criticised Justice 
Banerjee for gross misconduct and ordered his house auctioned to return his dues to the government. The list 
of such subsidized plot holders was found to be a who’s who of bureaucrats, journalists, politicians and 
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The next important institution to be brought under the party sway was the municipalities - the 
institutes of grass-root democracy and agencies of local self government in urban areas. Since 
1977 the CPIM had participated in municipal politics with a well-formulated political design 
of externally operated party control of municipal affairs. Again, the aim was to use the 
municipal platforms for building party support and extending political influence through 
development activities. Harihar Bhattacharya’s study of the municipal town of Burdwan and 
Hooghly leads him to infer:  
 
The party forms Municipal Sub-committees at different levels of the party hierarchy 
such as district, zonal and local committees to look after the interests of the party in 
municipality. These Sub-committees are the most powerful techniques of party 
control over municipalities. In party’s terms of discourse, these Sub-committees are to 
take all the important decisions regarding municipalities (Bhattacharya, H, ibid.:12-
13).  
 
As a result of this external political control, even the CPIM admitted that the ambition of 
strengthening urban grass-root democracy through the municipalities was never realised
68
.     
 
Similar partisan incursions extended into other important state institutions such as the police, 
and even the judiciary, where the CPIM-controlled unions/associations gradually became the 
main nodes of power. According to a Police Commission Report, “it is needless to emphasize 
that police associations seem to have emerged as an alternative center of authority in the 
police system. In many places they have tended to usurp control of the force and subvert its 
command structure” (quoted in Namboodiri, 2006:388). There have been many instances 
where the police and administration have blatantly ignored court orders which might have 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
academics. In a similar instance, a professor of English at a local university - Surabhi Banerjee - was ‘given’ a 
valuable plot of land after she wrote an official biography of Jyoti Basu. Roy (2002) describes this transaction 
as just one of the innumerable acts of territorialized patronage that the CPIM specialised in, albeit blatantly 
illegal.   
68
 “The main weakness in running the municipalities is our failure to involve the people in the activities of the 
municipalities. In some areas, Ward Committees including common people have been formed, but they are 
not active at all” and “We have not been able to make much headway in so far as the mass initiative in the 
developmental activities of the Municipality is concerned”, admitted the 1985 and 1988 reports respectively.  
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affected the CPIM. The judiciary itself is often found to delay and subvert justice where the 
Left parties have indulged in large scale political violence, for example the mass killings of 
Ananda Margis in 1982, the near genocide in Marichjhampi, the killing of 11 opposition 
supporters in Suchpur, and the Chhoto Angaria arson and murder (ibid:55-64). State higher 
education institutions provided another significant point of control. The party education cell 
was usually entrusted with the responsibility of choosing candidates for high ranking 
positions, even that of Vice Chancellors in the state universities, and the official forums for 
these decisions were often reduced to mere formalities ratifying the party choices. Prof 
Santosh Bhattacharya (Vice Chancellor of Calcutta University, 1984-87) alleged in his aptly 
titled book, Red Hammer Over Calcutta University (2009), that the CPIM not only came to 
gain absolute control over the entire education system in the state, but “systematically 
destroyed” Calcutta University, one of its most prestigious educational institutions, through 
its concerted strategies to manufacture political consent at any cost.  
 
There are numerous other instances. For example, various bus workers’ unions, railway 
employees’ federations, private bus and minibus federations, etc. control most of the 
transportation sector; the banking and finance sector is dominated by CITU controlled bank 
employee unions and federations. The private sector is kept in check through various 
workers/labourers associations, either directly under CITU or through affiliated majdoor 
(labourer) unions and construction workers’ federations. In the education sector there are 
various school, college and university teachers’ associations; physicians’ associations and 
medical sales representatives’ union in the health sector. There are CITU affiliated engineers 
and technical officers’ associations and an IT workers’ union. And finally, even in the arts 
there are party affiliated theatre associations, poets’ foundations, etc. In those cases where the 
party does not enjoy formal control, it resorts to standard disruption tactics and eventually 
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triumphs. The CPIM can deadbeat any institution - as Mukherjee writes - “because of its long 
experience in organizing the politics of the work place under party controlled unions which 
acts as conduits for furthering the power of the party” (2007:14). 
 
3.4 Ideological Legitimisation of the Hegemonic Practices 
 
As mentioned before, it can certainly be argued that extension of political influence over state 
institutions is not unique, especially in the Indian context. However, what makes the CPIM 
stand out among mainstream political parties in India is the legitimisation it draws from its 
ideological doctrines to give its hegemonic structures and practices a veneer of moral and 
political sanctity. This act of sanctification derives from what Djilas describes as one of the 
major errors of contemporary communist belief: “[i]n the pretensions of contemporary 
Communism of being, if not unique and absolute, but in any case the highest science, based 
on dialectical materialism, are hidden the seeds of its despotism. The origin of these 
pretensions can be found in the ideas of Marx, though Marx himself did not anticipate them” 
(Djilas, 1957:2).  
Whether one fully agrees with Djilas or not, it is undeniable that there is a sense of 
inevitability in the communist laws of historical progress of human society culminating in 
socialism. Furthermore, communism declares that the working class alone, by virtue of being 
free from any vested interest in the existing social order, has an intellectual monopoly on 
these laws. Beginning with the premise “that they alone know the laws which govern society, 
Communists arrive at the oversimplified and unscientific conclusion that this alleged 
knowledge gives them the power and exclusive right to change society and to control its 
activities” (ibid:3). They see themselves as the vanguard of the working class with the sole 
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claim to the repository of scientific laws that govern society, and thus as the true interpreters 
of human history and its philosophical, intellectual and moral torchbearers.  
 
The obvious corollary of such an assumption is that whoever opposes the communist party in 
effect stands in the way of science, truth and the inevitable course of history. Such opposition 
generally originates from two sources: (a) sections of society with vested interests in the older 
order, namely feudal landlords and the bourgeois classes; and (b) ignorance among the 
common masses of the communist laws. The latter can be addressed initially by education in 
communist principles
69
, and if necessary, coercion. The former, however, cannot be expected 
to give up their vested interests in the existing social order so easily, and thus relentless class 
wars must be waged.        
 
The CPIM party programme prescribes a similar path. It upholds the “scientific philosophy 
and principles of Marxism-Leninism which alone shows the correct way to complete 
emancipation” of the Indian people from all forms of exploitation under the current 
bourgeois-landlord rule (Article 8.7). In order to achieve this, the party “has to conduct 
prolonged struggles on all fronts - political, ideological, economic, social and cultural - till 
victory is attained” (Article 8.1). Thus the efforts to build a mass base also commensurately 
consolidated the party’s ideological and political influence. In order to discharge its historic 
responsibility towards the working class, including those who might carry a ‘corrupt 
consciousness’ (Mukherjee, 2007) and need to be coerced into accepting the true and 
scientific principles of historic progression, the party “must constantly educate and re-educate 
itself, renew its ideological-theoretical level and build up its organisational strength” (Article 
8.4). It must also wage a determinant struggle to free people from the influence of the 
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 Ideological education is a serious task in communist parties around the world. In West Bengal, regular party-
classes have been a distinguishing feature of the CPIM since its formation. A constant emphasis on increasing 
the publication and circulation of party literature stems from the same necessity.     
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exploiting bourgeois-landlord classes. The party programme adjures peaceful means to bring 
about the proposed transformations, but at the same time repeatedly refers to the nature of the 
struggle as militant, and warns its members that the ruling classes will not relinquish power 
voluntarily. They will seek to “defy the will of the people and seek to reverse it by 
lawlessness and violence. It is, therefore, necessary for the revolutionary forces to be vigilant 
and so orient their work that they can face up to all contingencies, to any twist and turn” 
(Article 7.18).  
 
The tactics used by the CPIM for the “complicated and protracted struggle” (Article 7.16), 
thus find complete endorsement in its ideological doctrine. From the use of extra-
parliamentary forms of struggle to militant activism and even efforts to establish an 
intellectual hegemony over all aspects of society, these tactics are not only deemed essential 
to the war the party is engaged in, but in need of constant reaffirmation until victory is 
attained. By defining its political tasks in militaristic terms such as war and victory, 
psychologically the party gained the freedom to choose whatever tactics it deems fit for the 
purpose, i.e. the greater good, which can be brought about only by following the scientific 
principles of Marxism-Leninism. 
 
It can of course be argued that most CPIM members do not ascribe to such a traditional 
Marxist discourse. While the party did follow the Marxian belief system more closely in its 
early days, it has been much diluted in recent times, especially after the departure of the 
Naxalite faction and the subsequent formation of a state government within a federal 
democratic structure. The ideas of peoples’ democratic revolution and the imminency of 
socialism have gradually been replaced by other priorities, most notably, winning elections. 
However, the orthodox belief system continues to perform one crucial function, it provides 
the party with a “legitimising discourse to undermine and crush the legitimacy of the very 
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idea of an opposition” (Mukherjee, 2007:8). Unlike any other mainstream political party in 
India, the CPIM is in constant need of an argument to defend its version of democracy (i.e. 
the idea of the PDF as an interim stage on the road to a socialist revolution). It is only by 
ascribing to the knowledge-power nexus of Marxism that such an argument could make 
sense, and Marxian ideology, “in the service of the CPIM, has become a mere means to its 
end of retaining political power. In this strategic use of Marxism the CPIM makes 
instrumental use of the old left orthodoxy that the end justifies the means...and is usually 
reduced to the sole aim of staying in power” (ibid.).  
 
3.5 Conclusion  
 
The glaring contradiction between the CPIM’s ideology and its role in Indian politics is as 
follows: the party is wedded to the idea of revolution by bringing the liberal bourgeois 
democratic state to an end, but at the same time it was in charge of two such regional 
governments (West Bengal and Kerala) until 2011, and to the present day in Tripura, thereby 
submitting to the same bourgeois diktats that it pledges to destroy. Strict adherence to 
Marxist-Leninist principles would have made such a situation impossible to survive - either 
the party would have to leave office and call for revolution, or surrender its ideology to a 
more liberal set of principles
70
. The CPIM has done neither. Instead, it has come up with a 
rather novel combination of both, where Marxist rhetoric and the organisational structure of a 
communist party is used to “capture, colonise and subvert the institutions of the state as well 
as the space of civil society. Marxist ideology has provided legitimacy to this process of 
colonization” (ibid:9).        
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 According to Kohli, as discussed in the previous chapter, this is exactly what the CPIM has done. It is today, 
for all practical purposes, a socialist democratic party. However, the CPIM has never formally abandoned its 
Marxist-Leninist principles.  
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The conceptualisation of this process as a unique political rationale - comprised of an 
ideological discourse and a set of hegemonic practices - provides a fresh perspective on the 
totalitarian nature of the communist regime in West Bengal. The idea deviates significantly 
from the institutional account, and while it does borrow the conceptual core of the party-
society thesis, it steers clear of a further extension of the argument, focusing instead on the 
conditions that are precursors to the party-society environment. In addition, the political 
rationale argument also helps to trace the features of Bengali communism to certain 
fundamental characteristics of the totalitarian nature of communist regimes. In doing so, it 
also closely echoes Harihar Bhattacharya’s idea of communist designs of power as a 
‘modernist problematic’, one that demands conformity and consensus at the same time 
(1998). Communism, Bhattacharya argues, represents both a modernity and a totality, and 
produces an inevitable exclusionary process of those outside of the closed loop of 
conformation-consensus. The well formulated designs of these regimes and their concomitant 
operations determine the patterns of exercise of power at different levels of socio-political 
reality, and in most cases result in an exclusion of common people from the processes of 
power, decision and action. The West Bengal situation is no exception, where the questions 
of mass-mobilisation, expansion of social bases of support, and degree of popular 
participation are all ultimately connected and determined by these designs of the ruling party.  
 
 
In his examination of the micro-foundations of Bengali communism, Harihar Bhattacharya 
reaches similar conclusions to the observations made in this chapter. Factors responsible for 
the achievements of the CPIM in West Bengal, he writes, “are a set of well-formulated 
designs of capturing and exercising power at different institutional levels of society” (ibid:1). 
At the same time, the CPIM’s exercise of power in West Bengal since 1977 has been 
accompanied by a particular version of Marxian political theory, a discourse which 
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“determines and legitimises the contours of the exercise of power, and the degree of mass 
participation in the process of decision” (ibid:3). He further points out that the development 
dimension of this regime should not be over-emphasised at the cost of the mobilisation goals 
of the party (a crucial mistake made in the institutional accounts and particularly by Kohli), 
as in the party’s frame of reference, the two are closely interlinked (ibid:5).  
 
It is this interconnection that the political rationale argument focuses on, where the 
hegemonic practices of the party balances its governance and development duties against its 
political agenda, and any contradiction or discrepancy is sanctified by a legitimising 
Marxian discourse. Such a strategy served the CPIM extremely well throughout the 1980s. 
Furthermore, the closed economic environment of the country significantly aided such a 
political style, as there was no incentive for the Left Front (or any other state government) 
to expand its development initiatives. The CPIM also worked out a useful way to transfer 
the blame for all kinds of economic woes to the central government
71
. Overall, the 
importance of CPIM’s political rationale lies in the fact that it shaped the political economy 
of West Bengal in a unique way, of which the party-society environment is the most visible 
manifestation. However, in so doing governance, for sole development purposes, was 
reduced to a temporary and almost peripheral activity. Unless a governance initiative 
facilitated the political objectives of the party in some way, it was not deemed important. As 
a result, governance and/or administrative channels in West Bengal lost their autonomy 
almost entirely, and could only function according to the guidelines provided by the 
political channels.    
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 Assema Sinha (2005) calls this a partisan confrontational strategy - an important policy plank for the CPIM. 
See Chapter 4 for details.  
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The 1990s brought hitherto unforeseen challenges for the CPIM at various levels. While the 
economic reforms unfurled by the central government compelled the party to rethink its 
entire policy approach, the collapse of the USSR dealt a severe blow to its political ideology. 
The way CPIM responded to these challenges was multi-faceted, with the party ideologues 
and policy makers trying to maintain a fine balance between the new economic compulsions 
and the party’s own political agenda, which itself underwent significant modifications. The 
post-1990 transitional period in West Bengal is often reduced to a story of straightforward 
economic compulsions and (or the absence of) policy responses. The real turn of events were, 
however, much more complex and were neither prompted by pure economic compulsions, 
nor exercises in policy design. For the first time, the CPIM had to renegotiate its political 
rationale - making adjustments to both its ideological discourse and hegemonic practices - 
and also take complete responsibility for implementing the changes. While the actual nature 
of the transition will be explored in the next chapter, it is important to conclude this chapter 
by recognising one crucial aspect: in spite of the pressures and compulsions of economic 
reform, the CPIM never relinquished its monopolistic political control. The post-1990 
political economic scenario of West Bengal therefore presents a contradictory picture of an 
economic and policy environment that strives to change on one hand, but on the other, suffers 
from the same degree and intensity of political control that characterised the previous years. 
The story of policy transition in West Bengal is a story of these contradictions.    
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Chapter 4 
 
The Period of Transition: Fiscal, Federal and Ideological 
Choices72 
 
“The pace and the qualitatively higher advances made by socialism in a relatively short 
span...led to a belief that such advances were irreversible. The Leninist warning that the 
vanquished bourgeoisie will hit back with a force hundred times stronger was not fully taken 
into account...the overestimation of the strength of socialism and the underestimation of the 
strength of capitalism did not permit an objective analysis and consequently the proper 
assessment of the emerging world situation.” 
(Sitaram Yechuri, 2006:8-9) 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
The above statement was made by Sitaram Yechuri, a senior CPIM politburo member and 
one of the most prominent Left leaders in India. Such an admission of ‘underestimating 
capitalism’ - a self-critical notion that emerged in the CPIM by early 1990 - aptly 
encapsulates the fundamental theoretical modification that the party underwent in the years 
following the Soviet disintegration and the Chinese economic take-off. Expectedly, Yechuri 
went on to predict that eventually the forces would reverse, and the ‘future is socialism’. 
However, amidst this larger debate over theoretical misjudgements, what often goes 
unnoticed is how an admission about the shortfalls in its ideological discourse provided the 
CPIM with a succinct justification to bring in subtle, yet far-reaching changes in its 
operations. These changes coincided with the post-1990 compulsions of a transitional 
national economy, and, in the opinion of many staunch Leftists, indicate how praxis has come 
to dominate ideology in the party.  
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 All population data in this chapter has been calculated as per census records.   
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The concept of the political rationale of the CPIM - made up of an ideological discourse and 
a modus operandi based around the creation of hegemonic structures - was developed in the 
previous chapter (and will be re-visited in Chapters 5 and 6). This rationale served the party 
extremely well, both in the realms of ideas and tactics, and in achieving a political, cultural, 
intellectual and even moral hegemony over Bengali society. It is therefore rather puzzling 
that the party decided to deviate significantly from its ideological discourse and undertake a 
policy transition in accordance with the central government initiated pro-market reforms 
during early 1990s, while in public remaining highly critical of the same. Over the last two 
decades, the political economic literature on West Bengal has, in essence, paid only lip-
service to this conundrum, listing a set of economic constraints and federal compulsions as 
the primary explanation. However, as argued in this chapter, there was also a series of 
underlying political and ideological negotiations, accompanied by a gradual change in the 
mindset of top-level party members. The role of Jyoti Basu - Chief Minister of West Bengal 
(1977-2000) and arguably the most charismatic Left leader of the country - in bringing about 
such a change was also paramount, but often ignored. The objective of this chapter is 
therefore to focus on the period of transition (c.1991-2000) in the political economic history 
of West Bengal and highlight the complex and dynamic range of political negotiations 
underpinning it. This is not just a re-evaluation of an interesting chapter in the economic 
history of the state, but rather an effort to understand the political choices of the time, which 
continue to shape its development trajectory to the present day.  
4.2 The Declining Industrial Economy of West Bengal 
In comparison with the attention devoted to the Left Front’s performance in rural and 
agricultural sectors, relatively less has been written about its industrial initiatives. This is 
rather surprising, as industrial development would normally be seen to be of critical 
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importance to a Left government, representing the interests of the proletariat (Pederson, 
2001). While providing a detailed historical account of industrial development in West 
Bengal is not the objective of this chapter
73
, a brief summary along with a review of the key 
themes of the Left Front’s Statement on Industrial Policy (1978) is necessary to appreciate 
the magnitude of change during the period of transition.  
4.2.1 The Pre-Left Front Era 
Bengal was one of the most industrialised provinces in colonial India and, partially 
withstanding the blow of partition in 1947, West Bengal continued to prosper industrially 
until about 1965. Planned industrialisation commenced in India with the first five year plan in 
1951, and between 1951 and 1965 the value of industrial output from West Bengal increased 
by 287% (BCCI, 1971:41). The state also maintained a leading position in employment 
generation in the organised sector (CSO, 1965). During the first two decades of post-
Independence, it was only outperformed by Maharashtra in terms of licenses issued and value 
added (Report of Industrial Licensing Policy Inquiry Committee, 1969). 
 
However, the industrial economy of West Bengal went into a drawn-out recession following 
the 1965-67 national harvest failures, which also affected the financial resources of the 
central government (already stretched due to the Indo-Pakistani war of 1965), thus pushing 
the entire nation into a temporary recession. Though by 1968 national industrial production 
was well on the road to recovery, registering a 6.4% growth rate in 1968 and 7.1% in 1969 
(Dasgupta, 1998), West Bengal was one of the worst affected by the recession. Many 
engineering units that had flourished pre-1965 - Braithwaite & Co., Bridge & Roof, Burns & 
Co., Indian Standard Wagon, Jessop, Texmaco etc. – suffered a severe down-turn in business 
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See the EPW special edition (November 21, 1998) for a detailed discussion and analysis of industrial 
development in West Bengal since Independence.  
  
156 
 
and this created a cascading effect among their vast ancillary sectors. While employment in 
most Indian states had picked up by 1967, West Bengal continued to register a decline, and 
by 1970, it was the only Indian state with an aggregate employment level lower than in 1965 
(ibid.).  
 
The sharp decline in economic conditions resulted in acute labour agitation. Strikes, lock-outs 
and gheraos
74
 became the order of the day, and the number of industrial disputes increased 
phenomenally (see Table 4.1). The industrial crisis was compounded further by the harvest 
failures that led to high prices of staple foods, triggering food riots and political agitation 
across the state. The tumultuous political climate resulted in the defeat of the incumbent 
Congress government in 1967 for the first time since Independence. The CPIM-led United 
Front governments of 1967 and 1969, however, did little to restore stability in the industrial 
sphere, as “workers aggressively tried to protect their interests especially as a coalition of 
pro-poor labour parties was in power in the state. The result was yet another round of 
industrial disputes which further accentuated the already fragile situation” (ibid.:3051). 
Repeated Presidential rule (in 1968 and 1970) was also unable to contain the spiralling labour 
unrest, and whatever private capital still in circulation in the state had started to be withdrawn 
and reinvested in other parts of the country. The recession of 1965-70 thus had a dual effect 
on the economy of West Bengal, not only scaring away new investments but also eroding the 
existing industrial base.  
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 A form of agitation by suspending work and physically surrounding management personnel until the 
workers’ demands are met or an agreement is reached.   
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Table 4.1: Industrial Disputes in West Bengal vis-à-vis India; 1967-70 
 
 1967 1968 1969 1970 
 West 
Bengal 
India West 
Bengal 
India West 
Bengal 
India West 
Bengal 
India 
Stoppages 438 2815 417 2776 894 2627 806 2889 
Workers involved (in 
lakhs) 
1.6 14.9 2.6 16.7 6.7 18.3 4.5 18.3 
Person-days lost  
(in lakhs) 
50.2 171.5 67.2 172.4 93.8 190.5 94.2 205.6 
Average population of West Bengal between 1961-1971: 39.6 million 
Average population of India between 1961-1971: 493.7 million  
Source: Economic Review, GoWB, various issues; Indian Labour Year Book, GoI, various issues 
Source: Economic review, GoWB, various issues    
 
Emerging out of the chaotic 1960s, the decline was somewhat arrested in the 1970s, although 
industrial growth remained paltry in comparison to pre-1965 levels. Barring 1976, which saw 
a double digit growth rate (10.6%), growth between 1970 and 1977 was only around 4% 
(Desai, 1981:383; Shelly, 1978:187, Dasgupta, 1998). The total number of licenses issued in 
this period was a modest 499, well short of Maharashtra, Gujarat, and even Tamil Nadu (see 
Table 4.2). Moreover, as Dasgupta (1998.:3051) points out, there was a shift in the type of 
licenses issued, “whereas in 1965, out of 63 licences issued to West Bengal, 47 were for new 
units or for substantial expansion, in 1973 for example, out of total licences issued, three 
were for new units and 11 for substantial expansion. That is investment intentions declined in 
Table 4.2: Industrial Licences Issued to States; 1970-77  
 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 Total Average 
population 
1971-1981 (in 
millions) 
 
Maharashtra 112 162 131 171 265 255 143 150 1389 56.6  
Gujarat 39 66 57 75 89 97 83 60 566 30.4  
Tamil Nadu  36 51 36 63 99 141 61 32 519 44.8  
West Bengal 46 81 54 41 107 74 56 40 499 49.5  
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the state in the seventies. Actual investment in the state between January 1971 and December 
1977 was paltry”. West Bengal managed to retain the second spot for total employment in the 
manufacturing sector behind Maharashtra, but by 1978 its all-India share had fallen to an all 
time low of 15% (ibid.).  
 
Various factors prompted this decline. Even before 1965, there were a number of 
disconcerting trends which had an adverse impact on the long-term industrial growth of the 
state. Firstly, higher employment vis-à-vis lower value addition indicated a lower level of 
productivity/efficiency when compared to states such as Maharashtra. In fact, in terms of 
value added per employee, by 1965 West Bengal had fallen behind not only Maharashtra, but 
also Karnataka, Gujarat and Tamil Nadu (ibid.). Secondly, the large-scale industrial sector in 
the state was seriously disadvantaged by two sets of central government policies: freight cost 
equalisation for coal and steel (introduced in 1956), and the overwhelming emphasis on 
import substitution which completely overlooked the problems faced by the jute industry, a 
highly labour-intensive sector (Bagchi, 1998; Chakravarty and Bose, 2009). The effects of 
the former were particularly severe. One of the greatest advantages the state had enjoyed was 
its proximity to major coal and steel belts in eastern India (and as a result, West Bengal was 
home to India’s biggest heavy engineering sector), but the policy completely nullified this 
geographical advantage. It equalised the domestic freight rates for iron and steel across the 
country, thus eroding the cost preferences that engineering industries in West Bengal used to 
enjoy. This was particularly discriminatory for the eastern Indian states due to its 
unidirectional nature: other important industrial raw materials were not accorded equal 
treatment (e.g., the thriving textile industry in West Bengal was heavily dependent on cotton 
cultivated mainly in the western states, but the freight rates for cotton were never equalised). 
Successive state governments in West Bengal, irrespective of their political colour, accused 
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the central government of robbing “eastern India of its locational advantages without 
compensating policy measures to redress its locational disadvantage in other industries” 
(Dasgupta, 1998:3050). Thirdly, while all other major industrial states also recorded 
impressive agricultural growth rates, an almost stagnant agricultural sector in West Bengal
75
 
indicated a possible decline in demand for industrial outputs in the years to come. Finally, the 
reshaping of the political contours of the state in the form of a declining Congress and a 
rising Left opposition may have also played a role. In the two decades following 
Independence when West Bengal was under Congress rule, central government invested 
significantly in the state. Between 1947 and 1968, West Bengal accounted for 13.3% of the 
total public sector investment in the country. However, this declined rapidly once the first UF 
government came to power, and as Raychaudhuri and Chatterjee note, since the late 1960s, 
“political considerations rather than economic criteria seem to have guided the distribution of 
industrial licenses and allocation of public sector investments...” (1998:3061). 
 
4.2.2 The Left Front Era   
4.2.2.1 The Statement on Industrial Policy, 1978 
The Left Front took office in 1977 when, due to the events noted above, West Bengal had 
slowly become synonymous with an industrial black hole. The licensing scheme had not 
helped the state either, as most of the private capital in circulation was controlled by outsiders 
(either foreigners or Indian entrepreneurs from other states) who had little interest in 
promoting West Bengal’s interests.  
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 Between 1952 -53 and 1964-65, average agricultural growth rates (in percent per annum) in some of the 
major states were as follows: Gujarat: 4.55; Tamil Nadu: 4.17; Mysore: 3.54; Bihar: 2.97; Maharashtra: 2.93; 
Andhra Pradesh: 2.71; and West Bengal: 1.94 (Dasgupta, 1998:3053)  
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The Left Front published a Statement on Industrial Policy in 1978, the primary theme of 
which was to “encourage industrial growth based upon small enterprises and the public sector 
in an attempt to reduce the economic power of big business - Indian and foreign - with an 
ultimate aim of strengthening the working class through growing employment and a larger 
influence on the factory floor” (Pederson, 2001:649-50). The major goals of the Statement 
were (GoWB, 1978):  
(a) Reversal of the trend towards industrial stagnation; 
(b) Arresting the growth of unemployment and providing for increased employment 
in the industrial as well as agricultural sectors; 
(c) Encouraging the growth of small and cottage industries;  
(d) Lessening the stranglehold of the monopoly houses and multinational firms on the 
economy of the State;  
(e) Encouragement of indigenous technology and industrial self-reliance; 
(f) The gradual expansion of the public sector; and  
(g) Increasing the control of the workers over the industrial sector. 
 
The Statement had a number of key features in tandem with the ideological orientation of the 
party. Firstly, it repeatedly expressed a militant attitude towards multinationals and big 
corporations. These were accused of “utilizing the profits realized from West Bengal's 
industries either for supporting the lavish style of living of the owners and top executives or 
for setting up industries elsewhere, or for remitting funds abroad...with delirious 
consequences for the state’s economy”, and hence there was “no question of allowing new 
multinationals to come in” (ibid.: 103-105). Existing multinationals were allowed to continue 
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their operations, but under close governmental scrutiny and as long as their profits were 
reinvested in the state “along lines previously agreed to and vetted by the Industrial Advisory 
Council. In submitting schemes for plough back, these units must place maximum emphasis 
on the need to expand employment and utilise indigenous technology. Care must also be 
taken that they are not allowed entry into spheres where small and medium-scale units 
deserve to be nurtured” (ibid.)  
 
Secondly, a revival of the once-flourishing industrial units of the state was not judged a 
priority. If the stress of the policy is on revival, it was argued, then “the monopoly houses and 
the multinational companies will be helped in further increasing their grip over the economy 
of this State. This would be wholly against the principles upheld by the Left Front... The 
Government should, as a matter of policy, scrutinize every industrial project with an eye to 
alternative uses for the funds to be spent” (ibid.:103-104). The focus instead was on 
maximising employment by (a) promoting small-scale labour intensive sectors such as 
handlooms, fisheries, cottage industries etc., forming co-operatives and extending financial 
subsidy as and when possible; and (b) relying on public undertakings. “Whether for 
encouraging indigenous technology or for offering stimulus to small-scale operations or for 
providing basic inputs to crucial sectors, it will be necessary to rely more and more upon the 
instrumentality of public undertakings. The public undertakings must ultimately become the 
channel through which the goals of production, investment, surplus generation and income 
distribution are achieved” (ibid.:105).  
 
The third feature of the Statement was a strong emphasis on the government’s duty to attempt 
to influence central government policy. The Left Front lobbied hard for a “major 
modification in the allocation of powers between the Centre and the States in such matters as 
industrial licensing, the regulation of industries and arrangements concerning institutional 
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finance” (ibid. 107). It also pressed the centre to curb the activities of the monopoly industrial 
houses and multinational corporations and campaigned for this policy to be accepted as much 
at the national level as in the case of individual states. 
 
The Statement was in accordance with the CPIM’s ideological discourse. In an extensive 
three-part article published in 1978, N. K. Chandra attempted to justify this conviction and 
presented a blueprint for the industrial sector in West Bengal. The urban working classes and 
the poor peasantry (including landless agricultural labourers), Chandra wrote, are the main 
focus behind the revolution, while the landlord and the capitalists, domestic or foreign, “are 
the main enemy classes which have to be liquidated politically, economically and socially” 
(1978:part one:5). Following the conventional path of industrialisation through foreign 
capital and technology would thus be self-defeating for the larger political objectives of the 
party, as industrial development cannot be a goal in itself. Unless a united front of all classes 
was brought about under the leadership of the urban proletariat against the two enemy 
classes, no development strategy would be able to bring an end to the exploitative element of 
Indian society. However, Chandra argued further, the party did realise that given the drawn-
out nature of the struggle for the PDF and the growing problem of unemployment, some 
means of combining class struggle with the struggle for production had to be established, so 
that at least some temporary relief could be provided to the people. That is what the 
government had to aim to achieve via its efforts in the industrial sector.  
 
In a similar vein, the ideological discourse of the CPIM upheld the idea that neither 
production nor employment could advance to adequate levels, due to the semi-feudal nature 
of the national economy and the foreign hold over it. A policy of facilitating industrial growth 
and promotion would thus be self-defeating and only serve to strengthen the hand of the 
enemy classes. The only way forward would be to adopt an alternative strategy, one that 
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would focus on maximising employment via public undertakings and labour-intensive 
small/rural initiatives, and provide some temporary relief to the exploited classes. Such an 
approach could make a small beginning to raising the consciousness of the ‘toiling masses’ 
and possibly also attract new allies to the struggle.  
 
The Statement of 1978 was therefore an extension of CPIM’s political line, with the idea of 
an alternative strategy, commonly referred as the Left alternative, providing both the 
motivation behind and the direction outlined in it. It was also duly noted that neither the party 
nor the Left Front: 
 
“wish[es] to create the illusion that large scale poverty and underemployment 
prevailing in West Bengal can be removed only if the policies recommended...are 
faithfully implemented. Indeed, such policies cannot be fully implemented except 
after the People's Democratic Revolution...However... if honest attempts along these 
lines are made both by the Left Front Government and by the left parties, it would 
raise the class consciousness of the toiling masses and create a feeling of purposive 
unity between them and all classes other than the big business and the landlords. And 
that would be salutary not only for West Bengal but also for the rest of the country” 
(ibid.: part three: 72). 
      
4.2.2.2 Industrial Growth in West Bengal: 1977-1991 
 
In spite of growth promises articulated in the Left alternative, developments in the industrial 
sector post-1978 did not present grounds for optimism. While it is undeniable that the 
agrarian reforms and significant decentralisation measures did improve rural income levels 
and increased the demand for non-agricultural goods (Chakravarty and Bose, 2009), the 
impact on the overall economy of the state was limited. Between 1980 and 1990, the growth 
in per-capita SDP (state domestic product) of West Bengal was extremely sluggish (see Table 
4.3). In fact, West Bengal registered one of the lowest growth rates among the fourteen non-
special category states in this period, occupying thirteenth position, only above Orissa (see 
Table 4.4).  
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The increased demand for non-agricultural goods was largely met by rural unorganised 
manufacturing units (Human Development Report, 2004), while organised and especially 
large-scale manufacturing units continued to deteriorate. In 1977, West Bengal accounted for 
7% of the total registered factories in India, provided employment for 13.2% of the workforce 
and produced 10.5% of gross registered factory output. By 1990, these figures had declined 
to 5%, 9.1% and 6.1% respectively (see Table 4.5). This rate of decline is even more 
staggering in comparative terms. Between 1983 and 1990, among the nine top industrialised 
states in the country, only Bihar registered a sharper decline in its all-India share of factories 
than West Bengal, while in terms of total employment and gross factory output, the reduction 
in the latter’s shares were the highest in the country (see Table 4.6). The public sector also 
suffered low profitability from 1979-80 onwards and negative profitability during 1983-84 to 
1990-91 (barring 1987-88), whereas at the all-India level the scenario was entirely opposite. 
The average profit-output ratio in West Bengal vis-à-vis India from 1980 to 1990 was -0.98 
and 3.61 respectively (calculated from Chattopadhyay, 2004). This period also saw a 
spectacular increase in the number of person-days lost, the highest in the country by a 
significant margin (see Table 4.7). In fact, public sector employment in West Bengal 
surpassed that of the private sector for the first time in the 1980s, as only the agencies of the 
state government continued to generate employment. (Pederson, 2001; see Table 4.8). 
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Table 4.3: Per capita Net State Domestic Products at Factor Cost, 1980-1990  
1980-81 prices 
 1980-
81 
1981-
82 
1982-
83 
1983-
84 
1984-
85 
1985-
86 
1986-
87 
1987-
88 
1988-
89 
1989-
90 
Andhra 
Pradesh 
1380 1569 1563 1593 1512 1573 1497 1663 1906 2013 
Assam 1284 1402 1437 1470 1447 1510 1437 1468 1446 1517 
Bihar 917 947 935 1003 1074 1074 1135 1050 1158 1116 
Gujarat 1950 2084 2008 2343 2293 2186 2276 1986 2737 2644 
Haryana 2370 2399 2487 2479 2513 2893 2825 2709 3289 3254 
Karnataka 1520 1583 1586 1663 1750 1644 1764 1853 1978 2055 
Kerala 1508 1469 1485 1406 1473 1507 1453 1482  1614  1705 
Madhya 
Pradesh 
1358 1360 1388 1427 1327 1409 1315 1459 1529 1523 
Maharashtra 2435 2441 2480 2579 2558 2705 2666 2781 3000 3414 
Orissa 1314 1290 1191 1407 1316 1442 1436  1365  1623 1699  
Punjab  2674 2875 2906 2904 3073 3249 3302 3410 3526 3730 
Rajasthan 1222 1285 1276 1525 1379 1338 1428 1295 1791 1716 
Tamil Nadu 1498  1640  1527  1582  1758  1798  1755  1837  1987  2094  
Uttar 
Pradesh 
1278 1276 1344 1364 1354 1375 1402 1433 1584 1593 
West Bengal 1773 1689 1719 1883 1892 1929 1962 2022 2061 2086 
Source: Handbook on the Statistics of Indian Economy, RBI (2007-08) 
 
4.2.2.3 The Strategy of Partisan Confrontation  
The industrial woes of West Bengal during the first fifteen years of the Left Front regime, 
however, both fed into, and were fuelled by, certain political overtones regarding relations 
between the central and state governments. The CPIM has always maintained that while the 
state structure in India is federal in name, most power and resources are concentrated in the 
hands of the central government. Therefore, on coming to power in 1977, the party prompted 
the Left Front to adopt a fifteen point memorandum seeking a readjustment of centre-state 
relations, particularly regarding certain legislative (e.g., misuse of Article 355 and 356 of the 
Constitution, appointment and role of Governors, central intrusion into the state list, etc.) and 
financial issues (e.g., inadequate central transfers, restrictions on market borrowings by the 
state, etc.).  
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Table 4.4: Per Capita SDP Growth Rate: 1980-81 to 1990-91 
Position State Growth Rate (%) 
1 Rajasthan 5.8 
2 Tamil Nadu 5 
3 Haryana 4.6 
4 Maharashtra 4.3 
5 Punjab 3.8 
6 Gujarat 3.8 
7 Karnataka 3.6 
8 Uttar Pradesh 3 
9 Andhra Pradesh 2.9 
10 Madhya Pradesh 2.9 
11 Bihar 2.9 
12 Kerala 2.5 
13 West Bengal 2.3 
14 Orissa 1 
Source: Sachs, Bajpai, and Ramiah, 2002 
 
        
       
     
    
    
    
  
Source: Annual Survey of Industries, various issues 
 
These demands were not specific to the Left Front alone
76
. In fact, centre-state relations in 
India have been the subject of academic debate, political commentary and journalistic ink 
over the years, and the states’ demands definitely have a certain amount of legitimacy 
(George and Gulati, 1985; Arulampalam, Dasgupta et al, 2009). However, as Sinha (2005) 
                                                          
76
 In a landmark conclave held in Srinagar in 1983, most of these demands were also upheld by a number of 
non-left political parties such as the DMK, TDP and Akali Dal.  
Table 4.5: Structure of Industry in West Bengal: Percentage Share 
of Registered Sector: 1977 vis-à-vis 1983-90  
 
Indicators 
 
1977-
78 
1983-
84 
1984-
85 
1985-
86 
1986-
87 
1987-
88 
1988-
89 
1989-90 
No of 
Factories 
 
7 5.8 5.5 5.5 5.3 5.2 5.2 5 
Employment 13.2 11.4 11.7 10.8 10.3 9.4 9.9 9.1 
 
Gross Output 
 
10.5 8.1 8.1 7.9 7.4 7.2 6.7 6.1 
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points out, unlike other parties/state governments, the CPIM/Left Front successfully turned 
its anti-centre stance from a policy debate into an ideological plank, and as a result, its 
hostility towards the centre often spilled over into agitational politics. Sinha argues that while 
difficult anti-centre relations had preceded the Lefts in West Bengal, and was evident even 
during the periods of Congress rule (1947-67 and 1971-72)
77, “the difference in terms of anti-
centre relations between the Congress rule in West Bengal...and the Left Front rule (1977 
onward) lay not in the ideological positions of the two parties...but rather in the political 
routes the parties used to oppose the centre” (ibid:101). The Congress government adopted a 
tough, but Constitutional route that can be termed intra-party bargaining to address the 
interests of the state in its dealings with the centre. In contrast, “what distinguishes the Left 
Front rule is not its ideological differences from the central government but rather the choice 
of a political strategy that stresses inter-party zero sum confrontational bargaining” (ibid.). 
The CPIM successfully converted its differences with the centre into an attitude of 
ideological hostility and political agitation - or what Sinha describes as a strategy of partisan 
confrontation - making it a vehicle of Bengali regional sentiment in the process.  
The most notable impact of such an attitude was on the industrial sphere of the state. With no 
sign of revival in the stagnant industrial economy, the CPIM continued to further the 
argument that West Bengal was being discriminated against by the centre because of the 
ideological adherence of its rulers. The main accusations were: (1) discrimination in public-
sector allocation and the granting of industrial licences, (2) deliberately robbing the state of 
its geographical advantage by the policy of freight-equalisation, (3) keeping the credit-deposit 
                                                          
77 Sinha (2005) discusses how West Bengal felt itself to be treated unfairly even when the Congress was at the 
helm of affairs both in the state and the centre. The state leaders often demanded special attention from the 
centre, citing the unique problems that had plagued West Bengal since Independence (the partition, refugee 
problem, etc.), but were turned down on many occasions, thus prompting the accusations. Kohli (2009) further 
observes that the “traditional ambivalence of the Bengali bhadrolok towards Gandhi manifested itself as a 
belief that Congress and Delhi did not have Bengal’s interest at heart, a belief that was reinforced by a sense of 
regional nationalism” (quoted in Chakravarty and Bose, 2009:7). However, the accusations and grievances 
were never allowed to turn hostile and spill over into agitational politics. 
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ratio of the nationalised commercial banks in the state unreasonably depressed, and (4) a 
biased attitude towards western states by financial institutions, as the majority were 
headquartered in Bombay and elsewhere in the western part of the country. As a result, West 
Bengal lost its natural advantage in attracting investment, capital fled the state to areas which 
benefited from freight equalisation and the licensing policy, and it suffered increasingly from 
the lack of new investments, growing industrial malaise and stagnation. 
 
Another notable feature of the confrontational attitude and the argument of central-
discrimination was that it was not confined to the higher echelons of the ministries 
concerned, but was backed up by the CPIM with strong political and institutional 
commitment. Sinha (ibid.) provides four key pieces of evidence portraying this: 
 
1. The volume of press output issued by the party on the question of centre-state 
relations was considerable and served to ensure continuous attention to the question of 
central discrimination. 
2. Almost every public statement of Left Front ministers on centre-state relations was 
published and widely circulated, the most notable example being a two volume 
publication of the Chief Minister’s letters to the national industry minister and the 
Prime Minister. Some of the letters adopt an extremely critical and even threatening 
tone and embody the partisan confrontational strategy: “the purpose is not to achieve 
a solution to the problem but to be seen as agitating against the Congress Party and 
the centre” (ibid: 103).  
 
3. A number of institutional and political agencies were established (or strengthened) by 
the Left Front, which played a key role in corroborating the state’s position and 
offered it substantial political support. These included the Information and Cultural 
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Department of the GoWB, Ganashakti (a Bengali newspaper published by the CPIM) 
and the People’s Democracy (a journal published by the CPIM). This support not only 
bolstered the government’s position, but also signalled to investors and the central 
government alike that the Bengali political elite was interested, and involved in, a 
sustained and committed opposition to the centre.  
4. Finally, the Left Front also successfully moulded public opinion on the issue of 
central discrimination. No meeting, public statement or interview was complete 
without raising and citing a number of instances on the subject. As a result, “most 
literate and illiterate people, supporters and opponents of the regime, upper and lower 
castes, know about various instances of central discrimination” (ibid:104). 
 
Table 4.6: Magnitude of Change in the Structure of Industry between 1983 and 1990: Comparison 
of West Bengal and Other States (percentage shares) 
States Factories Employment Gross Output Average 
population (in 
millions)  
 
1983 1990 1983 1990 1983 1990 1981-1991 
Maharashtra 15 14.3 16.1 15 22.4 21.6 70.9  
Gujarat 10.8 10.1 9.9 8.7 12.4 10.4 37.7 
Tamil Nadu 12.3 12.8 10.4 11.5 9.9 10.4 52.2 
Uttar 
Pradesh 7.8 9.1 9.3 9.8 7.5 9.6 
118.6 
Andhra 
Pradesh 12.2 14.8 9.3 10 6.1 5.9 
60 
Karnataka 5.8 5.3 5 5.1 4.4 4.4 41 
Bihar  4 3.2 4.6 4.5 6.2 4.9 58.4 
Madhya 
Pradesh 3.3 3.2 4.6 5.1 4.4 5.3 
43.4 
West Bengal 5.8 5 11.4 9.1 8.1 6.1 61.4 
Source: Annual Survey of Industries, various years 
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Table 4.7: Person-days Lost by States; 1979-89 
 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 Average 
population  
1981-91 
(in millions)  
Maharashtra 2972 3515 1464 45279 17440 7491 2750 3436 4040 4629 2269 70.9 
Tamil Nadu  8405 3707 3840 1999 2217 4142 2136 3591 3305 1984 1471 52.2 
Kerala  3770 1250 497 2348 1575 2036 737 2327 2163 1666 699 27.3 
Bihar  1711 1021 1476 1414 1809 1465 415 577 1908 490 184 58.4 
Andhra 
Pradesh 
664 553 531 2015 2747 2806 2036 7926 2609 1689 2518 60 
Uttar 
Pradesh 
1280 856 636 646 571 515 285 528 1435 1472 166 118.6 
Karnataka 946 980 2422 403 582 954 935 233 767 1153 147 41 
Madhya 
Pradesh 
1200 830 1208 316 882 1535 654 861 255 417 284 43.4 
Gujarat 544 1046 630 833 772 1143 583 1185 1645 294 215 37.7 
Rajasthan 129 547 762 416 785 665 570 684 1002 492 216 39.2 
West Bengal 18076 6236 8028 16133 15191 20285 11085 8554 14600 18773 6252 61.4 
Source: Indian Labour Year Book, GoI, 1980-1990. 
 
Source: Economic Review, GoWB, 1990-91 
 
The rhetoric of central discrimination has indeed become, as Sinha writes, folklore in the 
CPIM’s political discourse. However, while the argument about centre-state relations is a 
fundamental and legitimate debate concerning the nature of Indian federal structure, the 
reorientation of this debate in the form of a confrontational strategy embedded in an ethos of 
distrust and suspicion towards the centre is difficult to validate (Chakravarty and Bose, 
Table 4.8: Sector-wise Distribution of Estimated Employment in West Bengal: 1983-90 (in millions) 
Year Public Sector Private Sector 
1983 1.67 .99 
1984 1.69 .94 
1985 1.72 .94 
1986 1.69 .93 
1987 1.70 .93 
1988 1.70 .90 
1989 1.68 .89 
1990 1.69 .89 
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2009). Whether West Bengal was truly discriminated against or this attitude prevented its 
rulers from lobbying pragmatically to obtain licenses and industrial investment is a debate 
that continues to provoke varied responses, though at best anecdotal in nature
78
. The fact of 
the matter is that during the first decade and a half of the Left Front rule, there was a drastic 
decline in the number of new licenses for big businesses. Between 1983 and 1990, a mere 
204 licences were issued to West Bengal (see Table 4.9 for a comparative breakdown). A 
further breakdown reveals that out of the 204 licences, only 72 were for new units and/or 
substantial expansion (see Table 4.10). It is undeniable, as Pederson writes, that “by the early 
1990s - after more than 13 years of Left Front rule-  it was evident that a sense of fatigue had 
set in” (2001:656).  
 
4.3 The New Economic Policy (NEP) and Policy Transition in West Bengal 
4.3.1 The Left Front’s Initial Reaction to the NEP 
The NEP (discussed in Chapter 1) adopted by the Narasimha Rao-led Congress government 
in 1991 was a complete antithesis to the Left ideology, and evoked strong reactions from all 
the Left parties. The CPIM, owing to its size and significant presence in parliament, was the 
most vocal of all. Not only did it criticise the NEP, but it accused the pro-market policies of 
the preceding Rajiv Gandhi regime (import liberalisation, concessions to foreign capital, etc.) 
of having brought the balance of payments crisis upon the country - thereby intensifying the 
imperialist pressures - in their attempt to dominate the nation even further. To all the Left 
parties, the NEP was less of a policy mechanism, and more of a symbol of the central 
government offering a meek surrender to the IMF-led imperialist forces.  
 
                                                          
78
 The two flagship instances that the CPIM puts forward to justify its claims of discrimination are the Haldia 
Petrochemicals Project and the Bakreshwar Thermal Power Project, both of which were much delayed due to 
the centre refusing to grant necessary permissions and finances.   
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The CPIM mounted a well-constructed critique of the NEP, both inside and outside 
parliament, from the streets of Delhi to every public meeting in the towns and villages of 
West Bengal. The allegations were manifold, ranging from a moral betrayal of the socialist 
dream (which not only the Lefts but also the Nehruvian principles stood for) to emotional 
outbursts accusing the Congress of selling out the nation to foreigners. However, the main 
areas of criticism, which were succinctly summarised in the 14
th
 Congress of the CPIM held 
in Madras in 1992 were as follows: 
First, the IMF loans, along with the associated conditionalities, would lead India into 
a debt trap and undermine national economic sovereignty. By 1991-92, India already 
had an external debt of over Rs. 1.8 lakh crores and an internal debt of around Rs. 2.4 
lakh crores. Annual debt servicing stood at 31% of the country’s net export earnings. 
Seeking further loans from the IMF under its structural adjustment facility would 
therefore not only push the country into a spiralling debt trap, but also lead to the  
humiliation of direct regulation and supervision of the Indian economy by the IMF.  
Second, the NEP provided for automatic clearance of 51% of foreign equity in 34 
different industries, and also opened up all but 18 industries to negotiations with 
foreign private capital. But the inflow of high proportions of foreign investments 
would primarily be in the elite consumption goods sector, thereby distorting the 
direction of the economy even further. Moreover, technology imports would not be 
geared to meet the primary needs of the nation but the requirements of the 
multinational investments in pursuit of quick profits.   
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Table 4.9: Industrial Licences Issued to Different States in India; 1977-91 
States Years 
Average 
population  
(in millions) 
 1977 1980 1983 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1991 1981-1991 
Andhra 
Pradesh 27 42 63 70 40 38 29 37 12 
60 
Assam - 5 - 12 5 3 0 3 - 20.2 
Bihar 16 4 9 20 9 9 3 5 5 58.4 
Gujarat 60 85 115 69 86 49 34 49 34 37.7 
Punjab and 
Haryana 46 38 228 118 73 44 39 29 21 
33.2 
Karnataka - 40 - 69 42 45 30 39 - 41 
Kerala - 11 - 24 13 7 5 7 - 27.3 
Madhya 
Pradesh - 18 - 39 34 18 16 25 - 
43.4 
Maharashtra 150 107 171 134 96 86 84 72 54 70.9 
Orissa 2 8 14 25 12 8 2 4 6 29.1 
Rajasthan - 15 14 38 19 16 8 12 - 39.2 
Tamil Nadu 32 37 76 177 61 41 32 44 28 52.2 
Uttar 
Pradesh - 30 - 79 69 40 30 51 - 
118.6 
West Bengal 40 23 71 51 21 25 22 14 3 61.4 
 
 
 
 
Source: Economic Review, GoWB, various issues 
 
 
Source: Economic Review, GoWB, 1990-91 
 
 
 
Table 4.10: Classification of Licences Issued to West Bengal; 1978-90 
 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 
Licenses 
for new 
units 
4 6 5 6 7 7 5 4 2 5 10 5 2 
Licences 
for 
substantial 
expansion 
of existing 
units 
3 4 4 6 4 4 8 5 4 3 5 0 3 
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Third, with the weakening in the resistance of the Congress government, there would 
be an increasing risk of foreign multinationals penetrating sensitive economic areas 
such as banking and insurance, and the GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade) negotiations would be used to pressurise India to accede to these demands.  
 
Fourth, the NEP would prove to be a bonanza for the big bourgeoisie and discriminate 
against the small and medium sectors. The virtual dismantling of the MRTP 
(Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices) Act and de-licencing, geared to meet the 
monopolists’ demand for greater scope for investment of the surplus capital, would 
harm the small-scale sectors by allowing the monopolists to enter reserved areas. 
Dismantling the public sector would also mean an end to the idea of self-reliance on 
the basis of indigenous research and development, endangering the economic 
sovereignty of the nation. There was also a possibility that indiscriminate 
liberalisation of imports of capital, technology and commodities would generate 
conflicts between western monopoly capital and the Indian big bourgeoisie. 
 
Fifth, the privatisation drive was anti-worker and would trigger unemployment by the 
import of capital-intensive technologies. The exit policy fashioned under the guidance 
of the IMF and World Bank would also spell the end for the 2.4 lakh ‘sick’ units 
(businesses running in perpetual loss) in the country, which could not be revived by 
making lakhs of workers unemployed.  
 
And finally, the fiscal and budgetary policies of the government were a naked attempt 
to pass the debt crisis onto the people. The new indirect taxes which were being 
created along with the burgeoning budget deficit, devaluation of the rupee and 
administered price hikes would together create inflationary pressures on the economy. 
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Early signs were already visible with the annual inflation rate of wholesale prices in 
1991 standing at nearly 50% more than that in 1990.  
 
The CPIM central committee, the politburo, and various mass organisations of the party came 
out in protest repeatedly over the next few years. The first major nationwide action took place 
on 29
th
 November 1991 through a general strike called by the Sponsoring Committee of 
Trade Unions. From 15
th
 February 1992 onwards, a range of localised protest marches were 
organised, culminating on 4
th
 March with state-wide rallies and a mass-protest led by CPIM 
MPs and MLAs in Delhi. On 16
th
 June, another nation-wide general strike was called, 
followed by a massive trade union members’ rally in Delhi on 25th November. In April 1993, 
a National Platform of Mass Organisations was formed for the first time, which organised a 
jail-bharo (court voluntary arrest) movement in August, followed by another all-India general 
strike on 9
th
 September. In 1994, a two stage programme was outlined by the CPIM and other 
Left parties which led to a number of protest marches in different parts of the country 
throughout February and March, followed by massive state-wide rallies on a charter of 
demands against the NEP. Notable among these were the rallies organised jointly by the 
CPIM and CPI at Vijayawada (Andhra Pradesh) and Thanjavur (Tamil Nadu). This two 
month long campaign culminated in the 5
th
 April rally in Delhi which saw a militant 
demonstration after the police stopped the march on its way to parliament. The second stage 
of the programme in 1994 began with a call for a mass civil disobedience campaign between 
16
th
 August and 9
th
 September, the target being 10 lakh volunteers for court arrest. This saw 
the biggest mobilisation conducted by the Left parties with the participation of 12.5 lakh 
volunteers in the court arrest programme and another 50 lakh in mass sit-ins organised in 
West Bengal. This was followed by a rail-roko (stop the rail) movement on 20
th
 September 
and another general strike on 29
th
 September. Mass agitation reached its peak during 1995-
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96. On 15
th
 December 1995, protest rallies took place countrywide, culminating in Delhi in 
front of the parliament. The one in West Bengal was the largest, jointly organised by 56 
different mass organisations. A similar, albeit smaller, event took place in Delhi only three 
days later. The CPIM Calcutta District Committee organised a number of meetings and 
protest marches during the December-January period at the Brigade Parade Ground in 
Calcutta. On 23
rd
 February 1996 another nationwide industrial strike was called to oppose the 
labour-interest curbing economic policies and the enactment of the Employees’ Pension 
Scheme. In addition to these campaigns, the 1991-96 period also saw a significant increase in 
CPIM publications which discussed a variety of issues related to the NEP - the GATT treaty, 
dismantling the public sector, financial sector reforms, disinvestment of public sector unit 
shares, opening up telecom, power and other infrastructure sectors to private capital, etc.       
Agitations and demonstrations aside, the CPIM also suggested an alternative path to what it 
saw as the IMF dictated, pro-imperialist, pro-monopoly and pro-landlord policies. This 
‘alternative policy’, based on the idea of the Left alternative, was first fashioned in a 
convention organised by the Left parties in defence of economic sovereignty, and published 
by the Left Front in July 1991. Its main suggestions were: 
 
1. Land reforms hailed as the basic solution to the agrarian crisis, for the emancipation 
of the mass of the peasantry, and to abolish the poverty which afflicted the rural 
population in the country. Land reforms, along with rural employment guarantee 
schemes were prescribed as the basic steps to expand the home market.   
 
2. Fiscal deficit to be brought down through increased and direct taxation and reduction 
in government expenditure. Suggestions included plugging loopholes in tax laws, 
retrieving black money in circulation and introducing punitive measures, and 
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imposing wealth taxes on monopoly houses that had built up large assets. The 
adoption of these measures, it was argued, would not only reduce the revenue and 
fiscal deficits but also reverse the trend of relying on indirect taxes and administered 
price hikes to raise revenues at the expense of the common people.  
 
3. Public industries to continue to be given prominence as a strategic sector of the 
economy. Inefficient and bureaucratic management to be eliminated and replaced by 
workers’ participation in management.  
 
4. The policy of indiscriminate imports of capital goods and technology for luxury goods 
production to end. Import of foreign technology to be confined to sectors vital for the 
development of the economy only, with the main emphasis on developing self-
reliance and indigenous research and development.           
 
5. Measures to be taken to provide relief to the poor in times of economic difficulty, 
such as expanding the public distribution sector and schemes for employment 
generation and poverty alleviation. Expansion of primary education, literacy, health 
care, etc. In order to implement these measures effectively, greater decentralisation of 
power from the centre to the states and below to the panchayat level was required.   
 
4.3.2 The Policy Statement on Industrial Development (1994) and Subsequent 
Institutional Changes  
 
While the CPIM continued to denounce the NEP in public at every opportunity, signs of 
change within the Left Front itself had gradually started to surface. As Pederson (2001:658) 
writes:  
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a few months before the 1993 strike, the Left Front government had indirectly 
acknowledged in its Economic Review for the year 1992-93 that the freeing of the 
industrial sector from the compulsion to seek central government licenses had resulted 
in an increase in investment proposals in the state. To take advantage of the new 
situation, the West Bengal authorities stepped up their efforts to attract new 
investments. In April 1993, they launched a new incentive scheme for investment 
projects. Later on, new tax concessions were offered for new investment projects. 
Moreover, the government streamlined procedures for handling applications for 
financial support for new investment projects by the government’s industrial 
development corporation.  
 
However, the watershed moment of this story came in September 1994, when the government 
published a renewed Policy Statement on Industrial Development which contained the first 
significant deviation (in favour of the private sector and foreign investment) from the rhetoric 
of the 1978 Statement. It read: 
“The State Government welcomes foreign technology and investments, as may be 
appropriate, or mutually advantageous…[I]t recognises the importance and key role 
of the Private Sector in providing accelerated growth…the State Government would 
also welcome private sector investment in power generation…While continuing to 
advocate a change in some important aspects of this New Economic Policy, we must 
take the  fullest advantage of the withdrawal of the freight equalization policy on steel 
and the delicensing in respect of many other industries” (GoWB, 1994:7-8). 
 
While the opening pages of the Statement re-emphasised the discrimination-by-centre and 
self-reliance arguments, the later sections were a marked departure from the 1978 Policy 
Statement in both content and tone. Consider the following points with respect to the features 
of the 1978 Statement discussed earlier:  
 
1. The sceptical and almost militant attitude towards multinationals was completely 
reversed, and the state was promoted as an attractive destination for private capital, 
both domestic and foreign. “Apart from the presence of large Indian Industrial Houses 
functioning in the State, a number of Multi-national Corporations (MNCs) have long 
been successfully operating in the State...Philips, GEC, Hindustan Lever, ICI, 
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Siemens, Bata, etc. A welcome development is that a good number of Non-Resident 
Indians (NRIs), MNCs directly or through foreign Governments and Indian Industrial 
Houses have, in the recent past, shown special interest in coming to West Bengal” 
(ibid.:7). The Statement also declared that private and joint sectors, along with public 
sectors, would be treated as effective instruments for mobilising necessary resources 
and expertise in important areas of economic activity such as power generation, 
communication, roads and other infrastructure.  
 
2. Based upon available opportunities and geographic advantages, certain industry 
segments were declared as ‘thrust areas’ for special attention. These were: 
petrochemical industries, electronics and IT, engineering, iron and steel and other 
mine-based industries, textiles and leather industries, food processing, 
pharmaceuticals, gems and jewellery and tourism.  
 
 
3. Contrary to the earlier claims that a revival of sick industries would strengthen the 
grip of the monopolists, the government now promised that all such units in the 
private sector would be “reopened and rehabilitated appropriately at the earliest either 
through existing management or through induction of new promoters” (ibid.:14). For 
sick public sector undertakings, it promised to continue to pressurise the central 
government to formulate appropriate strategies ensuring healthy revival and 
rehabilitation.   
 
4. Finally, along with the promises and thrust areas, a number of policy instruments 
were introduced to expedite the process of industrial development. As mentioned 
  
180 
 
previously, some of these were already in place by 1993
79
, indicating early signs of 
the change in government attitude. The rest of the instruments included (a) a proposal 
to strengthen the WBIDC (West Bengal Industrial Development Corporation) by 
upgrading its single window service, the Silpabandhu (friend of investors), in order to 
provide support and eliminate unnecessary delays to project proposals; (b) 
constituting an Empowered Committee under the chairmanship of the Chief Secretary 
of the state government to arrange for time-bound decisions and clearances; and (c) 
setting up various committees under the District Magistrate with the Superintendent 
of Police, Assistant Labour Commissioner, General Manager of the District Industries 
Centre, etc. at district levels to ensure fast decisions regarding land, employment and 
other related matters.        
 
The 1994 Statement is the cornerstone upon which the subsequent industrialisation drive in 
West Bengal was based. The Left Front, to its credit, also initiated a number of politically 
risky shifts following its announcement, such as allowing the private sector to enter the 
infrastructure, health, and even education sectors. The most important institutional change 
was reorganising the WBIDC and the appointment of Mr. Somenath Chatterjee
80
 as its 
Chairman. Chatterjee, despite being a senior CPIM member and a highly respected Left 
leader of the country, was never a part of the core group of ideologues in the party and had a 
relatively liberal image
81. In keeping with this, he was given a “free hand to evolve new 
policies for the state’s industrial development” (Sinha, 2004:81). Chatterjee recognised the 
persisting credibility problem as a fundamental impediment to improving the industrial 
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 An Incentive Scheme for new as well as expansion of existing units, with a High Powered Committee looking 
into individual cases; tax concessions announced in the 1993-94 state budget; streamlined and simplified sales 
tax laws and procedures, etc.  
80
 He later went on to become the parliamentary Speaker, but was eventually evicted from the party in 2010. 
81
 While interviewing industrialists who have been associated with West Bengal over the last few decades, 
many often jokingly referred to Mr. Chatterjee as the only state level leader besides Jyoti Basu who could hold 
a conversation in English properly.  
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prospects of West Bengal, and made a conscious effort to move away from the usual rhetoric 
of central discrimination.  
 
The most serious problem is one of image- an image that nothing happens in West 
Bengal, nobody works here, there’s no power, no water, and the government is run by 
the Mafia, the industrial sector is full of all sorts of irresponsible people. That’s an 
image that has been very assiduously created [by the press and the Centre]...There 
was deliberate action on part of the Centre to deny licences, persuade people to move 
from here...But I say, forget the past, except to learn from the past
82
. 
 
Chatterjee, along with Jyoti Basu, intensified the promotion of West Bengal as an attractive 
investment destination through a number of foreign tours and visits. He also made a 
conscious effort to court the press. In spite of the party having long dismissed mainstream 
media as ‘bourgeois’, post-1994 the government attempted to signal its commitment to the 
reform agenda by drastically increasing the volume of interviews and press statements given. 
In most of his interviews, Chatterjee argued explicitly that addressing the credibility problem 
would require the government to undertake ‘large’ and ‘stronger’ reforms (Sinha, ibid.): 
“...unfortunately there is still the feeling among a section of the industry: Why should we go 
to a communist-led state? This should prompt us to be more aggressive in projecting West 
Bengal. We must attract private capital. I don’t see any alternative”83. 
 
The government also tried to change the discursive frames through which most people 
viewed its economic programmes by limiting the power of the trade unions (particularly 
CITU) and promoting an environment conducive to investment. It was repeatedly stressed 
that while “just demands would be met, the question of work discipline and work culture was 
a much larger and more important issue. Jyoti Basu went as far as to threaten the unions with 
‘stern action’ if they did not maintain harmonious labour-business relations” (ibid.:85).  
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 Interview, Business World, 22
nd
 June 1997, p.94. Quoted in Sinha (2004:83) 
83
 Quoted in Sinha (ibid.) 
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The post-1994 industrial environment in the state also marked a clear increase in interaction 
between the government and various sections of the business community, particularly evident 
in the support provided by the local chambers of commerce. Two important initiatives were 
taken during this period: the state planning board was reorganised with a private sector 
representative, and a Government-Industry Coordination Committee was formed to look after 
the implementation of individual projects. This was also the period when international 
consulting firms were brought in for the first time to review and advise on the state’s 
industrial prospects. The first was the Arthur D. Little report commissioned by the 
Confederation of Indian Industry (CII) in 1995, followed shortly by the CII and WBIDC 
jointly commissioning Price Waterhouse to help in promoting the state as an attractive 
investment destination. Both reports made similar suggestions, the former recommending an 
“’industrial development compact’ between government, industry and labor...” and criticising 
the “lack of strong partnerships and growth attitudes among business, labor and 
government...the single most important historical factor behind the state’s loss of its 
industrial performance” (Arthur D. Little Inc, 1995:1-2; quoted in Pederson, 2000:659), and 
the latter pointing out some of same key thrust areas with strong growth potential. The CII 
also successfully organised two consecutive Partnership Summits in 1997, both attracting a 
significant number of investors. Both before and during these events, the government, 
possibly for the first time, worked in close cooperation with the CII (Sinha, 2004:85). The CII 
President during 1996-97 was also a Bengali, Shekhar Datta, who, as pointed out by various 
members of the CII and the press, may have played a crucial role in both promoting West 
Bengal and smoothing things out with the government
84
. 
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 Source: Interviews with two CII senior officials (anonymity requested); 30
th
 June 2009, Calcutta 
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In retrospect, the 1994 Statement marks the first moment of transition not only in the Left 
Front’s policy approach, but also in the political economic history of West Bengal during its 
three decade long Left rule. For the first time, an attempt was being made to de-link 
government from politics, albeit rhetorically. The 1978 Statement was essentially an effort to 
link the struggle for production with the ongoing class struggle of the Left parties in order to 
provide some temporary relief to the poor. The 1994 Statement was, on the contrary, by and 
large apolitical. The focus was on income and employment generation via industrial revival 
and growth, and in the entire Statement, not once were the words ‘revolution’ or ‘class 
struggle’ used. However, the magnitude of this change went unnoticed at the time, and it was 
not until over five years later, that CPIM ideologues in West Bengal took upon themselves 
the task of providing a theoretical justification of the same
85
.      
 
It is here that the puzzle lies. Why was such a de-linkage necessary? The Left Front had been 
performing satisfactorily as far as its political agenda was concerned. The Left parties, 
especially the CPIM, had entrenched themselves politically, organisationally and socially 
throughout the state and were riding high on electoral performance at the state, municipal and 
panchayat levels. Rural West Bengal, by the late 1980s, also demonstrated modest levels of 
economic affluence and social/communal peace owing to the pro-poor policies of the 
government. Why would the Left Front not sustain its political line based on its achievements 
so far, rather than falling into line with the central government recommended policy measures 
- which all the Left parties continued to oppose in the public sphere even after 1994?  
 
Contemporary Left literature fails to provide an answer. In fact, as the following section 
elaborates, the industrial policy statement was formulated by Jyoti Basu with the aid of a 
close circle of bureaucrats, keeping the party entirely in dark. Hardly anyone in the CPIM, let 
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 See Chapter 5.  
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alone other Left parties, realised the magnitude of change being initiated. The issue was 
discussed in the 15
th
 Party Congress in 1995, but even then the focus was on watering down 
the scale of change rather than acknowledging the shift in the party’s discourse. Soon after 
the 1994 Statement was passed by the West Bengal Legislative Assembly, the CPIM 
politburo prepared a document explaining the role of the Left Front in the context of the NEP. 
The central committee examined this document in December 1994 and tabled it in the 15
th
 
Congress. This CC statement re-emphasised the discriminatory attitude of the central 
government via policies such as freight equalisation and the partisan use of licensing, and 
went on to point out that while the state had made significant progress in agricultural 
production and expanding the rural market, the discrimination had led to industrial stagnation 
and large-scale job losses. It was thus essential for West Bengal to undertake rapid 
industrialisation, but this had to take place in the context of the NEP. In such a situation:   
 
it has become necessary to adjust the industrial policy in the state...[But] doing so 
does not mean giving up or compromising on our basic strategic goals...This can be 
done to an extent within the confines of the existing policies of the Centre while the 
strong base of the Left and democratic forces in West Bengal will be mobilised to 
strengthen the all India struggle against the economic policies of the Centre. It is in 
this perspective that the Left Front government should implement its industrial 
policy...while at the same time firmly defending the legitimate rights of the workers 
and consulting the trade unions in all matters affecting the workers interest (15
th
 Party 
Congress of the CPIM, 1995:100).  
 
The CC document also pointed out:  
 
…[w]hile implementing policies for industrial expansion and inviting private capital 
both Indian and foreign into West Bengal, care should be taken to see that our 
government...do not subscribe to any policy statement which justify the liberalisation 
policies and the economic reforms set out by the government...The Left Front 
government’s policies should be in defence of the public sector in core areas, 
retaining the state intervention in the infrastructure development and in social 
infrastructure...In every forum where official policies are debated, the Left Front 
government must clearly set out alternative policies possible in the present situation 
and in the long term and this should be the basis for our Party’s propaganda and 
mobilisation among the masses...It is by keeping this basic perspective in mind that 
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we should judge current policies, review them from time to time and make 
adjustments (ibid: 100-101).  
 
The document concluded by saying that the Left Front government would continue to play a 
leading role in the nationwide resistance to liberalisation and privatisation.  
 
This is a rather superficial argument, mainly on three counts. Firstly, the 1994 Statement 
itself mentioned nothing about setting alternative policies. While the CC statement is 
essentially a political one and might not be expected to cover administrative details, neither 
the government nor the CPIM delivered any subsequent plan detailing how such alternative 
policies would be set. Secondly, promoting state intervention as a political priority would 
discourage private capital from coming to West Bengal which, even the CC admitted, was a 
necessity. Finally, it is not clear how the Left Front could canvas for private capital while at 
the same time leading a nationwide anti-liberalisation movement, thus running a high risk of 
creating doubt among potential investors about the government’s true intentions86. This CC 
statement is possibly the only formal explanation of the policy transition that the CPIM 
provided during the 1990s, but rather than focusing on the de-linkage question, it attempted 
to recreate the political sanctity of a pro-labour alternative economic model, and labelled the 
shift in policy as necessary ‘adjustments’ rather than a fundamental transition.     
 
The puzzle however, remains unanswered. For analytical clarity, let us rephrase it as two 
distinct questions: why were the policy changes, irrespective of whether one labels them as 
adjustments or transition, necessary? And more importantly, why was an attempt made to de-
link government from politics, contrary to the Left parties’ declared ideological discourse and 
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 In fact, precisely this half-hearted attitude was a major factor behind a rather stunted industrial growth in 
West Bengal in the years to come. See next chapter for details.       
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the 17 year old history of the Left Front? The rest of the chapter focuses on these two 
questions.  
 
4.4 Explaining the Transition: Fiscal and Federal Compulsions  
 
If one looks beyond the political overtones of the period, certain basic facts about the fiscal 
condition of West Bengal stand out. The coffers of the Left Front had deflated alarmingly 
between 1980 and 1990, so much so that by early 1990, the fiscal standing of the state was 
one of the worst in the country. Table 4.11 provides a comparative analysis of the cumulative 
fiscal indicators of the ten states with maximum revenue deficits in this period. West Bengal 
tops the chart with a total deficit of Rs. 1765 crores, while Uttar Pradesh is a distant second 
with a total deficit of Rs. 911 crores. The state also performs dismally in terms of revenue 
collection. Between 1980 and 1990, the own revenue receipt of the government (own tax and 
non tax revenues plus interest payments) stood at 60% of its total revenue receipt - 
significantly less than most other states. Given the level of deficit, the government had to 
borrow substantially to make ends meet, and its total outstanding liability was the third 
highest in the country. In terms of debt-income ratio, West Bengal was one of the most debt 
stressed states in the country. The government itself admitted to the extreme constraints on its 
financial resources in the economic review of 1990-91: “the total loan repayment liability of a 
state government has become so large that it often exceeds the Central Plan Assistance for a 
particular year. In 1989-90, for instance, for West Bengal’s Annual Plan of Rs. 1115 crores, 
Central Plan Assistance was Rs. 325 crores, whereas the loan repayment to the Centre was 
around Rs. 656 crores. It appears that the state has been caught in an ‘internal debt trap’ in 
relation to the Centre” (Economic Review of GoWB, 1990-91:94).  
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This debt-trap, on top of the increasing revenue-deficit, left the government with barely any 
room to manoeuvre its resources for developmental expenditure. In fact, the total capital 
expenditure in West Bengal between 1980 and 1990 was a paltry 28% of its total revenue 
expenditure, slightly higher than Andhra Pradesh (25%), but less than all the other revenue-
deficit states.   
 
It should also be noted that these figures show that, despite the Left Front’s discrimination 
rhetoric of reduced central assistance, almost 40% of West Bengal’s total revenue receipt 
between 1980 and 1990 came from the centre, and was the second highest in the country.  
While most of the observations above about the fiscal condition of the state can be 
corroborated by the government published annual economic reviews, the CPIM rarely admits 
the same in public. The standard refutations put forward by the party point to the successful 
land reforms, improved agricultural productivity, and panchayati-raj institutions, and blame 
the central government for all the industrial and economic afflictions of the state. The 
justification provided by the CPIM behind the policy transition stops at merely admitting that 
some elements of the NEP had created certain opportunities which should be taken advantage 
of, without acknowledging the alternative of continuing economic decline.  
 
Given its financial straits, the government had little choice but to court private investments in 
order to inject much needed momentum into the state economy. While the CPIM chose to 
continue with its rhetoric of a ‘self-reliant alternative’ in public, the pro-market reforms 
introduced by the central government had, in effect, provided the Left Front with a way out of 
fiscal bankruptcy. Mukherjee (2007) describes the reforms as a “godsend for the CPM to get 
out of the impasse it had landed itself in trying to attract capital and half-heartedly implement 
the Nehruvian development plan” (2007:3).  
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Beyond the fiscal crisis, there was a larger arc of federal compulsions and political 
salesmanship that also played a critical role in the process, especially between 1991-1994 (i.e. 
between the time the reforms were introduced by the central government and the Policy 
Statement formulated by the Left Front). The arguments stem from the dual conceptual 
categories of inter-jurisdictional competition (Sáez, 2002) and provincial Darwinism 
(Jenkins, 1999) (see Chapter 1), summarised below. 
 
The most overt influence of the NEP was on national industrial policy. Abolition of the 
licensing era triggered intense competition among the different state governments to attract 
private investment
87, resulting in “a proliferation of tax-incentive schemes and promises of 
speedy administrative procedures, expedited land acquisition for new industrial projects, and 
efforts to maintain a ‘conducive’ industrial-relations climate” (ibid: 134). The long-lasting 
implication of this change is what Sáez calls an institutional shift towards inter-jurisdictional 
competition among the states.  
Jenkins, in a similar vein, labels this as the partial displacement of centre-state conflict by 
inter-state competition. What is crucial though, is to identify the political skills employed by 
the central government to bring about this shift.   
The key issue here is that the central government was able to pass on many of the difficult 
tasks arising from structural adjustments to the state governments by making them the main 
point of contact for entrepreneurs, thus holding them largely responsible for their own 
economic performance. Thus state governments across India entered an inter-jurisdictional 
competition, fighting for private investments, as public funding for large capital intensive 
projects waned under the new policy regime. Coupled with this was the effect of provincial 
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 As Jenkins writes, state governments had become akin to agents to whom industrialists now needed to go 
for environmental and labour clearances, basic infrastructural facilities, permits, etc.  
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Darwinism, as the central government “pitt[ed] states against one another, starving states of 
resources, and providing new opportunities for patronage and profiteering at the state level” 
(ibid:179).  
Table 4.11: Fiscal Indicators of 10 States with Maximum Revenue Deficit: 1980-90
88 
Indicators States 
WB UP KRL RTN MH GJRT PN TN AP KNTK 
Revenue Deficit 
(in Rs. Crore) 1765 911 812 544 522 403 363 363 305 108 
Total Revenue 
Receipt (in Rs. 
Crore) 21603 38172 12765 15505 42742 20575 11140 24941 26680 19786 
Own Revenue 
Receipt (in Rs. 
Crore) 12995 20557 8781 9647 36441 17713 9298 17684 20063 15795 
Net Devolution 
and Transfer of 
Resources from 
Centre (in Rs. 
Crore) 9935 22497 4446 7513 12169 6998 5730 8852 9825 6249 
Central Transfer 
as % of Total 
Revenue Receipt 
39.85
% 
46.15
% 
31.21
% 
37.78
% 
14.74
% 
13.91 
% 
16.54
% 
29.10
% 
24.80
% 
20.17 
% 
Total Outstanding 
Liability (in Rs. 
Crore) 41448 69931 20767 31495 49115 28303 25553 26493 34008 23670 
Total Outstanding 
Liability as % of 
Total Revenue 
Receipt  
191.86
% 
183.20
% 
162.69
% 
203.13
% 
114.91
% 
137.56 
% 
229.38
% 
106.22
% 
127.47
% 
119.63 
% 
Total Outstanding 
Liability as % of 
Own Revenue 
Receipt  
318.95
% 
340.18
% 
236.50
% 
326.47
% 
134.78
% 
159.79 
% 
274.82
% 
149.81
% 
169.51
% 
149.86 
% 
Total Capital 
Expenditure (in 
Rs. Crore) 6597 15495 4045 6313 12244 7875 6561 7778 6863 6755 
Total capital 
expenditure as % 
of Total Revenue 
Expenditure 
28.23
% 
39.65
% 
29.79
% 
39.33
% 
28.30
% 
37.54 
% 
57.04
% 
30.74
% 
25.43
% 
33.96 
% 
Calculated from the Handbook of Statistics on the State Government Finances, RBI:2010 
State abbreviation key: WB =West Bengal, UP= Uttar Pradesh, KRL= Kerala, RTN= Rajasthan; MH= 
Maharashtra, GJRT= Gujarat, PN = Punjab, TN= Tamil Nadu, AP= Andhra Pradesh, KNTK= Karnataka. 
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 For population figures see Table 4.9 
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For states like West Bengal which were initially not supportive of the liberalised policy 
regime, this implied a lone fight against central government directives
89
. The Left Front’s 
opposition was further undermined by some non Congress state governments implementing 
the reforms
90
. Despite their initial anti-NEP stance, eventually the Left Front leaders realised 
its unsustainability and joined in the race for investment, thus undermining the anti-reform 
stance of the Left MPs in parliament. As Jenkins writes, “to the extent that discrepancies 
between national rhetoric and state-level reality undermine this [nationalist anti-reform 
rhetoric], it is a blow to opposition efforts to reverse the direction of government policy” 
(ibid.:144). With the new industrial policy of 1994, West Bengal was seen to have finally 
joined the reform brigade. An article in the Economic Times observed, “Economic reforms 
are no more an object of contention among political parties. This is evident from their 
manifestos and speeches of various leaders, and more so from the recent industrial policy 
statement of the left-ruled West Bengal which is virtually an endorsement of the Centre’s 
policy” (Singh, 1994)91.        
 
4.5 Beyond the Transition: Ideological Negotiations and Political 
Salesmanship 
 
The dual set of fiscal-federal compulsions goes a long way to explaining the policy transition 
in West Bengal. However, there remains a third angle to the story, one that is integral to the 
CPIM’s ideology and culture, but rarely acknowledged in mainstream discourses. It includes 
the debates that started to surface over certain elements of the ideological discourse of the 
                                                          
89
 With most states already engaged in competition to attract private investment, few shared the Left Front’s 
ideological commitment to an agriculture/SME led economic strategy.  
90
 For example: the then Shiv Sena government of Maharashtra led by Manohar Joshi, and (though slightly 
later) the Telegu Desam Chief government of Andhra Pradesh under Chandrababu Naidu. 
91
 Economic Times, 22
nd
 November 1994. 
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party, the associated changes in mindset and attitude of CPIM leaders, and the role of Jyoti 
Basu in the entire process. These are examined in turn below. 
4.5.1 Ideological Debates and Factional Pressures 
Certain ambiguities emerged within the CPIM over its ideological orientation during the mid 
1980s and early 1990s. These took three specific forms. Firstly, the party’s role in promoting 
a Left alternative versus its long term governmental duties. Secondly, the collapse of the 
Soviet Union and the associated ideological implications. And finally, the redundancy of the 
partisan confrontational strategy.      
The ideological discourse of the CPIM provides the fundamental guidelines for all its 
political, as well as policy decisions. This discourse was built upon an understanding that on 
the way to a people’s democratic revolution, the party might have to occupy power for a 
transitional period with the aim of distributing immediate relief to the people (CPIM Party 
Programme, 1964). However, though the party was contesting elections and was the majority 
partner in the two United Front governments, no consensus was ever reached (or even 
attempted) on what the party’s duties would be if it came to hold power over a longer period.  
 
Once the CPIM found itself in office in 1977, there was an overt feeling within the party, as 
well as the Left Front, that this would not be long-lived. Coming out of the Emergency, many 
Left leaders harboured a deep suspicion of the Congress government at the centre and 
believed that it was only a matter of time before the centre overruled the state government. 
This belief intensified after the Congress returned to power at the centre in 1980 (replacing 
the CPIM-supported Janata government), and again after the Congress won a massive 
majority in the 1984 Lok Sabha elections following Indira Gandhi’s assassination. Therefore, 
the formation of the Left Front was assumed to be only for a transitional phase, during which 
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the political goals of the party could be intensified further using the governmental institutions 
(hence the declaration of the government as an instrument of class struggle). In the words of 
Jyoti Basu: “neither did we ever believe that we would form a government, nor did we 
imagine that once formed, our government could stay in power for so long. Although the 
Communists had formed a government in Kerala in 1957, we were not certain about what 
such a regional government would achieve within the capitalist and bourgeoisie 
parliamentary system of our country” (Introduction to Sen, 2008).  
 
Therefore, on assuming power in 1977, industrial revival was not considered a priority 
compared to the more politically attuned tasks of land reform and panchayati-raj. The 
government’s attitude to industrialisation was apparent from the onset when the industry and 
commerce portfolio was given to a Forward Block ministerial candidate, while the CPIM 
retained ministries such as land and land reforms, panchayats and rural development, 
agriculture, etc.
92
 The 1978 Statement was demonstrative of the deep suspicion that the Left 
leaders harboured towards big businesses and industrial houses, both politically and 
culturally. In the words of a former highly-ranked WBIDC official:  
 
The rulers of West Bengal believed in a ‘small is beautiful’ ideology. They therefore 
concentrated more on the small and medium scale industries and neglected the heavy 
industries. This is apparent from the fact that the industry and commerce ministry was given 
to a coalition member - whereas the cottage and small industry ministry was kept within 
CPIM. They also never build up any rapport with potential investors.
93
 
 
Added to a natural aversion towards the industrial class was the ideological support of trade 
unionism. A former Chief Secretary to the Chief Minister said: 
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 Historically, being the majority partner of the coalition, the CPIM used to retain the key ministries, 
distributing ’lesser’ portfolios to other member parties according to their size and relative importance.     
93
 Source: Interview (anonymity requested), 3
rd
 July, 2009, Calcutta. 
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The Lefts essentially empowered the trade unions. It was they who had legitimised the culture 
of gherao in the 1960s. Now that they were in power, the culture still continued, though not in 
an institutional format, but with passive support from the state. At the same the traditional 
industries in the state were also weakening. Many had fallen sick, Heavy engineering 
industries were already on the decline, so was jute and tea. The once thriving cotton industry 
was almost on the verge of extinction. The large industrial belt on the bank of the Ganges and 
the age-old foundry units in Howrah were dwindling. But the government hardly had any 
plans to address these problems; the only standard response was to take over the sick units. 
Apart from these, at least till 1985, the government was also heavily against computerisation, 
automatic clearance in the banking sector, and even English education.
94
  
 
This attitude definitely paid rich political dividends for the CPIM in the first five to seven 
years of its rule. But while the political gains largely compensated for the economic worries 
of the state the situation gradually started to change from the mid-1980s. With the conclusion 
of Operation Barga and with most of the panchayats already under party control, the political 
activism surrounding the two major institutions upon which the idea of a Left alternative was 
based had reached a low level equilibrilum, and the party was gradually entering a political 
impasse in the absence of fresh ideas. At the same time, the prospect of being in power long 
term, or at least longer than initially expected, had begun to dawn on the CPIM. This created 
a rather challenging situation for the party inasmuch as: it had a chance to enjoy a longer stint 
in office, but had no guidance from its ideological discourse on what its long-term duties 
should be; it was not clear how to combat the pitfalls of parliamentary participation which 
would certainly infect the party if it stayed in power for long; and, if the party remained 
associated with a bourgeoisie parliamentary system for too long, this might hinder the 
prospects of the people’s democratic revolution.  
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In the words of Samir Putatundu, former secretary of the CPIM’s South 24 Parganas district 
unit
95
:  
When the Left Front came to power in 1977, they had absolutely no idea that they could 
remain in power for so long. When this realisation started to set in, then sticking only to a 
programme of immediate relief was judged inadequate...In the past years of its rule, the Left 
Front achieved almost zilch as far as development planning was concerned. On one hand they 
never risked increasing the financial burden on the masses and persisted with populist 
measures, but on the other they could not undertake any development work...due to a massive 
resource crunch. Be it employment generation, be it agriculture, be it general development 
issues- all had hit a deadlock
96
. 
 
Under pressure from such conflicting ideological positions, by mid-1980 debates started to 
emerge within the CPIM over its long-term governmental duties. At the forefront were the 
dual issues of industrial development and attitude towards private capital. These were 
formally voiced at the 12
th
 Party Congress in Calcutta in 1985, where the issue of economic 
development (as an independent subject rather than intertwined with the political agenda) was 
discussed at great length for the first time. In an effort to address these concerns and find a 
way out of the impasse, the party congress approved the idea of joint sector initiatives for the 
first time. While the exact nature of the discussions that took place was never made public, 
the significance of the departure is shown in the following quote from a CPIML
97
 observer 
(albeit critically):   
 
As far back as in the party’s 12th Congress in 1985, BTR (yes, the same BT Ranadive 
who as the General Secretary of the undivided CPI in 1948 had sought to plunge the 
entire party into an adventurous insurrection to overthrow the rule of capital 
represented by the Nehru government) came down heavily against opponents of state-
private joint ventures, helping Chief Minister Jyoti Basu take a big stride forward in 
his drive for industrialisation. From then onwards, top leaders including General 
Secretaries have offered all assistance and guidance to the process of continual 
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rightward drift in the Left Front Government’s economic policies. Joint ventures, or 
what we would call PPPs today, proved to be a transitional step towards privatisation 
and then the neoliberal industrial policy document of 1994
98
. 
 
Evidently, the contradictions in ideas had initially surfaced from a sense of an ideological 
void within the party which came to light in the face of a trade-off between political longevity 
and revolutionary character. While the debates pertaining to it were largely confined to the 
higher echelons of the party during the time of the 12
th
 Congress, they were aggravated 
significantly after the Soviet disintegration which came as quite a shock to the party; it had 
pledged its allegiance to the CPSU in leading the struggles against imperialism as late as 
1988-89. The opening lines of the 14
th
 Party Congress confirm this: 
 
The international situation in the period after the 13
th
 party congress has been a 
stormy and difficult one for the forces of socialism...The reverses suffered by 
socialism in the Soviet Union and earlier in Eastern Europe have altered the world 
balance of forces in favour of imperialism for the present...Though significant 
changes began taking place in the socialist countries and in many Communist Parties 
by the time of the 13
th
 Congress of the party, we failed to grasp their deep 
implications then. Hence the subsequent developments which unfolded were quite 
unexpected (CPIM 14
th
 Party Congress, 1992:1). 
 
This was a serious setback for the CPIM. While the debates surrounding the party’s role in 
government were already in full swing, the Soviet disintegration dealt a blow to the larger 
theoretical framework it operated within. The 14
th
 Party Congress therefore had to make a 
formal attempt to re-evaluate the existing ideological discourse. The Congress adopted a 
resolution on ‘Certain Ideological Issues’, which admitted, “the complexity of the situation 
and issues being questioned, encompass the history of nearly a century of human civilisation. 
This demands a wide, extensive and in-depth study” (ibid.:91-92).  
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This resolution was one of the most significant in the history of the CPIM, as for the first 
time it admitted a fallacy in its understanding of the nature and potential of capitalism
99
. The 
resolution stated: 
 
In retrospect, it can be said that the general crisis of capitalism was simplistically 
understood. The historical inevitability of the capitalism’s collapse was advanced as a 
possibility round the corner. This was a serious error that inhibited a concrete 
scientific study of the changes that were taking place in the capitalist countries and the 
manner in which it was adapting to meet the challenges arising from socialism...while 
the socialist revolutions reduced the physical size and levels of operations of the 
world capitalist market, in the absence of socialist revolutions in any advanced 
country, these basically affected neither the levels of productive forces already 
attained by capitalism nor its future potential. It was hence possible for world 
capitalism to adapt to the new realities of a reduced physical market and yet raise the 
levels of the productive forces (ibid.:94-96).       
 
This was a significant admission, and, as suggested in the opening lines of this chapter, 
introduced a fundamental change to the ideological discourse of the party. While a detailed 
critique is beyond the purview of this work, it is important to note the political line that the 
party assumed henceforth. The debates leading up to the 14
th
 Congress and the resolution on 
Certain Ideological Issues provided the CPIM with an ideological middle ground. Having 
admitted that a socialist revolution was not imminent and that some means of co-existing 
with capitalism needed to be found, it was now possible to weave the logic of capitalist 
production into the operational principles of the party while in power. The government could 
be given licence to promote a more industry-friendly attitude and concentrate on basic 
development duties without appearing to lose its ideological character, and at the same time 
the party could continue protests against the economic reforms at national level. In 
accordance with this, the 14
th
 Party Congress also praised the Chinese and Vietnamese 
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economic models, which seemed to have successfully negotiated a similar challenge of 
adhering to a socialist framework whilst tacking the issues of economic reform and 
renovation. 
 
Finally, the economic reforms of 1991 led to a serious setback to one of the cornerstones of 
the CPIM’s political line - its partisan confrontation strategy based on accusations of a 
discriminatory attitude on the part of the central government, particularly regarding its 
licensing policy and the freight equalisation scheme. The abolishment of both of these as a 
part of the NEP therefore made the earlier accusations entirely redundant, and took the steam 
out of the party’s anti-centre rhetoric. The government was left with no option but to 
acknowledge that, “while continuing to advocate a change in some important aspects of this 
New Economic Policy, we must take the fullest advantage of the withdrawal of the freight 
equalisation policy...and the delicensing in respect of many industries” (GoWB, 1994:6).    
 
These debates and the corresponding shifts in attitude among CPIM leaders were obviously 
noticed, and even criticised, by some of the other coalition member parties as a deviation 
from the idea of a Left alternative. Manoj Bhattacharya, State Secretary, Revolutionary 
Socialist Party (RSP): 
 
The motivation behind the Left Front government after 1977 was to develop an alternative. 
But ultimately the effort had stopped after the first few years. Especially 1988 onwards the 
Left Front has been trying to operate within the overall parliamentary democratic setting of 
the country. There are certain internal contradictions within the coalition which are 
responsible for this deviation. The CPIM has always believed in some sort of a middle path, 
adjusting with capitalism. The Left Front as a whole was compelled to follow this middle 
path. We tried to protest against these, but in vain
100
.  
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Mihir Bain, State Secretary of the Revolutionary Communist Party of India (RCPI) similarly 
observed: 
From a political perspective, Left movement in India have become increasingly stagnant and 
directionless for many years. In 1977, we said that the Left Front will be a tool for class 
struggle against bourgeoisie oppression and its ultimate goal will be to bring in the revolution, 
even if the process is long drawn. But after a few years the government started to pacify 
rather than encourage trade union movements in the industrial belts. Agriculture had also 
reached stagnation after the initial success of Operation Barga. On the whole, in both 
industrial and agricultural belts, neither were there any movements, nor was there a 
favourable ideological condition to facilitate such movements. The government had stopped 
working towards increasing the common people’s consciousness, and had started to adjust 
with the bourgeoisie parliamentary system.
101
 
 
A final point remains to be noted regarding these debates. One section of the party leadership 
remained unconvinced about the validity of the new ideas and a factional struggle continued 
to rage within the CPIM throughout the second half of 1980s and well into the 1990s 
regarding its overall ideological orientation and the involvement of the private sector in the 
state economy
102
. However, this opposing faction did not wield much decision-making power 
within the party, and once certain decisions were taken at the highest level - the Party 
Congress - it gradually dissipated. Hafiz Alam Sairani, a Forward Block member and a 
former panchayat minister in the Left Front cabinet described the factional struggles:     
 
There were two opposing views inside the CPIM. One group said that we have done land 
reforms, and brought in significant welfare programmes via a system of democratic 
decentralisation through the panchayats. This is indeed an achievement. But there is no 
further scope for development. We have reached a saturation point in the agricultural sector, 
and there is limited scope to increase productivity. Yet at the same time we have to generate 
employment. So we need to find an alternative way. This has to be via industrial 
development. But given the resource crunch on the government, there is no option but to 
involve private players in the process. 
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The second group considered modern industries to be more capital intensive rather than 
labour, and argued that industrialisation cannot be a job oriented development programme and 
therefore not beneficial for the state. But the actual decision making power in CPIM was in 
the hands of the former group. The others had no option but to follow suit.
103
 
 
Manoj Bhattacharya of RSP made a similar observation about how the decision-making 
faction of the CPIM had become convinced of the inevitability of the neoliberal policies.  
 
Within two years of the economic reforms being announced by the central government, a 
sizeable number of leaders of both the major Communist parties - CPIM and CPI - were also 
taken into confidence. A part of the CPIM leadership, particularly those who mattered 
organizationally, even went to the extent of arguing about the importance and inevitability of 
these economic policies. Although the CPIM formally opposed these policies like all other 
Leftist parties, the dominant faction within it had already decided to fall in line.
104
 
 
What these changes indicate is that by early 1990, the CPIM had begun to accept a Chinese-
style economic model and withdraw some of its earlier radical stances against private capital. 
The 14
th
 Congress provided the necessary ideological legitimacy to such a change in attitude. 
Although the party continued its opposition to the economic reforms via protests and 
demonstrations, as far as its governmental duties were concerned, it was slowly coming to 
terms with the changing situation. 
 
4.5.2 An Ambivalent Policy Environment   
 
The diverse ideological and factional pressures within the party, quite predictably, spilled 
over into the realm of policy-making. While there were already serious debates over joint 
sector ventures vis-à-vis trade union practices, the Left Front was caught in a serious policy 
dilemma post-1991, trying to balance its initiatives to attract investment against a continuous 
denunciation of the NEP in public.  
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The Finance Minister of West Bengal, Dr. Asim Dasgupta, launched scathing attacks on what 
he sarcastically termed the so-called economic reforms of the central government in 
successive budget speeches from 1991 to 1997
105
. His criticisms were detailed and diverse, 
ranging from economic recession, inflationary pressures, debt trap, sovereignty crisis, and 
even an assault on the basic social values of the vast majority of the common people of the 
country. He then proceeded to outline the Left alternative, or “the possibility of an alternative 
path in the interests of the common people and all the patriotic citizens of our country...As an 
alternative to the anti-people socio-economic approach at the national level, a different 
scenario has been placed by West Bengal at the all-India fora. At the same time, the State 
Government, even with its limited power, has tried to implement this alternative approach 
within the state itself” (GoWB Budget Speech, 1995-96).  
 
What is interesting to note are the subtle changes gradually introduced into this alternative 
approach. In the 1990-91 and 1991-92 budget speeches, the main thrust was on self reliance, 
which “began in agriculture with land reforms, and in industry with emphasis on small-scale 
units and then trying, whenever possible, to link up, with a social perspective, the small-scale 
units with the mother-complexes in the large-scale industrial sector” (GoWB Budget Speech, 
1991-92). There was no mention of external and/or foreign trade. But over the next few years, 
external trade participation along with the ideas of efficiency and comparative advantage 
were gradually introduced, and self-reliance came to be equated to self-respect. In the 1993-
94 budget speech, Mr. Dasgupta said, “…self-reliance does not mean shifting out from 
external trade. It only means that...we should make it [the growth process] depend, along with 
criteria of efficiency, on what we primarily have, and then...on the basis of comparative 
advantages, participate in external trade...we are proposing participation in imports and 
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exports from a position of self-respect”. Within another two years, foreign investment was 
also included in the definition: “…it is possible to allow foreign investment in specific areas 
of importance where there is no industry in the country...Self-reliance, of course, does not 
mean withdrawal from foreign trade” (GoWB Budget Speeches, various years).  
 
The second point to note is that in spite of the emphasis on the alternative approach, Dr. 
Dasgupta announced a number of initiatives which were very much in accordance with the 
NEP. For example, a detailed industry incentive scheme was introduced as early as 1992. 
Detailed in the 1993-94 budget “in the face of a new potential of industrial revolution”, it 
announced sales tax deferment or increased remission for up to 13 years, and suspension of 
electricity duty for five years (GoWB Budget Speech, 1993-4). In the 1994-95 budget an 
attempt was made to simplify and decentralise the tax structure, so that “in place of 
unnecessary complexity and centralisation, forces of equal competition can be 
introduced...which may then encourage equal competitive forces in the sphere of production 
and trade” (GoWB Budget Speech, 1994-95). In fact, during the discussion on the 1994-95 
budget in the Assembly, several opposition members criticised the finance minister for 
“following the prescriptions of liberalisation in the disguise of communism. The budget is an 
imitation of Dr. Manmohan Singh’s budget, with the same kind of allocations and tax 
exemptions.”106 
 
Another area where the government’s ambivalent attitude became apparent was its initiatives 
to attract private capital to the state via joint ventures. Two of the earliest and most publicised 
ventures were a project between Philips and the West Bengal Electronics Development 
Corporation to set up an electronics complex in Calcutta and a petrochemicals complex at 
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Haldia, the first in the eastern region of the country107. There were a number of other 
proposals as well, though their promotion was much lower profile. For example, by as early 
as 1985, Webel Consumer Electronics Ltd., a subsidiary of West Bengal Electronics Industry 
Development Corporation Ltd. (Webel), had entered into a partnership with National 
Insulated Cable Company of India Ltd. (subsequently called Webel Nicco Electronics Ltd.). 
The records of the state Legislative Assembly show that, on 10
th
 May 1990, Jyoti Basu 
informed the House that the state was entering into joint sector ventures with both Reliance 
Industries and TATA Group
108
. On 23
rd
 March 1992, Mr. Abdul Mannan (a Congress MLA) 
quoted from a note that had been circulated in the House earlier that month, which read: 
“efforts are to be made to locate resourceful private sector entrepreneurs of good track 
records who can be introduced in India for public projects such as Paper Pulp, NISCO, 
Krishna Glass Syndicate, Lily Biscuit and India Belting...attempts may be made to convert 
Paper Pulp, NISCO and Krishna Glass Factory into joint sector companies, while Lily 
Biscuits can be possibly sold off to a good private sector firm”109. Two days later, on 25th 
March, Basu observed that “private sectors should be given a fair trial. They should be 
allowed to enter core industries like power and steel in a big way. The government is 
negotiating to sell part of its holdings in several state owned undertakings”110. On 13th July 
1993, the House was informed that Peerless Group (a Calcutta-based finance and investment 
company) and Associated Cement Companies Limited (a Mumbai-based cement production 
company, now known as ACC Ltd.) had acquired 51% equity in the Greater Calcutta Gas 
Supply Corporation and Webel Electro Ceramic respectively
111
.  
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In spite of these initiatives (and many more), there were also several signs indicating the 
government’s self-doubts. An important example is the rejection of the National Renewal 
Fund (NRF): the Fund was announced by the central government as a part of the NEP in 
1991, and formally established on 3
rd
 February, 1992. During the period of 1992-93 to 1998-
99, the NRF provided assistance to most states for implementation of voluntary retirement 
schemes in central public sector undertakings and counselling/redeployment schemes for 
retrenched workers from the organised sector
112
. Only the government in West Bengal which, 
although engaged in a similar task of “retraining and redeploying the work force, as well as 
arrang[ing] for compensation and rehabilitation for retrenched workers if necessary” (Budget 
Speech for the Ministry of Industries and Commerce, GoWB; 1993-94), refused assistance 
from the NRF, Jyoti Basu stating “we cannot accept the National Renewal Fund” (ibid.). It 
may be inferred, given the mindset of the CPIM during this period, that it was unsure as to 
what extent association with a NEP-induced policy measure would be accepted in trade union 
circles. This decision was severely criticised by opposition members, who called it an 
inherent contradiction of government policy
113
.  
 
In spite of criticisms, such conflicting signals continued to surface. A former chairman of 
WBIDC cites a lesser-known, but significant example of the government rejecting possible 
investment opportunities:  
 
Around 1993/94, Mr. Purnendu Chatterjee114 wanted to turn Calcutta into a major financial 
centre and requested some land from the government to do so. But the government did not 
encourage it. The reasons are known to no-one. Had this project materialised, it would have 
led to a substantial amount of investment in West Bengal. Very few people know about 
this.
115
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Another interesting example can be found in the Legislative Assembly records of 16
th
 June 
1994. The House was informed of a meeting held in Delhi on 9
th
 June between Dr. 
Manmohan Singh and several Congress MLAs from West Bengal. In this meeting, Dr. Singh 
had apparently praised Jyoti Basu as a pragmatic leader, citing his recent request to the 
central government to facilitate a proposed Rs 500 crores leather complex in the state with 
Japanese collaboration. However, he had then gone on to observe that Mr. Basu, while in 
Delhi, usually praised the central government’s initiatives, but assumed a totally different 
tone and changed his statements once back in Calcutta
116
.  
In summary, these examples illustrate that there was a certain amount of indecisiveness on 
the part of the government with regard to its policy initiatives on the industrial front. The 
origin of this indecisiveness can be traced to a number of factors within the CPIM, viz. the 
various strands of ideological debates and factional pressures, and also the larger 
compulsions of a stagnating economy and an increasing resource crunch. The policy dilemma 
assumed challenging proportions post-1991 against a backdrop of the NEP, and the wider 
federal compulsions of inter-jurisdictional competition and provincial Darwinism. While the 
Left Front stuck to its traditional rhetoric in public, there were increasing signs of an internal 
shift. In fact the government came under serious criticism for what the opposition described 
as a duality in its approach. In a particularly interesting observation made by Saugata Ray, a 
senior Congress MLA, the joint sector initiatives of the government were criticised as a 
policy of confused giganticism, stemming from a misdirected theoretical understanding:  
 
…the Left Front is not being able to decide on the specific development road to take. Post 
Communist states today have largely abandoned the Stalinist-Communist idea of centralised 
planning...[and] While Eastern Europe earlier used to be the theoretical compass for the Lefts 
in West Bengal, the changes there have led to a confusion. On one hand, they are talking 
                                                          
116
 West Bengal Legislative Assembly Proceedings, 1994; Volume II, 16
th
 June 
  
205 
 
about decentralisation of power, while on the other there is a move towards giganticism in 
terms of certain prized projects such as Haldia, Bakreshwar etc. This is a policy oscillation 
between decentralisation and confused giganticism, leading to a theoretical void within the 
Lefts.
117
  
 
In the next few years, the Left Front also came to be increasingly criticised for maintaining a 
double-standard between its political initiatives at national level and policy approaches at 
state level, for example, protesting against the NEP in Delhi while holding meetings with the 
Bengal Chamber of Commerce to identify new opportunities for private investment, opposing 
a subsidy withdrawal policy of the central government while freezing subsidy levels for 
public units in the state, and so on
118
. In fact, citing the various meetings and foreign trips of 
Basu to attract investment, the opposition went so far as to say that not only had the Lefts 
moved away from the policy of total state control, but “Mr. Jyoti Basu has become the 
principal mouthpiece of the national bourgeoisie.”119 
4.5.3 The Role of Jyoti Basu 
The above discussion shows that long before the new policy statement was announced or 
even conceived, higher echelons of both the party and the government were embroiled in 
debates over an industrialisation-based development agenda. While a policy transition 
eventually took place in 1994, the ambivalent ambience present would have possibly 
continued much longer had it not been for Jyoti Basu. His role in the process deserves 
special attention. 
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Basu was seriously criticised for his government’s policy indecisiveness120. He was seen to 
be entirely subservient to the party, turning a blind eye towards the state’s stagnating 
economy and never interfering with party diktats
121
, even if that meant disrupting 
government services (such as acceding to the habit of calling frequent strikes). However, 
while his inability to rise above party priorities and establish a favourable investment 
climate in the state was seen as a serious drawback, his individual initiatives to attract 
investments were appreciated. Consider the following statement by Saugata Ray: “Mr. Basu 
is constrained by his party. While he has been trying to attract investments, the party is 
pulling him back. On one hand he is trying to start Haldia Petrochemicals, while on the 
other the ideology of strikes continues in the party”. Ray went on to praise Basu for a shift 
in outlook and attitude: “while at one point he was against modernisation of factories, today 
he is welcoming foreign technology and joint collaboration”122. Sinha makes a similar 
observation: “[w]hile Jyoti Basu insisted upon reorienting the CPI(M) and the Left Front 
government toward industrial and even monopoly capitalists…his efforts were not 
successful because he could not manage the full effort of the party apparatus behind him” 
(2005:196).  
 
Although he never transgressed official party lines, Basu was widely regarded for his 
pragmatic attitude, and was the first among his contemporary Left leaders to start speaking 
in a new language, “far removed from talk of class struggle, revolution, anti capitalism and 
anti imperialism” (Mukherjee, 2007:2). He clearly expressed his views on industrial 
development on several occasions: 
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1. In a widely publicised speech to the Bengal Chamber of Commerce, Basu candidly 
confessed to harbouring a “vital interest in helping the growth of industries”. He 
wanted to take a “realistic view of the political and economic situation”, and in the 
existing situation the private sector, including multinational and monopolies, have a 
“major role to play”. “Certainly we would support the need for foreign technology 
or even investment…” he continued, “…if it would help production and distribution 
of items essentially required”. He also pointed out that “our incentives to the private 
sector have been increasing rapidly”.123  
 
2. On 12th March 1992, shortly after the announcement of the NEP, Basu observed that 
the abolishment of the licensing scheme would certainly alleviate the industrial 
situation in West Bengal, saying: “from a self-complacent point of view, I am really 
happy”.124 
 
3. On 25th March 1992, Basu said: “I have been going abroad every year to invite 
foreign companies and NRIs to invest in West Bengal...Computerisation and other 
forms of modernisation are inevitable...Trade union leaders have no right to avoid 
work on the excuse that they are looking after the welfare of the workers…We are 
not against modernisation and technological transformation and nor are we in favour 
of unproductive job protection in non-viable units”125. 
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The role that Basu played in bringing a discursive shift in both the party and the 
government’s attitude towards industrialisation can be summed up as that of an initiator of a 
changed mindset. Sujit Poddar, his Chief Assistant (1987-96) and one of his closest aides: 
 
It was unthinkable in those years for a government officer to even hold a private meeting with 
a businessman. Non-cooperation with the industrialist class was perceived to be the right 
thing, an alternative definition of being ‘just’ used to prevail. But it was Mr. Basu who was 
able to usher in a change in this mindset. He used to attend Chamber of Commerce meetings, 
meet industrialists outside government offices and even accept private invitations from them. 
Gradually, he started to get rid of the sensitivity about the industrial class. Though it was a 
very gradual process, but it was perhaps his biggest contribution to initiate a change in the 
culture of viewing businesses and businessmen as untouchables
126
.  
 
Neither the ideological debates within the party, nor the criticisms from certain factions that 
an industrialisation agenda is, in essence, a deviation from the idea of a Left alternative could 
dissuade Basu from what he observed to be an objective reality. N. Krishnamurti, Chief 
Secretary to the Chief Minister (1991-96), explains Basu’s outlook further:   
 
He never felt that he has deviated from the Left ideology. Instead, his main concern was that 
even after achieving a certain degree of development and social equity via the land reforms, 
the needs of the state had not been addressed completely. Particularly, there was still massive 
unemployment. Therefore some steps had to be taken. And as far as the economic reforms at 
the centre were concerned, he felt it was immaterial whether we accept or reject them 
ideologically, as they had become a part of the economic system of the country. He thus said 
let’s adopt what is good for us in it. So essentially it was never a question of ideology to him, 
but rather an administrative and pragmatic decision.
127
  
 
Gradually, these changes seeped into some of the key government institutions, particularly 
the WBIDC. S. N. Menon - former Chairman of WBIDC (1992-94) and Principal Secretary 
to the Chief Minister (1994-00) - observed:  
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 Source: Interview, 18
th
 June, 2009, Calcutta. 
127
 Source: Interview, 29
th
 June, 2009, Calcutta. 
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The WBIDC used to be a kind of organisation where it was normally felt that the 
industrialists should come to it on their own accord, and if we decided to go and meet people 
outside, we would be held in great suspicion. If one went to meet an industrialist in his office 
with a proposal to invite him to West Bengal, many questions would be asked. But 1990 
onwards, we could see a transformation gradually taking place. The questions gradually 
dissipated, we were now expected to sell and market the industrial prospects of West Bengal 
rather than wait for entrepreneurs to come on their own accord.
128
  
 
Another example of such institutional change was a special Industry Cell
129
 that Basu set up 
as a part of the Chief Minister’s Secretariat during 1990-91, involving only Poddar and 
Menon. Menon continued:   
 
We used to meet industrialists who wanted to invest in West Bengal, and provided them with 
single-point assistance, which included arranging for the clearances from various 
departments, checking the availability of land etc. I think we were able to channelise and 
gradually built up a new kind of enthusiasm for getting investments into the state. 
 
 
 
In addition to the mindset and corresponding institutional changes, Basu was also able to 
contain political controversy within the party. The greatest example of his political acumen 
was the formulation of the Policy Statement on Industrial Development in 1994. As noted 
before, while the CPIM was engaged in a vehement opposition to the NEP at a national level, 
Basu had started to meet investors and campaign for West Bengal. The request for a formal 
policy was made to him during these meetings. He himself wrote: “when we were visiting the 
various Chambers of Commerce and inviting people to invest in the state, they requested us 
to present a policy statement explaining our approach towards industrial development” 
(Introduction to Sen, 2008).  
 
Undoubtedly, this was a rather challenging task for Basu. In spite of the resource crunch, 
ideological debates, and the gradual changes in mindset, the party was yet to take a decision 
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 Source: Interview, 12
th
 June, 2009, Calcutta. 
129
The industrial cell also acted as a reconciliatory body for labour problems in the state, operating 
independently of the Labour Commission. Source: Interview, 18
th
 June, 2009, Calcutta.  
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on its attitude towards large scale industrialisation, and would hardly be amenable to the 
idea of the government formally courting private capital without party approval. Therefore, 
anticipating opposition from the party, he prepared the Statement involving only a very 
small group of bureaucrats - in what was perhaps the first and only instance of its kind 
during the entire Left Front period - the party being kept entirely in the dark. This team of 
bureaucrats included Menon, Poddar, Krishnamurti and D.P. Patra (Managing Director, 
WBIDC). The initial draft was prepared by Krishnamurti, who recalls the mood of the time: 
 
The ideas expressed in the Statement were nothing new in the larger context of the NEP, but 
it was the personal motivation of Mr. Basu to formalise them and let the industrial houses 
know. By this time both Haldia Petrochemicals and the Salt Lake Electronics Complex had 
started to take shape, so he did not want to wait any longer. In fact he was quite impatient 
and wanted to get the Statement prepared as soon as possible. So we drafted it over a couple 
of days, he went through it and made his recommendations. I do not think it was discussed 
in the party, or even in the Left Front cabinet for that matter. Only the finance minister, Dr. 
Asim Dasgupta was consulted
130
.  
 
Basu’s pragmatism comes across in the way he handled the following steps and associated 
political ramifications. Without prior notification to the party or cabinet, the Statement was 
tabled directly at the Legislative Assembly on 23
rd
 September 1994, just one day before the 
House closed. It was the last item on the agenda of the day and the session ended 
immediately after. The records of the next day show that the Statement was adopted with 
minimal discussion, and possibly, with very few members even realising its significance. In 
fact, a joint motion was brought against the NEP by two CPIM MLAs, Rabin Deb and 
Lakshman Seth, which was, to a large extent, quite contradictory in tone to the Statement. In 
response to this motion, Subrata Mukherjee (a Congress MLA) commented: “placing this 
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 Source: Interview, 29
th
 June, 2009, Calcutta. 
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motion just a day after the new industrial policy has been introduced highlights the 
bankruptcy of the Left Front...This policy is Mr. Basu’s policy, not the Left Front’s”131.  
 
Tabling the Statement at the very last moment, without any prior deliberation in (or even 
informing) the party or the cabinet was possibly a deliberate decision by Basu, anticipating 
the minimal discussion that the limited time would allow. Both Patra and Krishnamurti 
harbour similar opinions:  
 
He was a pragmatic leader… and a party man. He would guide the party via pragmatic 
methods but never break from it. Thus he might have played some cards close to his chest 
(Patra). 
 
Had the Statement been flagged up as an agenda item in the Left Front meetings prior to it 
was actually written, then the whole thing would have been delayed, or perhaps never 
achieved (Krishnamurti). 132  
 
Once the Statement was adopted, it created serious confusion within all the Left parties. The 
15
th
 CPIM Party Congress, held a year later in Chandigarh, noted: 
 
The Left Front government presented an industrial policy statement in September 
1994. This document spelt out the government’s attitude to private sector investment 
including foreign capital investment in the state in the context of the new economic 
policies of the Centre. This statement which was placed without any discussion in 
the state committee or central committee and the way it was covered in the press 
created confusion and apprehensions in Party circles. (CPIM 15
th
 Party Congress, 
1995:98-99).      
 
Sensing the apprehension amongst his colleagues, Basu tried to pacify them by promising 
that the policy would be discussed in detail in the cabinet. It should be understood here that 
given his authority and stature as one of the oldest and most respected Left leaders of the 
country, it was highly unlikely that any member, even from another party, let alone the 
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 West Bengal Legislative Assembly Proceedings; 1994, Volume V, 24
th
 September. 
132
 Source: Interview, 3
rd
 July and 29
th
 June, 2009, respectively. Calcutta. 
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CPIM, would disagree with or question his decisions
133
. Therefore, no formal opposition 
ever took shape against the Statement. The promised discussions never happened, and 
gradually the initial apprehensions and controversies dissipated. Mr. Hafiz Alam Sairani 
confirms this: 
 
We did not even know about the Statement. Once it was passed in the Assembly, we raised 
our opposition in a Left Front cabinet meeting. But Mr. Basu said that it has just been passed, 
not yet implemented, and there will be discussions about it.  No one could question him. But 
no discussions followed. And none of the other Left parties pushed for it.
134
  
 
The only formal discussions that took place were in the CPIM politburo and in a central 
committee meeting a month later. Justifying his decision in these meetings, Mr. Basu evoked 
the TINA (there is no alternative) clause. He stated that given the Left movement’s current 
position in West Bengal (having achieved a certain degree of progress via the land reforms 
and the panchayati-raj, but struggling under a serious economic crisis, the added 
compulsions of a wider federal shift towards a liberalised regime, and above all with no 
imminent socialist revolution) there was no option for the state government but to make 
certain adjustments with the capitalist system, even if politically it might seem a reformist 
deviation.  
Basu’s personal assessment of the situation as discussed above, was based on logic rather 
than ideology. Invoking the TINA clause was therefore a case of political salesmanship of 
the highest order. Politics is all about alternatives and possibilities, but if the TINA line is 
sold then there is no politics, no debate, no criticism, and effectively, no opposition 
                                                          
133
 While in a regimented party like the CPIM it is quite unusual for an individual to gain a heightened status, 
Basu was an exception. Not only was he one of the most senior Left leaders of the country, but he was also a 
charismatic figure owing to his British education, suave personality, impeccable English diction, unique 
mannerisms to almost sarcastically dissuade any criticism, and had risen through the ranks rather than 
‘starting at the top’. He was also one of the oldest members of the CPIM politburo from the time of the 
party's formation in 1964, and a figure of undisputed authority among all the Left parties.  
134
 Source: Interview, 24
th
 June, 2009, Calcutta. 
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(Mukherjee, 2007). After discussions in the politburo and the Central Committee, the 15
th
 
Party Congress eventually adopted the Statement, (discussed in Section 4.3.2), upholding 
the promise that the party in West Bengal would continue to play a prominent role in the 
nationwide resistance to liberalisation, but at the same time approving the policy statement 
on industrial development as the official position of the party. The ideological stamp of the 
Party Congress was the final hurdle in the transition process. It was a process, which in 
retrospect stands as a classic example of Jenkins’s conceptualisation of political 
salesmanship, reform by stealth, orchestrated by one of the leading Left leaders of India and 
the Chief Minister of West Bengal, Jyoti Basu
135
.   
 
4.6 Conclusion  
Industrial development in West Bengal under a relatively more industry-friendly environment 
during the second half of the 1990s and post-2000 has been extensively written about (see 
Appendix 7). However, the pre-conditions that prompted the Left Front to start on the path of 
an industrialisation-based development agenda have rarely been scrutinized. It was, as argued 
in this chapter, a unique set of circumstances, combining a wider set of fiscal and federal 
compulsions with internal debates and negotiations, factional pressures, political 
salesmanship, and above all, a reorientation of some of the basic tenets of Marxian principles. 
                                                          
135
 There are some conjectures regarding Basu’s role, mainly originating from other Left parties. According to 
one such theory, he threatened to resign from the cabinet if the Statement was not unanimously accepted. 
But a second theory, emanating from the RSP, presents a completely contrasting picture, verging on 
conspiracy theory. Basu was apparently in complete disagreement with the NEP and did not want the Left 
Front to follow suit. But a pro-reform CPIM faction conspired to remove him from Chief Ministership, and bring 
Buddhadeb Bhattacharya to power instead, as Bhattacharya was the favoured candidate of big national 
bourgeoisies with the backing of foreign capital. When Basu did not bow to the pressure, Bhattacharya 
tendered his resignation on the flimsy ground that the Left Front was a ‘government of thieves’. Basu had no 
option but to reconcile, and while he remained as Chief Minister, he was forced to support the new industrial 
policy to placate the situation. Immediately afterwards, Mr. Bhattacharjee rejoined the cabinet. 
 
This is a highly improbable scenario, and could not be validated from any other source during the course of 
this research. Bhattacharya did tender his resignation from the cabinet in 1993 due to what is generally known 
as a significant difference of opinion with Basu. However, there has never been any conclusive evidence on the 
reasons behind his leaving the cabinet and the party's decision to bring him back. 
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The last factor, in fact, was decisive not only during the period of transition, but paved the 
way for certain fundamental modifications in the CPIM’s ideological discourse in the years to 
come, modifications which have recently come under scathing attacks (see Chapter 6).  
 
Let us recall the two questions that underpin the transition phase: why were the policy 
changes necessary? And why was there an attempt to de-link government from politics? The 
answers can be summarised as follows. 
 
The conditions that precipitated the changes stemmed first and foremost from the financial 
and political impasse the Left Front was in by the mid-1980s. This impasse was a result of a 
misplaced notion about the transitory nature of the government and being guided entirely by a 
political agenda instead of working on a long-term developmental plan. But once the CPIM 
realised that there was a possibility for the government to remain in power for longer, 
involving private capital in some form was deemed the only possible way forward. The 
debates over joint ventures during and after the 12
th
 Party Congress indicate the gradual 
acceptance of such an eventuality. However, these early changes were still only theoretical, 
while the actual resource crunch on the government was steadily assuming alarming 
proportions. The party was thus confronted with the additional challenge of formulating an 
ideological middle ground where the government could be seen to be pursuing a private 
capital induced mode of economic development, without having lost its revolutionary 
character and at the same time, trying to avoid the inevitable criticisms. This marked the 
beginning of an ambivalent attitude in the policy-making sphere, as instead of rising to the 
challenges, the government adopted a one step forward, two steps back approach towards 
private capital and industrial development. As Mukherjee (2007:2) writes:  
…since the Left’s imaginary, ideology and strategy was centred on revolution, once it 
moved away from militancy...it simply did not know what to do. It was a collective 
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failure of imagination and creative and critical thinking on the part of the CPM. They 
completely ran out of ideas. New thinking within CPM could not emerge, not only 
because of the anti intellectual culture of the party, but also because of the dogmatic 
way they believed in Marxism which, did not allow them to formally accept that they 
have given up their belief in revolution. Like any religion, they just clung on to 
Marxism as a set of rituals and mantras.  
 
 
The 1990s brought with it a way out of this impasse via two largely unrelated events, the 
Soviet disintegration and the announcement of the NEP which together gave the CPIM a way 
to formulate a middle ground. It now had the opportunity to be seen in public as opposing the 
NEP and not having relented to the imperialist forces, thereby retaining its political character. 
At the same time, it could start weaving the logic of capitalist production into the 
government’s policies, having admitted to a theoretical misjudgement of the imminency of a 
socialist revolution and undermining the resilience of the forces of capitalism. In other words, 
it was now possible for the government to keep its ideological opposition alive at the all-India 
level, and justify its actions in the state by citing the unavoidable compulsions placed on it by 
recent developments on the national and international horizons.  
 
The 1994 Policy Statement on Industrial Development could, therefore, be seen as an 
eventual outcome of the political choices of the time, rather than a standalone policy exercise. 
However, the outcome could have been delayed much longer had it not been for Jyoti Basu. 
His clandestine manner in introducing the policy while ideological debates were still raging 
at large within the party managed to underplay the potential significance of the changes. As a 
result, while the policy was approved in the 15
th
 Party Congress, the party continued to 
perpetrate the standard excuse of blaming federal pressures as having left the state 
government with no choice. Nor did the party ever venture into examining the nature of these 
pressures or openly admit to the extent of internal ideological modifications.  
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This is also exactly what prompted the de-linkage attempts. The party could go as far as 
admitting a theoretical misjudgement, but to admit that the government was no more an 
instrument of class struggle, and was trying to adjust to market forces instead, would be 
politically suicidal. It would then be accused of, at best, having completely given way to 
reformist pressures, and the entire Left movement in the country would be undermined. 
Therefore the party had to argue, at least publicly, that the changes in West Bengal were 
confined to a realm of regional governance compulsions, while politically remaining 
disassociated with a pro-market development agenda.       
 
Industrial development in West Bengal during the second half of the 1990s saw glimpses of 
such de-linkage and disassociation attempts of governance from politics. Unfortunately, it 
remained a purely rhetorical exercise. While words such as ‘revolution’ and ‘class struggle’ 
slowly disappeared from the governance vocabulary, and there was a genuine attempt to 
repair the damaged industrial credibility of the state, the party failed to explain the complex 
realities of the day even to its own members and cadres. As a result, hardly any of the 
governance initiatives reached ground level, the party’s stronghold. The political economic 
history of West Bengal up to the period of transition was one of fiscal, federal and 
ideological compulsions, but the story henceforth is one of political negotiation around the 
choices made both at ideological and grassroots levels, where the two components of the 
political rationale of the CPIM come into play. 
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Chapter 5 
 
The Politics of Transition: Clarity, Negotiation and Consensus 
 
“We are facing a transitional period of development: from agriculture to industry... I cannot 
build socialism in this part of the country…We must have modern industries and have to try 
to attract investment from big business” 
Buddhadeb Bhattacharya, Chief Minister of West Bengal (2000-2011)
136
  
 
5.1 Introduction 
The transition from agriculture to industry in human history has rarely been free of associated 
socio-political turbulence. While the nature of such turbulence varies across time and space, 
the onus of negotiating a successful transition often emerges as the biggest challenge for the 
agency at the helm of the process. The story of West Bengal is no different, as Bhattacharya 
admits in the above interview: “we are at a turning point and it is therefore critical that we 
formulate our policies in a very clear-cut manner. There should be no confusion over our 
intentions and the meaning of the transition. There should be no grey areas” (emphasis 
added). Unfortunately, despite such rhetoric emanating from the highest echelons of the 
government, it is precisely in its intention and meaning that the transition experience in West 
Bengal went wrong.  
 
The political and ideological choices of the CPIM during the initial years of transition 
(c.1991-2000) were explored in the previous chapter. After these initial choices, once the 
party arrived at an ideological consensus on pursuing an industrialisation-centric growth 
model, it then also had to grapple with the challenges of a new set of political negotiations, 
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 Source: “It is high time we move from agriculture to industry”: Interview with Buddhadeb Bhattacharya, The 
Hindu, 27
th
 February 2007.  
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the dynamics of which continued to shape the political economic landscape of the state over 
the next fifteen years. Along with the usual collective action problems that come with any 
developmental shift, the CPIM was confronted with an additional policy-change dilemma not 
faced by any other centrist or right-wing party in India: how to “modify its ideological 
agenda toward public sector-led industrialization and redistributive economic policy 
strategies without losing its core base of political support, public sector workers and the 
middle peasantry” (Sinha, 2004:80). Such a dilemma is especially pronounced within a 
democratic framework, she continues, where parties like the CPIM may be punished 
electorally for abandoning earlier ideological commitments
137
.  
 
In addition to this dilemma, the erstwhile credibility problem continued to haunt West 
Bengal’s industrial prospects. Widespread scepticism about the CPIM’s political intentions 
among investors and the public alike, made marketing the state an extremely difficult task. 
The government needed to reassure many of its serious and long-term commitment to policy 
change (ibid.:83).        
 
However, this was a serious problem for the party. Achieving credibility, as Rodrik argues, 
often requires large-scale policy initiatives that would not otherwise be necessary (Rodrik, 
1998) and such policy reforms require fundamental doctrinal changes. While there are 
socialist parties who have gone down the path of reforms and revision to pursue market-
oriented policies (e.g., the socialist parties in France, Spain, and Italy), the national apparatus 
of the CPIM has always refused to adopt doctrinal modifications (Sinha, 2004)
138
. Therefore, 
even after the 1994 Statement of Industrial Policy, it was not clear how the state would 
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 The defeat of CPIM in the 2000 Calcutta municipal corporation elections is a case in point. 
138
 Disassociating from the United Progressive Alliance (I) in 2008 due to differences over the civil nuclear deal 
with the United States, a move many political observers hail as the beginning of the CPIM’s marginalisation in 
national politics, testifies to the party’s aversion towards major doctrinal changes.      
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“secure its industrial future in a substantially more market-oriented environment, and [would] 
the new situation...[be] characterised by less political interference...[and] provide a 
foundation for renewed industrial growth” (Pederson, 2001:647). 
 
The political-economic literature on West Bengal that has emerged over the last fifteen years 
focuses largely on the above questions, and highlights a range of institutional problems that 
plagued the Left Front’s industrialisation initiatives139. However, there remains to be told the 
story of the political core of the transition. The primary objectives of this chapter are 
therefore threefold: (1) to trace a continuous undercurrent of ambivalence on part of the 
CPIM leaders and ministers on issues related to industrialisation, and the lack of political 
consensus that this duality originated from; (2) detail the CPIM’s search for an alternative 
legitimising discourse in the hope of achieving consensus, and the ambiguities inherent 
within that discourse; and (3) to analyse how the CPIM leadership went about 
negotiating/explaining/justifying the renewed discourse and its stance on industrialisation to 
its own cadre base, trade union activists and other Left parties in the coalition. The 
overarching theme of this chapter is therefore to show how the management of the transition - 
both in its intent and meaning - came to be intensely politicised even within the higher 
echelons of the Left Front, contrary to Buddhadeb Bhattacharya’s surmise in the interview 
quoted above.  
 
 
 
                                                          
139 See Sinha (2004, 2005), Ghosh and De (2005), RayChaudhuri and Basu (2007), and Chakravarty and Bose 
(2009)  
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5.2 The Politics of Duality 
5.2.1 A Return to Bhadralok
140
 Calcutta  
 
In studying the diverse political contours behind the management of the transition process, an 
appropriate starting point would be to describe the changes that gradually espoused the 
physical and cultural landscape of Calcutta during the 1990s. Riddled with halted 
industrialisation
141
, rapid loss of political ground in the urban centres, and a continuous 
criticism of dire infrastructural conditions, the Left Front took up the mantle of urban 
development, which in the course of the next decade became the primary spatial catalyst in its 
attempt at an economic rejuvenation
142
. The government aggressively sought to transform 
Calcutta into a world-class city, following the “predictable formula of elite enclaves of 
residence and leisure, economic zones to attract mobile capital, and civic campaigns to insure 
beauty and order in the city” (Roy, 2011:259). A number of efforts and initiatives are 
noteworthy in this context. The first was the Calcutta Mega City Programme (MCP), 
produced by the Calcutta Metropolitan Development Authority (CMDA) in May 1994, a Rs. 
16,000 million plan, to be implemented over the next ten years. The second, and grander 
project, was the inauguration of New Calcutta on 1
st
 June 1995, a township located on the 
north-eastern fringes of the city, outside the CMDA area, designed to house 500,000 people. 
The area consisted of two erstwhile villages, Rajarhat and Gopalpur, comprising large 
sections of cultivable land and water bodies.
143
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 See Chapter 2. 
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 See Appendix 7 for an overview of the industrial economy of West Bengal post 1994. 
142
 This was however, not a feature of Calcutta alone. Chakravorty and Gupta wrote as early as 1996, “there 
are signs that certain urban regions in India may be on the threshold of an economic boom similar to those 
that have transformed Kuala Lumpur and Jakarta in recent years. The Calcutta agglomeration is one such area” 
(415).  
143
 The initial proposal included 10,000 dwelling units over 8.4 square kilometres, 1.5 square kilometres of a 
new business district and commercial complexes, 2.2 square kilometres of modern, pollution-free industries, 2 
square kilometres for transportation hubs, 0.3 square kilometres for cultural facilities and 13.1 square 
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Along with urbanisation programmes, there were attempts to re-capture the public spaces of 
the city from illegal squatters, sometimes by force. The most notable of these attempts was a 
sudden move on the part of the government in December 1996 to evict informal vendors (or 
hawkers) from the city’s pavements. For almost thirty years, the pavements of Calcutta were 
clogged with thousands of shabby kiosks, their illegal occupants relying on their CPIM ‘safe 
vote’ status for protection. But with increasing pressure to project a global image in order to 
attract capital, the municipality and police’s euphemistically titled ‘Operation Sunshine’ saw 
them swept away (Chatterjee, 2004). The operation was led by one of the CPIM’s most well-
known faces, Mr. Subhash Chakrabarty (who ironically, enjoyed a reputation of being one of 
the mass leaders of the party), and was heralded world over. Newsweek magazine, in its 
March 1997 edition, commented that the “world’s worst city” was cleaning up its act. Such 
initiatives
144
, even though at best only moderately successful, did manage to instil a belief 
among the majority of urban middle-class that their city was finally being restored to its 
original beauty and charm, a return to its traditional bhadralok image (Roy, 2002). 
These changes gathered momentum once the top executive post of the state passed from Jyoti 
Basu to Buddhadeb Bhattacharya in November 2000. Heralded as an icon of the Bengali 
bhadralok
145
, Bhattacharya took upon himself the task of promoting the changed face of the 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
kilometres for water and green areas (Chakravorty and Gupta, 1996). The plan has since undergone substantial 
modifications. The Calcutta Newtown (currently one of the most lucrative luxurious residential and 
commercial areas of the city) is now divided into three: Action Area I, mainly shopping malls and planned 
residential and commercial plots; Action Area II, (currently under development) the main business district 
along with large residential complexes; and Action Area III, primarily a top-end residential area and mini sub-
townships. The township currently occupies approximately 28 square kilometres, more than three times 
originally planned. 
144
There were other similar (though not so successful) initiatives. In early 2002, a citizen’s group brought a 
public interest litigation in the Calcutta High Court demanding the eviction of the settlers in a colony built 
around the railway tracks in the midst of Jodhpur Park, an exclusive south-Calcutta locality. The police were 
sent to evict the squatters as per the court order, but eventually had to retreat in the face of violent protests. 
145 In Bhattacharya, CPIM had found a new face that was finally accepted by the urban middle class. A Sanhati 
report describes him as “...one of them [the urban middle class]. Mr. Bhattacharjee had gone to Presidency 
College, he wrote books of poems and plays, he translated Mayakovsky and Marquez. Bhattacharjee is not a 
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civic and cultural administration of the city. There was some initial scepticism regarding his 
ability to do so, as noted in the following lines from an editorial published by The 
Telegraph
146
 immediately after he succeeded Basu: 
To meet this challenge with any degree of assurance, Mr Bhattacharya needs to be his own 
master. This he is not. He has to reckon with orders from his party headquarters in Alimuddin 
Street, the claims of the various constituents of the Left Front and the intangible demands 
emanating from Mr Basu’s legacy. Moreover, Mr Bhattacharya, because he is such a loyal 
party man, may not have the political and ideological inclination to take on the challenge (8
th
 
November 2000).  
 
However, compared to his predecessor, Bhattacharya portrayed a more liberal and pragmatic 
image of both himself and the party almost from his first day in office. He issued several 
statements regarding his willingness to engage more with the opposition, making 
industrialisation his main priority, promoting work culture among state government officials, 
etc. The Telegraph further commented: 
There is a hint that the new chief minister of West Bengal, Mr. Buddhadev Bhattacharya, is 
going to act like a realist rather than as an indoctrinated ideologue (editorial, 10
th
 November 
2000). 
Mr Bhattacharya must have raised the hopes of most sensible people...when he declared his 
belief that no government should be in the business of running hotels and newspapers. This is 
not the voice of a committed communist, but that of a realist who has learnt his lessons the 
hard way (editorial, 11
th
 November 2000). 
Bhattacharjee, just a little more than a week into his job...said he had made it clear to the 
CPM that he would not accept any day-to-day interference in the working of the government 
(editorial, 18
th
 November 2000). 
Mr Buddhadeb Bhattacharjee... has put the industrialization... at the top of his list of priorities. 
There is the recognition in Mr Bhattacharjee’s statements that West Bengal is a laggard in the 
race to industrialize; there is also a clear statement of intent to make up for this lag. Mr 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
doctrinaire. He has an affability... In sum, Mr. Bhattacharjee fits the bill. He was the face to sell the new CPM 
to the new clientele: the urban middle class and corporate houses. In the process CPM would emerge out of its 
vestigial socialist moorings”. Source:  http://sanhati.com/excerpted/3576/ - accessed 30th April 2012.  
 
146
 One of the leading English dailies published in West Bengal, known for its anti-establishment reporting 
style.  
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Bhattacharjee is not being complacent about this matter...[He] has gone on record to say that 
shirkers will not be tolerated. Mr Bhattacharjee is more concerned with governance and 
policy rather than with politics, which is best left to the apparatchiki in Alimuddin Street. Mr 
Bhattacharjee’s attitudes seem to be right, time will tell if his decisions are equally correct 
(editorial, 21
st
 November 2000).  
 
These observations reflect a change in the mood of urban upper and middle class citizenry, 
who, usually frustrated at the state’s derision owing to its stagnant economy and a disruptive 
political culture, for the first time in over two decades started to anticipate a change in 
priorities on the part of its political class. By the turn of the millennium, Calcutta, a city long 
teetering between imminent ruin and desperate remedy was finally brimming with optimism, 
at last on its way to becoming ‘global’ (Chakravorty, 2007).  
 
5.2.2 An Underlying Duality  
 
The urbanisation project, in spite of the optimism surrounding it, was beset with several 
contradictions. The flyovers, skyscrapers, five-star hotels and glittering shopping malls only 
briefly overshadowed the parochial nature of the project and the subtle shift from an equity-
oriented to a cost-recovery model
147
. However, the larger and inherent irony of the situation 
was that it was the communists, who once having championed the cause of dictatorship of the 
proletariat, now found themselves tasked with imposing the orderly claims of civil society 
against the carnival of the fringe. Chakravorty writes:  
                                                          
147
 As Chakravorty and Gupta observe: “a major problem with [the MCP]...is that the majority of the projects 
are to be implemented in or just around Calcutta City...In the view of the facts that growth in the city has 
stagnated and there is considerable emigration from it, such an investment pattern belies all rhetoric and 
plans for decongestion and decentralisation...investments do not match reality, but reflect a consistent 
Calcutta-centric vision” (1996:425). The structural shifts in the budgetary allocations of the CMDA brought in 
with the MCP also show how sectoral spending priorities were evolving. For example, proportional spending 
on housing and new area development jumped from 9.5% (as a part of an earlier Calcutta 300 project 
allocation) to 36.3% in the MCP. The clear losers were drainage and sanitation, and slum development, whose 
shares went down from 31.4% and 12.1% in the earlier CUDP III (Calcutta Urban Development Project, 1983-
92) to 15.5% and 1.7% in the MCP. Clearly, the CMDA was gradually taking over a new role - that of providing 
housing for medium and high-income groups and commercial facilities - on the basis of higher cost recovery 
margins.  
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The old industrial map has changed...The premises of defunct factories are being 
handed over to developers who build condominiums, malls and multiplexes. The 
patriarchal communitarianism of the neighbourhood has no place in these new 
enclaves. The fishermen of the eastern suburbs have moved out, with developers 
buying in every available piece of land flanking the eastern bypass. Derelict 
warehouses along the river may soon be converted into Singapore-style restaurants. 
The High Court has banned political processions and meetings on weekdays; crackers 
and microphones are illegal; the Election Commission has outlawed political graffiti. 
Communists now plead with their own trade unions to ignore the workforce in 
information technology so that American clients are not upset. The government has 
tried, with fitful success, to evict squatters and hawkers. The court and the army have 
ordered that messy fairs to be moved out of the Maidan. The primary task of the civic 
authorities now seems to be restricting access to public space and carefully licensing 
its use. The Maidan itself is being fenced off, and one has to pay a fee to walk in the 
gardens of the Victoria Memorial (Chakravorty, 2007:18).           
 
 
What the above account masks in its satirical tone is that along with the promotion of a 
surface liberal image, a serious dilemma had originated and intensified in the corridors of 
power. In spite of the efforts to rebrand the state as an attractive investment destination, there 
remained an underlying yet continuous ambivalent attitude on the part of the CPIM leaders, 
even at the highest level. No one was willing to be seen openly courting private capital, 
including Jyoti Basu and Somenath Chatterjee, whose appeal to investors would always be 
carefully quoted with a detailed preamble of the discrimination-by-centre rhetoric. This 
attitude manifested in two distinct ways. On one hand, the government did not want to be 
seen pushing the bureaucracy too much to facilitate private investment proposals, while on 
the other, neither did they take on board certain recommendations by the bureaucracy which 
might have improved investment prospects. In the words of a senior CII official, the former 
attitude took the following form: 
 
Throughout the 1990s, the CPIM exhibited a peculiar schizophrenic attitude - on one hand 
they wanted investment but at the same time they didn’t want to be seen as promoting 
industries too much - bureaucrats were often asked to hold back and even act hard to get. The 
reason behind this dilemma was probably the ideological disorientation of the party itself, 
they didn’t know which way they should be going - and no one wanted to rock the boat. So 
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even if there were governance compulsions, we couldn’t project ourselves as eager for 
investment. It was a peculiar situation, pulling and pushing at cross purposes.
148
 
 
An example of the latter attitude was a continuous ignoring of the poor infrastructural 
conditions of the state, and even that of Calcutta (as well as an increasing focus on real-estate 
projects instead of basic civic infrastructure). Dipankar Chatterjee, ex-Chairman CII (Eastern 
and North-Eastern regions), recalled: 
 
We asked the government to clean up Calcutta, but in vain. They could not complete the 
feeder roads to the existing flyovers, delayed the Durgapur expressway project and many 
more. They took so much time to address the basic specific issues - such as construction of 
roads, issuing land, etc - that private entrepreneurs had no option but to forgo the intention to 
invest in the state. 
 
 
But the problem ran much deeper than failing to improve ailing infrastructural conditions. He 
continued:  
The problem was the mindset of the leaders - which never allowed them to bring all the 
implementation agencies to the table, discuss the issues and hammer out solutions. They may 
have been well intentioned, but intentions alone are never good enough.
 149
  
 
Prasad Ranjan Ray, former Home Secretary of West Bengal, gave a comprehensive 
description of the duality in the government’s practices: 
Firstly there was a serious lack of political will, particularly at field level. The intentions at 
the state level did not percolate to the lower levels. Secondly, even at the state level, the 
intentions were often mixed. In 1998, the government decided to set up an advisory 
committee which would meet industrialists and hear their demands and concerns. A number 
of sub committees were also set up to see how the existing procedures regarding industrial 
investment could be streamlined. Once these committees started operating, it immediately 
became clear that despite the commitments made in the 1994 statement and the subsequent 
initiatives, there were a lot of infirmities in the industrial approval procedure, and unless these 
were tackled, we were unlike to get large investments, We came up with a series of 
recommendations which were published by the Department of Commerce and Industries in 
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2000. But very few of these recommendations were ever set forth into action. Another 
important bureaucratic initiative was to encourage decentralised planning and having planned 
resources earmarked through the state finance commissions. But all the reports of the first 
commission were virtually negated by the finance department. The second commission again 
recommended similar resource allocation, and again met with a similar outcome.
150
 
 
The most interesting example, one that aptly demonstrates the shifting political will even at 
the seniormost level, was the cancellation of an incentive scheme in early 2000. Mr. D.P. 
Patra (ex-Managing Director, WBIDC) recalled: 
 
Up until 1998, the state persisted with its archaic incentive structure that was announced in 
1992-93, while states like Maharashtra was offering lucrative incentives such as 27 years tax 
holiday. CII was given the responsibility to prepare a new scheme. What they eventually 
came up with was a proposal of even a lower incentive structure than the one that was 
currently operational. To my bewilderment, I was told that anything higher will not be 
politically acceptable. 
By 1999, another scheme had been put into place which was to be announced at a partnership 
summit. The Finance Minister, Dr. Asim Dasgupta, was completely against it, but agreed 
reluctantly at the behest of Jyoti Basu. This scheme was finally made operational in June 
1999. In the following seven months 149 new industries expressed their interest to come to 
West Bengal, the biggest influx at that time. But the scheme was suspended on 1
st
 January 
2000 due to some unknown reason. The biggest victim of this was Haldia Petrochemicals, the 
only flagship project the state ever had. Withdrawing the incentive scheme completely ruined 
the possibility of a downstream industry around Haldia, and as a result Haldia Petrochemicals 
could never realise its full potential. Its customers are at a mean distance of 2000 km away, 
whereas for the Reliance petrochemicals plant in Gujarat, the downstream industry is within 
400 km.
 151
         
 
The industrialisation agenda was ideologically approved at the 1995 Congress of the CPIM, 
so what explains this duality in attitude and the resultant impasse? While observers such as 
Sinha view this impasse through the lens of sticky institutions and collective action 
problems
152
, there was a larger subtext to the story. It is important to understand that the 
challenges brought by the post-reform era were of a completely new kind for the CPIM. The 
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 In addition to institutional efficiency related arguments, Sinha (2004) also emphasises that the politics of 
liberalisation in West Bengal was fragmented, i.e. the CPIM could never create potential winners of 
liberalisation, particularly in the countryside.  
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party could not fall back on its traditional rhetoric, nor could it ignore the potential for the 
state’s economic growth. In effect, it was left grappling with the dual pressures of developing 
(and validating) a new development strategy and dealing with the ongoing changes in its own 
ideological discourse. The result was an initial impasse, or period of political indecisiveness 
that spilled over into the realm of policy making. “On one hand, the Left Front has sought to 
engage in a new set of developmental strategies. On the other hand, it has attempted to 
maintain old populisms, for example its mobilization alliances with the rural-urban poor. This 
tightrope balancing...has created a quite amazing impasse...in which developmental projects, 
including those sponsored by the state, remain stalled” (Roy, 2002:12).  
 
This is precisely the point missed by the institutional accounts. While outdated institutional 
practices, bureaucratic delays and infrastructural inadequacies all intensified the impasse, it 
was, at its core, a political project, and more complex than a fragmented political agency 
battling against collective action problems. The party had to strike a balance between 
retaining and projecting its traditional class character whilst attempting a liberal policy 
makeover at the same time, and had little idea how to go about it. Saifuddin Choudhury, an 
ex-MP and party central committee member until 1995, described the situation as chaotic: 
 
By the mid-1990s, a realisation had set in that the earlier ways and practices would not work, 
and the party needed to change. But there was hardly any clarity about how much to change 
and in what way. It was a serious contradiction. They had to stick to the traditional slogan of 
capitalists being the class enemies who need to be destroyed and yet find a justification for 
inviting them to the state. The only argument that the party came up with was that under the 
present circumstances they were compelled to depend on private capital, but will continue 
their opposition in principle and once societal relations become conducive for revolution or at 
least the party gains power nationally, there will be hardly any need for private capital. But 
why would industrialists come to the state if this is the declared attitude? In effect, it was a 
complete chaotic situation. The basic problem was that the party was not ready to admit that 
there is a role of private entrepreneurs in the economy of the state, and that rather than 
opposing them, the party should be looking at a renewal of its own ideas and responsibilities 
to ensure a successful cohabitation. Basically they wanted to create a facade or a super-
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structure which would be pro-industry, and yet remain a revolutionary party at the core. This 
reflects a complete lack of political sincerity and ideological decisiveness.
153
         
 
Mr. Chaudhury was part of a pro-reform faction within the CPIM, which advocated social-
democratic principles. Eventually he left the party in 2000 and with Samir Pututunda (former 
Secretary of the South 24 Parganas District Committee, who also resigned from the party 
during 2000/01) formed the Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS) . Chaudhury’s views are 
echoed by Debashish Chakrabarty, one of the chief party ideologues in West Bengal and the 
editor of the party’s Bengali daily, Ganashakti:  
 
In the early days of the Left Front, we used to open all rallies/demonstrations with the slogan 
bamfront sarkar shangramer hatiyaar (the Left Front government is an instrument of 
struggle). This was a part of our theoretical understanding at that point. We used to believe 
that these state governments would give a fillip to democratic movement in the country. But 
eventually we realised that this was an oversimplified argument. At the same time, having 
come to power on a promise of radical social transformation, our initial focus was on 
redistributive reforms, but we soon realised that the government cannot sustain on the basis of 
these reforms alone. Therefore, we came to understand that the Left Front cannot be an 
instrument for class struggle either at a national or even at the state level. Those earlier 
slogans then gradually died down. We could not claim our government to be an instrument of 
struggle any more, at best it could provide a helping hand, and that too we were not sure in 
what ways to proceed.
154
       
 
Evidently, the source of this duality lay in a lack of ideological clarity. The idea of the PDF 
(People’s Democratic Front- see Chapter 3) as the fundamental building block of the CPIM’s 
ideological discourse had been criticised by both external observers as well as party members 
in the light of the post-1990 changes. As Roy writes, “in the Indian context at least, Kolkata 
belies any argument about Leftist exceptionalism. Neoliberalism has been as much at home in 
this Marxist ruled region as it has been elsewhere in the country” (2011:259). While such an 
observation may be too harsh, Chakrabarty’s views noted above testify that the party’s 
                                                          
153
 Source: Interview; 31
st
 July 2009, Delhi. 
154
 Source: Interview; 22
nd
 December 2009, Calcutta. 
  
229 
 
revolutionary credentials had even come to be doubted by some party ideologues. A close 
reading of the party documents from 1990 onwards reveals a similar marginalisation of the 
rhetoric of people’s democratic revolution. Instead, the new rhetoric that started to surface 
was one of governance. The 19th West Bengal State Party Congress in 1998 admitted that 
“our aim is a developed, people-oriented and sensitive Left Front government”. But the 
existing ideological discourse provided little guidance about how this might be achieved. 
Furthermore, in the absence of a clear legitimising discourse, party members and even 
ministers were not sure what would be politically acceptable to the traditional class character 
of the party. Therefore, towards the end of the 1990s, party ideologues took upon themselves 
the task of updating the existing discourse, and explaining the party’s role in promoting a 
private-capital led industrialisation model in West Bengal. This, in turn, sparked intense 
factional tension both within the party as well as the entire Left Front. These ideological and 
political debates that form the core of the transition process in West Bengal are explored in 
the following sections. 
 
5.3 The Ambiguities in Search of an Alternative Legitimising Discourse 
5.3.1 Lack of an Ideological Consensus within the CPIM 
 
The debates about industrialisation that arose in the CPIM during the 1990s, as the views of 
Saifuddin Chaudhury and Debashish Chakrabarty clearly articulate, were a subset of a larger 
debate over the party’s revolutionary ambitions. After the fall of the Soviet Union, a social 
democratic faction originated within the party, which engaged in a serious debate with the 
traditional ideologues about whether the party should move away from its original objective 
of establishing a dictatorship of the proletariat and accede to a commitment of working within 
a pluralistic democratic set up. Associated debates also arose about the democratic centralist 
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functioning style, with the reformist faction arguing that the democratic functioning within 
the party had become a casualty of centralist behaviour. Issues such as the separation of 
judiciary, legislature and executive were all a part of these debates. While the 
industrialisation question was not initially at the forefront, it became one of the key issues 
post-1994, particularly in its articulation of the idea of alternative policies
155
.         
The social democratic faction - led by both relatively young faces in the party like Saifuddin 
Chaudhury and Samir Pututunda, and also old and popular leaders such as Radhika Ranjan 
Pramanik - was in favour of the industrialisation agenda, but questioned the idea of 
alternative policies from a theoretical standpoint. Samir Pututunda recalled: 
 
After the Soviet disintegration, a draft resolution on ideological issues was circulated in the 
party before being placed at the 14
th
 Party Congress. The resolution admitted that the 
complexity of the situation and the issues being questioned, encompassing a history of nearly 
a century of human civilisation, demands a wide, extensive and in-depth study. Furthermore, 
it went on to admit that given the pace of developments, only some preliminary conclusions 
can be drawn at that stage. We then argued that until and unless this in-depth study is 
conducted, a conclusive amendment of our earlier ideological stand is not possible and the 
party should not adopt a full length resolution till then. The idea of alternative policies is 
therefore bound to be a half-baked one, without a proper analysis of what alternatives the 
current world situation actually presents before us, becoming an incomplete theoretical 
understanding. It was also because of this reason, that I proposed an amendment to rename 
the resolution by including the word ‘certain’ in the title. The resolution accepted at the 
congress was eventually titled as a resolution on certain ideological issues, indicating that the 
task of ideological amendment remains incomplete.
156
 
 
At the other end of the spectrum was a dominant section of party hardliners in the central 
leadership (often referred to by party members in the West Bengal as the puritan group) who 
wanted to adhere to the traditional ideological discourse They formed a core part of the 
party’s central decision-making structure (the politburo and the central committee) and 
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 In response to questions raised by party members, the formulation of alternative policies was emphasised 
in the CPIM central committee resolution “On the Role of the West Bengal Left Front Government in the 
Context of the New Economic Policy”. It was adopted in 1994 as the long-term objective of the 
industrialisation agenda of the party in the state (see Chapter 4 for details).      
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included senior members such as E. Balanandan, V.S. Achuthanandan, S. Ramachandran 
Pillai, Sunil Maitra, and E.K. Nayanar, as well as relatively younger faces such as Prakash 
Karat and Sitaram Yechury. The debates between these groups continued to intensify 
throughout the 1990s, assuming threatening proportions in 1996 when it appeared that Jyoti 
Basu was about to become India’s first communist Prime Minister, only to be thwarted by the 
party hardliners themselves. Three-quarters of the central committee members voted against 
the nomination of Basu as the prime ministerial candidate for the United Front coalition
157
. 
The 19
th
 CPIM West Bengal State Congress report admits:  
 
A serious debate originated within the Central Committee after the 1996 Lok Sabha 
elections on the question of joining the government at the centre...Unfortunately the 
disagreements came out open in public...and were also reported in the politburo 
circular...In West Bengal, at least some comrades from almost all districts had 
suspicions about the Central Committee decisions, and even the leadership in one or 
two districts expressed their disagreements...Though these disagreements did not 
translate into organisational problems in most of the state, a serious factional conflict 
originated in two districts, and the entire party was sharply split vertically (CPIM 19
th
 
State Congress, 1998:55, translated).  
 
In between the social democrats and the hardliners, the organisationally significant state party 
leadership in West Bengal took the pragmatic stance of maintaining ideological subservience 
to the central leadership, while gradually moving along a pro-market development model as 
far as state affairs were concerned. As discussed previously, the move was spearheaded by 
Jyoti Basu and Somenath Chatterjee, and by the mid-1990s leaders like Buddhadeb 
Bhattacharya and Nirupam Sen (who held the commerce and industries portfolio in 
Bhattacharya’s cabinet) had also risen in stature. This pragmatist faction also had the support 
of the non-hardliners in the central leadership, particularly from the two stalwarts E.M.S. 
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Namboodiripad and Harkishen Singh Surjeet, and gradually came to exert a significant 
influence over the ideological discourse of the party. There were some state level leaders 
known to be ideologically inclined towards the hardliners - such as Abdur Razzak Molla 
(Minister of Land And Land Reforms, 1997-2011) - but they were far less influential where 
decision-making in the state was concerned. The slow pace of the transition during the 1990s 
can be traced back to this middle path that leaders such as Basu and Chatterjee chose to walk, 
maintaining an ideological status quo and moving along the path of transition only very 
gradually, until a clear ideological consensus was reached across all factions.  
 
5.3.2 The Alternative Policy as a Legitimising Discourse and its Ambiguities 
 
It is in this context that the idea of alternative policies became important, as it gave the party 
leadership in West Bengal a legitimising discourse to push the industrialisation agenda 
forward. However, existing ideological contradictions about the nature of these alternatives 
(as discussed above) also spilled over into the realm of policy-making. In a resolution titled 
“On Industrialisation in West Bengal” adopted at the 19th West Bengal State Congress of the 
CPIM, the following observations were made: 
 
The state government has adopted an alternative policy...which has created a 
conducive environment for industrialisation...However, the policy of economic 
liberalisation pursued by the central government is creating an impediment to our 
efforts...Unless the policies of economic liberalisation are defeated, our state cannot 
reach its declared goals. Under the present circumstances, there is no alternative other 
than encouraging private capital to invest in the state (CPIM 19
th
 West Bengal State 
Congress, 1998:103-104, translated). 
 
These are blatantly contradictory statements. On one hand the party seems to be claiming that 
it is pursuing an alternative policy that is opposed to the policies of economic liberalisation, 
while on the other it admits that there is no alternative to encouraging private capital to invest 
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in the state. Also, it is not at all clear how the party proposed to defeat economic 
liberalisation by attracting private entrepreneurs. On the contrary, the 1994 central committee 
resolution (tabled in the 15
th
 Party Congress) had already admitted: 
 
today with deregulation and delicencing, it is up to the Left Front Government to 
initiate steps to attract capital investment in West Bengal. This can be done only by 
allowing greater investment of private capital in various sectors. This is the basis on 
which the Left Front government has to adjust its policies in West Bengal to meet the 
new situation brought about by the Centre’s policy of liberalisation (15th Party 
Congress of the CPIM, 1995:100).  
 
These statements clearly indicate a lack of understanding of the party’s stand on issues 
related to promoting industrialisation in states where it is in power. To resolve these 
ideological conflicts, the CPIM leadership undertook the task of updating the party 
programme, taking into account the experiences of running state governments both in the pre- 
and post-liberalisation phases. The political-organisational report of the 19
th
 Party Congress 
recalls the necessities that spurred the party to do so: 
 
The Left-led governments formed after the 1964 programme was adopted could not 
serve their full terms and had short tenures. Both the UF governments in West Bengal 
in 1967 and 1969 had a combined tenure of less than two years. The Kerala UF 
government lasted a little over two years. The emphasis of such governments was to 
utilize the government to bring some immediate measures which can help unleash the 
mass movements and strengthen the Party’s base...and bring some immediate relief to 
the people
158
...That situation changed. After the experience of the Left Front 
government in West Bengal for more than two decades and the full terms of such 
governments in Tripura and Kerala it was not sufficient to talk in terms of carrying 
out a modest programme of giving immediate relief to the people...[P]eople expected 
these governments to also provide development and raise their living standards. 
Therefore, creating employment, public education and health facilities, provision of 
basic services had to be on the agenda of the state governments (CPIM 19
th
 Party 
Congress Political Organisational Report; 2008:60-61).   
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It is clearly evident in the above that the party had moved away from the rhetoric of 
government as an instrument of struggle. It is believed that the pragmatic faction within the 
party played a major role in persuading the hardliners to accept these changes, emphasising 
the compulsions of staying in government. The party programme was finally updated in 
2000. The most crucial change was a revised formulation on the role of state governments in 
paragraph 7.17
159
, where it was earlier envisaged that state governments would only provide 
modest relief to the people. The updated programme revised this to:  
 
[T]he Party will utilise the opportunities that present themselves of bringing into 
existence governments pledged to carry out a programme of providing relief to the 
people and strive to project and implement alternative policies within the existing 
limitations (CPIM Updated Party Programme, 2000; emphasis added).    
      
Therefore, after more than two decades in power in West Bengal, the CPIM formally 
accepted that the role of a communist government had to be more than just providing modest 
and immediate relief, and promised that its governance responsibilities would be carried out 
via a set of alternative policies. The next task was to elaborate on the nature of such policies, 
which the party debated over the next few years, and formalised at the 18
th
 Party Congress in 
2005. In discussing the idea of an alternative, the political organisational report of the 
congress made the following crucial observation: 
The struggle for an alternative socialist order has to be based on the revolutionary 
transformation of the existing order. This, in turn, needs an engagement (i.e. 
joining issues) of the revolutionary forces with the existing world realities with 
the sole objective of changing the correlation of forces in favour of socialism. This 
process of revolutionary transformation has to be based on such an engagement and 
not on the wishful thinking of escaping from the existing realities. The entire history 
of the revolutionary movement led by the working class is the history of such an 
engagement with the existing realities in order to shape the material force 
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required to establish the alternative in socialism (CPIM 18
th
 Party Congress 
Political Organisational Report, 2005:29; emphasis in original). 
    
There are two specific clarifications in the above formulation. Firstly, the party clearly 
believes that the alternative has to be a socialist one. Secondly, it proposes to strengthen its 
revolutionary forces by actively engaging with existing socio-political realities. The congress 
went on to discuss the nature of such engagement in detail, and outlined the party’s approach 
towards globalisation, international financial capital, the public sector, withdrawal of the state 
from welfare schemes, NGOs, etc. It concluded by saying that “[b]y addressing all these 
crucial areas which are the products of the developments since the adoption of neo-liberal 
reforms in India...the Party has defined its approach and guidelines”, but also tried to balance 
the approach by emphasising its socialist character: “[m]any of the conclusions drawn on the 
basis of this analysis must serve as the instruments of popular mobilisation against imperialist 
globalisation. For...the alternative to imperialist globalisation is only can only be 
socialism...In the concrete conditions that we face in India...the conclusions drawn serve as 
guidelines for intensifying the CPI(M)’s popular intervention and strengthening the Left 
progressive movement in the country which will form the core of the struggles to achieve the 
socialist alternative” (Yechuri, 2006:47).  
Whether the above modifications indicate a reformist trend or a deviation from Marxism-
Leninism is a theoretical debate in its own right. The point that needs to be emphasised here 
is that from the late 1990s, the CPIM was engaged in a continuous effort to formulate a 
legitimising discourse which would validate the actions of the Left state governments - as 
they moved away from providing relief to more elaborate governance duties - by giving these 
actions a socialist stance. This was finally completed in the 18
th
 Party Congress by arguing 
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that the actions of the state governments are a form of engagement with the forces of neo-
liberalism which would strengthen the party’s core struggle to achieve socialism. 
However, what is extremely interesting is the subversion of this ideological stance by the 
state leadership in West Bengal, and giving the alternative idea an altogether different spin to 
justify the intense promotion of a private capital led development model under the 
stewardship of Buddhadeb Bhattacharya and Nirupam Sen. 
The idea of implementing alternative policies was discussed in a series of West Bengal state 
committee meetings from 1999 to 2001. These discussions led to the publication of two 
important party letters, numbered 3/99 and 3/01
160
, which have since become the operative 
basis of the government. Letter 3/01 explains: 
It is unrealistic to expect the Left Front government to oppose the attack by the forces 
of neo-liberalism within the current socio-economic environment of our country. 
These impractical expectations are arising from a lack of understanding about the 
strategic modifications necessary for the Left Front programme, so that the increasing 
limitations and compulsions that our government faces under the current environment 
can be successfully countered. There is no alternative to adopt a pragmatic viewpoint 
about the situation and explain that to the people (party letter 3/01; unpublished; 
translated). 
   
The 20
th
 West Bengal state congress of the party adopted the resolution ‘Left Front 
Government and Our Tasks”, in which, on the basis of the above observation from letter 3/01, 
the following admission was made: 
The Left Front Government is trying to protect the working class via an alternative 
policy. This is not an alternative to capitalism. Under the present federal structure of 
our country, no such alternative can exist (CPIM 20
th
 West Bengal State Congress, 
2002:77; translated and emphasis added).  
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This is in complete contrast to the position taken by the central leadership - that the party is 
engaging in a socialist alternative. Nirupam Sen, one of the chief ideologues from the state 
party leadership, wrote a series of articles in various party publications explaining what the 
alternative policies stood for in the context of West Bengal. These articles were compiled in a 
book entitled Bikalper Shondhane (In Search of an Alternative), which has become the key 
reference on all ideological clarifications related to the functioning of the Left Front. In his 
writings, Sen clearly admits that “the alternative specified in the party programme, is not a 
socialist alternative” (2008:2; translated and emphasis added) and asserts emphatically:  
West Bengal is not a socialist state. There has been no attempt to bring socialism in 
West Bengal. Even a People’s Democratic Front has not been established here. The 
path that the state is on is a capitalist path (ibid.:192; translated).  
 
The absolute contrast between the ideological position taken by the central leadership of the 
party and the interpretation adopted by the West Bengal state leadership is highly surprising. 
The question that obviously follows is how could such a difference be allowed to endure, and 
more importantly, be explained to the rank and file of the party? There are two explanations, 
the first theoretical, where an additional spin was added to the admission that the state was on 
a capitalist path, relating it to the rhetoric of the people’s democratic revolution. Sen explains: 
Our aim is to complete the unfinished tasks of the people’s democratic revolution... 
the weakest link in the bourgeoisie-landlord rule...is the link between capitalism and 
feudalism...The Left Front government should work towards weakening this link even 
further...and this is what our idea about an alternative is embedded. If the link can be 
weakened, then capitalist forces would expand more quickly...We know capitalism is 
an advanced stage than feudalism, but inferior to socialism...therefore we cannot 
avoid the intermediary stage in our quest for socialism (ibid.:4).    
 
How can this link be weakened? Sen goes on to elaborate: 
We cannot protect the common people from the inevitability of capitalism. But unless 
we can reduce the number of people dependent on agriculture and make them 
dependent on industry instead, no development can take place. So we need to 
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industrialise our state, and invite private capital in order to do so...allow it to make 
profit, be competitive and productive. Otherwise it will go to other states and avoid us 
(ibid.: 66). 
 
Read in isolation, the above is a perfect neoliberal argument. However, when read together 
with the preceding quote, it assumes a different character altogether. To put it simply, Sen 
and other CPIM leaders have been arguing since 2000 that it is only by expediting the 
capitalist forces in West Bengal that they can abolish the remnants of feudalism and prepare 
for the eventual transition to socialism. As per the Marxian stages of revolution, only when a 
fully fledged capitalist society develops do the contradictions inherent within capitalism 
intensify, and society progress to a socialist era. Therefore, the government should intensify 
its efforts to industrialise West Bengal via private capital, as only then would an eventual 
transition to socialism be possible.  
Once again, the theoretical merits of these claims are debatable, and Left ideologues such as 
Ashok Mitra and Prabhat Patnaik have launched vehement criticisms of the CPIM, accusing 
it of a theoretical crisis and ideological degeneration. Entering a critique of whether such a 
formulation is a deviation from (or a misrepresentation of) classical Marxian political 
economy is, however, beyond the scope of this work. 
 
Patnaik goes on to warn that if the Left falls prey to this argument, of initially allowing a 
capitalist transformation with the plan of overthrowing it later, it will amount to self-
annihilation and its incorporation into the structures of bourgeois hegemony, entailing a 
transformation of the Left into a ‘Blairite’ entity. “The moment of that passage from capitalist 
transformation to the transcendence of capitalism will never come as some natural historical 
break, and if there is no such discontinuity then this entire distinction between two phases 
becomes invalid” (Patnaik, 2009a:10). In fact, Patnaik describes the alternative policy of the 
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Left Front as no different from the dictates of the neoliberal paradigm, and similar to what 
other non-Left states in the country follow. The scope to create a true alternative - even if 
limited for a state government - must be based on the Left’s anti-imperialistic struggles, not 
on a compromise with the forces of imperialism and neoliberalism. The true nature of the 
crisis of the Left in India - theoretical as well as electoral - lies in its anti-imperialism being 
insufficient (ibid.; Patnaik, 2009b).  
 
To summarise, the idea of an alternative policy that gradually took shape within the CPIM 
was a theoretical exercise in search of a legitimising discourse that would strike a balance 
between its revolutionary credentials and governance compulsions, and also help the factions 
within the party to arrive at a consensus. However, the discourse failed to address the core 
ideological contrast between the positions taken by the central and West Bengal state 
leaderships. While the former claimed that the only alternative to capitalism is socialism and 
the idea of an alternative policy is essentially a socialist one, the latter defined capitalism as 
an essential condition that must be fulfilled before socialism can be achieved, and that is what 
the alternative policy of the Left Front aspires to. Party leaders from either side rarely 
acknowledge this fundamental ideological conundrum in public, but it is hard to deny that the 
party’s approach at a national level and in West Bengal had taken divergent routes. Sen 
himself admits:       
 
Forming government in one state cannot have anything to do with socialism. The idea of a 
transformative struggle, discussed at the 18th party congress is true, but from a larger all-
India perspective. Nationally, the fight to transform capitalism is one of our main 
agenda....But in West Bengal, we are essentially carrying out a bourgeoisie task, and therefore 
there is absolutely no question of proposing an alternative to capitalism, the alternative 
development model that we speak of is essentially adopting a pro-people attitude while 
accepting and operating within a capitalist structure.
161
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These contradictions in the party’s ideological discourse not only led to a one step forward-
two steps backward approach as far as industrialisation initiatives in West Bengal were 
concerned, but also prevented the party leadership from engaging in clear discussions with its 
own membership to explain the necessity behind such initiatives. Furthermore, while the 
rationalisation by ideologues like Sen may have placated some of the debates within the 
party, it came under serious criticism not only from the likes of Patnaik, but also from 
coalition partners such as the Revolutionary Socialist Party (RSP) and Forward Block (FB), 
opening up new grounds for factional tension. Most importantly, these theoretical debates, 
while crucial in understanding the overall orientation of the party, have always remained 
confined to higher party circles, rarely reaching the grassroots. Taken together, the task of 
negotiation both within and across party/coalition lines presents the second dimension of the 
entire transition exercise. 
 
5.4 The Politics of Negotiation 
5.4.1 Lack of Negotiation and an Increasing Disassociation within the CPIM 
 
Intra-party negotiation, particularly for a cadre-based party like the CPIM, is not only vital to 
upholding its democratic credentials, but also to build a consensus among the cadres 
responsible for executing the party’s policies at ground level. The CPIM had a rich heritage 
of conducting party-classes that were not only intellectually stimulating, but also provided an 
opportunity for ordinary members to engage in dialogue with party stalwarts. Unfortunately, 
these practices have been in continuous decline over the last few decades.  
As discussed in the previous chapter, discussion of the 1994 Statement was severely limited 
within the CPIM itself, let alone with coalition partners and virtually non-existent with the 
rank and file of the party . Once agreement was reached within the party leadership over its 
  
241 
 
approach to industrialisation, the question of explaining the necessity of the transition to its 
cadre base was raised, but rarely addressed. Samir Putatuda recalled: 
 
The party had made a shift and intended to work along the new line, therefore its stand 
needed to be made clear among the common people through political or development 
campaigns. This was a task of the cadres of the party - who therefore should have properly 
been made aware of the newly accepted line. The party did realise the importance of this task, 
and it was decided by the leadership that all party workers will need to be tuned up. But 
unfortunately, this never happened- especially in areas where this was really crucial- mainly 
due to disagreements over the stand among top leadership of the party (emphasis added).
162
  
 
These disagreements, as explored in the previous section, stemmed from either a lack of 
clarity on the ideological questions or a tendency to play safe by sticking to the traditional 
class-character of the party. As a result, only lip service was paid to the task of tuning up 
party workers. At the time of the 19
th
 West Bengal state party congress in 1998, hardly any 
party classes had been organised where the issues of policy transition, ideological 
modification, and governance compulsions could have been properly discussed. The congress 
report states: 
 
No party education camps were organised following the 18
th
 congress...some 
initiatives were taken in Calcutta and the surrounding areas, but no programme was 
launched to reach workers in the rest of the state (CPIM 19
th
 West Bengal State 
Congress, 1998;45; translated). 
 
 
One of the main problems that the party faced, the report admits, was the lack of people 
capable of initiating discussions at lower levels. In the few camps run by state level leaders, 
there was no arrangement to circulate written notes, and district level party workers were not 
capable of taking their own notes to continue the discussions ‘further down’. From the reports 
collected from all districts prior to the state congress, it was apparent that apart from Howrah, 
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Midnapore, Burdwan and Bankura, party classes involving the local committees were non-
existent. Where forums were organised, the absenteeism rate was more than 50%. Districts 
such as North and South 24 Parganas, North and South Dinajpore, Jalpaiguri, Darjeeling, and 
Kochbihar performed particularly badly in this respect. The situation barely improved over 
the next decade. The 21
st
 state congress, organised in 2005, observed that to that date there 
had been only one education camp and three lectures, all at the state centre. The situation in 
the districts largely remained the same.  
 
There were a number of organisational issues that also proved detrimental to a proper 
dissemination of the changes happening at higher levels. The 19
th
 State Congress Report 
highlights some: 
 
There is serious lack of coordination between party committees working at different 
levels. The district committees do not directly send their reports to the state 
committee...the state committee coordinates with the central committee but hardly 
sends its reports to the district committees. There is also no formal arrangement of 
coordination within districts- between district, zonal and local committees...There are 
many party members in various district committees who have no clear idea even 
about a single zone in their districts, similarly many zonal committee members are not 
aware of the happenings in their own local committees. There is a serious lack of 
commitment among members in several districts when it comes to interacting and 
assisting with the lower levels, and logically explaining to them the decisions taken by 
the party leadership...In fact, at the lowest levels, most of our comrades are not even 
party members (ibid.:48-9). 
 
These organisational issues, while significant on their own, also point to an increasing 
disassociation among the party leadership and its wide member base, particularly on 
ideological and policy matters. It was a two-way problem. On one hand only a limited (and 
decreasing) section of party members tried to actively engage with the leadership on 
questions of ideology and policy, and on the other, there was a tendency on the part of the 
leadership to ignore comments/questions from the members. This disassociation was starkly 
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portrayed once the party began to update its programme. Initially, the draft of the updated 
programme was circulated among all party members across the country, but on an issue as 
fundamental as this, the majority of amendments came from one district in West Bengal, 
South 24 Parganas, with other districts proposing only a few or even none. The condition in 
the rest of the country was even worse, with 70% of all amendments proposed originating 
from West Bengal (Report of the Central Committee on the Amendments Received on the 
Draft Programme, unpublished). Such limited engagement with fundamental ideological 
questions shows the lower level lack of interest in issues related to the party’s overall 
orientation. On the other hand, some important questions raised in the amendments proposed 
were brushed aside: 
1. A number of amendments have come...about the mistakes committed by the party. 
The draft states, ‘in the course of arduous struggles, the party registered substantial 
achievements while committing some mistakes. As a party committed to self-critical 
analysis of its success and failures, the party consistently strives to learn from its 
mistakes...’ 
The reference to mistakes led to a large number of amendments...[enquiring] what 
mistakes? Delete the reference to mistakes...we cannot go into what the mistakes are 
(pg. 2). 
2. No amendments can be accepted on the Soviet Union setback as that would mean 
opening up a whole area of discussion (pg. 3). 
3. Another trend of amendments from South 24 Pargana is to highlight the positive 
aspects of the Constitution and underplay the class conflict...This cannot be accepted 
(pg. 5). 
4. A number of comrades...have tried to emphasise the fact that parliamentary 
democracy has matured and has come to stay in India after fifty years. It seeks to 
highlight the fact that because of people’s movement, parliamentary democracy has 
become a permanent feature. The implication is that there is no serious threat of an 
authoritarian attack on democracy from the ruling class. This approach will foster 
illusions and has to be rejected (pg. 6).  
5. Some amendments raise fundamental questions...advocate a new understanding of the 
Indian State and to argue for working within the system to bring about a basic 
transformation. We reaffirm the stage of revolution is democratic and the need for 
replacement of the present Indian State by a people’s democratic state (pg. 7). 
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(Report of the Central Committee on the Amendments Received on the Draft 
Programme, unpublished.)  
 
The above excerpts establish two specific points. Firstly, there was a serious lack of 
commitment displayed by the central leadership to actively addressing the concerns of party 
members. Most of the amendments on crucial ideological questions were dismissed without 
even a proper discussion. Secondly, rejecting some of the amendments on parliamentary 
democracy and the nature of the Indian state reinforced the ideological double-speak within 
the party. The central leadership clearly wanted to retain its revolutionary core and the 
rhetoric of people’s democratic state, whereas the West Bengal state leadership - as discussed 
in the previous section - articulated quite a contradictory position.  
Another point needs to be made regarding the lack of negotiation within the party. Some of 
the most popular faces among the state party leadership - who could have played key roles in 
engaging the lower levels - remained surprisingly inactive on the grounds of what can only be 
described as benign ideological optimism. Abdur Razzak Molla was one such, who remains 
to the present day one of the most popular mass leaders of the CPIM. However, explaining 
why the party never actively engaged its supporters in explaining the necessity of the 
transition, Molla said: 
 
Hardly any explanation/negotiation was ever carried out, especially engaging the party 
cadres at the lowest levels. The party had assumed that given the success of the land 
reforms and end of feudalism in the rural areas via democratic decentralisation, the 
consciousness level among rural people must have gone up. The obvious corollary of 
assuming that the people in the state are now more politically conscious was that they 
would automatically understand and accept the necessity of a transition to 
industrialisation. 
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In retrospect, this was a wrong assumption. In the absence of any negotiation initiatives, 
the policy transition had been super-imposed by the party leadership, and definitely 
created a lack of credibility among the lower level of party supporters.
163
  
 
 
This is an extremely interesting observation, especially coming from a popular and top level 
state leader. It reinforces the argument that after fifteen years in power, there was an 
increasing divergence between grassroots activities and the views at the top. The situation at 
ground level was significantly different from the kind of understanding even mass-leaders 
such as Molla had, with disengagement between district-zonal-local levels becoming a 
serious problem. It should also be noted that all this time the industrialisation scenario in the 
state was not anything to boast about. Until 2000, apart from the two prolonged projects of 
Haldia Petrochemicals and the thermal power plant at Bakreshwar (the state playing a key 
role in both) there was little influx of private capital. The only major industry house that 
started operating during this time in West Bengal was Mitsubishi Chemicals. This apart, until 
2006, the state had not had a single flagship project to prove that it had been able to solve the 
capacity problems and change the culture of political interference at ground level. Therefore, 
the entire debate around industrialisation and policy orientation remained primarily a 
theoretical one, in which only the higher echelons of the party actively engaged. In the 
absence of concrete changes at ground level, the state/district leadership was unwilling to 
engage in theoretical justifications of the party’s stance, nor would have such sessions 
attracted members at large. 
 
Taken together, the issues of organisational problems and a growing disassociation between 
the higher authorities and the vast cadre base of the party on questions of policy and practice 
did nothing to encourage negotiations. Ideas expressed at the top rarely percolated down to 
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the lowest levels, and given the conceptual differences among central-state-district 
leaderships, whatever little did reach the workers on the ground was in the form of politically 
coloured instructions with an eye towards maximising localised benefits, instead of a logical 
justification or an attempt at engagement.  
 
5.4.2 Emergence of Brand Buddha and Factional Tension within the CPIM  
The party leadership in West Bengal, as previously discussed, had come to be dominated by 
the pro-reform faction during the 1990s, which enjoyed a clear majority both within the party 
and the government. Jyoti Basu’s task was more difficult than that of his successor, as not 
only did he have to formulate the Statement on Industrial Policy and oversee its passing in the 
assembly, but he also had to make sure that the changes in the state did not irk the party high 
command. His tenure is often described as one that, at best, maintained a status quo, but the 
political compulsions of trying to gradually adopt a pro-market stance - albeit in rhetoric - 
while maintaining ideological subservience to the high command meant that a more 
aggressive tone could have been detrimental. The situation was much changed by Buddhadeb 
Bhattacharya’s time. An ideological consensus had already been achieved via updating the 
party programme in 2000 and the declarations in the 2002 party congress, thereby 
legitimising the perusal of industrialisation coated with the rhetoric of alternative policy, the 
social-democratic faction had parted ways, and most importantly, the transition - though 
hardly negotiated with party members at lower levels - had gained a general acceptance 
within the party, and was being cheered by the urban middle class. The stage was therefore 
set for Bhattacharya to push for active promotion of the industrialisation agenda. Soon after 
becoming Chief Minister, on the 25
th
 anniversary of the Left Front government, he described 
the government’s outlook:  
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Ours is an alternative path of development aiming at raising the common man’s 
standard of living and promoting activities for the overall progress of the State...In the 
present economic system of the country, the private sector plays an important role. 
We urge the private sector to make more investment in order to build a prosperous 
West Bengal... (GoWB, 2002;ix-x).  
 
Bhattacharya, unlike his predecessor, was also clear in his description of the transition as one 
from agriculture to industry. Moreover, he was emphatic both in his admission of pursuing a 
path of capitalist development as well as rejecting accusations of ideological deviation, 
arguing that ideological positions must be formulated based on reality.     
 
We are facing a transitional period of development; from agriculture to industry...I am very 
clear about what we are trying to do. If we fail...then the benefits we gained from our 
agricultural policies, from land reforms, will collapse. It is high time now that we move from 
agriculture to industry... Another point being raised is that industrialisation means capitalist 
development. Yes, I cannot build socialism in this part of the country. This is not possible. If 
you want industry you have to ask all industrial houses including big business to 
invest...Ideology is not an abstraction and will have to be applied according to the 
situation.
164
  
 
Bhattacharya also created a part-economic, part-emotional rhetoric explaining the need for 
this transition through his writings, speeches and interviews. He argued that the government 
had been able to create and sustain a foundation of prosperity based on high levels of 
agricultural production, as a result of which the purchasing power of the peasant class had 
increased. At the same time, economic prosperity had increased the aspiration of the younger 
generation for a better livelihood. In The Marxist, a quarterly journal published by the CPIM, 
Bhattacharya wrote: 
 
West Bengal has been able maintain a sustainable growth rate of 4 per cent for more 
than last ten years....Our kisans [peasants] possess the highest purchasing power of 
industrial goods in the whole of the country today in the retail sector...The members 
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of a kisan family till the land through generations. The first generation, despite having 
received education, may yet be willing to accompany the father to the field. The 
second generation does not. They are not willing to go back to the fields after passing 
out from schools and colleges (Bhattacharya, 2007:2-3).  
 
He went on to argue that continuing with an agriculture based development model would lead 
to a stagnating and eventually regressing economy, as not only had the cost of agricultural 
production gone up, but there were other problems such as the lack of viable marketing 
mechanisms. What then was the alternative? The answer was a gradual transition towards an 
industrial economy: 
 
We must bring about changes gradually, and I use the word with deliberation. We 
must maintain food security but increase the share of the industrial sector, gradually 
reducing that of agriculture. This is the general trend of the economy...65 per cent of 
the population of this state is involved with agriculture and allied activities...Is this a 
picture depicting high standards? We cannot agree with the postulate that agriculture 
is the last and final stage of development and that we have to stay at the place that we 
have reached. (ibid.:4; emphasis added).  
 
While arguments by ideologues such as Nirupam Sen remained largely a theoretical exercise, 
the rhetoric above assumed prominence both in the party and the government. The electoral 
slogans for the Left Front during its campaigns for the 2002 and 2006 state assembly 
elections were based on these ideas. In 2002 the strapline was bamfronter bikolpo unnototoro 
bamfront or ‘The alternative to the Left Front is an improved Left Front’, and in 2006 krishi 
aamader bhitti, shilpa aamader bhobishyot or ‘Agriculture is our foundation, industry is our 
future.’        
  
It is difficult to differentiate Bhattacharya’s arguments from a standard neoliberal logic, apart 
from the occasional oblique reference to an alternative path and the conditions in China, for 
example:  
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“In China, the share of agriculture in the GDP is just 14 per cent. We do not say that 
the Chinese model is our model. They had to struggle when they were ushering in 
change. Wage differential between urban and rural areas is a fact. The migration of 
population from the rural to the urban areas has been a problem. However, the 
transition from agriculture to industry is an inevitable phenomenon both in capitalism 
and in socialism” (ibid.).  
 
 
However, theoretical debates about whether these ideas were in accordance with the tenets of 
Marxian political economy, or any further discussion on the nature of the alternative policy 
were gradually marginalised within the CPIM, as Bhattacharya continued his aggressive 
mode. He was lauded by the mainstream media, particularly the ABP group (owners of 
Ananda Bazar Patrika and The Telegraph), one of the largest media houses in the country
165
. 
The phrase Brand Buddha was coined by these newspapers, projecting Bhattacharya as the 
liberal face who could finally steer West Bengal away from the clutches of political 
interference and on the road to economic prosperity. The media rejoiced when he announced 
that the bureaucracy had to adopt a culture of do it now, signalling that the much maligned 
culture of red-tapism might finally be coming to an end, and vociferously supported his 
demand for the party to move away from the practice of calling bandhs (strikes). 
Bhattacharya, on his part, often made quite dramatic statements asserting his liberal image 
and willingness to promote industry above everything else. His statement below not only 
made headlines in the media, but also created a massive uproar in the party. During an 
ASSOCHAM
166
 meeting on 26
th
 August 2008, Bhattacharya said:  
 
Personally if you ask me, I think it [calling strikes] is not helping us, our country. But 
unfortunately, as I belong to one party and [when] they call a strike, I keep mum. But I have 
finally decided that next time, I will open my mouth...We are also trying our best to change 
the mindset of union leaders and workers. I think things have changed. I assure you, gherao 
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will never return to our state. I will not allow that. I think it is highly illegal and immoral 
(The Telegraph, 27
th
 August 2008). 
 
 
The Telegraph, in its report titled the ‘Buddha Bandh Bombshell’, celebrated the 
announcement, while castigating the party for not supporting Bhattacharya:  
 
Buddhadeb Bhattacharjee today took the boldest stride yet by a politician to make Bengal 
bandh-free but disruption addicts within and without his party appeared in no mood to kick 
the habit in a hurry (ibid.)  
 
Bhattacharya’s proactive stance was also praised by the industrial houses. The general 
secretary of ASSOCHAM, D.S. Rawat explained:  
 
During the last five-six years, there has been a tremendous change in the perception about 
West Bengal among the investors outside the state.. Today there is hardly any large industrial 
house which has no presence in West Bengal, while till about five-seven years back talking 
about investing there was a joke. The ASSOCHAM started to concentrate on West Bengal 
sometime around 2004. That was the time when Buddha babu had completed a few years as 
the Chief Minister and had given a very loud and clear message that any investment in the 
state would be welcome. He was extremely dynamic, positive and forward looking, and 
extended every possible help to the investors.
167
  
 
Buoyed by an increasing popularity, a close group of colleagues (including Nirupam Sen, 
Gautam Deb
168
, Surjya Kanta Mishra
169
, and Mohammed Salim
170
) who were equally 
committed to the cause, support from mainstream media and the corporate sector, and a mood 
of optimism among the urban middle class, Bhattacharya went on to emphatically promote 
industrialisation in West Bengal. At the 20
th
 West Bengal State Party Congress in 2002, it 
was announced:  
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…the aim of the government is to make a committed effort to build new 
industries...the success of this effort entirely depends on private investment and 
competitiveness of industries. Developed infrastructure, prompt and transparent 
administration, managerial efficiency, productiveness, etc. are all important elements 
of this effort, and cannot be ignored if industry is to be created and sustained in the 
state in the face of fierce competition (CPIM 20
th
 State Congress, 2002;77-78, 
translated).  
 
 
However, in the face of this aggressive stance, the question of negotiation - not only with 
party workers at the lower levels, but also between state party leaders and other coalition 
member parties - was completely marginalised.  
There remained a group within the CPIM which maintained a distance from the dominant 
faction led by Bhattacharya and Nirupam Sen. This faction was comprised of some of the old 
and popular faces within the state/district level party leadership, who retained an ideological 
affinity to the hardliners in the central leadership. While accepting the necessities prompting 
the transition in theory, they continued to have reservations about the pace of change and the 
reformist understandings on the question of class struggle and revolution. Their most 
prominent leader was Abdur Rezzak Molla, who was vociferous in his opposition to the stand 
taken by Bhattacharya-Sen and the pro-reform section of the party leadership. Others 
included Shyamal Chakraborty (central committee member and vice-president, CITU), 
Chittabrata Majumdar (general secretary, CITU, 2002-2007), and state committee members 
such as Binoy Konar, and Kali Ghosh. While most were not explicit in their criticisms in 
public, they are known to have influenced the government to move away from its 
industrialisation oriented development model. Members with trade union affiliation, 
particularly Shyamal Chakrabarty and Chittabrata Majumdar, held strong views on issues 
related to foreign direct investment, arguing that allowing FDI in the country would 
compromise its self-reliance
171
. Other areas of differences included allowing private 
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entrepreneurs to enter the retail sector, setting up special economic zones, modernisation of 
Calcutta airport involving private capital, etc., and also regarding the party’s overall position 
in parliament on issues such as banking and pension reforms. Bhattacharya himself admitted 
the existence of these differences within the party in an interview with The Indian Express in 
2006: 
I’m a Communist and I’m proud of it. We have to learn truth from the facts. We have to 
change, we have to reform...We debated among ourselves and came to certain conclusions 
[about FDI]...Only in retail do we have some reservations. On Special Economic Zones we 
had serious differences...we still have some issues with the government on the pension 
scheme, on private participation in modernisation of airports. I tell my colleagues if the Civil 
Aviation Ministry itself decides to modernise the airports that is the ideal position. But if they 
invite private investment in Delhi and Mumbai how can I oppose it? ...On pension I’ve told 
my colleagues we are opposing it. But, given our salary and pension bills and the overall 
fiscal situation—if we oppose it we’ll have to face the music here...We have to find a middle 
path...My colleagues are quite intelligent.
172
  
 
Contrary to the cautious optimism of Bhattacharya, Abdur Rezzak Molla was quite assertive 
in his accusations directed specifically at the former: 
 
Nothing was wrong with the vision of industrialisation, but the approach was completely 
incorrect. The government tried to make a jump and execute the transition as fast as it could- 
and fell in a ditch. This acceleration in approach was mainly a decision of the Chief Minister- 
who is the first among equals- but there is no limit to how ‘first’ he is. This entire decision to 
proactively push for industrialisation was Buddha babu’s decision, even if some members of 
his own party or even in his cabinet had other views (emphasis added)
 173
.      
 
Molla also mentioned that Bhattacharya hardly ever listened to the views of the opposing 
faction, and added: 
Me, and people like myself were of a microscopic minority within the party. We were even 
accused of standing in the way of development. 
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The factional tension within the party did not remain confined to ideological principles or 
policy matters, but assumed a much more personal and acerbic tone. Responding to a 
question on the nature of the current leadership of the party, Molla added:   
 
There is no match for the experience and personality of Jyoti babu who came up through 
grassroot struggles. The current rank of leadership has neither his experience nor his 
personality. At the same time they might have had an intention to surpass the achievements of 
Jyoti babu, but they were hardly capable of doing so. The current leadership is of a hybrid 
nature - they talk a lot, but with less ability to do anything. Another problem is the larger than 
life image of Buddha babu. The phrase brand Buddha coined by some sections of the media 
has bloated his ego. He thought whatever he did would be accepted.
174
 
 
Irrespective of the accuracy of these observations, it is clear that there was a factional tension 
within the CPIM on the question and pace of the industrialisation agenda promoted by 
Bhattacharya and Sen. While voices such as Molla’s were initially a rarity, their numbers 
started to increase and became the dominating strand of criticism within the party after the 
Singur-Nandigram incidents and the eventual electoral decline (see next chapter for details).    
 
Bhattacharya had not only irked old party vanguards such as Molla, but also trade union 
activists with his reluctance to support labour activism. While CITU had left the days of 
militant activism behind and had been persuaded by Jyoti Basu to collaborate with the 
government in promoting a positive industrial atmosphere in the state, it also continued to 
play a crucial role in opposing the liberal policies of both the NDA
175
 and the UPA regimes at 
a national level. It organised processions, demonstrations, and public meetings, and called 
industry specific or general strikes all over the country on issues related to retrenchment due 
to privatisation and modernisation, lack of compensation, proposed changes to labour laws, 
etc. It fiercely protected its right to call bandhs (strikes), and by virtue of tacit support from 
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the government, each call for a strike was highly successful in West Bengal, even if 
marginally effective elsewhere. Bhattacharya however, fought hard to curb the practice of 
calling indiscriminate strikes - as evident in the excerpt from his ASSOCHAM speech - 
arguing that not only was it detrimental to the state’s economy, but it also sent a negative 
signal to prospective investors. He particularly wanted the IT industry to be classified under 
the Essential Services Maintenance Act, 1981 (ESMA), which would keep it outside the 
remit of any strike. However, his views were not completely endorsed by other CPIM 
leaders. Sitaram Yechury, for example, had supported a strike called by CITU on 20
th
 August 
2008, just days before Bhattacharya gave the ASSOCHAM speech. Although no minister or 
central/state level leader spoke directly against Bhattacharya, CITU leaders reacted sharply. 
In response to Bhattacharya’s speech, Kali Ghosh, West Bengal state secretary of CITU, 
asserted: 
 
Whatever he said was his personal opinion, which is different from the party’s position. CITU 
considers bandhs the working class’s ultimate weapon. We have achieved the right (to strike) 
through a long struggle...“We don’t know why he said what he did and under what 
circumstances. But it is the standard practice in our party to air personal views in proper 
forums of the party and go by its collective decision...[he] may face opposition if he spoke (in 
the CPM) against the right to bandh on just causes (The Telegraph, 27th August 2008). 
 
It should be pointed out that despite some attempts hardly any negotiation took place between 
the state party leadership and the trade union wing on the question of industrialisation. In 
1999, a state trade union sub-committee was formed in West Bengal, along with party-teams 
for specific industries and trade union fraction committees which brought union members 
from different sectors together. There were serious differences of opinion between these 
committees and the government on the issue of closing down loss incurring state-enterprises. 
The 21
st
 West Bengal State Congress observed: 
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Since the 20
th
 State Congress in 2002 the government has closed down three factories. 
The interests of the workers have been dealt with enough compassion ... There have 
been 3/4 discussions with the trade union sub committees and fractions ... There were 
serious ambiguities and lack of understanding among many comrades and trade union 
workers …some of it has been cleared, but there still are many questions and 
ambiguities among trade union workers (CPIM 21
st
 West Bengal State Congress, 
2005:127; translated).  
 
The party-teams and trade union fractions were rarely involved in any negotiation with the 
government or the state party leadership on questions of policy. Instead, “in reality, they 
hardly even performed their preliminary duties...In most cases the...party fractions were 
completely inactive...and did not even meet once” (ibid.:130; translated).  
To summarise, it is evident that the pro-reform group of Bhattacharya-Sen (along with other 
important leaders like Gautam Deb) had come to dominate both the party and the Left Front 
in their aggressive promotion of the industrialisation agenda. The opposing faction was 
minimal in size and importance, and therefore largely ignored. While there was hardly any 
negotiation involving the district level members and downwards to clarify the need for (and 
achieve an ideological consensus on) these initiatives, contrary views/disagreements were 
marginalised due to the Left Front’s impressive performance in the 2002 and 2006 state 
assembly elections
176
, both fought with the agenda of industrialisation at the forefront. In 
2002 the Left Front won 199 out of 294 seats, with the CPIM securing 143 seats, and in 2006, 
the tally increased to 233 and 176 respectively. At the same time, the share of Trinamool 
Congress, the main opposition party in the state, fell drastically from 60 to 30 seats. With 
such an overwhelming victory, all opposing views to the pro-reform faction were completely 
swept aside, and Bhattacharya and Sen’s authority within the party, as well as the 
government, was undisputed. In fact, at the 21
st
 Party Congress in 2008, it was declared that 
the Left governments had made the biggest contribution in advancing the all-India struggle, 
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and the Left-led states were the mainstay of Indian communism. It was even accepted that the 
party’s role at the national and state levels might be divergent. The political-organisational 
report of the Congress observed: 
The entire Party has to understand the role played by the CPI-(M)-led governments 
and the constraints they face. Failure to do so leads to exaggerated expectations...it is 
unrealistic to expect the Left-led governments to initiate any basic changes...While at 
the all India level the Party puts out alternative policies...it does not follow that that all 
these alternative policies can be put into operation in the states were we run state 
governments...In the struggles launched against economic policies of the Centre, the 
Left-led states are the mainstay and have made the biggest contribution. This must be 
kept in mind when we are projecting alterative policies (Political-Organisational 
Report of the 19
th
 Congress of the CPIM, 2008:63).  
 
5.4.3 Factional Tension within the Left Front     
With the CPIM going gung-ho on industrialisation, the dynamics within the Left Front 
became seriously distraught. As discussed in Chapter 4, there was absolutely no negotiation 
between the CPIM and the other coalition parties on the question of the 1994 Statement either 
before, or even after, the Statement was announced. Given the dominance of the CPIM over 
the coalition and also the stature of Jyoti Basu among the Left parties, the changes in 
direction were not particularly opposed. Basu, on his part, did not aggravate the status quo 
within the Left Front by going overboard. The lack of ideological clarity within the CPIM 
also prevented a proper debate taking place within the coalition. Above all, the actual 
investment scenario in the state remained paltry throughout the 1990s and early 2000, and 
therefore no major discontentment arose among coalition partners over the nature of capital 
and the government’s actions at ground level. However, serious fissures emerged within the 
coalition once Bhattacharya upped the ante. 
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Among the eight parties within the Left Front besides the CPIM, historically the CPI had 
been a moderate on policy matters and usually toed the CPIM line. The other two major 
partners - RSP and FB - describe themselves as Left among the Lefts and take a much more 
hardline stance. Of the remaining small parties, the RCPI also sides with the RSP/FB. The 
DSP, SP, MFB and RBC depend on the CPIM for survival, and thus are always in accordance 
with it. Given this distribution, the RSP and FB are usually more critical of the Left Front as 
steered by the dominant partners - CPIM/CPI. Therefore, the following CPI statement, 
testifying how the CPIM alone had come to dominate the coalition came as a surprise: 
 
The Left Front meetings are highly irregular. Even today there are no guidelines 
regarding how frequently the Front should meet. The member parties are not even 
informed of the agenda prior to a meeting, which prevents them from discussing the 
matters amongst themselves beforehand. At the meetings, neither there are any 
discussions on policy matters nor is the government’s performance evaluated. In the 
management of the Left Front, government and even the panchayats there is an 
increasing tendency to dominate by the majority partner. The coalition partners have 
to read about policy measures in newspapers. This creates complication and 
misunderstanding...In spite of repeatedly raising these issues in Left Front meetings 
there has been no improvement. (Political Report, CPI 22
nd
 West Bengal State 
Conference, 2005:39-40) 
 
The CPI West Bengal state secretary, Manju Majumdar, admitted that the CPIM gradually 
came to dominate the entire Left Front, and the government rarely took into account views 
expressed by the other parties: 
 
In the Left Front meetings there are serious disagreements between the CPIM and the other 
parties. We try to fight with the CPIM as much as possible, but it is mostly futile. However, 
we cannot abandon the Front, and will have to accept the situation for its future.
177  
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As might be expected, RSP and FB are more vocal in their criticism of the CPIM and the way 
the Left Front was run. There were four major areas of discontent: 
Firstly, as the CPI also admits, the lack of regular discussion among the Front members and 
the CPIM forcing their decision on the other parties were serious issues. Manoj Bhattacharya, 
West Bengal state secretary of RSP, said: 
 
The CPIM had started to go their own way without taking other parties and even the common 
people into their confidence. They started to believe that whatever they decided would be 
approved by the ordinary people. Particularly the huge victory in the 2006 assembly elections 
gave the CPIM a euphoric freedom to implement whatever they desired. We tried to amend 
their attitude many times.  But our protests were of no value or consequence to them. To give 
an example, there was a proposal for a petrochemical hub at Nandigram. We asked the 
government umpteen times to show us the detailed project report. We were curtly told by 
Nirupam babu and Buddha babu that it would be provided, but it never was. We also raised a 
question about the timeline of the project, but Buddha babu gave no importance to our 
objections. Furthermore, a huge stretch of land was necessary for the project. But no 
discussion ever took place on the acquisition issue, at least not in a democratic manner. 
CPM’s attitude is reminiscent of a Stalinist dictatorship- not listening to or negotiating with 
anyone - but deciding and executing on their own. It’s not just arrogance, but intransigence.178   
 
Hafiz Alam Sairani, West Bengal state secretary of FB argues that under the current Left 
Front leadership which, unlike their predecessors, has limited experience of mass struggle, 
the compromise on unity is natural:  
None of the current leaders have seen or experienced the kind of hardship which our earlier 
leaders went through, which made them bond at a personal level. The current alliance is more 
for the sake of convenience. The level of unity our predecessors achieved is not possible to 
replicate any more. Once the earlier generation gave way to the current leadership, Left unity 
degenerated to just a slogan. People see a united Left Front only during elections, but in no 
other matter is there a unified presence of the Left Front.
179
 
 
Secondly, a lack of trust was becoming increasingly evident within the Left Front, even to the 
extent of several conspiracy theories emerging about Buddhadeb Bhattacharya. He came to 
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be seen as colluding with the big national and international bourgeois forces for electoral 
benefits, and even getting close to communal forces. Parties like the RSP took these charges 
quite seriously. Manoj Bhattacharya continued:  
 
Possibly, a tremendous amount of pressure was being applied on Jyoti babu by Buddha babu 
to resign. And once Jyoti babu succumbed to the pressures and Buddha babu became the 
Chief Minister, the state came to be covertly ruled by the big bourgeois. The media, at the 
behest of the big bourgeoisie, also suddenly became extremely vocal about his efficiency. 
While they remained highly critical of the Lefts in general, they turned into the main 
protagonists of Buddha babu, and thereafter incessant pressure was put on him to adapt the 
course of economic development as championed by the big bourgeois forces. Buddha babu, 
on his part and with the help of the media, tried to push his idea of development down the 
throat of the common people. Even the BJP wanted to keep him happy. So it is legitimate to 
question whether Buddha babu himself had some collusion or alliance with the big 
bourgeoisie, because its agents were full of praise for him. I think in recent times major 
international capital has played a role in promoting the Left Front; in fact the government has 
been hijacked by it since the mid-1990s. This is a conjecture, but should be seriously looked 
into.
180
 
 
Third, there were many differences between the CPIM and other parties on policy orientation, 
with the former being accused of deviating from a proper Left path. These differences 
emerged on issues related to the nature of capital entering the state, capital versus labour 
intensive industries, setting up special economic zones, land acquisition, rehabilitation and 
compensation procedures etc (see next chapter for details). Given the pace at which the CPIM 
tried to proceed, Manoj Bhattachrya continued, sensitive issues such as land acquisition, 
rehabilitation, etc. were hardly paid any attention, and even the democratic element that 
should be ingrained in any such initiative - negotiation, dissemination of information, 
resettlement - were all bulldozed.  
Manju Majumdar gave an example: 
Buddha babu often used to say- we have received a certain amount of investment. But we 
always protested and wanted to know how many people would be employed as a result, and if 
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the same amount would have been invested in the small scale sector, how many more could 
have been employed. We never got a satisfactory answer.
181
  
 
One incident which sparked a serious disagreement was an agreement with Salim Group, an 
Indonesian conglomerate, to implement various developmental projects, including what was 
said to be the largest infrastructure project undertaken by any state
182
. The Salim Group was 
once closely and corruptly linked to the Suharto family of Indonesia (Dieleman and Sachs, 
2008), and inviting a multinational corporation with such credentials to West Bengal was 
seen as a serious breach the Left alternative’s trust. Similar objections arose, particularly 
from the RSP, to a project proposed by Bhushan Steel, a company involved in importing 
scrap war materials from America and accused of being heavily engaged in corruption
183
. For 
a Left government to indiscriminately collude with private capital of such nature was, 
according to all coalition partners, unthinkable. To what extent Buddhadeb Bhattacharya was 
a true communist leader, was also questioned. Manoj Bhattacharya argued: 
 
In 2005-6 Buddha babu went to Singapore. After coming back he openly proclaimed that 
having lunch with the chairman of the Singapore Economic Development Board - which is a 
conglomeration of big international bourgeoisie - was the most memorable day in his life. Is 
this normal for a member of a Communist party?
184
 
 
The theoretical rationalisation attempted by the CPIM ideologues such as Nirupam Sen was 
also refuted by the coalition partners. Mihir Bain, the West Bengal state secretary of RCPI 
observed: 
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It is completely wrong to argue that given the state of our nation, the next step is democratic 
revolution by tying forces with the progressive bourgeoisie forces, and that socialism can 
come only through industrial revolution. How could then revolution happen in Russia which 
was an agricultural economy, contrary to Marx’s prediction that the revolution would take 
place in advanced industrial nations such as Germany or England? Revolution can happen 
even without passing the stage of capitalist production. This theoretical justification comes 
out of a compulsion to stay in power and is devoid of any ideological grounds. In the crisis 
period that the CPIM is in, they are in dire need of an ideological platform, as they have 
totally deviated from Leftism. They are operating according to a more self-interest driven 
policy orientation.
185  
 
Manoj Bhattacharya was particularly vocal about the CPIM’s complete disorientation from 
Leftism. 
They may justify themselves by citing China. But they have completely shifted from the idea 
of Leftism. And they have made the Left Front go the neoliberal way envisaged by 
Manmohan Singh and Chidambaram. It is an aberration of Leftism, and that too in a very 
aggressive manner. This in a way is the Stalinist style of development - crush the peoples’ 
voice. Capitalists have done so for ages and now even we are doing the same thing. We met 
the CPIM leaders like Prakash Karat, SItaram Yechuri, and along with the FB leadership, 
appealed to them to check and amend their practices. We also complained about the 
government’s arrogant attitude. But nothing ever happened. The class alignment that all the 
Left parties had once built has gradually started to dissipate. We have tried our best, but the 
CPIM refuses to hear anything, anyone.
186
  
 
Finally, there was a procedural problem in the way the Left Front operated. There is no 
coalition below the district level, where even Front member parties contest elections against 
each other. Hafiz Alam Sairani described the problem in detail: 
 
More recently, in the face of stiff opposition, most of the CPIM leaders in the state as well as 
district levels have become more committed to maintain Left unity. Other coalition parties 
have also responded to that. But that commitment never percolated down to the lower levels. 
The lack of unity starts from the municipal corporation levels, where there is no unified 
coalition, but rather individual parties. Even if a formal coalition is not possible, at least there 
should have been some consultation among the parties over policy matters. But this never 
happened. The Front exists only at the state and district levels. Even at district levels, the 
Front hardly looks into how the zilla parishads (district committees) function.
187
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Mihir Bain described how the Left Front was suffering from a poor image in public: 
 
There has been an increase in arguments, debates and persuasion in each and every Left Front 
meeting in recent times. Furthermore, the disagreements within the Front are coming out in 
the public - thus tarnishing the image of the Front - something that has never happened 
before.
188
  
 
The problems within the Front intensified after the death of Anil Biswas, West Bengal state 
secretary of the CPIM and Chairman of the Left Front, in 2006. An astute politician, Biswas 
was highly regarded for his deft management of the Front and ability to ensure consensus 
among member parties, at least in the public eye. He was replaced by another CPIM veteran, 
Biman Bose, but he could not replicate the political astuteness of Biswas. In fact, soon after 
Bose took over, he had to face serious criticism of his handling of the Nandigram issues and 
some Left Front member parties called for his replacement. Bose, however, retained the post 
with the support of Jyoti Basu.
189
 
Taken together, the above observations paint a picture of a rather disarrayed Left Front 
during its final decade in power. Given the electoral success until 2006, and with Anil Biswas 
at the Front’s helm, the discontent among the member parties was only evident sporadically. 
But during the Singur fiasco and the Nandigram massacre - apart from a toll on the electoral 
base of the Front from the 2008 panchayat election onwards - the fissures within the Front 
became public, with the CPI, RSP, FB and RCPI openly accusing the CPIM and predicting 
(correctly) an eventual loss in the 2011 assembly elections. The factional tension within the 
CPIM also increased manifold, particularly with Abdur Rezzak Molla taking an open stand 
against Buddhadeb Bhattacharya and Nirupam Sen on questions of land acquisition and 
compensation. These incidents are briefly examined in the next chapter.   
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5.5 Conclusion  
The story of industrial development in West Bengal post-1994 has usually taken two 
divergent forms in the existing literature - either praising the marked changes in the growth 
statistics and investment quantum, or deconstructing the growth story to highlight the large 
share of unorganised sector vis-à-vis an almost stagnant organised sector
190
. Neither of these 
strands, however, analyse the metamorphosis of the transition exercise into a political project 
which, as argued in this chapter, became its defining feature. 
The opening lines of this chapter pointed out that the transition exercise in the state went 
wrong in both its intention and meaning. The precise nature of this claim can now be 
summarised. 
The intention to promote a private capital-led growth model in the state fell short of 
realisation first and foremost due to inadequate capacities. Authors such as Sinha (2004, 
2005, 2007), Ghosh and De (2004), RayChaudhuri and Basu (2007), and Chakravarty and 
Bose (2009) have discussed in detail how the state suffers from poor infrastructural and 
bureaucratic capacities, along with sticky institutional practices. The government did little to 
address these capacity problems, and thus never prepared a platform on which its intentions 
could be realised. The second problem, which has hardly been addressed in existing 
literature, is that of political indecisiveness. This chapter has discussed in detail how the 
government’s persistent ambivalence sent mixed messages to those willing to invest in the 
state, as well as to the party’s own cadres. The integrity of the declared intentions thus came 
to be questioned by investors, and the yardstick of political acceptability continued to reign 
supreme within the party. 
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It was in its meaning that the transition exercise came to be seriously contested, the problems 
manifesting in various forms. Firstly, a lack of clarity over the industrialisation agenda and 
the CPIM’s ideological discourse throughout the 1990s meant that leaders like Jyoti Basu 
were compelled to maintain a status quo instead of engaging in an effort to transform the state 
into an investment destination. Secondly, even when an ideological middle ground was 
achieved via the idea of an alternative policy, serious discrepancies remained in the way the 
idea was construed by the state leadership as opposed to the central leadership of the party. 
Thirdly, the leadership hardly engaged the rank and file of the party in any negotiation to 
explain/justify the necessities of the transition. And finally, an undercurrent of discontent 
within the CPIM along with growing factional tension within the Left Front over the direction 
and orientation of the government meant that the entire meaning of the exercise ended up 
being significantly convoluted among all its stakeholders.  
The problem that emerged from such lack of consensus and negotiation was a misdirected 
attempt at implementation. As discussed in Chapter 3, the cadre base had always been the 
most trusted channel, even for implementing policy decisions, with the party ideologically 
inclined to keep formal bureaucratic channels subservient to party control. For the 
management of the transition process, however, the increasing disengagement between the 
higher authorities and lower levels meant that both the intent and meaning of the transition 
was lost in translation by the time it reached the grassroots. Instead, it became an opportunity 
to maximise local interests, political as well as personal. The celebrated failure of the 
industrialisation initiatives of the Left Front - the Singur case, along with the violence at 
Nandigram - which marked the rapid downfall of the CPIM and the entire Left Front, were 
not the standalone incidents they have come to be viewed as but the eventual culmination of 
these intensifying contradictions. 
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Chapter 6 
 
Land, Consent and Violence: The Multiple Narratives of 
Politicisation  
“It [the CPIM] succumbed to the capitalist paradigm of development with its present mantra 
of private sector-led and export-oriented and largely jobless growth, and was hustled into 
adoption of anti-people policies, robbing the masses of their right to land, water and other 
natural resources..” (Gohain, 2011:80). 
 
“The 14th March 2007 killings in Nandigram shocked the people of the state. How on earth 
could a Left administration shoot down in cold blood women and children from impoverished 
peasant families? The resulting widespread public revulsion led to the erosion of the Party’s 
mass base” (AM, 2009:8).  
 
“If overwhelming evidence shows that the CPI(M) has abandoned the project of 
‘transcending capitalism’ then [one] should come to the conclusion that CPI(M) is no 
different from any standard bourgeois party” (Shankar, 2011:76) 
 
 
6.1 Introduction  
 
The final phase of the Left Front government, from 2006 to 2011, increasingly saw a 
multitude of political audits emanating from various quarters, fuelled by the Singur fiasco, 
the brutalities at Nandigram, and the steady political decline of the Front starting with the 
2008 panchayat elections and culminating in the 2011 assembly elections’ decisive loss. 
Such audits (excerpts from some quoted above) can largely be classified into three themes. 
First, a procedural critique of the government’s policy of land acquisition (e.g., Banerjee, 
2006; Sarkar, 2007; Chandra, 2008); second, development approach centric debates around 
the issues of public vs. private industrialisation, transition from an agricultural economy to an 
industrialised one, etc. (e.g., Bhaduri, 2007; Bhattacharya, 2007; Fernandes, 2007; Patnaik, 
2007; Sau, 2008,); and finally, a moralistic critique of a Left government inducing large-scale 
displacement of peasantry for the benefit of a multinational conglomerate, and an associated 
perception of the changing class-character of the party (e.g., Bandopadhyay, 2006; Banerjee, 
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2006, 2008; Sen, 2011). The first two strands have also significantly influenced similar 
events nationwide, such as the long drawn-out struggles around the Posco site in 
Kalinganagar, Orissa to the recent protests over the Yamuna expressway in Uttar Pradesh, as 
well as the debates over a new land acquisition bill that is currently stalled in parliament. 
However, a closer look at all three categories reveals that in spite of scathing criticisms of the 
Left Front and meticulously highlighting several of its fault lines, most critics remained 
largely noncommittal about the fact that those fault lines could not have just suddenly 
surfaced, particularly after the overwhelming victory of the CPIM in the 2006 assembly 
elections. The problems that were discovered to have suddenly eroded the party within a 
relatively short span could not have been just an outburst of the accumulated discontent 
triggered by the Singur-Nandigram fiascos, as these audits often made them out to be. What 
often remained ignored was the fact that events at Singur-Nandigram were themselves 
symptomatic of the fundamental contradictions embedded within the political nature of the 
transition process. The previous chapter examined some of these contradictions over the 
intent and meaning of the transition, and concluded with the observation that due to such 
ambiguities much of what was intended was lost in translation by the time it reached the 
grassroots. The merits of this claim will be explored in this penultimate chapter, with 
reference to the CPIM’s political rationale (see Chapter 3) and the Singur-Nandigram 
incidents. 
 
It was argued in Chapter 3 that the trajectory of the post-1990 socio-economic transitional 
phase in West Bengal continued to be a function of the unique sociability that was created by 
the emergence of party-society during the 1980s. The most significant determinant of this 
trajectory was, however, a feature that the party-society thesis underscores rather implicitly. 
Chapter 3 explored how the state institutions and, in fact, all governance channels in West 
Bengal were completely subjugated to political agencies and guidelines. In effect, over the 
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decades of the Left Front rule, formal administrative channels not only suffered from partisan 
incursions, but also became heavily dependent on political leadership for normal functioning. 
Therefore, while the rhetoric emanating from the top offices of government post-1990 
promised a transition in development policy, political control over the process was barely 
relinquished and any adjustments made were only to the extent that would suit localised 
political priorities. As a result, when the government attempted to bring the new economic 
priorities to the forefront post-2000, it could not generate the intended impact. With an almost 
defunct channel of administration which had lost the capability to perform on an autonomous 
basis, real control of the process shifted back to party quarters. With the cadre-base of the 
CPIM in charge of overseeing administrative initiatives at ground level, the serious 
disengagement across party hierarchy over the intended nature of the transition (see Chapter 
5) meant that the implementation exercises became an opportunity to maximise local political 
interests. 
 
The objective of this chapter is therefore to bring this underlying, yet continuous project of 
grass-root level politicisation of the transition initiatives into the spotlight, as it has gone 
largely unnoticed by the institutional and ideological debates around industrialisation in West 
Bengal. Chapters 4 and 5 established the political nature of the transition process and 
illustrated its manifestation among the higher echelons of the CPIM/Left Front. This chapter 
takes the argument forward by examining how, not only in intent and meaning, but even 
translation of policy directives was intensely politicised.    
 
6.2 Revisiting Singur and Nandigram 
 
The Singur-Nandigram incidents, described briefly in the Prologue and cited frequently 
throughout this work, have attained cult status among the increasing cycles of land 
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acquisition-displacement-protest which have come to dominate the India-growth story in 
recent times. They are also often described as a tipping-point, triggering the dramatic outburst 
of cumulative discontent against the Left parties in each and every election that followed
191
. 
In this chapter, however, they will be used in a context much different than the standard 
discourses that have emerged, one that will try to infer the political nature of the 
implementation initiatives around them.  
 
Before proceeding with this exercise, a brief review of both cases and their associated debates 
is necessary. An important disclaimer also needs to be provided at this juncture: the events at 
Singur and Nandigram are usually agglomerated in common parlance, but many nuances, 
particularly in the Singur case, are lost as a result. The two cases are markedly different, and 
need to be separated for analytical clarity.    
 
6.2.1 The Singur Project 
 
Immediately after their 2006 ‘industrial development’ led assembly elections victory, the 
government started an intense campaign to win a big-ticket project to catapult the state into 
the big league of attractive investment destinations. The much coveted ‘Nano’ project of Tata 
Motors Ltd (a small car with a promised price-tag of only Rs 1 lakh) was announced as that 
elusive ticket, lured away from Pantnagar, Uttarakhand, with a range of fiscal incentives 
(most of which were never made public). Amidst much fanfare, the government promised 
that the Nano project would turn West Bengal into the next automobile hub of the country, 
create a chain of downstream ancillary industries, and whose success would attract many 
more investments thus increasing industrial output and employment (Chandra, 2008) 
                                                          
191
 While such an observation may be over-simplistic in nature, the TMC led opposition, which transformed 
itself from a marginal political party in 2006 (30 seats as opposed to the Left Front’s 233) to one with an 
overwhelming majority in 2011 (the TMC-Congress coalition won 226 seats, the Left Front reduced to 62), had 
the Singur-Nandigram events at the very forefront of their campaign for the entire period.  
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The infamous Singur controversy was initially sparked by the government’s decision to 
acquire 997 acres of agricultural land in order to set up the Nano factory. The site chosen was 
in the small town of Singur in Hooghly district, approximately 40 km from Calcutta, but with 
easy access to the city via the Durgapur Expressway/National Highway 2. The land affected 
was spread across five mouzas
192
 - Beraberi, Gopalnagar, Singherbheri, Bajemelia, and 
Khaserbheri - with marginal and small farmers constituting more than 50% of the population. 
There was also a sizeable section (25-30%) of unregistered baradars (sharecroppers) and 
landless people belonging to the scheduled caste (SC) category (Status Report on Singur, 
2006; Banerjee, P., 2006).  The area is agriculturally prosperous (multi-crop land, producing 
rice, potatoes, jute and an array of vegetables), fully irrigated (a Damodar Valley Corporation 
canal passes through the villages), and has generous access to groundwater, with two deep 
tube wells and twenty-seven mini deep tube wells (ibid.)
193
.   
 
The compensation to be awarded was initially calculated on the following basis: landowners 
were to receive Rs 8.7 lakhs per acre for single-cropped land and Rs. 12.8 lakhs per acre for 
double-cropped land; registered bargadars were to receive 25% of the value being offered to 
owners. However, no arrangement was made to compensate unregistered bargadars. WBIDC 
itself admits: “[a]ccording to local enquiry, the total number of unrecorded bargadars is about 
170. Till date 60 such unrecorded bargadars have applied to Collector requesting that they be 
considered for some compensation to be paid to them” (Status Report on Singur, 2006:2).  
 
                                                          
192
 A mouza corresponds to a specific land area within which there may be one or more settlements. In the 
colonial era, the term referred to a revenue collection unit in a pargana or revenue district. Although the 
concept has declined in importance, it is still used for land revenue administration.   
193 However, as Mohanty (2007) argues, despite the fact that Singur is an agriculturally prosperous area, 
agriculture is not the most important source of income and employment in the area. Banerjee similarly 
observes: “Being located at a distance of only 40 km from Kolkata, the people of Singur are closely linked with 
life in the city, many of the landowners are engaged in services and businesses, while their lands are tilled 
either by the bargadars or by the landless and marginal peasants leasing-in those lands. A section of the poor 
people in Singur also frequent the nearby town, being employed in factories, shops and small businesses. 
Some of the youth have migrated to cities like Mumbai, Delhi and Bangalore.” (2006:4719).  
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The timeline for acquisition and compensation payment was as follows: 
 
Table 6.1: Singur Timeline 
Issuance of Notice under Section 4(1) of 
Land Acquisition Act 1894 
19
th
 to 24
th
 July 2006 
Issuance of Notice under Section 6 of Land 
Acquisition Act 1894 
29
th
 to 31
st
 August 2006 
Declaration of award: 21
st
 to 23rd September 2006 
Commencement of payment of Land 
Acquisition: 
25
th
 September 2006 
Source: Status Report on Singur, GoWB, 2006.  
 
 
The project’s announcement caused almost immediate apprehensions about the loss of land 
and livelihood. The first instance of organised agitation occurred during the visit of a Tata 
Motors team and WBIDC officials on 25
th
 May 2006, when a group of local peasants 
gathered to block their passage. Soon after, a Krishi Jami Raksha Committee (Save 
Agricultural Land Committee) was formed, which organised its first demonstration on 1
st
 
June in front of the local block development office (Banerjee, 2006). Between 9
th
 May and 
27
th
 September there were nine meetings between various arms of government and local 
representatives, including four with the Krishi Jami Raksha Committee. However, in spite of 
extensive consultations, even the government’s own records suggest that no consensus 
emerged from these meetings on how to take the process forward (Mohanty, 2007). The 
protests escalated rapidly, and brought together a motley political coalition, spearheaded by 
the TMC under Mamata Banerjee, PDS, as well as the SUCI (Socialist Unity Centre of India - 
a Left party outside the ruling coalition). Their specific demand was to return 400 acres of 
land that belonged to unwilling farmers (plot-holders who refused to part with their land and 
did not collect compensation cheques, albeit some were absentee landlords/businessmen) 
(Sau, 2008). The movement received widespread support from civil rights and human rights 
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groups, legal bodies and social activists like Medha Patkar, Anuradha Talwar and writer-
activist Arundhati Roy. Other intellectuals, including writers (Mahasweta Devi and Ruchit 
Shah), artists (Suvaprasanna), theatre and film personalities (Shaoli Mitra and Aparna Sen) 
and other prominent citizens also lent their support.  
 
On 25
th
 September 2006, the day scheduled for compensation disbursement to commence, the 
local block office was surrounded by thousands of protestors, demanding the process be 
stopped. What happened during the following hours remains unclear, but the police finally 
resorted to a lathi-charge that resulted in one dead, and several injured. Next, just prior to the 
beginning of fencing operations in early December, another phase of violent clashes took 
place, and the government responded by imposing initially, one month but later indefinite, 
prohibitory orders under Section 144 of the Indian Penal Code in order to continue fencing 
operations
194
. A ceremonial inauguration of construction of the factory took place on 21
st
 
January 2007
195
. Mamata Banerjee called a state-wide bandh (strike) on 1
st
 December, 
protesting against police brutalities and demanding the return of the 400 acres. She then went 
on a 25-day hunger strike, only calling it off at the request of the Prime Minister and the 
President on 28
th
 December
196
. While the government was quick to dismiss her campaign as 
grandstanding and opportunism in the hope of reviving a flagging political career - and there 
may have been some truth in that - it was evident that her campaign had started to gather 
significant resonance because of the already extant stiff resistance. 
                                                          
194
 A group of civil society members including prominent personalities Shnaoli Mitra and Aparna Sen tried to 
visit Singur on 7
th
 December 2006 in response to increasing reports of police atrocities, but were turned back 
by the police citing restrictions under Section 144. Source: http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2006-
12-08/india/27814630_1_medha-patkar-singur-cpm ; accessed 28th June 2012. These incidents gradually 
brought about a change of opinion about the entire industrialisation agenda among sections of the middle 
class urban intelligentsia.  
195 In a major embarrassment to the government, the Calcutta High Court, in a judgement passed on 14th 
February 2007, held that imposition of prohibitory orders under Section 144 in Singur amounted to 
administrative highhandedness and misuse of power; Source: 
http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2007-02-15/india/27875032_1_prohibitory-orders-land-
acquisition-singur ; accessed 28th June 2012.  
196
 Source: Ananda Bazar Patrika, 1
st
, 2
nd
 and 29
th
 December 2006.  
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Construction of the factory continued throughout 2007 and the first half of 2008 amidst 
regular protests and agitations that often turned violent. There were several reports of 
disruption of work, assault, and intimidation of workers and officials at the site
197
. The saga 
also played out in the state assembly with the government coming under severe criticism for 
its refusal to publicly reveal the details of the deal, particularly the concessions given to Tata 
Motors, under the clause of ‘trade secrets’198. Left Front partner parties like the CPI and RSP 
also questioned this dictum of ‘trade secret’ for land being acquired ‘in the public interest’ 
and demanded transparency (Banerjee, 2006). There was even a public reproach from none 
other than Jyoti Basu
199
.  
 
A fresh bout of intense agitation centred on the return of land to the unwilling farmers was 
led by Mamata Banerjee in August 2008 and brought work at the site to a complete standstill. 
This led to a series of inconclusive negotiations between the government and the opposition 
and led to Tata Motors’ withdrawal of the project on 3rd October 2008200. In the press 
conference, Ratan Tata (Chairman of the Tata Group) stated: 
This is a decision we have taken with a great deal of sadness because we came here two years 
ago, attracted by the investor-friendly policies of the current government, which we still have 
a great deal of respect for, the leadership of Mr Buddhadeb Bhattacharjee. And all through the 
two years that we worked, I am very appreciative of the support that the government gave us 
and the facilitation that they provided. Unfortunately, we also faced great agitation and great 
aggression on the part of the opposing parties, which have in fact been the sole reason for us 
to take this decision
201
.  
 
                                                          
197
 For a chronology of events from 2006 to 2008, see “The TATA-Singur Saga Chronology”, published by the 
Hindustan Times on 6
th
 September 2008; http://www.hindustantimes.com/News-Feed/India/The-Tata-Singur-
saga-chronology/Article1-336094.aspx ; accessed 12th August 2012.  
198
 Source: The Telegraph: 13
th
 October 2006.  
199
 Ibid.  
200
 The project was eventually relocated to Sanand in Gujarat, where it took around 14 months to build the 
factory and start production, compared to the disruptive 28 months in West Bengal. Source: 
http://businesstoday.intoday.in/story/gujarat-is-indias-new-factory-hub/1/11918.html ; accessed 28th June 
2012.  
201
 Source: The Telegraph, 4
th
 October 2008; http://www.telegraphindia.com/archives/archive.html; accessed 
28
th
 June 2012.  
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6.2.2 Procedural Debates around Land Acquisition  
The series of events at Singur, predictably, gave rise to a wide range of questions about the 
manner in which the government had gone about the project. One of the larger thematic 
issues that surfaced was that while conventional development economics literature has never 
considered land requirement as a serious constraint to the development process
202
 (Sarkar, 
2007:1435), Singur showed that land could be a crucial determinant of socio-political 
consequences. However, given the extremely adverse land-man ratio and stagnating 
agricultural conditions in West Bengal, it can be argued that any long-term development of 
the state must involve industrialisation, and large-scale economic transformation in the state 
must draw on agricultural land
203
. However, a concern voiced frequently from various 
quarters questions whether large-scale use of agricultural land for industrial purposes might 
prove detrimental for food security in the state
204
. A corollary of such an observation is that 
industrial projects should only be located on land previously occupied by industry. Sarkar 
provides a counter argument:  
[f]irst, it may be pointed out that the choice of land does not always lie with the 
government...given the intense competition between the Indian states to attract private 
capital, the respective state governments are compelled to allow the investors to make 
their choice of land...[T]he real reason for worrying about the process of transforming 
agricultural land for industrial use is the possibility of an ensuing threat to food 
security. We shall argue that such a worry is to a large extent baseless...total land in 
the state is 88,75,000 hectares (1 hectare = 2.47 acres approximately) out of which 63 
per cent is cultivated. So...in West Bengal...14 million acres
205
...of land is under 
cultivation....Suppose West Bengal requires 1,00,000 acres of land for building up 
infrastructure, industries and a modern services sector. That will be less than 0.7 per 
cent of the total agricultural land in the state. It is highly unlikely that if this 
                                                          
202
 Arguably, traditional development economics has always focused on the dual aspects of physical and 
human capital accumulation. The land question remained outside the ambit of both of these.  
203
 According to the 61
st
 round of the NSSO survey (2004-05) the land-man ratio in West Bengal was the worst 
in the country. Cropping intensity in the state was very high, with 63% of the total available land being under 
cultivation (West Bengal Human Development Report, 2004).  
204 For example, see Amitadyuti Kumar’s article titled “Headline Singur - Food self-sufficiency, barren land, 
fighting unemployment, and other misrepresentations”; Sanhati, 22
nd
 March 2007: 
http://sanhati.com/articles/132/ accessed 10
th
 August 2012.   
205
 1 hectare = approximately 2.47 acres.  
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minuscule amount of land goes away from the agricultural sector, total food grains 
production of the state is going to be substantially reduced (ibid.:1438).  
The larger context is of course not only economic, but also emotional. Sau (2008:11) writes:  
 
a peasant family receives, not one, but as many as four kinds of benefits from its strip 
of land, namely, (a) employment of family members; (b) income from crops by way 
of accrued rent and profit, over and above the virtual wages; (c) a sense of family 
security; and (d) social esteem accorded to a landowner, however minuscule, as 
opposed to the derision thrown at a landless labourer. The market price cannot reflect 
the full range of all these. Of the four, the last two are incommensurable with standard 
pecuniary measurement; money cannot procure them. A substitute job for an unskilled 
farmer as compensation for land would only perpetuate his family’s agony across 
generations to come; that low-paid job is hardly better than a bit of opium to soothe 
the pain of penury.  
 
 
There were also debates about the manner in which the government went about the 
acquisition, following the archaic Land Acquisition Act (1894). The problems were primarily 
twofold: land pricing and quantum of compensation offered. The market for agricultural land 
in West Bengal (indeed, throughout India) is sparse, as transactions are infrequent. It is 
thereby difficult to obtain a proper estimate of the market value of land that would also reflect 
the true valuation by the farmer-owner
206
. Additionally, a small farmer usually keeps a large 
part of his production for self-consumption. If compelled to sell his land, he would have to 
buy food grains at market price, which is much higher than the farmer’s sale price. Therefore, 
the market valuation of land, even if accurate, still fails to provide adequate compensation. 
Finally, questions were also raised about the practice of evaluating land on the basis of 
earnings arising out of its present use rather than what it might earn in future if put to an 
                                                          
206 The usual practice of fixing the market price of land by averaging past prices is likely to be an 
undervaluation, as land prices are constantly on the rise. Furthermore, as Sarkar notes, “The market price of 
land should roughly reflect the discounted sum of the expected value of output produced by land in future net 
of material and labour costs. To an owner-farmer, however, ownership of land gives him an opportunity to 
work. This particular advantage...will not be reflected in the market price. Thus to him the market price of land 
is much lower than its shadow price. Now, we get the shadow price of land by deducting the material costs 
and the opportunity cost of labour of the owner-cultivator from the discounted sum of the expected value of 
output. But given widespread unemployment, the opportunity cost of labour is less than the market wage 
rate. Hence the market price of land is lower than its shadow price. As a result, the owner-farmer will not be 
willing to sell his land at the market price” (2007:1440).  
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alternative use: obviously, the value would be higher if used for industry. Social justice 
requires that the present owner of land should also receive a share of this increased valuation. 
The Land Acquisition Act, in spite of all its later amendments, failed to guarantee this. It 
specifically stated that when determining compensation ‘any increase to the value of the land 
acquired likely to accrue from the use to which the land acquired will be put’ has to be 
neglected (Sarkar, 2007; emphasis added). 
 
Therefore, compensation based on the market valuation of land would naturally be judged 
insufficient. Furthermore, the compensation package completely ignored inflationary 
pressures. Adjusting for inflation, the future returns from the compensation falls ruefully 
short of even the current monthly income from an acre of multi-cropping land (ibid.).  
 
6.2.3 The Violence at Nandigram 
 
Located about 150km from Calcutta, Nandigram is a rural area in the East Midnapore district 
of West Bengal, situated opposite the industrial town of Haldia, and under the jurisdiction of 
the Haldia Development Authority (HDA). In August 2006, the government announced that a 
Special Economic Zone would be set up in the area as part of a larger plan for the Salim 
Group, an Indonesian conglomerate, to build a chemical hub
207
. Controversy started almost 
immediately, and though no formal announcement was made by the government regarding 
acquiring land, the ongoing events at Singur created fear among local people. On 15
th
 August, 
in an article titled ‘Nandigram Gets Singur Jitters’, The Statesman reported that the ongoing 
protests in Singur had provoked apprehension about the fate of their own land among the 
people of Nandigram
208
. However, it was not until 27
th
 December that Lakshman Seth, the 
                                                          
207
 While the CPIM approved of involving the Salim Group in the state, other Left Front coalition members - 
particularly the RSP, were seriously opposed on ideological grounds - see Chapter 5 for details.  
208 It is in this context that Nandigram and Singur and have come to be uttered in the same breath, whereas 
they are otherwise significantly different. Nandigram is less fertile, not located on the national highway and 
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local MP and district leader of the CPIM, mentioned in a speech at Nandigram that 
agricultural land - covering 27 mouzas in Nandigram and two in the adjacent Khejuri village - 
would be acquired for the chemical hub. A notice was issued by the HDA the very next day 
announcing the same. The first instance of protest and violence was reported within less than 
a week - on 3
rd
 January 2007 - with conflicting reports emerging about confrontation between 
the police and protestors in which several people were injured, with each side blaming the 
other for initiating the violence.
209
 Following these confrontations, local people dug up roads 
and destroyed several bridges to prevent the police from entering their villages (Report of the 
People’s Tribunal on Nandigram, 2007). As Nandigram became cut off from the rest of the 
state, sporadic violence erupted in the area on an almost daily basis. At least six people were 
killed as armed men, allegedly backed by local CPIM cadres, fired and hurled bombs at 
groups of protestors on 7
th
 January
210
. There were several reports of illegal weaponry being 
dumped at Nandigram and tension continued to mount despite repeated attempts by the 
authorities to restore peace
211
.   
 
According to newspaper reports
212
 and the People’s Tribunal on Nandigram (2007), on 14th 
March, at around 9.30 am, two forces comprised of 300 and 500 armed policemen entered the 
area from the Nandigram and Khejuri sides respectively. The forces allegedly included 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
there was considerably less land speculation. Above all, the proposal in Nandigram was to set up a SEZ, 
whereas in Singur, the acquisition of land was for a car factory. However, in Nandigram, acquisition of 
homestead land was also a possibility, thus evoking fear not only of dispossession, but also of dislocation. The 
similarity between the two cases was in the manner in which, as Bhattacharya (2007) wrote, such basic fears 
of the rural poor were manipulated, resulting in similar apprehensions about loss of land and livelihood not 
only among the people earning their livelihood directly from agriculture, but also others who had lived in the 
area for generations and those providing various services to them.   
209
 On 3
rd
 January, in response to the incidents of violence, Buddhadeb Bhattacharya informed the press that 
no notification for acquiring land in Nandigram had yet been issued. The Statesman reported on 4
th
 January 
that “Mr Buddhadeb Bhattacharjee today parried questions on the mob fury and attack on a police contingent 
at Nandigram and said no notification for acquiring 25,000 acres of land for Salim Group projects had as yet 
been issued. The chief minister’s comment, however, did little to clarify the situation regarding the notice 
issued by the Haldia Development Authority to gram panchayats”.     
210
 Source: Ananda Bazar Patrika, 8
th 
January 2007. 
211
 Source: January-March issues of Ananda Bazar Patrika, The Telegraph and The Statesman. 
212
 Source: 15
th
-20
th
 March issues of the Ananda Bazar Patrika, The Telegraph and The Statesman.  
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hundreds of CPIM cadres as well, some clothed in khaki police dress, with sandals on their 
feet and caps with the logo of Bhagat Singh (a revolutionary leader of the Indian freedom 
struggle). The police fired indiscriminately at people, including women and children. 
Fourteen people died, one went missing, and hundreds were injured, the majority of whom 
were women. Many women were also reported to have been sexually assaulted, both by the 
police and the party cadres. Surprisingly, the local police did not even record an FIR (First 
Information Report) or report these incidents to the District Magistrate. The Times of India 
observed in its 15
th
 March issue:  
 
In a brazen display of muscle power, thousands of CPM men sealed off all access 
points along a 30-km radius around Nandigram and prevented journalists from 
entering the area, while the police carried out a bloodbath on Wednesday morning. In 
a carefully orchestrated plan, the administration stayed away from Digha Road — the 
highway from which several roads meander into Nandigram. Instead, CPM supporters 
took position, setting up checkposts at strategic points to flush out media persons from 
vehicles headed towards Nandigram.  
 
 
A statement was issued by the Governor of West Bengal on the evening of 14
th
 March, 
admitting that “the news of deaths by police firing in Nandigram this morning has filled me 
with a sense of cold horror”213. Soon after, the Calcutta High Court passed an order on its 
own motion to initiate a public interest litigation, observing: “prima facie we are satisfied that 
this action of the police department is wholly unconstitutional and cannot be justified under 
any provision of law”, and called for a special inquiry into the incident by the Central Bureau 
of Investigation
214
. There were reports that human rights groups, while moving towards 
Nandigram, were obstructed by CPIM cadres. It was also found that there was an urgent need 
for medical and material help for the people of Nandigram. The Calcutta High Court issued 
an order allowing free movement of the people for the purpose of relief work.  
                                                          
213
 Source: The Telegraph; 15
th
 March 2007. 
214
 Source: Annexure I of the Report of the People’s Tribunal (2007) 
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The People’s Tribunal Report (2007) categorically gave the verdict that the West Bengal 
government, particularly the district administration, engaged police forces along with armed 
ruling party hooligans to teach a lesson to the poor villagers in Nandigram. The conclusive 
recommendation of the report was that in order to prevent a recurrence of the incidents of 14
th
 
March in any form, the government should make a solemn declaration that force would not 
be used against local people for the “so-called restoration of law and order and control of 
administration”.     
 
Not unexpectedly, the events at Nandigram were widely condemned. In a joint letter to the 
Economic and Political Weekly on 31
st
 March 2007, a number of well known academics and 
activists commented:  
 
We the undersigned, who have long been associated with the Left movement in the 
country, feel deeply pained and anguished by the loss of lives and injuries suffered 
during the police action in Nandigram on March 14. Nobody belonging to the Left 
would ever justify repressive action against peasants or workers who are the basic 
classes of the Left. The tragedy at Nandigram on March 14 was an entirely 
unanticipated, unjustified and unfortunate turn of events, whose exact origin and 
course should be established through a proper inquiry (Bagchi, Raina, Rahman et al, 
2007).   
 
 
In another article, a group of noted economists including Abhijit Banerjee, Pranab Bardhan 
and Kaushik Basu wrote:  
 
We, of course, unambiguously condemn the brutal assault on, and killing of, farmers 
resisting land acquisition by the police and cadres of the ruling party in Nandigram on 
March 14, 2007. Whatever the provocation they may have faced, there should be no 
exceptions, and no caveats on the question of abuse of human rights (Banerjee, 
Bardhan, Basu et al, 2007). 
 
 
Similar reactions continued to pour in, along with protests and demonstrations in the streets 
of Calcutta. The bhadralok image of Buddhadeb Bhattachrya also suffered as leading names 
in Bengali intelligentsia – with whom Bhattacharya was known to have close ties - reacted 
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sharply. Historians Sumit Sarkar and Tanika Sarkar, celebrated economist and poet Tarun 
Sanyal and author Nabarun Bhattacharya returned their respective awards from the state 
government. Poet Sankha Ghosh and literary critic Asrukumar Sikdar resigned from their 
respective positions as vice-president and member of the Bengali Academy
215
, and many 
more similar examples followed. In a meeting held in Calcutta by leading intellectuals, film 
and theatre personalities to condemn the government’s role in the violence and killings at 
Nandigram, the collective anguish was clearly articulated by Sumit Sarkar: “We have been 
leftists all our lives. But we cannot accept the manner in which the police and CPM activists 
have committed atrocities in Nandigram. I cannot believe that a Marxist government has 
allowed this” (RoyChowdhury, 2007). 
 
6.2.4 Larger Thematic Resonances and an Ideological Critique 
 
As well as procedural critiques about land acquisition, the incidents at Singur and Nandigram 
have also thrown up larger questions about the nature of the development paradigm such 
initiatives are embedded in. The first major issue to have emerged questions the extent to 
which the state should act as a facilitator for private-capital led projects such as these, with 
supporters (e.g., Sarkar, 2006, 2007) and detractors (e.g., Banerjee, Bardhan, Basu et al, 
2007) on either side of the argument. The second question is about the neoliberal economic 
order itself, which has come under increasing criticism for its claim to be the sole hegemonic 
model and inducing a re-enactment of the 19th century paradigm of industrialisation by 
expropriation of agricultural land, the victims of which are the peasants who are increasingly 
being sucked in by expanding urban areas. The present Indian state’s efforts to pursue the 
neoliberal model of industrialisation, is resulting in the building small enclaves of private 
wealth within a much bigger economy that remains backward and stagnant, where farmers 
                                                          
215
 Source: Ananda Bazar Patrika, 18
th
 March 2007. 
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commit suicide and dalit and tribal peasants are forced to migrate to cities to earn a living and 
are exploited by urban commercial predators (Banerjee, 2006). In a widely cited article titled 
Development or Development Terrorism, Amit Bhaduri writes:  
 
The unprecedented high economic growth on which privileged India prides itself is a 
measure of the high speed at which the India of privilege is distancing itself from the 
India of crushing poverty...We first need to understand this paradox which counter-
poses growth against development, and challenge this dangerous obsession with 
growth. Globalisation is the context in which growth is taking place. The 
accompanying processes of economic liberalisation and privatisation are tilting the 
balance in favour of the market against the nation state... A massive land grab by large 
corporations is going on in various guises, aided and abetted by the land acquisition 
policies of both the federal and state governments. Destruction of livelihoods and 
displacement of the poor in the name of industrialisation, big dams for power 
generation and irrigation, corporatisation of agriculture despite farmers’ suicides, and 
modernisation and beautification of our cities by demolishing slums are showing 
everyday how development can turn perverse (2007:552).  
 
 
These are not questions restricted to a local political economy; they have much wider 
ramifications that have come to dominate the latest trajectories in development discourses 
around the world. While such debates are beyond the ambit of this research, it is interesting to 
note how attempts at engineering an economic policy transition by a Left government have 
come to display such widely resonating trends.  
 
The questions raised by the Singur-Nandigram incidents, however, have also taken another 
distinct form: that of a moralistic critique about the changing class character of the Left 
regime. How can a government of Left parties - one that proclaims to be a government of the 
poor and boasts of a rich history of land reforms, democratic decentralisation and political 
mobilisation among the working class - engage in such acts of oppression against the poor 
peasantry, displacing them from their land, especially in order to court private multinational 
conglomerates? The CPIM in particular has also been severely criticised by traditionally Left 
sympathisers for having suffered a complete loss of the moral philosophy that once 
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underpinned the principles of communism (Banerjee, 2007). The Nandigram incident- writes 
the anonymous author, A CPIM Supporter: 
 
…is a culmination of the West Bengal CPI(M) leadership’s buying the logic of 
neoliberal economic policies. The symptoms have been visible for some years now. 
Rather than fighting against the neoliberal paradigm of attracting private investment 
by offering sops and reigning in the trade unions, the pronouncements made by the 
leaders of the LF government seems to suggest that they agree with it. The pursuit of 
a loosely defined goal of “development” has acquired primacy at the cost of class 
struggle and raising the consciousness of the people against neo-liberal policies. It has 
been immensely demoralising for CPI(M) members and sympathisers all over the 
country to see their politburo member and chief minister of West Bengal repeatedly 
state in newspaper and television interviews that communists have to get rid of their 
‘dogmas’ (2007:1596). 
 
 
The above review summarises the diverse opinions that have emerged over the Singur-
Nandigram incidents, ranging from initial knee-jerk reactions to seasoned procedural 
critiques of the entire land acquisition initiatives, and denouncement of the party for having 
abandoned its erstwhile ideological/moral character. Needless to say, the withdrawal of a 
high profile project by a major business and the perceived associated lack of management 
abilities of the government did little good for the industrial climate of the state, which seemed 
to once again have seeped into the doldrums of its erstwhile credibility crisis. 
 
However, there remains a third dimension to the story that has rarely been touched upon: can 
the Singur-Nandigram incidents be contextualised within the politicised transition process 
that the government had been engaged in since the early 1990s? In other words, can the turn 
of events also be described as a culmination of the contradictory political character of the 
entire transition process, in addition to policy/procedural errors and/or a larger ideological 
deviation? The rest of this chapter focuses on this question.   
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6.3 The Alternative Bureaucracy of the CPIM 
It is necessary to formulate certain theoretical notions in order to successfully examine the 
above questions, for which some of the fundamental characteristics of the CPIM need to be 
revisited. In the second part of Chapter 3, the following factors were identified as some of the 
defining features of the party’s political rationale: the emergence of a new political ruling 
class, the authority it came to exercise over state institutions, and an ideological 
legitimisation of such practices stemming from a suspicion and hostility towards liberal 
constitutional arrangements and formal bureaucratic structures. These features, taken together 
with the party’s tactics to create and sustain hegemonic structures (discussed in detail in 
Chapter 3) highlight the fact that the CPIM had created an entire parallel structure of its own 
to supervise and control crucial state institutions, as well as to monitor the provision of even 
the most basic civic services with an eye towards upholding partisan motives.  
 
A parallel phenomenon reinforced this development. While West Bengal was routinely 
criticised for bureaucratic inefficiency, it  be recognised that historically, given the level of 
party-supervision, it was rare that an administrative decision (particularly below state level) 
could be taken without political approval. Thus, as a result of decades of political ‘guidance’, 
the formal bureaucratic channels gradually lost their capacity to function independently. A 
Deputy Director General of the CII, on condition of anonymity, admitted: 
Bureaucrats in West Bengal have been hiding behind their political bosses for over thirty 
years, and were never able to get rid of this habit and emerge as objective 
facilitators/implementers of governance decisions
216. 
 
Dipankar Chatterjee (ex-Chairman CII, Eastern and North-Eastern regions) observed: 
 
                                                          
216
 Source: Interview, 30
th
 June, 2009, Calcutta.  
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The government in West Bengal was never able to carry the bureaucracy. The state 
bureaucracy had lost the capacity to work because of not having to work as an independent 
agency for decades. Unlike other states where the bureaucracy would implement whatever the 
leaders would say the next day, in West Bengal the leaders did not want to appear too keen to 
push the bureaucracy to pursue governance matters, and the latter would not work without 
political approval and guidance.
217
 
 
What this meant was that the government was reliant on the party’s networks even for 
administration. From assessing ground level priorities to formulating policy decisions to 
implementing them, the party’s parallel structure was in charge. In effect, this structure was 
analogous to an alternative bureaucracy - owned and controlled by the party - working 
primarily to maximise political interests by virtue of its authority over formal administrative 
services, and admission to which was only possible on the basis of political allegiance.     
 
D.N. Ghosh, Chairman of the Peerless Group of Companies, and one of the most senior 
members of the IAS (Indian Administrative Service) provides an accurate description of the 
CPIM’s attitude towards formal bureaucratic channels218: 
 
The CPIM took pleasure in the fact that they completely pulverized the bureaucracy. The state 
bureaucracy never functioned in the way central bureaucracy could. Jyoti Basu was the only 
leader with enough authority to have improved the situation, but he never tried. Buddhadeb 
Bhattacharya, in spite of honest intentions, was never able to achieve it either as he did not 
command that kind of an authority in the party. Because the CPIM did not trust the formal 
bureaucratic channels, they had created their alternative bureaucratic structure.
219
 (emphasis 
added)        
 
This was certainly not an unexpected development. As discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, 
controlling the various administrative units was one of the declared political-ideological goals 
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 Source: Interview, 8
th
 August, 2009, Calcutta.  
218
 Mr. Ghosh has served in various positions in several central government departments. He was appointed 
Chairman of the State Bank of India and was one of the pioneers of the nationalisation of banks during Indira 
Gandhi’s regime. He joined the Left Front government after 1977, and eventually moved into the private 
sector. He has served as the Chairman of the Directors’ Boards in companies like Philips India Limited, Larsen & 
Toubro Limited, the Indian Institute of Management- Lucknow, Management Development Institute- Gurgaon; 
and the Peerless Group of Companies. 
219
 Source: Interview, 11
th
 August 2009, Calcutta.  
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of the party, and it had successfully designed a layer of political supervision for each 
administration level, from the gram panchayats up. Although during the initial period of 
Buddhadeb Bhattacharya’s tenure there was a perception that the government might be 
gradually distancing itself from the party (see Chapter 5 for details), Anil Biswas, the then 
CPIM Secretary and Left Front Chairman, explained in a 2001 interview that the government 
and the party remained in a symbiotic relationship and went on to assert that a true Marxist 
gladly follows the party diktat and is proud to be a "puppet in the hands of the party"
220
. 
Given such an attitude, it is hardly surprising that the government, instead of relying on 
formal bureaucratic channels for administrative purposes, started to rely on the party’s own 
people or own sources. D.N. Ghosh further commented: 
 
The CPIM had set about creating their alternative structure from the very beginning. While 
this is a common practice among all political parties, their political channels tend not interfere 
with the official bureaucracy. But in West Bengal the party bureaucracy has completely 
engulfed the official bureaucracy. It has been a very common practice to rely upon what our 
people are saying in spite of the District Magistrate, the police or other official channels 
giving contrary reports.  
 
Undoubtedly, with the widespread and deep-rooted organisational networks of the party 
based on the new political ruling class (or the middle-class core of party functionaries that 
included government employees, school teachers, government contractors, middle and rich 
peasants, etc.- see Chapter 3 for details) that had emerged in West Bengal, the alternative 
bureaucratic structure became a much more efficient and politically acceptable channel to 
collect or disseminate information, exercise control and coercion, and enter the ambits of 
family and even moral space to maintain the political status quo. The tasks it performed were 
manifold, and included (but were not restricted to): (1) supervision/control of state 
institutions to ensure their activities were politically acceptable; (2) creation and sustenance 
                                                          
220
 Source: “It’s now or never”, The Statesman, 25
th
 May 2001. 
http://www.thestatesman.net/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&show=archive&id=26739&catid
=39&year=2001&month=5&day=25&Itemid=66 accessed 11
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285 
 
of patronage networks; (3) supervision of all governance/development initiatives in an area to 
ensure adequate political returns (such as donations or payments to party funds, employing 
local unemployed party supporters, using raw materials provided by party-run syndicates, 
etc.); (4) functioning as the sole negotiating channel between the public and the state for 
provision of civic services, thereby ensuring political allegiance of the citizenry
221
 (at times 
by force if necessary); and (5) acting as the sole reliable source of information for the higher 
authorities to take administrative/policy decisions (for example, the local committee would be 
in charge of preparing or supervising the BPL list in a village, identify which families were 
eligible to subscribe to government schemes, authorise transfers/promotions among 
government employees in the locality, etc. Predictably, access to such services/facilities 
would only be provided if one was willing to subscribe to the patronage network or promise 
political allegiance
222
). This is how the notion of the party-society - discussed in Chapter 3 as 
the key theoretical marker for the state of affairs in West Bengal - overlapped and eventually 
engulfed the governance space in the state, translating even the most basic tasks of 
governance into a political project. Chatterjee, in his usual strong manner, writes: 
“Every account speaks of the ubiquitous presence of the ‘party’. One knows that 
despite some general characteristics of democracy in India, each region and state has 
its own peculiar practices and idioms of democratic politics. In West Bengal, the key 
term is ‘party’. It is indeed the elementary institution of rural life in the state – not 
family, not kinship, not caste, not religion, not market, but party. It is the institution 
                                                          
221 As Partha Chatterjee (2009:44-45) writes: “The sway of illegality in the daily lives of most people in rural 
society is astounding in its range and depth. From land records to barga rights to minimum wages, the official 
records do not show the real picture. This is not, however, a simple story of bureaucratic corruption. In most 
cases, it is a politically mediated result of attempts to find fair and consensual solutions... Thus, landowning 
families who have effectively moved to non-agricultural occupations may be persuaded to allow others to 
cultivate their land without any formal transfer of title or tenurial rights. More people may be accommodated 
in a public works programme at less than minimum wage without the official records showing the 
discrepancy... If one moves to non-agricultural activities, the illegalities are endless. Almost all husking mills in 
West Bengal are unlicensed. Most of the trade in agricultural commodities, in spite of laws and regulating 
institutions, is effectively unregulated. Most rural shops and roadside markets are regulated politically, not 
legally. The same goes for rural transport. In all such cases, we will find that the law is either too restrictive or 
too cumbersome or too expensive to be acceptable and, therefore, it is the local political leadership, belonging 
to one or the other “party”, which steps in to regulate the transactions.”  
222
 Bardhan, Mitra et al (2009) argue that the lasting political success of the Left Front in West Bengal, even if 
partially, was owed to such clientelist relationships of the party with the voters.  
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that mediates every single sphere of social activity, with few exceptions, if any. This 
is indeed the true significance of the shift from the old days. Every other social 
institution, such as the landlord’s house, the caste council, the religious assembly, 
sectarian foundations, schools, sporting clubs, traders’ associations, and so on, have 
been eliminated, marginalised or subordinated to the ‘party’” (Chatterjee, 2009:43). 
 
This alternative bureaucratic structure gave rise to some key area specific political managers, 
or party supremos who would oversee all operations in their individual localities/districts. 
Some, who operated on the fringes of Calcutta, were established mid-level leaders such as 
Kanti Ganguly or Subhash Chakraborty
223
. Similar figures emerged in other districts, for 
example, Lakshman Seth and Sushanta Ghosh in East Midnapore, Dipak Sarkar in West 
Midnapore, Balai Snapui in Hooghly, and Zakiruddin Balluk in North 24 Parganas. These 
people became the go-to men for the government for almost anything in their respective areas 
- law and order problems, agricultural issues, health, educational services, as well as 
industrialisation initiatives. The usual practice to carry out any work was to entrust these 
district level political managers with the overall responsibility; they would then involve the 
appropriate people/channels (local political leaders and party cadres in the zonal and local 
committees and the panchayats) to carry out monitoring on a daily basis. The formal 
administrative channels such as the block development offices or local municipalities were 
completely subservient to the panchayat or the local committee.  
 
Nirupam Sen acknowledges the emergence of the political managers as a distinct feature of 
the state, describing it as a formation of power centres in the lower levels of the party: 
 
                                                          
223
 Kanti Ganguly oversaw all matters related to colony lands, negotiating displacement and reallocation when 
the land became necessary for various infrastructure and housing projects. Roy (2002) gives several interesting 
examples of the roles played by Subhash Chakraborty, who was also the transport minister. In his DumDum 
constituency on the northeastern fringes of the city, Chakraborty had successfully forged electoral alliances 
with promoters. “Subhash was fighting a governmental initiative to broaden the VIP Road... by demolishing all 
houses illegally constructed within five hundred metres of the road. In the final Public Works Department 
survey, the buildings constructed by Subhash-supported promoters survived, marking a key victory for the new 
alliances between the CPM and private real-estate interests” (170).       
  
287 
 
Democratic decentralisation has been one of our biggest achievements, and it has indeed 
reached the grassroots. But at the same time power has also been decentralised. As a result, a 
number of power centres have come up in the lower levels. The main feature of these power 
centres is that these generate a backward networking process, i.e. instead of the usual 
networking practices historically inculcated in our party- where our cadres used to reach out 
to the people- now the local leaders in control of these power centres seem to attract people 
on account of their positions and connections to get things done. This trend reversal has also 
generated a sense of a privileged status and authority among leaders in charge of the power 
centres. Today, they seem to believe that it is not necessary to reach out to the common 
people any more. On the contrary, they have started to sort out problems exercising their 
political authority but only when people themselves bring their problems to the attention of 
the party and request their help (emphasis added).
224
 
 
 
Throughout the 1980s and early 1990s, though the alternative bureaucratic structures were 
extremely active, the stagnant economy of the state had checked the capital-gravitas of these 
middle-class party elites. While they prioritised a political agenda and sustained patronage 
networks through the panchayats and party offices, their simple lifestyles and relatively clean 
images earned them acceptance in the eyes of the common people. However, as the pace of 
transition gradually picked up, with increasing numbers of infrastructural and urbanisation 
projects and a steady influx of capital even in rural areas, a new group of political managers 
emerged and started to operate in a way that not only maximised their political clout, but also 
accrued personal benefits. For example, the party supremo in East Midnapore district - 
Lakshman Seth - had various allegations and court cases against him, ranging from arson to 
disproportionate assets. Recently, the CPIM itself questioned the ownership patterns of 
ICARE (Indian Centre of Advancement of Research and Education), an NGO he headed. 
While the party allows its members to work for an NGO, ICARE was allegedly owned by 
Seth and his family members, though the party prohibits such ownerships
225
.    
 
While Seth has been a much debated case in recent times, using political positions for 
personal gains has been one of the most widely practiced and openly evident tactics 
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 Source: Interview; 22
nd
 September 2009, Calcutta. 
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 Source: “Lakshman Seth’s NGO comes under CPM lens”; The Indian Express, 18
th
 May 2010. 
http://www.indianexpress.com/news/lakshman-seths-ngo-comes-under-cpm-lens/620297/ ; accessed 11
th
 
July 2012.   
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employed by party leaders at various levels. Many party members, from small-time local 
committee workers to some of the top functionaries, have amassed a great deal of property by 
virtue of their access to development funds
226. As Roy observes, “nowhere perhaps is this 
ostentation more apparent than in the swanky new offices of the Ganashakti, the CPM’s 
Bengali daily. On my first visit to Ganashakti Bhavan, I was overwhelmed by this structure, 
wrapped in marble and granite, its postmodern furniture and monogrammed ashtrays, central 
air-conditioning, shiny new elevators staffed with uniformed guards. It was a long way from 
the decrepit and the musty party offices...no wonder that the building has come to be seen as 
a towering exhibit of the rich cash flow into the party” (Roy, 2002:172).  
 
However, it was not only at the top that one witnessed such accumulation of wealth. It was 
just as bad at the grassroots. Consider the following examples widely reported in the media: 
 Himangshu Das was the CPIM zonal committee secretary in Khejuri, Nandigram. As 
a member of the local zilla parishad (the top tier of the three-tier panchayat system- 
overseeing all the panchayats in an entire district), he received a salary of Rs 1,500 
per month. As a district committee member of the party he also earned another Rs 
1,500 per month. These were his only known sources of income. But he owns a 
palatial house in Khejuri with air-conditioned rooms, a car and a bike. Local villagers 
alleged that he siphoned off funds meant for the local civic bodies. In August 2009, 
they attacked his house, dragged him out and beat him up in public. Das fled the 
village with his family. “How could a communist leader amass such huge wealth? He 
                                                          
226
 Source: The Telegraph, 9
th
 March and 1
st
 May  1997. 
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had become a crorepati (multi-millionaire) and behaved like an industrialist”, said 
Manik Maity, a villager at Khejuri
227
.   
 In another incident, on 15
th
 June 2009, a two-storey house belonging to Anuj Pandey, 
CPIM zonal committee secretary, Lalgarh (an extremely backward area in East 
Midnapore), was partly demolished by the local villagers. Mr. Pandey was 
unemployed before joining the party, and as a party full-timer earnt Rs 1500 per 
month. But he came to own 40 bighas
228
 of land and built a sprawling house on it. The 
only big house in the entire village, it had air-conditioners, LCD television, a 
refrigerator, and expensive furniture. On the day, well over two thousand villagers 
converged on the house, beating drums and chanting: “come and watch how a 
zamindar’s229 house made with money sucked from poor peasants is being 
demolished.” The local party office was closed and Pandey and his family fled the 
area (The Telegraph and Ananda Bazar Patrika, 16
th
 June 2009)
230
.  
 
A number of interesting cases can be cited from the Haldia Township, an area which 
benefited immensely from the development of Haldia Petrochemicals, the Left Front’s pet 
industrial project over two decades: 
 S.K. Muzaffar, CPIM councillor in the Haldia municipality, controlled the workers’ 
union of the Haldia dock and allegedly ran the dock’s labour market. He owned a 
storage facility, cargo trading agency and a logistics agency - all operating at the 
dock. About 1,500 labourers worked under him. Muzaffar had been a worker at the 
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 Source: Sanhati, 2010; http://lalgarh.wordpress.com/ accessed 21
st
 February 2012.    
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 Bigha is a unit of measurement of land, used in several parts of India. While measurements can vary in 
different states, in West Bengal, 1 bigha is approximately equal to 1/3 acre or 1337.9 square meters of land.  
229
 It is interesting to observe how the term zamindar - meaning landlord - has come to be used to describe a 
communist leader. 
230
 On 10
th
 October 2010, the CPIM held a massive rally at Lalgarh, led by the same Anuj Pandey, and the party 
office was eventually opened.  
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dock in the 1970s. Later he became an employee of Haldia municipality and 
eventually a local CPIM leader. “For him, becoming a communist was more 
profitable than being a worker in the municipality,” said a local Congress leader. 
After the CPIM came to power in the state, Muzaffar started to expand his business, 
and became a councillor in the municipality. One of his sons studied in London and 
another helps him in business. Another son has a fascination for car racing. Muzaffar 
does not see anything wrong in being a communist and a businessman at the same 
time. “Tell me where it is written that communists cannot become businessmen and 
become rich. It’s the propaganda of frustrated people,” he said231. 
 Ashok Patnaik and Ananta Bera, two other prominent CPIM leaders in Haldia, also 
have thriving businesses. On quitting his job as a primary schoolteacher and joining 
the party, Patnaik soon became the chairman of a cooperative society which brought 
him in direct contact with the local business community. Later, as chairman of a 
council in the Haldia Development Authority, he looked oversaw the major land deals 
in the Township. “Basu wanted to make Haldia an industrial hub and spent crores for 
its development. Leaders like Patnaik benefited from it,” said a local CPIM leader. 
When the port was upgraded, Patnaik, like Muzaffar, seized his opportunity. Now, he 
is one of the richest contractors in the Haldia dock. “He drives almost all cars 
available in the market. He is one of the richest communists in India.”232  
Bera also benefited hugely from the party’s decision to make Haldia an industrial hub 
for cars and petrochemicals. Hailing from a poor family in Contai, East Midnapore, he 
had moved to Haldia with his wife, also a CPIM member, in the late 1970s. “They are 
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successful businessmen and CPIM leaders as well. They have changed the meaning of 
communism,” said a senior CPIM leader on condition of anonymity233.  
 
That such stories and sites have surfaced in almost all districts and localities of West Bengal 
aptly demonstrate two things. First, it is apparent that a new group of political managers has 
emerged across party levels, with varying degrees of power and authority. Second, with the 
advent of industrialisation, they started to use their positions not only for political, but also 
personal benefits, as the gradual transformation in their lifestyle - particularly those with 
direct access to local development funds - testifies. While this is nothing new in India, the 
communists have always enjoyed a relatively clean image with their simple attire and 
lifestyle. Most top level leaders lead a modest life even today, but many district or local 
leaders live in palatial houses, drive expensive cars, and own factories or even shopping 
centres. The evidence is largely anecdotal, but there is no accounting for the disproportionate 
wealth accumulated by many such district level leaders. Even local party members openly 
admit that leaders who are closely associated with the central government sponsored projects 
in their areas, usually take advantage of the lack of government monitoring, and siphon off 
huge amounts of money from the panchayat funds
234
.  
Nirupam Sen, in the interview quoted earlier, admitted this was a growing problem within the 
party: 
With the assumed authority of the leaders of the power centres, people start approaching them 
- not from any ideological affiliation with the CPIM - but only to seek personal favours such 
as to guarantee jobs in local government schemes, solve land ownership issues, sort out 
family problems, etc. The party is also increasingly interfering in all these. But such practices 
have a dual effect. Firstly, it creates a negative impression on large sections of the local 
community that remain outside this personal equation between the power centre leaders and 
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 Numerous such stories are published regularly. For example, see The Telegraph, 9
th
 March 1997, for reports 
on CPIM workers themselves complaining that they were being singled out while top-ranking leaders continue 
to lead extravagant lifestyles.  
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those who approach them. It seems that the party is behaving in a parochial nature or may 
have vested interests. Secondly, it is not uncommon for the local leaders to use their power 
and authority for personal benefit. There are several instances of such misuse of power 
happening at the lower levels. And if somebody is indeed engaged in such behaviour, then he 
will naturally try to retain or cling to his position in any manner whatsoever - by contesting 
elections, trying to gain a higher political or administrative position, or even by becoming an 
MLA. Therefore over time an effort to stay in power replaces provision of public services as 
the major objective. From a purely objective viewpoint, such developments are neither 
unnatural nor unique. But what is of concern to us is the lack of maturity and understanding 
that some of our party cadres at the lower ranks have come to display in recent times. They 
need to understand that their task is to be with the people, and not behave in such restricted 
manners. This is the core of the problem in the party today (emphasis added).
235
  
 
This is indeed a candid admission, though modestly expressed. It is also true that such trends 
are quite common in India, irrespective of political parties. However, what makes West 
Bengal stand out is that in spite of such growing trends and at times the party itself 
acknowledging such behaviour
236
, gradually the entire government became dependent on 
these political managers and the alternative bureaucratic structures to formulate and execute 
policy/administrative decisions, particularly from the mid-1990s onwards once 
industrialisation became a priority. In the absence of clear approval from their political 
leaders, the bureaucrats hesitated in implementing policy directives, and in turn, the CPIM 
headquarters (at Alimuddin Street, Calcutta) became the main functioning organ. Each and 
every investor had to visit, in addition to the Chief Minister’s office and WBIDC, the 
premises at Alimuddin Street. It was believed (perhaps rightly so) that if a clearance could be 
obtained from the political headquarters, anything could be done, even bypassing formal 
regulations. The leaders at Alimuddin Street would put the investor in touch with their own 
people who would oversee the entire project and guarantee no disruption. Of course such 
facilities came with conditions, such as making regular donations to party funds, employing 
only party-approved local labourers and suppliers, etc. Failure to comply with any of the 
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 The party runs periodic programmes of shuddhikaran (rectification), where corrupt party functionaries are 
identified, names published and some even purged. But the cadres are increasingly found to capitalise on the 
dynamics of informality, and sanctions have usually proved ineffective (Roy, 2002:171.). 
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conditions would not only result in delay, but all kinds of disruption (licences not issued, 
clearances not given, electricity or telephone connections delayed, even threats and physical 
attacks). These practices took an institutional form at the site of the New Township project in 
Rajarhat. Local CPIM cadres formed syndicates to supply raw materials to all the projects 
(often at higher prices and of inferior quality), and refusal to buy items from the syndicates 
led to indefinite delays
237
. Even the premier projects of renowned companies with all their 
political connections could not escape this
238
.  
 
Santosh Ranjan Saha, Chairman of Delta India, a textile and garment manufacturing company 
with operations spread over different states, illustrates the disruptive political culture 
prevalent at ground level:  
 
We were originally a Bengali company, with a number of textile mills in West Bengal. 
Unfortunately we were compelled to withdraw from the state during the turbulent 
environment of the 1980s. By mid-1990, I was getting repeated requests from several CPIM 
leaders to start operations in West Bengal once again, citing the changed scenario. I did set up 
a factory, but within six months local political lumpens started to interfere in operations, and 
as I refused to pay heed to their demands, they incited the labourers to call a strike. I 
eventually had to request Buddha babu to intervene. He got those men arrested and I could 
resume operations. But only because I had access to the highest authorities could I manage to 
get things sorted. It would be impossible for small entrepreneurs, especially in rural areas, to 
do so. To this day, such low level political interference continues to contradict what the top 
authorities promise. Not only does such behaviour create operational problems, it also 
impacts our costing and productivity levels.  
 
On the other hand, there is no denying that Bengali labourers are highly efficient. If one looks 
at the garment factories in Kanpur, Mumbai, Delhi and elsewhere, those are predominantly 
run by Bengali labourers. But unfortunately, in West Bengal itself, local political leaders 
instruct the labourers not to maximise production, so that the management can be coerced into 
accepting the demands of those leaders. If one does not listen to them then they may delay the 
licences, withhold the delivery of raw materials or obstruct work in other ways. The situation 
has improved over the last few years under Buddha babu, but at a very slow pace, and only in 
the urban areas.
239
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The general secretary of ASSOCHAM, D.S. Rawat, describes this situation as a problem of 
low level political interference that continues to plague the industrial prospects of West 
Bengal, despite honest intentions at the top:  
 
Investors willing to invest in West Bengal often complain about the political rigidity among 
the people at the ground level. As soon as one starts negotiations to acquire land, commence 
construction, or for any other purpose, local political issues will invariable emerge. Low level 
political interference is the main problem in the state. There is almost a natural tendency to 
politicise everything, let alone industrial initiatives.
240
  
 
 
However, it was in pursuing implementation for industrial initiatives that the alternative 
bureaucracy first started to falter, as there remained a serious discrepancy between intention 
at the top and capacity at ground level. It had functioned perfectly well as long as the political 
objectives and governance initiatives remained in tandem (during the land reforms and 
panchayati raj phase in the 1980s - see Chapters 2 and 3), but once the government started to 
push for industrialisation, and the party had to perform its balancing act (see Chapter 5), the 
situation took a different turn. As discussed in Chapters 4 and 5, the party hardly ever 
discussed the necessity or form of the transition, even with its own membership. Despite the 
rhetoric, the signals from the leaders were mixed. Therefore, while the political channels and 
the local party cadres in charge of the process were adept at exercising control and coercion, 
they were not trained in following policy directives and actually facilitating implementation, 
and there was no clear instruction from the top to forgo the traditional practices of 
maximising political hegemony. As a result, the maintenance of existing patronage networks 
and rent-seeking practices continued to remain the overarching priority at ground level. An 
example is that of Zakiruddin Balluk, a mid-level CPIM leader, active in the Aamdanga area 
of North 24 Parganas district, who refused to allow any entrepreneur to build a factory in his 
area unless they acknowledged his authority. His usual practice was to demolish whatever 
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construction that might have taken place and recapture the area. Calcutta-based businessman 
Asim Bhoumik tried to set up a fishery in the area, but abandoned the project due to regular 
disruptions and threats from Balluk’s men. Similarly, Chitta Chakrabarty’s agricultural farm 
and resort was burnt down three times. Balluk even disrupted an agro-industry which the 
state itself was training local party members for, and yet remained untouched. The police 
finally took action after Nripen Majumdar, another entrepreneur, whose construction ventures 
were receiving attention from Balluk, complained - and arrested him on the afternoon of 14
th
 
March 2007. That night, large numbers of his supporters attacked the local police station 
where he was being held, freed him, and celebrated their victory by setting off firecrackers in 
front of the police station. The police could do nothing
241. Balluk’s story was widely covered 
in the media, but it was the norm in the entire state, where the party relied on low/mid-level 
leaders like Balluk to mobilize local support, and the latter in turn enjoyed complete authority 
in their respective localities, making any local initiative completely subservient to their 
diktats
242
. 
However, when the state tried to facilitate industrialisation via these local political managers, 
these ambiguities started to feed upon each other. For example, the government was entirely 
reliant on the party people to pass on grass-root level information (such as the availability of 
land for a project) to higher authorities, on which administrative decisions would be based. 
But as the local political managers were traditionally accustomed to sending politically 
beneficial information, for them the choice of land would become an exercise, not in 
facilitating the actual project, but in maximising political advantage by undermining the 
territorial strongholds of the opposition. As a result the entire exercise would be distorted. 
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T.K. Dasgupta, one of the most senior officers in the Department of Commerce and 
Industries (GoWB), candidly admitted: 
 
Completely wrong information is being fed to the higher authorities from the ground level. 
Our land-record system is extremely poor, virtually non-existent. So we have no option but to 
rely on bureaucrats on the ground, who are usually either party members themselves or are 
answerable to the local/zonal committees. Therefore, they are more concerned with remaining 
in the good books of their immediate political authorities, and hence would only supply 
information that will serve the purpose of, or be conducive to, what the latter group wants to 
hear. Such behaviour, though condemnable, is also understandable, as no one would want to 
put themselves at risk, given the complete authority that those political leaders enjoy in their 
areas.
243
 
 
The once thriving tea industry spread over the northern districts of the state is another 
instance of how local political interference proved detrimental to industrial prosperity: it is in 
a dire condition today, mainly because the CPIM controlled local committees in the area were 
engaged in endless rent-seeking cycles for years. Suparna Pathak, the business editor of 
Ananda Bazar Patrika, who investigated the case in detail, observed:  
 
Even after a string of labour suicides at several tea gardens, and the government promising to 
look into the conditions of the industry in 2002, to date the tea estates remain embroiled in 
endless cycles of promises to curb union control and increase productivity but with little 
effect. With many estates devoid of an owner or proper management, the operational 
responsibility has been taken over by local committees, which are predominantly made up of 
local CPIM members. In all gardens, the local committees claim that the price of leaves on 
average is Rs. 3.50 per kg, out of which the labourers on average get only one rupee, one 
rupee is kept by the committee as commission charges, and the rest is supposed to be kept as 
an emergency fund or invested back into the garden. But the factories to which leaves are sold 
say that the price ranges from Rs. 4.50 to 5.50 per kg. Thus for each kg of leaves sold, there is 
no account of one to two rupees. Workers claim that this amount, as well as most of the 
emergency funds, is siphoned off by the committee leaders. Even according to a conservative 
estimate, per garden, each committee leader makes an annual profit of rupees ninety lakhs to 
one crore. The factories are also mostly controlled by these leaders. As a result, the cycle 
continues, with the industry becoming increasingly sick
244
.  
 
Evidently, it was a peculiar dialectic: formal bureaucratic channels were at best partly 
functional, conscious of not overstepping what would be politically acceptable; political 
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guidance from the leaders was not forthcoming; and policy directives to facilitate 
industrialisation (as well as all other forms of service provision) were being monitored by 
people with (1) limited experience or administrative capabilities; (2) an entirely different 
skill-set, perfected to perpetuate political hegemony; and (3) a completely different objective 
of maximising political dividends and personal gains. The situation at ground level therefore 
became significantly different from the rhetoric of a favourable investment climate emanating 
from the top, as these local political managers continued to enjoy almost unchecked authority 
in their respective areas, and given their role in ensuring mobilisation for electoral purposes, 
the party had no way to rein them in. It was an exercise that kept getting stalled at cross-
purposes: the promises to facilitate implementation made at the top were interpreted as a 
political exercise of reinventing the party’s hegemonic tactics in order to maximise the 
benefits of the changed circumstances and influx of capital.  
To summarise, the ideas expressed above - the alternative bureaucracy of the CPIM and the 
way it operates - take forward Roy’s (2002) notion of institutional ensemble (see Chapter 3) 
and argue that the post-1990 transitional phase in the West Bengal’s economy gave that 
ensemble a new space to propagate. As discussed earlier, throughout the 1980s the party had 
perfected creating hegemonic spaces and structures through populist networks and taking 
advantage of the informality that stemmed from the fuzzy overlap of the state’s and the 
party’s respective ambits. By means of a wide and pervasive party network and its core 
middle-class political managers/functionaries, the CPIM created, and over time came to 
exclusively rely on, what amounted to almost a parallel bureaucratic structure of its own, with 
political overseers positioned over each and every administrative decision-making source. 
Over time, the state administration lost its ability to function without political guidance.  
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As the economic environment of the state gradually started to transform, the party, as usual, 
depended more on this alternative structure to bring its declared intent to fruition. However, 
unlike before, owing to the ambivalent political guidance and limited negotiation across the 
party hierarchy, a gap emerged between the intention at the top and the ground realities. As a 
result, while the CPIM state leadership was promising to turn West Bengal into an attractive 
industrial destination and formulating economic, ideological and even emotional 
justifications for its changed orientation (see Chapter 5), low-level party workers went about 
their usual practice of exacting political benefits - perhaps more than before - as 
industrialisation meant a far greater quantum of funds was being circulated locally
245
.  
 
In light of these ideas, we now return to Singur and Nandigram in an attempt to assess the 
specific role of the alternative bureaucracy in the series of events. 
 
 
6.4 The Multiple Narratives of Land, Negotiation and Violence 
স োনোর ধোন বুকে ধকর, জমি সিোকের িো; 
তুফোন আ ুে, পুমিশ আ ুে, জমি সেব নো। 
The land is our mother, harvesting golden crops. Come storm, come police, we will not give 
our land. 
(Text from a poster protesting land acquisition at Beraberi village, Singur) 
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The predominant narratives that emerged from the events at Singur and Nandigram - as 
discussed earlier - were either procedural or based on moral/ideological grounds. Although 
political undertones could be found in both, a coherent political narrative, surprisingly, never 
came to the forefront. Admittedly, the nature of the episodes easily lent themselves to a state 
versus peasants or an ideological aberration format, but ignoring the political nuances leaves 
a void in understanding the layered nature of the role that the party played. In the following 
discussion, three crucial themes - land, negotiation and violence - are examined in order to 
build such a discourse. 
 
6.4.1 The Narrative of Land at Singur  
The Interim Report of the Citizens’ Committee on Singur and Nandigram (2007) observed: 
According to the Status Report issued by the CPM, most of the affected area is mono-
cropped. They, however, seem to have used a land survey of the early seventies after 
which several deep tube wells have been sunk, and many shallow hand pumps set up, 
increasing soil fertility enormously. According to villagers, most of the land is under 
four to five crops...We did find very green fields and relatively prosperous village 
homes. The people are very humiliated that their land has been described as poor in 
quality and their labour devalued as a backward form of work
246
. 
Therefore, one of the first questions that emerges on a close scrutiny of the Singur affairs is 
why choose such a fertile area as Singur for a project that requires large scale acquisition 
and transformation of agricultural land into industrial usage? While it is understandable that 
acquisition of some cultivated land was unavoidable, the fact that the government completely 
ignored the fertility levels of the area is inexplicable.  
Nirupam Sen tries to explain the decision in the following manner. 
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When the TATAs decided to shift the project to West Bengal, our main thought was that this 
project would do a lot of good for the state. We showed them a number of areas, but they 
chose Singur. Given the importance of the project, we saw no reason to disagree. The nature 
of the land - whether it was mono or multi-crop - was never taken into account.
247 
 
Given its location, Singur is understandably one of the best possible sites from an 
entrepreneur’s point of view. However, it is surprising that Sen admits that the fertility of the 
land was never a concern for the government. In fact, he goes on to state that the government 
did not even know about it.  
 
Historically, the Singur area was predominantly low land. The fact that almost all the mouzas 
in the area have the suffix bheri in their names is a testimony to that
248
. Over the years most 
of the area has been developed by the local people on their own initiative, but it was never 
recorded. There are two reasons behind this: (1) the land record system in our country has 
always been extremely poor, and (2) the farmers themselves never informed the government 
in order to avoid the increased tax rates that would have been imposed on the developed 
lands. Local administration was also not active enough to take the initiative and identify the 
changes themselves. Therefore, in our records, most of the area remains sali (low yielding or 
single-crop), and only a small proportion is suna (high yielding or multi-crop)
249 
 
This admission does not explain why the government did not bother to verify its records 
before approving the project. What is even more perplexing is that in the face of widespread 
contrary reports in the media - declaring that Singur was indeed a highly fertile area - the 
government maintained a stoic opposition. The following is an excerpt from a television 
interview with Buddhadeb Bhattacharya that was broadcast on 25
th
 February 2007
250
, almost 
ten months into the entire episode.       
Interviewer: So you, therefore, decided to give them [the TATAs] fertile land, 
knowing that it was the only way they would come to Kolkata?  
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Bhattacharya: No, no. What you are saying about the nature of the land [is not right] 
- maybe our reports are not up to date.  
Interviewer: You concede that?  
Bhattacharya: Yes. But I tell you that the major portion of the land is mono-crop. I 
stick to that.  
 
The reasons behind such discrepancy between the official and public versions (as well as the 
doggedness of opinion expressed by the state) have rarely been questioned. But it is here that 
the crucial role of the alternative bureaucratic channels of the party can be identified. In the 
absence of land records, the government relied blindly on the party’s local political managers 
for the necessary information. Bhattacharya categorically admits this in the interview: 
 
Interviewer: How do you know that? If your report is not up to date, how can you say 
the major portion of land is mono-crop?  
Bhattacharya: Then how can they [the citizens’ committee] know that?  
Interviewer: Because they visited it. They have spoken to the farmers.  
Bhattacharya: I know these farmers better than them particularly. My colleagues are 
working there, my party, my peasants' organisation knows better than these people. 
 
Evidently, Bhattacharya’s source of information was his party colleagues. He precisely 
echoes the kind of information that was fed up the chain by the political managers at ground 
level. For example, Balai Snapui, an influential local CPIM leader, said: 
This is predominantly a mono-crop area. The whole area is low land, only a handful of plots 
at the edges, next to NH2, may be two-crop. Even if one takes that into account, out of the 
entire 997 acres, at most 100 acres are two-crop, the rest is all mono-crop. Furthermore, 
agriculture is hardly a profitable venture here. Even those people with two-crop land could at 
best procure their own consumption, there is hardly any profit ever, not even 2000 rupees a 
year per bigha.251  
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Contrast Snapui’s version with the following excerpt from Subrata Sinha’s (ex-Deputy 
Director General, Geological Survey of India) article in Mainstream (2008): 
 
The crème de la crème of this prime alluvial basin is the Hooghly river valley, capable 
of diversified multi-cropping the year round. This is because of rich alluviation during 
the monsoons, prolific groundwater and a network of stream channels. If cultivated 
with care, virtually every bit of its land is a veritable gold mine. In fact, massive 
investments of more than a thousand crores for irrigation, canals (DVC network) and 
large and small bore-wells, were made. Singur is an area which received special 
attention; to yield a harvest basket of food grains, vegetables and potatoes
252
. 
 
In Singur, farmers concur with the above observations. A woman, taking a break from 
sowing seeds in a plot almost adjacent to the factory site, said: 
 
See, now we are sowing dhan (paddy), next will be alu (potatoes). After alu, dhnyarosh 
(okra), and then jhinga (ridge gourd). If there is time, we will grow alu again after jhinga. So 
there are at least four crops per year.253    
 
The overarching consensus among the locals is that most of the land in the area grows three 
to four crops on average. Krishnachandra Manna, a local farmer and ex-primary school 
teacher, gives an estimate entirely contradictory to Balai Snapui’s claims:  
Over the years with improved agricultural methods, four different crops per year is a norm. 
On average, our annual net income used to be 12-13000 rupees per bigha.254  
 
The most interesting comment came from Rathindra Ghosh, a farmer who now runs a small 
tea stall after having lost all his land (about 5 bighas). He accused the local party people of 
having provided incorrect information to their political bosses, and also claimed that neither 
the government nor the party authorities ever bothered to check with the local people.   
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No one came to us to enquire or discuss. The government just asked their local committee 
workers, people like Balai Snapui, Surhid Dutta. And we know that they have misinformed 
the government. They have said that not much rice grows here. That is a blatant lie.
255      
 
What may be the reasons behind such inaccuracies? Opposition quarters accused the state of 
a barrage of allegations/conspiracy theories. For example: (1) the real intention behind the 
project was to recover lost political ground and capture the local assembly seat; (2) the 
demarcation of the factory site was actually a covert exercise to undermine the opposition 
stronghold in the area by marking plots owned by TMC supporters for acquisition while 
leaving CPIM loyalists’ land untouched, thus resulting in a zigzag shape instead of a 
conventional quadrangular area for the whole site; (3) contrary to the government’s claim that 
Singur was chosen as the best possible site by Tata Motors’ representatives themselves, it 
was a Hooghly based CPIM leader who first notified the party that if the project could be 
brought to Singur it might lead to political dividends, as local youth would rally behind the 
party in anticipation of employment, their support could be used to regain the assembly seat, 
etc.  
It is important to note that most of these accusations were based purely on anecdotal 
evidence/rumours and cannot be verified. However, these stories also help to establish the 
arguments presented earlier - even if the possibility of any ulterior political motive on the part 
of the CPIM is rejected - that right from the onset, not only were local CPIM leaders involved 
in the project, but they were also the main ground level agency entrusted by the government 
with acquiring consent. Furthermore, such was the scale of this dependence, that only 
information from party sources was considered reliable by the government, even if there were 
contradictory reports from elsewhere (it may be noted that such behaviour is not totally 
unexpected from the CPIM, as they have always been dismissive of mainstream media, 
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accusing them of being the mouthpieces of bourgeois forces). The political tone of the project 
was thus established right at the source.  
 
6.4.2 The Narrative of Consent and Negotiation at Singur 
 
As events unfolded in Singur, so did various versions of how many landowners had given 
consent for their land to be acquired as per the declared compensation rates. For example: 
 
 On 23rd October 2006, Buddhadeb Bhattacharya announced that consent had been 
given for a total of 800 acres of land
256
, and compensation cheques had already been 
collected.  
 On 6th November 2006, Nirupam Sen said that consent had now been given for 854 
acres.
257
 
 In an assembly speech on 23rd November, Buddhadeb Bhattacharya announced the 
amount to be 913 acres.  
 As per the Status Report on Singur (WBIDC, 2006), up to 2nd December 2006 
compensation had been awarded for only 635 acres, while at the same time it claimed 
that consent has been given for a total of 952 acres.   
 On 9th January 2007, 789 farmers claimed that they had not given consent or taken 
any compensation. The total amount of land owned by these farmers amounted to 
337.97 acres.
258
  
 Nirupam Sen admitted that consent was given for 70% of the area, and compensation 
had not been collected for the remaining portions
259
. This estimate is closer to the 
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above claim by the Singur Krishijami Raksha Committee and contradicts the formal 
announcements made by Sen himself as well as Buddhadeb Bhattacharya as listed 
above.    
 
This idea of acquiring consent is rather intriguing. The government itself claims that as per 
the Land Acquisition Act (1894), there is no provision to acquire consent (Status Report on 
Singur, 2006). However, of its own accord, the government designed a consent form (and 
also promised an additional 10% payment to those who agreed to sign the form within the 
deadline, a decision which was later questioned by the Calcutta High Court
260
). The various 
official consent estimates are based on these forms.  
 
The actual exercise to garner consent on the ground was not just a case of collecting 
signatures on forms: it was once again a party-mediated exercise. The overt consensus at 
Singur among farmers who refused to give consent seems to be that from the announcement 
of the project to the specific decisions about which plots would be acquired, the party played 
a major role, with very limited negotiation with local people. This observation concurs with 
the Interim Report of the Citizens’ Committee on Singur and Nandigram conclusion: “Singur 
villagers learnt of the land acquisition for the Tata factory from newspapers, there being no 
Panchayat meeting or Party spokesman who informed them”261. Not only did the party play a 
crucial role in demarcating the plots to be acquired, but it was also in charge of overseeing 
the list of farmers who would be eligible to receive compensation. The locals gave vivid 
examples of how the party was in control of the entire process from the start. Rathindra 
Ghosh, quoted in the previous section, commented: 
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We were never officially informed that our land would be acquired. Apparently there were 
notices put up in the block development office, but we did not know. Once the details came 
out in the newspapers, and protests started, we went to the block development office where 
we were straightaway told that our land had been earmarked for acquisition. There was no 
question of getting consent, nor did anybody discuss the adequacy of the compensation 
offered.
262
  
 
Krishnachandra Manna gave an instance of a meeting that was organised by the party to 
discuss the project with all stakeholders. 
 
We were told that the party had called a meeting with all the farmers. We went to it, 
expecting to be given information about the project and negotiate about how much land 
should be acquired and for what price. Instead, they just showed us an already finalised map 
of the project site and declared which plots would be acquired. Some of us protested and 
asked them to initiate a discussion with the villagers before finalising anything. But the 
meeting was full of party cadres and our voices were drowned out. We tried to say that this 
was not the process, we could not just be ordered by the party, but our protests were not paid 
much attention. 
Actually, the party knew discussions with the villagers might lead to many awkward 
questions. Instead, they planned to straightaway initiate the acquisition process hoping that 
once the compensation had been disbursed, no further questions would be asked.
263
  
 
What are these ‘awkward questions’ that Manna refers to? This is where the entire consent 
story comes in. Ratan Ghosh, popularly known as Babu Ghosh, a local TMC leader, 
elaborated: 
 
We asked the CPIM leaders to call meetings with all the villagers at the gram panchayats. 
Instead, they went about it in a clandestine manner. For example, the registered sharecroppers 
were supposed to get 25% of the declared value of land. The party listed many names for 
compensation who were not even sharecroppers, but party cadres. Some were sharecroppers, 
but in other areas, even as far as Balarambati, which is 10km from Singur. Then, the party 
office issued patta (ownership rights for vested plots) to their cadres for plots which were 
khas (non-vested), so that they could also claim compensation. This also increased the 
number of people who could be shown to have given consent. They even managed to get 
some of their cadres to sign empty consent forms.
264
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Even if the majority of the above claims are dismissed as political blame-games, a farmer 
who did sell his land and claimed compensation - and is also a CPIM supporter, said 
(speaking strictly on condition of anonymity): 
 
The government is saying that they organised negotiation camps at Singur. True, there were 
camps, but organised by the party and mainly for party members. The local leaders 
encouraged us (party supporters) to quickly agree to sell our lands, and promised that we 
would be given something extra on top of the declared compensation. We were also asked to 
spread the message among other party supporters. There was hardly any presence of 
government officials on the ground. As far as I know, the party may have included some of its 
cadres’ names - even though they actually did not have any land or did not till anybody else’s 
plot in the area - in the list of farmers who have given consent.”265  
 
Many versions of such stories can be heard in Singur, not only from dissenters, but also from 
estranged CPIM supporters. Balai Das, who used to be an active CPIM cadre until he refused 
to part with his land, asserted: 
 
I was a CPIM supporter. I even used to go to meetings and demonstrations for the party. But 
now I realise that only if one is willing to abide by what the leaders say, can one survive and 
even be rewarded, but otherwise the party will coerce you into submission, even by brute 
force if necessary. That is what has happened to us because we did not want to give our land.  
 
In an ethnographic account of Kadampur - one of the five villages within the Singur area that 
stood to be affected - Dayabati Roy found a similar political polarisation: 
 
[A] section of people residing in Ghoshpara...have offered their land to the 
government under the influence of CPI(M) party which could maintain its stronghold 
in that particular hamlet...The influence of the CPI(M) party in the village was spread 
by some...farmers...One of them, Karuna Das, a retired primary school teacher, is the 
present CPI(M) leader in the village and is organising people in favour of land 
acquisition....He had been a panchayat member several times since 1978 and worked 
in the position of ‘pradhan’ (chief) and ‘upapradhan’ (deputy chief)...He was reported 
to have been arrested on corruption charges for embezzling money allotted for flood 
relief (Roy, 2007:3324-25) 
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Interestingly, the claim that the entire ground level mobilisation at Singur was a party-
mediated exercise, with little or no government officials involved, received support from 
local CPIM leaders as well. When asked to what extent the government depended on local 
party leaders, Balai Snapui not only admitted, but boasted, that he was one of the most 
reliable go-to men for Nirupam Sen.  
 
I used to talk directly with Nirupam babu. He used to instruct me to organise meetings, talk to 
the people and get them to agree to the project. There were no government 
officers/bureaucrats here. We were in charge. Apart from me there were Srikanta Chatterjee 
(local committee member), Dipankar Das (district committee member) and Anil Bose (ex 
MP) who used to function locally. Everybody who wanted to sell their land used to come to 
us for advice.  
Perhaps we could not create a public opinion strong enough in favour of the project. In 
retrospect, it seems that we may have hurried a bit too much.
266
 
 
Snapui even admitted, albeit indirectly, that they did not try to negotiate with the people who 
were known to oppose the project. 
We did many meetings. People would come and we would explain to them why this project 
was beneficial. But we used to avoid those areas where they opposed it. What was the point? 
It could have led to quarrels, may be even violence.
267
  
 
Finally, political managers like Snapui were also the most reliable source for the higher 
authorities on the state of affairs at ground level, and they even had a say in policy decisions. 
A very senior WBIDC official - who was an integral part of the project right from the onset - 
clearly voiced some of his concerns, suspicions, and regrets:  
 
Firstly, the numbers that were being tossed around by the political leaders, including the 
grand claims made by even Buddha babu about the number of jobs that would be created, 
were absolutely baseless. But most importantly, I feel that local agents were pursuing their 
own political vendetta. On one hand we tried to be extremely cautious about the initiatives, 
appreciating the emotional and psychological attachment of the villagers to their land, but on 
the other hand the ground level incidents were getting totally politicised, and unfortunately 
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our political bosses would only listen to what their party people had to say. I even had a 
suspicion that our immediate boss at WBIDC was also being persuaded by the local party 
people. We repeatedly requested him to authorise the initiation of other development works in 
the area, but he turned a deaf ear.  
The party also played a key role in the procedural issues. The fact that the government took 
the TATAs to Singur without verifying the agricultural productivity of the region was 
possibly at the behest of an ex-MLA of the party from the area, who first informed the higher 
authority that Singur could be a suitable site. We were in favour of increasing the 
compensation quantum, but the CPIM krishak samiti (peasant wing) was against it. Even 
during the initial site demarcation and the fencing exercises, local leaders like Surhid Dutta 
were at the forefront.  
The key problem was the lack of local negotiation from our side. Whatever discussion 
happened took place amongst party supporters, it was not inclusive. Today, my main regret is 
not having visited the villages myself, not having sat with the villagers in their own homes 
and explained to them what this project was all about, devoid of all political colours
268
.      
 
The point of highlighting these stories is not to argue that the entire Singur project was an 
exercise in territorial subjugation by the CPIM under the garb of industrial development, nor 
to form a normative stance on whether such capital intensive projects are detrimental to the 
state’s economy and actually mark aberrations from an inclusive development ethos. The 
objective, is to show that outside the dominant themes of procedural and ideological 
criticisms, there remained an undercurrent of political narrative in the entire episode. Right 
from the inception, the local political machinery of the CPIM played a crucial role in 
facilitating the project, as a result of which the entire exercise assumed a political colour. 
Some of the major problems that beset Singur - particularly the lack of ground level 
negotiation which led to much of the initial apprehension - stem from this. Owing to its 
partisan character and usual hegemonic tendencies, the political channel’s attempt to facilitate 
the project remained parochial at best, never seriously engaging in consensus building. This 
trend was particularly apparent when many dissenters admitted that their initial opposition 
was actually a pressure tactic to force the government to increase the compensation quantum. 
Even Ratan Ghosh, the local TMC leader, admitted:  
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If the government had increased the amount of compensation, then I do not think the 
opposition could have cemented itself in the way it eventually did. I even saw many of the 
agitators convincing many farmers that the government would give in and raise the prices if 
they could just hold their land a little longer.
269
  
 
A group of farmers at the forefront of the agitations who did not claim compensation 
cheques, stated openly (while requesting not to be named): 
 
It was only later that the central demand of the agitation became the return of 400 acres of 
land, when we saw that the government was not paying heed to any of our concerns. Initially 
it was the price which we were primarily against, nobody in their right mind would have sold 
their land for such a meagre price, especially when their entire livelihood is dependent on that 
land. Had the government approached and negotiated the price with us directly, none of this 
would have happened. But they relied on the local CPIM leaders, who in turn knew that we 
could be convinced to sell our land at such rates. So they did not even bother to talk to us, and 
just convinced their supporters to sell their land instead, promising additional benefits. By 
doing this, they managed to convince their political bosses that there was sufficient 
consensus, and acquisition would not be a problem. The government blindly trusted them, and 
was caught off-guard once the protests escalated.
270
 
 
This is a fairly accurate summary of the fundamental conflicts at Singur. While the issue at 
stake was land price, the nature of the conflict was evidently political, the seeds of which 
were sown when the local party channels resorted to clandestine tactics to create a shroud of 
consensus around the project instead of recognising the legitimate concerns and aspirations of 
all the stakeholders. 
6.4.3 The Narrative of Violence at Singur and Nandigram 
Such outcomes, however, are not surprising. These clandestine tactics reflect the same 
hegemonic trends that the alternative bureaucratic channel had become so adept at executing. 
For decades it had perfected the art of manufacturing consent and extracting personal and/or 
localised political dividends out of all government initiatives, even resorting to violence if 
necessary. While the violence in Singur was not as acute as in Nandigram, there were 
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sporadic instances of police brutalities, particularly on 25
th
 September and 2
nd
 December 
2006. The Interim Report of the Citizens’ Committee on Singur and Nandigram observed:  
 
It is generally acknowledged that Singur villagers have not used violence against 
persons so far, even though there has been considerable violence by the police against 
villagers who demonstrated against acquisition with peaceful satyagraha
271
 methods, 
especially on 25 September and 2 December. Despite the peacefulness of protestors, 
Section 144 was clapped on Singur PS and on all roads leading to Singur. Even where 
it does not exist, protestors are arrested for congregating, and ordinary vehicles are 
stopped and searched. Women were beaten up by male policemen, filthy language 
was used, villagers and student protestors lathi charged, resulting in severe injuries. 
The charge of possession of dangerous weapons had been clapped on a two and a half 
year girl who was sent to prison for several days and was deprived of baby food 
there
272
  
 
Anecdotes aplenty are found on police brutalities during these two days. The villagers allege 
the police entered the village (at night during a power cut, which again is alleged to have 
been deliberately caused) and started indiscriminate lathi-charges. Balai Das, quoted earlier, 
described it: 
The police entered our houses, went up to the rooftops and started beating us. Even many 
crop-sheds were put on fire. They broke my hand. I had to be operated on and now have a 
four inch steel plate inserted in my forearm. It was completely pre-planned. I distinctly 
remember one of the police officers raising his finger signalling the force to charge. From 
then on, whenever police entered the village, we would keep an eye out for that raised finger. 
That was their signal.
273
 
 
A twenty-one year old farmer named Rajkumar Bhul died in the violence of 25
th
 September. 
Even more tragic is the case of Tapasi Malik: a young girl of nineteen, (allegedly) raped and 
brutally murdered. Her half-burnt body was found in the early hours of 18
th
 December on the 
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factory premises
274
. In June 2007, Debu Malik (a local CPIM cadre) and Suhrid Dutta (the 
CPIM Singur zonal committee secretary) were arrested as the prime suspects in the case and 
three other local CPIM cadres - Mahadeb Shnatra, Subodh Kole and Dilip Malik - were also 
interrogated
275
. The case is still ongoing; Dutta was released on bail in 2009.   
The Citizens’ Committee noted: 
 
The police seem to have obliterated most of the evidence during preliminary 
investigations, insisting that she was murdered by a boyfriend whose existence, 
however, cannot be proved. The fact that she had been a political activist in the 
movement and may have had political enemies is not taken into account in 
investigations even though her father insists repeatedly that a local CPM cadre could 
be responsible. Her male relatives are harassed, and her young niece was questioned 
vulgarly about the state of her underclothes. No policewomen were present at the 
questioning though that is legally obligatory
276
  
 
Though the above discussion is based mainly on Singur, it does not indicate a standalone 
pattern. Similar incidents occurred elsewhere, even if not as overtly or on a lesser scale. The 
violence at Nandigram, however, upped the ante by quite a few degrees, and as discussed 
earlier, the role that the party played in perpetuating it could hardly be more apparent. In fact, 
even after the massacre of 14
th
 March, Nandigram continued to witness occasional spurts of 
violence. It reached a crescendo once again on 11
th
 November when the party launched 
Operation Recapture to liberate the villages that were being controlled by the Bhoomi 
Uchhed Pratirodh Committee (BUPC; Save Eviction from Land Committee). An India Today 
story on the incidents observed: 
 
It was only another chapter in the politics of vendetta that CPI(M) has been practising 
to bloody perfection for the past many years...Unrest had been brewing in Nandigram 
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since the last week of October. In retrospect, it was a carefully-executed plan by the 
masterminds at Alimuddin Street. The police would be asked not to enter the area and 
CPI(M)'S special cadres would then storm the muktanchal (open zone) of BUPC and 
take charge. The leaders in Kolkata couldn't afford to fail this time.
277
 
 
An Indian Express report on an incident of alleged gang rape by CPIM men published on 17
th
 
November 2007 portrays a vivid picture of the extent to which the party had regained control 
of the area, possibly with some tacit support from the state: 
 
It’s been 10 days since Sabina Begum (name changed to protect her identity) was 
allegedly gangraped by CPM men during “Operation Recapture,”...But the 
Nandigram police, who registered a case after the medical report confirmed the rape, 
say they have not been able to visit the victim’s house...Superintendent of Police S. S. 
Panda says: ‘Investigation cannot be started because the situation is so tense.’...The 
Indian Express was able to reach Sabina’s house...dodging past the close surveillance 
of a 150-strong mob of CPM supporters. Any one who enters the village has to 
explain the purpose of their visit and get the cadres’ permission....The police have 
also not taken any step to search for Sabina’s two missing daughters who she said 
were also gangraped and abducted by CPM cadres. CPM cadres now guard the village 
and mill around Sabina’s house. Asked if any police team had come to investigate, 
CPM member Shyamal Jana said: ‘No. A CRPF team made a round but no policeman 
has come after the village was freed from terror’278  
 
These were not just localised one-off incidents: the local cadres were often shielded by the 
party’s highest authorities. Buddhadeb Bhattacharya, in his first public statement after the 
fresh wave of violence, remarked in uncharacteristic defiance: "They (TMC people) have 
been paid back in their own coin. Our people were desperate. If hellish peace exists in 
Nandigram now, did the last 11 months have heavenly peace?"
279
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While the scale of the blatant aberrations at Singur and Nandigram caught the public eye like 
never before, such political undercurrents permeate and control ground level affairs in almost 
all initiatives in West Bengal. Another example of how the CPIM became adept at turning a 
development narrative into a political one by means of coercion is the New Calcutta township 
project, meticulously observed in a study by the Sanhati group (Sanhati, 2009). Though the 
government celebrated Rajarhat as a successful acquisition exercise, in reality many farmers 
had united to form the Rajarhaat Krishi Raksha Committee (Save Rajarhat Farmers’ 
Committee), and mounted a strong resistance. In the face of stiff opposition, the government 
temporarily postponed its acquisition efforts. Instead, the local party unit went into action, 
adopting a multitude of tactics. It formed a Neighbourhood Committee with the local MLA 
Rabin Mandal as its chairman, which started informal negotiations with the farmers. The 
leaders of the agitating groups were asked to meet Rabin Mandal or Gautam Deb (Urban 
Development Minister and a member of the CPIM state secretariat) in person, where they 
were cajoled and coerced to change their minds. These meetings were also attended by the 
then officer-in-charge of the Rajarhat police station and some (party-sheltered) anti-social 
elements of the region, thus subjecting the farmers to an implicit pressure tactic
280
. In the 
meantime, when the compensation cheque distribution began, the majority of the farming 
community refused to accept them. However the CPIM continued to insist that huge numbers 
of people had already accepted the cheques. The Sanhati report also alleged that many people 
who did not own a single square inch of land, but were close to the party, used their political 
connections and the willing connivance of a section of government officials to siphon off 
several lakhs of rupees overnight.   
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To sum up the above arguments, the claim made in the introduction - that the rapid electoral 
decline of the Left Front between 2006 and 2011 points to something beyond just an outburst 
of cumulative discontent brought about by its mishandling of the Singur-Nandigram episodes 
- can now be traced back. The combined narratives of land, negotiation and violence 
demonstrate that the events at (and the aftermath of) Singur-Nandigram were not just 
outbursts triggered due to a sudden change in class-orientation of the party, but were 
themselves symptomatic of the CPIM’s hegemonic tendency to politicise all affairs at ground 
level. While the scale of both the proceedings and the eventual (unfortunate) outcomes were 
unprecedented, the operative style that brought the state of affairs to such a culmination was 
anything but new. In fact, what these multiple narratives show is that within the imperatives 
brought by the attempted policy transition - such as private capital-led industrialisation, 
urbanisation, new forms of spatial geography, as well as a constant rhetoric emanating from 
the top to legitimise the transition - the state agency in charge of implementation was left 
wanting due to (1) a bureaucracy incapacitated by lack of political guidance and institutional 
inefficiencies and (2) ambiguous regulatory contexts besetting ownership rights and service 
provision on the part of the state, which had led to a culture of “political management of 
illegalities” becoming the order of the day (Chatterjee, 2009:44). Therefore, despite some 
initial anticipation during Buddhadeb Bhattacharya’s tenure regarding a possible distancing 
between the party and the government, in reality the government had no choice, or any 
intention, but to depend on its tried, tested and trusted channels of political managers (or the 
alternative bureaucratic structures) to bring its attempt at transition to fruition. In effect, at 
ground level, such dependency quickly translated to local political managers adopting the 
same hegemonic tactics that they had been perfecting for decades. And given the difference 
in political priorities between the top quarters and the rank and file of the party due to a 
severe lack in intra-party (as well as intra-coalition) negotiation, the alternative bureaucracy 
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kicked in not only to negotiate land ownership, determine price and usage patterns but also to 
encourage land invasion, exact electoral discipline and maintain political loyalties, often 
through extra-legal or even violent means. Furthermore, as discussed earlier, the alternative 
bureaucracy had also become less attuned to the larger objectives of the party over time and 
had started to focus more on maximising localised political and even personal interests. This 
often resulted in misinformation (sometimes deliberate) being passed on to the higher 
authorities in order to support local priorities, instead of providing an accurate description of 
the realities (for example, misrepresenting the generally high fertility levels of the Singur 
area). The government, on the other hand, had become so dependent on the party for its 
administrative functions that it had no other way to verify this information. Industrialisation 
in West Bengal was thus transformed into a political project on the ground.          
 
6.5 Conclusion  
 
The story of policy transition embarked upon by the Left Front in the wake of the country’s 
economic reforms during the early 1990s concludes with this chapter. The approach taken to 
tell this story has been to study the majority partner and the driving force of the Front, the 
CPIM, in terms of two closely linked and yet distinct thematic strands that were formulated in 
the theoretical section of this research (Chapters 2 and 3) - the ideological discourse and the 
hegemonic structures - based on the CPIM’s political objective of establishing a People’s 
Democratic Front and its operational tactics on the ground, respectively. 
 
In the three empirical chapters that followed, the three stages in the CPIM’s political 
management of the entire transition process were examined. Chapter 4 explored the political 
and ideological choices that the party had to make during the initial years of the transition. 
Chapter 5 examined how the erstwhile ideological discourse was slowly being reshaped for 
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the purpose, and the associated negotiations (or lack of) within the party as well as the entire 
Front. In this chapter, the modus operandi of the party - based on the creation of hegemonic 
structures - was again emphasised to demonstrate how party functionaries at the lower levels, 
despite the different aspirations and promises of the top authorities, reverted back to the same 
set of tactics in an attempt to bring the rhetoric of transition to a fruition. The seeds of 
contradiction that were embedded in the first two stages fully manifested in the third, as 
resorting to tactics that were perfected in a contrasting institutional space (land reforms and 
democratic decentralisation) to facilitate the imperatives of private-capital led 
industrialisation lent a fundamental political colour to the micro-management of the entire 
process. Policy transition in West Bengal - as these three chapters have tried to illustrate - 
remained a political exercise at its core, in multiple ways. First, in terms of choice of the path 
of transition; second, in reshaping existing ideological discourse to provide legitimacy to that 
choice; and third, in implementing that choice. 
 
There remain a few postscripts that need articulation. First, throughout this research the term 
‘party’ has been used to denote the CPIM (unless indicated otherwise). It needs to be 
understood that while the universal mediating role of the ‘party’ in virtually all social 
transactions has indeed been pioneered by the CPIM since 1977, similar styles of functioning 
have been emulated by all the other parties, whether partners of the CPIM in the Left Front or 
those in opposition. However, as the CPIM enjoys the most efficient structure of discipline 
and command along with a systematic procedure of training its cadres - or in other words, the 
most efficient party machinery - it is usually the most effective (and at times the only) 
candidate in penetrating and controlling social institutions. In areas where it cannot, other 
parties seek to perform the same functions (Chatterjee, 2009).    
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Second, though frequent references have been made to the electoral decline of the Left Front 
post the 2008 panchayat elections, culminating in its decisive defeat in the 2011 assembly 
elections, this research intentionally refrains from entering into a debate on what could have 
precipitated such a turn of events. The focus, instead, has been upon understanding the 
political undercurrents that played a critical role in shaping the ideological-institutional-
economic spaces in the state over the past two decades. The contradictions embedded in those 
spaces, as highlighted in the course of this work, may contain pointers to the eventual 
outcomes - as it has been repeatedly shown how the internal structure of the CPIM (and by 
extension Left politics in the state) was falling short of adapting to the imperatives of the 
changing situation - but it has not been the objective to provide an explanation for the Left 
political crisis. This research is an attempt to study an extremely interesting chapter in the 
political-economic history of West Bengal, one that has produced and in turn been shaped by 
political contradictions of various forms, but has rarely been debated in the mainstream. 
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Chapter 7 
Conclusion 
7.1 Introduction 
Rather than recapitulate the entire thesis in miniature, this chapter probes some of the 
unexplored implications of its main arguments. This is a study of the politics of transition, 
and especially the sub-national, regional and local political trends and conditions that play a 
crucial role in determining reform outcomes in a diverse, democratic and federal polity such 
as India. This work also adds to the wider literature on the politics of reformism, while 
refraining from over-generalisation from what is a very specific case-study. Instead, the 
approach has been to study micro-level dynamics and assess how localised political variables 
can strengthen or thwart transition initiatives. The objectives of this chapter are therefore 
twofold: first, to briefly revisit the set of why-how questions set out in the Prologue – not to 
recount the arguments presented in Chapters 4 to 6 – but to highlight the thematic notions that 
emerge from the story; and second, to relate some of these notions to the larger literature on 
economic transition as discussed in Chapter 1. For the latter, it needs to be kept in mind, as 
Jenkins (1999:209) argues, that: “no single-country study can support generalisations about 
the relative change-promoting capacities of democratic or authoritarian forms of 
government”. On the contrary, this research shows that it is the localised political variables 
that come to play a large role in determining reform outcomes. ‘Untidy’ historical and 
political contingencies (ibid.) can tamper with even the most nuanced generalisations. 
However, the aim is to identify additional questions arising from the West Bengal story, 
which, it is hoped, will shed some light on the kind of challenges other governments or 
political parties have to grapple with while engaged in similar transition exercises. 
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7.2 The Importance of Historic Contingencies 
To recapitulate, this thesis attempted a reappraisal of the CPIM-Left Front era with respect to 
two specific questions (1) why did the CPIM/Left Front take upon itself the task of 
engineering a transition to a pro-market development agenda post-1991 from an erstwhile 
land-reform and agriculture based growth model? And (2) how was such a choice justified 
to/negotiated with the various stakeholders while sustaining the party’s traditional rhetoric 
and partisan character? This reappraisal was carried out in Part III. Without reiterating the 
arguments, the overall orientation of this research can be summarised as follows: in 
answering the why-how questions, this work evaluates the political-economic history of West 
Bengal over the last two decades, and shows how imperatives of economic transition can 
transform political agency, and, how the latter can also translate the former to suit its 
localised priorities. This interplay between transition and political agency forms the core of 
this research, and the way it takes shape has been explored via three thematic notions: first, 
the level of ideological consensus/clarity across different levels of the CPIM; second, how 
ideological ambiguities led to limited negotiation efforts both within the CPIM, as well as 
between the CPIM and other coalition partners of the Left Front; and third, how transition 
initiatives came to be translated by the agencies in charge of execution as exercises where 
local political benefit were prioritised.  
 
It must also be noted that these ideas are broadly in line with Jenkins’s conceptualisation of 
the Indian democratic system as creating conditions to sustain reforms. For example, Jenkins 
emphasises the importance of political incentives: “[r]egardless of the motivation for 
initiating policy reorientation, what incentives inclined politicians ruling in central and state 
governments to concentrate, in the main, on managing the political transition which 
sustainable adjustment demands, rather than battling to halt the reform process itself?” 
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(Jenkins, 1999:83). He then goes on to highlight two types in particular. One, to be able to 
use policy instruments to oblige important political constituencies, i.e. to engage in new kinds 
of patronage politics; and two, the knowledge that reforms do not necessarily threaten old-
style politics with extinction; in fact, the fluidity of interest-group structures opens avenues 
for new forms of coalition. Both these incentives can be seen in the case of West Bengal. 
Patronage politics – as argued in Chapter 3 – had become almost a defining feature of the 
CPIM long before the liberalisation era commenced in India, and the reforms opened up new 
sources of patronage for the party. Similarly, the interest-groups affiliated to the party also 
changed over time. Proclaiming itself a party of the proletariat, a middle-class core 
comprising the landed gentry, bureaucrats, school teachers, etc. had grown within the CPIM, 
and with the industrialisation initiatives, the party also became more amenable towards 
private entrepreneurs. In fact, by the time of Buddhadeb Bhattacharya’s tenure as Chief 
Minister, the party had started to bank on an increasing urban electorate both to support its 
industrialisation agenda, and offset the loss in its traditional support bases of rural West 
Bengal to a large extent.  
 
Similarly, Jenkins puts a great deal of emphasis on the political skills of pro-reform elites, to 
“understand how human agency can exploit the opportunities to which incentives and 
institutions give rise” (ibid.:173). He is not alone in this: for example, Guillermo O’Donnell 
has argued that if there is any hope of solving the prisoner’s dilemma that confounds efforts 
to manage economic and political change simultaneously, ‘it probably lies in finding areas... 
in which skilled action (particularly by the government) can lengthen the time horizons (and, 
consequently, the scope of solidarities) of crucial actors’ (1993:1376); Peter Gourevitch 
admits that ‘even leadership’ may be important in determining variations in the relationship 
between markets and democracy given a set of ‘structural constraints’ (1993:1271). A similar 
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situation could be witnessed in West Bengal surrounding the Statement of Industrial Policy, 
1994 - as discussed in detail in Chapter 4 – where the political salesmanship of Jyoti Basu 
proved to be a critical determinant both in formulating the statement, and ensuring its 
adoption in the state legislative assembly.  
 
The third element in Jenkins’s analysis is that of political institutions: “the ways in which 
institutions act as a sort of scaffolding, distributing the ‘force’ of political resistance across a 
wider network of pressure points than is found in more centralised political systems with less 
fully elaborated institutions” (Jenkins, 1999:119). India’s political institutions, Jenkins 
argues, are particularly useful in neutralising resistance to economic reform by their tendency 
to promote longer time horizons and to arrange bargains between competing groups. The 
CPIM, as discussed in Chapter 4, clearly admits the federal compulsions it was under to 
accept the reforms once they were initiated by the central government. In addition, the 
pressures of inter-jurisdictional competition (Sáez, 2002) and provincial Darwinism (Jenkins, 
1999) also created conditions where the party could no longer ignore a policy transition.     
 
The three themes of ideological consensus, (limited) negotiation, and politicised execution, 
expand the above arguments even further – to the levels of sub-regional and highly localised 
dynamics. As authors like Jenkins (ibid.), O’Donnell (1993), and Jeffries (1993) emphasise 
the role of historically contingent processes in determining the durability of a democratic 
system, as well as the reasons why an evolving form of democratic politics may (or may not) 
be able to foster and adapt to policy change, it needs to be understood that similar 
contingencies can exist even within a particular form of democracy. Jenkins points out that 
India’s is just one form of democracy embedded in a specific cultural context, and its ability 
to sustain reforms emerges out of a unique set of historical sequences that is impossible to 
replicate. The same holds true for the varying degree of success in the sustainability of 
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adjustment among the different Indian states, where the varying outcomes are, to a significant 
extent, determined by their historical contingencies.     
 
In the case of West Bengal, the ideology element presents a particular form of contingency 
that created problems of political legitimacy for the CPIM. A significant section of the 
transition story therefore revolves around the party’s search for legitimacy, the ambiguities 
inherent in that search, and the resultant contradictions, all of which slowed the process 
considerably. The eventual ideological modifications that the party arrived at, aiming to give 
its actions a theoretical sanctity, were not only contentious, but as argued by other Left Front 
member parties (such as the RSP and FB) and prominent Left ideologues (such as Prabhat 
Patnaik and Asok Mitra), were at best a rhetorical jugglery, and at worse amounted to a 
bourgeois argument, deviating significantly from the notion of a Left alternative.  
 
Focusing on political parties on the basis of their most clearly articulated axis of formality – 
their codification or ideological positions – may run the risk of neglecting the many ways in 
which a party can provide channels for its leaders to construct and sustain other forms of 
relationship, based on mutual understandings between representatives of socio-economic 
interests and party elites in their personal capacities, rather than in their institutional roles. 
Nevertheless, for a party like the CPIM that derives a constant legitimacy – even if just 
rhetorical – from its ideological discourse, tracing the ideological transformation is crucial to 
understand how the mindset and outlook evolved among the party leaders, as they 
accordingly assisted or abated in the sustainability of reforms.  
 
Next is the aspect of negotiation. The importance of building coalitions and consensus by 
negotiating economic and political bargains, and the willingness and capacity of socio-
economic elites to engage in negotiations with both other interest groups and governing 
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elites, and ultimately to strike acceptable bargains, underwrite the sustainability of reforms. 
And this is precisely where political parties play a crucial role in shaping behaviour patterns 
among stakeholders in the process. Jenkins summarises the key arguments in favour of such a 
proposition:  
 
the fuzziness of boundaries separating party and non-party political networks, 
combined with the ease of exit for faction leaders, inclines politicians to take policy 
risks because of the expectation that they will be able to quell resultant political 
resistance by: (1) arranging suitable conflict-avoiding (or conflict-deferring) 
compromises among contending interests; (2) exploiting the faith of privileged 
interests in the sanctity of their privileges by assuaging these opponents of 
liberalisation with promises that may never be fulfilled; and/or (3) harnessing the 
political potency of nascent groups which might emerge as key supporters in the 
future if offered tacit support. All three behaviour-shaping expectations are structured 
by the nature of parties as an informal institution operating within a context of formal 
democracy (1999:152). 
 
In West Bengal, however, as discussed at length in Chapters 4 and 5, the lack of negotiation – 
even within the CPIM itself, let alone the Left Front - proved to be a serious impediment 
towards sustaining its transition initiatives. What is important to highlight here is the fact that 
such a development once again underscores the importance of historical contingencies. The 
engagement in any form of negotiation or arranging compromises among contending factions 
needs to be preceded by an acknowledgement, at least within the party’s own higher 
echelons, about the nature and necessities of transformation. But for a party like the CPIM, 
such an admission was never forthcoming. Instead, it reacted in a contradictory fashion, and 
downplayed the magnitude of the changes, thereby seriously limiting its scope to even begin 
negotiations. Even when the party finally reassessed the situation, it only managed to produce 
a theoretical reassurance, arguing that its efforts were guided by the historical stages of 
Marxist dialectics. The strictures of democratic centralism meant that such positions adopted 
by the higher authorities, albeit conflicting, came to be accepted by the majority of the party.      
  
325 
 
This is, however, not to deny that the CPIM did provide channels outside its institutional 
realm, where decidedly more informal patterns of interaction were created, nurtured, and 
pressed into service on occasions when more formal channels on their own proved incapable 
of effecting policy objectives. And it is precisely in this context that the element of politicised 
execution took shape. Chapter 6 discussed at some length how the party was completely 
dependent on its alternative bureaucratic networks, for not only political mobilisation but also 
governance initiatives. And therefore, as the local facilitation of industrialisation projects was 
entrusted to the political managers of the party - but without negotiating the necessities (both 
in political and economic terms) of such initiatives with them - it created an environment of 
ambiguity and mistrust. Middle to low-ranked party leaders, who over time had acquired 
almost unchecked authority in their respective areas, appeared more and more alienated from 
what the promises of the party leaders, as, buoyed by the influx of investment in their 
localities and the authority to facilitate a suitable industrial climate, they had started to pursue 
their local political agendas with vigour, and even channelled development funds to accrue 
personal benefits. The nature of incentives at ground level, therefore, often subverted or even 
contradicted the transition imperatives emanating from the top, thus jeopardising the entire 
process. While the CPIM historically thrived on creating localised political incentives via its 
extensive patronage networks, it made sure that the incentives assisted in perpetuating the 
party’s political objectives (as in the case of land reforms and panchayati-raj). But for the 
first time, owing to contradictions that had set in within the party in the way it went about 
managing the entire transition process, the political managers were not in sync with the wider 
goals (which in themselves were ambiguous), thereby translating the process into an exercise 
where local agendas and personal ambitions came to be prioritised.   
 
  
326 
 
In the overall context of sustainable economic reforms within the Indian democratic setting, 
the story of West Bengal takes forward the broader argument that sustainability of adjustment 
has been significantly aided by the three key assets of India’s political systems – political 
skills, institutions and incentives (Jenkins, 1999): the product of half a century of a particular 
form of constitutional democracy, the manifestation of skills, impact of institutions and 
creation of incentives also varies significantly within the country. The nature of such 
variations depends considerably on local historical contingencies, which take shape against 
the plethora of factors that continually inform the Indian political landscape: caste, class, 
ethnicity, religion, language, and many more. For West Bengal, the development of certain 
kinds of Left politics – the adoption of Marxism-Leninism by the Bengali bhadraloks in the 
colonial era, the gradual foray of the communist parties into the mainstream of parliamentary 
politics (and the rejection of the same by a few like the CPIML, eventually launching the 
naxalbari movement) in the three decades after independence, and finally the CPIM-Left 
Front era since 1977 - have always dominated its horizon. The contradictions embedded in 
the entire transition initiative in the state - an ambivalent ideological discourse, limited 
negotiation efforts, and politicised execution - had its roots in such a unique historical setting, 
making the task a rather difficult balancing act for the political agency, which on one hand 
had to aid the process and on the other appear to be trying to thwart it, and also transform its 
own ideological contours at the same time. The story of policy transition in West Bengal is 
thus a story of these contradictions. 
     
7.3 Negotiating Audacious Reforms 
 
This story evidently, is not a stand-alone one, and as argued in Chapter 1, West Bengal 
represents a microcosm for the study of a set of puzzles that has much to say about similar 
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economic transitions elsewhere, particularly with regard to how large-scale macroeconomic 
policy decisions are negotiated at ground level, and how such acts of negotiation are 
intensely political both in its formation and agency. In this sense, this research blends itself 
into broader instances of political transformations elsewhere. Similar historical arcs exist in 
China; East Asian countries such as Vietnam and North Korea; Russia and other Eastern 
European nations; and even Latin American countries like Cuba and Venezuela. Thematic 
parallels can be found in Thatcherism in England, or more recently, in the way the Labour 
Party seeped into the ideas of New Labour; the transformation of the Italian communist party, 
etc. There remain, of course, an issue of degree intrinsic to such ideas. Not everywhere are 
the contradictions as intense, reactions evoked as sharp, or outcomes determined as similar.  
 
This research shows that even ideologies can be reshaped in the search for appropriate ways 
to negotiate transition efforts. Particularly for pro-labour political parties, with their own 
history and development-orientation to conform to, the task of negotiation neither happens on 
the basis of economic incentives, nor remains a question of forming coalitions to counter 
collective action or distributive problems. Instead, it becomes the much more difficult 
undertaking of justifying a form of change that is nothing short of a radical transformation – 
not only in terms of policy – but also in the realm of ideas, political rationality, historical and 
ideological legitimacy. Transition initiatives, in such circumstances, transgress the idea of 
‘reforms’ as matters of economic prudence or good governance, and become what may be 
described as negotiating an act of political audacity against the very rationale from which the 
political movement derives its legitimacy.  
 
It is important to emphasise that the focus here is not on the outcome, but on the act of 
negotiation itself, and the political variables that dominate much of the process. While the 
story told in this thesis demonstrates several examples of the latter - incentives formulated by 
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political elites to push reforms, political acumen and salesmanship, achieving (or subverting) 
consensus, rhetoric vis-à-vis execution, etc. – it also highlights the risks inherent in 
proceeding with what may be construed as audacious reformism. In such situations, although 
the political agency at the helm of affairs may no longer be able to ignore the economic 
imperatives of transition, it cannot afford to be seen advocating the same for fear of electoral 
backlash and/or political marginalisation. Under such pressures, the situation becomes one of 
status quo, where reform initiatives have to be counterbalanced by an effort to ‘not seem 
eager to change’ in public eyes. Even the act of engaging in negotiation becomes problematic 
as such acts could be construed as acknowledging the necessities of transition. The kind of 
consensus required to emerge out of the status quo therefore continues to remain elusive, as 
negotiation efforts are non-existent, or at best half-hearted. The only recourse for the political 
agency is then to engage in a form of distorted negotiation, i.e. not trying to build consensus 
on the basis of socio-economic imperatives, but by promising incentives outside the ambit of 
formal institutional arrangements. In other words, in the face of such status quo on one hand 
and economic compulsions on the other, regional and local level political elites are likely to 
be entrusted with the responsibility of executing some of the risky decisions - not by 
engaging with the relevant interest groups - but rather in a clandestine manner and using their 
local political authority. In return, these elites are promised ‘something extra’ (greater 
political authority, promotion in the party hierarchies, financial rewards, etc.) to sustain or 
increase their stronghold in their respective localities. Such practices, if continued long 
enough, run the risk of degenerating into a continuous propagation of a biased socio-
economic equilibrium, where a group of political elites emerges as the dominating section of 
society. The state of affairs in West Bengal during the course of a policy transition 
engineered by the CPIM/Left Front over the last two decades recounts one such story of 
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audacious reformism, variants of which - albeit in differing degrees – can be witnessed across 
global South, particularly in countries with communists or pro-labour groups in power.     
 
---------------- 
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Appendix 1: A Note on Methodology 
 
Let me present a brief overview of the fieldwork that lies behind this study. Evidently, this 
thesis is in the form of an in-depth single case study that is largely based on interviews and 
ethnographic materials. It also draws from a plethora of official documents – ranging from 
government (both GoWB and GoI) to party documents, independent tribunal/commission 
reports, and newspapers in both Bengali and English. While the main subject of this study 
falls in the field of political science, it also examines issues in political history by means of 
historical, anthropological and sociological research that links events in one locality to others 
at different spatial scales.  
The fieldwork undertaken for this research was spread over two years – 2008 and 2009 – and 
comprised several three to six months visits to Delhi and West Bengal. In case of the latter, 
apart from being based primarily in Calcutta, I frequently visited Singur, the towns of Barasat 
(in North 24 Parganas) and Sheoraphuli (in Hooghly), and Kanmari village (in North 24 
Parganas) to conduct interviews.      
The first part of the fieldwork was an extensive archival research that was carried out in 
2008. This took two forms, first, a detailed study of CPIM publications (Party Programme, 
Party Congress and West Bengal State Congress Reports, several plenum reports, party 
letters, writings on the ideological and tactical lines of the party, etc. Though the focus was 
on CPIM, I also studied CPI, RSP and FB party congress reports), and second, a study of the 
debates that took place in the state Legislative Assembly from 1986 onwards. For the first 
part, my two main sources were the library of the CPIM’s Bengali daily – Ganashakti, which 
has one of the most exclusive collections of party documents and also materials pertaining to 
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the history of the Indian Left movement in general, and the National Book Agency (NBA) 
archives – the publication house run by the party in West Bengal.  
Accessing the Legislative Assembly records was more challenging, and I had to go through a 
bureaucratic labyrinth trying to get permission to enter the premises. Fortunately, I was able 
to contact Mr. Sailen Sarkar, the Parliamentary Affairs Minister in the Left Front cabinet, 
who was kind enough to instruct the Assembly office to permit me to use the library. The 
library staff and particularly the Chief Librarian – Mr. Ashwini Kumar Pahari - were 
extremely helpful, and at times kept the library open past closing hours till I had finished the 
day’s work. 
Apart from the archival research, the rest of the summer of 2008 (and a short visit in 
December) was spent in establishing contacts for the second round of fieldwork. Some of the 
initial contacts I established proved instrumental not only in terms of information, but also in 
pointing me towards other important sources. Most notable in this regard were Professor 
Abhirup Sarkar of the Indian Statistical Institute; Dwaipayan Bhattacharya of the Centre for 
Studies in Social Sciences; Nirbed Ray of the Asiatic Society; and Suparna Pathak of the 
Anandabazar Patrika.  
The bulk of the research was carried out in 2009, and comprised about one hundred in-depth 
qualitative interviews, categorised into three levels – national, regional and local. The 
national level encompassed interviewing long-serving members of the Planning Commissions 
and senior bureaucrats in the 13
th
 Finance Commission, Ministry of Finance, and Ministry of 
Statistics and Programme Implementation (GoI) in order to trace the sequence of events 
behind the announcement of the NEP in 1990-91, the initial response of the Left Front, and 
whether the latter was coerced in any way into accepting the policy. This was followed by 
interviewing some of the national level Bengali CPIM leaders/MPs and several senior 
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journalists to gain a wider perspective of the centre-state relations during that period. 
Particularly helpful in this context were the interviews with Nilotpal Basu (former Rajya 
Sabha MP and CPIM Central Committee member), Jayanta Ghoshal (senior journalist, ABP 
Delhi) and Sumit Mitra (senior journalist, retired, India Today), which managed to clarify 
much of what was political rhetoric as opposed to the underlying trends of the era. 
The next round of interviews focused on examining the regional (state) level dynamics in 
response to the NEP and the subsequent negotiations that took place on the industrialisation 
question. My interviewees were categorised into several groups: Left Front ministers (such as 
the commerce and industry minister, land and land reform minister, etc.); representatives 
from all political parties (from the ruling coalition as well as the opposition); local journalists 
(from The Statesman, The Telegraph, Anandabazar Patrika, Aajkal, Bartaman, and 
Ganashakti, and also from several Bengali television networks such as Akash Bangla and 
Kolkata TV); academicians and political commentators; serving as well as retired state level 
bureaucrats (such as the ex-home secretary, ex-land reform commissioner, chief and political 
secretaries to the Chief Minister, WBIDC, CII and ASSOHAM officials, etc.); and several 
industrialists (some who ceased all activities in the state during the industrial unrest during 
the 1980s, some who are currently operating or considering investing).  
The final round of interviews was at the local or sub-state level, comprised primarily of 
political elites at various levels of party hierarchies – such as state, district, zonal and local 
committee members (of the ruling coalition), pradesh and district committee members of 
both Congress and the Trinamool Congress. Finally, a series of interviews was carried out at 
Singur, with people from across all walks of life – local party supporters/cadres; the local 
BDO and panchayat pradhan; farmers who sold their land and received compensation, and 
those who did not give consent for their land to be acquired; sharecroppers (both registered 
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and unregistered); villagers who were injured in clashes with the police; local youth who 
were receiving training from the TATAs and were promised employment in the project. And 
in what was a truly emotional experience, I also went to the house of Tapasi Malik – the girl 
who was allegedly raped and murdered at Singur – and spoke with her family.     
It also needs to be mentioned that I could establish a trust-base with most of my interviewees 
quite easily, which often led to frank and honest conversations. This happened, as I gathered 
during the fieldwork, primarily due to two reasons. Firstly, I am a Bengali, and having been 
born and brought up in Calcutta, I am naturally acquainted and comfortable with the local 
culture, and norms and nuances of the daily lives of people. Therefore, striking up a 
conversation with a farmer – perhaps while also helping him with his daily chores amidst a 
paddy field – was not a task too difficult for me. Secondly, while my interviewees could 
easily relate to me, they also saw me as a relatively safe person to converse with, as ‘here was 
a Bengali middle-class boy based in a foreign land’ (a remark made by a housewife at 
Singur). There were many things that my respondents told me precisely because I was 
perceived as an outsider. 
During the initial period of the fieldwork, I came to hear the same answers repeated to my 
questions, until I started to get a feel for the dynamics I was studying. It was only a month or 
so into the fieldwork when I started to understand the kind of questions to ask that would 
elicit more varied responses. I often abandoned the role of interviewer entirely, and just 
talked with my respondents for long periods, engaging in a style of conversation that is 
known as adda in Bengali, meaning ‘idle chitchat’. Some of these conversation sessions 
stretched to four-five hours, but led to the most insightful responses, and often to a level of 
detail I could not have possibly gathered had I persisted with formal interviews. I also 
attended many political and administrative meetings (sometimes purely by accident, as I was 
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kept waiting in the same room where these meetings were taking place, before I could start 
my interview). The kind of conversations that took place in these meetings were a pointer for 
me to understand the local political dynamics much better, and many of my interviews started 
as a continuation of these meetings, as the respondents were more interested in commenting 
on the discussions that had just taken place, before settling down and answering my 
questions. 
This thesis, on the whole, aims to tell the political history of West Bengal as it unfolded over 
the last two decades - an era when the irreversibility of reforms (though embraced gradually 
and often by stealth) in the entire country became more and more pronounced. The weakness 
of focusing on a single case in comparison with a large-N based comparative study is of 
course the difficulty in arguing to what extent the findings can be generalised to produce a 
robust theory. However, a single study such as this, set in the context of a broader theoretical 
and regional literature, remains an appropriate way for one researcher (as opposed to a team 
of researchers) to understand the deeper questions embedded in the unique historical and 
ideological context that characterises the case, and that are my object here. Many intriguing 
questions emerge ‘in the field’ where the very field itself opens up with its own energy, 
conundrums and flavours and speaks to the researcher, guiding his knowledge grounded on 
and generated from itself.               
        
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
336 
 
 
Appendix 2: Demographic Details of West Bengal
1
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
1 Source: Census 2011; http://censusindia.gov.in/2011-prov-results/prov_data_products_wb.html; accessed on 
5
th
 December 2012  
 
NUMBER OF DISTRICTS 19 
AREA 88,752 Sq.km 
TOTAL POPULATION Persons 91,347,736 
 Males 46,927,389 
Females 44,420,347 
DECADAL POPULATION GROWTH 2001-2011 
(absolute) 
 
11,171,539 
 
 
DECADAL POPULATION GROWTH 2001-2011 
(percentage) 
13.93 
POPULATION DENSITY per sq.km 1029 
SEX RATIO (No of females per 1000 male) 947 
  
0-6 AGE GROUP POPULATION 
Absolute Persons 10,112,599 
 Males 5,187,264 
 Females 4,925,335 
Percentage Persons 11.07% 
 Males 11.05% 
 Females 11.09% 
  
LITERACY 
Absolute Persons 62,614,556 
 Males 34,508,159 
 Females 28,106,397 
Percentage Persons 77.08% 
 Males 82.67% 
 Females 71.16% 
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Appendix 3: Electoral record of the CPI and the CPIM, 1952-1969
1
 
 
 
 
Appendix 4: Electoral record of the CPI and the CPIM, 1971-1977 
 
 1971 1972 1977 
 Seats 
Won 
Vote 
share 
Seats 
Won 
Vote 
share 
Seats 
Won 
Vote 
share 
CPI     13 20.99%    35 54.62%      2 12.67% 
CPIM 113 37.42% 14 35.92% 178 46.23% 
 
 
                                                             
1 Source: http://eci.nic.in/eci_main1/ElectionStatistics.aspx; accessed on 5th December 2012 
 1952 1957 1962 1967 1969 
 Seats 
Won 
Vote 
share 
Seats 
Won 
Vote 
share 
Seats 
Won 
Vote 
share 
Seats 
Won 
Vote 
share 
Seats 
Won 
Vote 
share 
CPI 28 24.52% 46 34.25% 50 40.88% 16 28.59% 30 53.1% 
CPIM - - - - - - 43 36.14% 80 54.12% 
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Appendix 5: West Bengal Panchayat Election Results, 1978 
 
 Gram 
Panchayat 
Panchayat 
Samiti 
Zilla Parishad Total 
CPIM 61.03 67.15 76.75 62.14 
CPI 1.79 1.58 0.80 1.74 
RSP 3.64 4.22 4.78 3.74 
AIFB 3.17 3.87 6.85 3.32 
Left Front 
(Total) 
70.28 66.27 89.49 71.51 
Congress  29.40 30.07 10.35 28.18 
Source: Pashchimbanga Panchayat Nirbachan 1993-Parisankhyan O Paryalochana, CPIM, 
West Bengal State Committee, Calcutta, 1993:230.   
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Appendix 6: Assembly Election Results in West Bengal, 1977-2011
1
 
 1977 1982 1987 
 Seats 
Won 
Vote 
Share (%) 
Seats 
Won 
Vote 
Share (%) 
Seats 
Won 
Vote 
Share (%) 
Left Front (major 
coalition partners) 
      
CPIM 178 35.46 174 38.49 187 39.3 
CPI 2 2.62 7 1.81 11 1.92 
RSP 20 3.74 19 4.01 18 3.94 
AIFB 25 5.24 28 5.9 26 5.84 
Congress 20 23.02 49 39.73 40 41.81 
TMC - - - - - - 
BJP  - - 0 0.58 0 0.51 
JNP 29 20.02 0 0.83 0 0.16 
 
 1991 1996 2001 
 Seats 
Won 
Vote 
Share (%) 
Seats 
Won 
Vote 
Share (%) 
Seats 
Won 
Vote 
Share (%) 
Left Front (major 
coalition partners) 
      
CPIM 189 36.87 157 37.92 143 36.59 
CPI 5 1.54 6 1.75 7 1.79 
RSP 18 3.47 18 3.72 17 3.43 
AIFB 29 5.51 21 5.2 25 5.65 
Congress 43 35.12 82 39.48 26 7.98 
TMC - - - - 60 30.66 
BJP  0 11.34 0 6.45 0 5.19 
 
 2006 2011 
 Seats 
Won 
Vote Share 
(%) 
Seats Won Vote Share 
(%) 
Left Front (major coalition partners)     
CPIM 176 37.13 40 30.08 
CPI 8 1.91 2 1.84 
RSP 20 3.71 7 2.96 
AIFB 23 5.66 11 4.8 
Congress 21 14.71 42 9.09 
TMC 30 26.64 184 38.93 
BJP  0 1.93 0 4.06 
                                                             
1 Source: Election Commission of India; http://eci.nic.in/eci_main1/ElectionStatistics.aspx; accessed 5th December 
2012 
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Appendix 7: Industrial Development in West Bengal Post-1994
281
 
Following the policy transition in 1994 and the subsequent institutional changes and image 
building exercises, the expectancy regarding industrial prospects of West Bengal was - 
perhaps justifiably so - highly optimistic. In its 1995-96 Economic Review the government 
described the upsurge in industrial investment after the 1994 Statement as nothing short of 
phenomenal. Also, in an attempt to illustrate the government’s increasingly liberal image, the 
Review went on to note that delegations comprising of both private industrialists and senior 
government officials from the state have visited the US, Europe, and China, and have 
commenced preliminary negotiations over projects worth more than $1.4 billion (Economic 
Review 1995-96; GoWB:39-40). The Left Front has always been emphatic in its claim that 
since 1994, West Bengal has been experiencing a new industrial ‘dawn’ (RayChaudhuri and 
Basu, 2007). If one looks at the period till 2000/2001, such claims assert credibility on the 
basis of three factors. 
Firstly, as RayChaudhuri and Basu (ibid.) shows, there indeed was a structural shift in the 
quantum of investment coming to West Bengal in the 1991-2000 period as compared to 
earlier years (see table A7.1). Secondly, the state experienced a steady growth in per-capita 
SDP during this period (see table A7.2), and was next only to Maharashtra, Gujarat, and 
Tamil Nadu in terms of per-capita SDP growth rates (see table A7.3). Thirdly, with regards to 
foreign direct investment, West Bengal outperformed most states - even Gujarat - between 
1991 and 1997 (Sinha, 2004) (see table A7.4).  
 
 
                                                          
281
 All population data in this appendix has been calculated as per census records.   
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Table A7.1: Structural Break in Industrial Investment in West Bengal 
Year Investment Catalysed (in Rs. Crores) 
1977-1981 173.76 
1982-1988 774.01 
1991-2001 19775.2 
Source: RayChaudhuri and Basu, (2007) 
Table A7.2: SDP Growth in West Bengal  
 
At 1993-94 prices 
Year SDP (in Rs. Crores) Per Capita SDP 
1993-94 48397.63 6755.95 
1994-95 51761.26 7094.08 
1995-96 55630.83 7491.86 
1996-97 59495.99 7880.05 
1997-98 64483.61 8407.58 
1998-99 68598.38 8813.76 
1999-00 73609.21 9330.02 
Source: Economic review, GoWB, various issues    
However, several caveats emerge in this story of an industrial turnaround and high growth on 
a closer look. First and foremost, as Sarkar (2006) points out, despite the high growth rates, 
the rank of West Bengal in terms of per-capita SDP has been continuously declining in 
comparison to other states. From a rank of 6
th
 in 1980-81 and 7
th
 in 1990-91, it had declined 
to 9
th
 by 2000-01. It seems, Sarkar notes, “that West Bengal is running faster than almost all 
other states, yet continuously lagging behind” (ibid.:343). Secondly, an examination of 
investment statistics also reveals patterns contrary to the claims of a phenomenal upsurge. As 
Sinha (2004) shows, between 1991 and 2003, the number of proposals
282
 coming West 
Bengal’s way was only 4.73% of the national share, and the actual investment was a paltry 
3.85% of all-India investment (see table A7.5). Sinha also goes on to show the divergence in 
performance between different states during this period, for example, while the per-capita 
investment (in Rs. million) in Gujarat was 37409, in West Bengal it was only 5514. Also, in 
                                                          
282
 Calculated as the sum total of Industrial Entrepreneur Memorandums (IEM) and Letters of Intent (LOI). 
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terms of the average ratio of implementation (investment under implementation/proposed 
investment) between 1996 and 1999, Gujarat occupied the highest rank with 55.6%, followed 
by Maharashtra with 49%, while West Bengal could only achieve 35.4%.   
  Table A7.3: Per-Capita SDP Growth Rates: 1992-93 to 1998-99 
Position State Growth Rate (%) 
1 Gujarat 7.8 
2 Maharashtra 6.8 
3 Tamil Nadu 5 
4 West Bengal 4.8 
5 Kerala 4.6 
6 Rajasthan 4.4 
7 Madhya Pradesh 3.9 
8 Andhra Pradesh 3.7 
9 Karnataka 3.5 
10 Punjab 2.8 
11 Haryana 2.6 
12 Uttar Pradesh 1.6 
13 Orissa 1.6 
14 Bihar -0.2 
Source: Sachs, Bajpai, and Ramiah (2002) 
Thirdly, the ground level realities hardly presented any grounds for optimism. As tables A7.6 
and A7.7 show, while the number of registered units increased by 11% between 1990 and 
1999, the employment generated actually fell by 7%. There was a 10% increase in ex-factory 
value of industrial output, but at the same time, the state’s national share fell from almost 
10% in 1981 to 6% by 1991 and to a meagre 4.3% by 1999. It is also clear from table A7.8, 
that among all the major Indian states, only West Bengal (along with Bihar and Uttar 
Pradesh) continued to display a negative employment trend in the organised sector for the 
periods 1980-90 and 1990-98. As table A7.9 also shows, the public sector continued to be the 
primary source for employment in the state during this period. Therefore, the SDP growth 
rate- albeit one of the best in the country- was never able to bring in an associated rise in 
employment.         
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Table A7.4: State-wise FDI Proposals: August 1991 to January 1997 
State No of Projects Investment Amount (in Rs. Crores) All India Share (%) 
Maharashtra 1355 12676.4 12.5 
Gujarat 548 3762.5 3.7 
West Bengal 271 5249.5 5.2 
Tamil Nadu 812 5468 5.4 
Kerala 104 520.9 0.5 
Andhra 
Pradesh 439 2511.3 2.5 
Bihar  69 130.7 0.1 
Source: Sinha (2004) 
 
 
Table A7.5: State-wise Investment Data: 1991-2003 
State 
Number of 
Proposals 
(IEM+LOI) 
All India Share 
(%) 
Investment Amount 
(in Rs. Crores) All India Share (%) 
Maharashtra 10232 19.9 242641 21.11 
Gujarat 6483 12.61 188916 16.43 
Tamil Nadu 4786 9.31 70254 6.11 
Uttar Pradesh 4553 8.86 77629 6.75 
Andhra 
Pradesh 3613 7.03 125811 10.94 
Haryana 3097 6.02 33613 2.92 
Rajasthan 2451 4.77 40973 3.56 
West Bengal 2434 4.73 44222 3.85 
Punjab 2312 4.5 53897 4.69 
Madhya 
Pradesh 2097 4.08 44976 3.91 
Karnataka 2086 4.06 55715 4.85 
Kerala 528 1.03 10554 0.92 
Orissa 414 0.81 30164 2.62 
Bihar 171 0.33 4468 0.39 
Source: Sinha (2004) 
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Source: Economic review, GoWB, various issues    
Source: Economic Review, GoWB, various issues 
Table A7.8: Annual % Growth Rate of Workers in Organised Sector, 1980-98 
State 
1980-81 to 
1989-90 
1990-91 to 
1997-98 
1980-81 to 
1997-98 
Average population (in millions) 
1981-2001 
Maharashtra -1.1% 2.1 0.4 79.4 
Gujarat -0.05 2.3 1.1 41.9 
Tamil Nadu 1.8 3.9 2.8 55.4 
Uttar Pradesh 0.5 -0.8 -0.1 134.4 
Andhra Pradesh 2.7 5.7 4.1 65.2 
Haryana 3.9 2.7 3.3 16.8 
Rajasthan 3.5 1.2 2.4 44.9 
West Bengal -2.9 1.9 -0.6 67.6 
Punjab 7.1 1.1 4.3 20.5 
Madhya Pradesh 2.9 1.8 2.4 49.1 
Karnataka 0.3 5.6 2.8 44.9 
Kerala -0.6 4.6 1.9 28.8 
Orissa 1.9 1.6 1.8 31.6 
Bihar 0.1 -3.7 -1.7 66.6 
Assam 0.2 3.3 1.6 22.3 
Source: Sarkar (2006) 
Table A7.6: Key Industrial Characteristics of West Bengal 
Year 
Number of Registered 
Units Average Employment 
Ex-Factory Value of 
Industrial Output (in Rs. Crs) 
1990 7373 874254 16287 
1995 7617 889647 25922 
1996 7807 864547 31409 
1997 7935 831887 34563 
1998 8059 832519 41895 
1999 8231 813082 33931 
Table A7.7: West Bengal’s Share in Ex-factory National Industrial Output 
Year % Share 
1981 9.8 
1986 7.9 
1991 6 
1992 6.1 
1993 5.6 
1994 5.4 
1995 5 
1996 4.7 
1997 5 
1998 5 
1999 4.3 
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Table A7.9: Sector-wise Distribution of Employment in West Bengal (in lakhs) 
Year Public Sector Private Sector 
1990 16.86 8.9 
1996 16.2 7.96 
1997 16.24 7.82 
1998 16.65 8.07 
1999 16.62 8.07 
2000 16.62 7.89 
Source: Economic review, GoWB, various issues    
 
Given these trends, how does one explain the growth figures (mainly SDP and overall 
production levels)? While the claim that low industrial growth of the 1980s has been largely 
reversed in the 1990s is dubious, it had indeed been compensated to a large extent by the 
growth in the unorganised manufacturing sector. The share of unregistered sector in the 
manufacturing industry in West Bengal showed a phenomenal increase from 42% in 1980 to 
61% by 2001 (contrasted by a fall in the national trend from 45% to 36% in the same time, 
see table A7.10). In terms of employment generation, the contribution of the unorganised 
sector in the overall employment in the manufacturing industry in West Bengal has 
consistently been one of the highest in the country (see table A7.11). There has been a 
spectacular increase in the number of unorganised units (particularly in the rural area) during 
the 1990s, a time when even Uttar Pradesh- the second largest state in terms of the 
unorganised sector- displayed an arresting trend (see table A7.12). The contribution of the 
unorganised sector in the overall industrial economy of West Bengal is substantial
283
, as 
Chakravarty and Bose observe: “...since the mid 1990s unorganised manufacturing, in fact, 
has been contributing almost as much as the organised sector...The relative decline of the 
organised sector in the case of WB becomes striking when we see how the state’s position 
                                                          
283 However, as Sarkar (2006) points, the data on the unorganised sector can be highly unreliable. While the 
sector is usually characterised by both high birth and death rates of units, the latter is often difficult to trace, 
and as a result might not be reflected in the growth trend statistics.      
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deteriorates with respect to the country...In the year 2004-05 WB stands at the 7
th
 position in 
terms of manufacturing output considering all states in India...However, the position of the 
state improves significantly to the 3
rd
 if we consider the unorganised manufacturing alone” 
(2009:12). 
 
Table A7.10: Share of Unorganised Sector in Manufacturing Industry- West Bengal 
vs. India (%) 
Year West Bengal India 
1980-81 42 45 
1990-91 45 38 
2000-01 61 38 
2003-04 65 36 
Source: RayChaudhuri and Basu, (2007) 
 
Table A7.11: Share of Unregistered Sector in Total Manufacturing Employment- West 
Bengal vs. other States (%) 
State 
Year Average population (in millions) 
1989-90 1994-95 2000-01 1991-2001 
Maharashtra 67.3 64.57 71.7 87.9 
Gujarat 70.07 69.85 66.4 45.9 
Tamil Nadu 78 71.2 75.19 59 
Karnataka 81.3 79.6 81.08 48.8 
Andhra 
Pradesh 79.39 70.4 78.4 
71.1 
Uttar Pradesh 86.5 88.39 90.9 149.1 
West Bengal 89.2 85.38 91.15 74.2 
Source: RayChaudhuri and Basu, (2007) 
 
Table A7.12: Estimated Unorganised Manufacturing Units and Employment Therein 
(in crores)  
Year    
State  
West Bengal  Uttar Pradesh 
Rural Urban Total Rural Urban Total 
1994-95 
Units 15312 3778 19090 18359 6789 25148 
Employment 3.37 1.01 4.38 4.15 1.78 5.93 
        
 
     
2000-01 
Units 21237 6474 27711 16313 6588 22901 
Employment 4.42 1.45 5.87 3.68 1.72 5.4 
Source:  Khasnabis, 2008; for average population figures see Table A7.11 
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Fourthly, the high growth rates- albeit largely due to growth in unorganised sector- are not 
reflected in other human development indicators. As per the National Human Development 
Report (2004), West Bengal is below the national average in per-capita consumption, access 
to pucca (concrete) housing facilities, electrification, per-capita consumption of electricity 
and poverty levels. However, the state is above the national average with respect to some 
other indicators- particularly literacy, infant mortality rates, life expectancy at birth and 
availability of drinking water.  
Finally, whatever growth took place barely eased the financial doldrums the government was 
already in (see chapter 4 for details). Table A7.13 provides a comparative analysis of the 
cumulative fiscal indicators of the top thirteen states with maximum revenue deficits in the 
1990-00 period. West Bengal was second in the list with a total deficit of Rs. 23675 crores, a 
slight improvement from the 1989-90 position, when it had topped the list. The state 
continued to perform dismally in terms of its revenue collection. Between 1990 and 2000, the 
own revenue receipt of the government stood at 57.5% of its total revenue receipt, slightly 
better than Uttar Pradesh (52.5%) and Orissa (43.25%), but significantly less than all other 
states. The state also continued to remain the third highest in the country in terms of total 
outstanding liability (Rs. 198564 crores), only behind Uttar Pradesh and Maharashtra. As far 
as the debt-income ratio is concerned, West Bengal stood out as one of the most debt stressed 
states in the country, only behind Uttar Pradesh, Orissa and Punjab or Bihar (in terms of total 
liability as a proportion of total revenue receipt or own revenue receipt). The state also was 
one of most stressed in terms of administrative, pension and interest charges, with a total of 
almost 35% of its total revenue expenditure going towards these expenses (less than only 
Punjab and Bihar). As a result, capital expenditure in West Bengal remained one of the 
lowest in the country - a paltry 19.37% of its total revenue expenditure, higher than only 
other low ranked states - Kerala, Punjab, Bihar and Madhya Pradesh. These indicators, along 
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with similar indicators from the 1980-90 period as discussed in chapter 4, prove that in spite 
of a substantial growth in SDP and a large quantum of investment, fiscal governance in West 
Bengal continued to remain one of the worst in the country.       
All the above issues, taken together, present a picture of the post-1994 industrial economy of 
West Bengal which is quite contrary to the often-repeated claims of a phenomenal turnaround 
by the state. While there were some encouraging trends, there were no signs of a steady 
change in conditions, and the industrialisation initiatives were- at best- halted in nature. As 
Sarkar suggests, “West Bengal is a middle ranking state and has remained so for a long time. 
This is not consistent with high industrial growth” (ibid.).   
Sticky Institutions and Fragmented Political Response 
The economic divergence of the Indian states post 1991 has been widely discussed and 
debated (see chapter 1 for details). However, while most of the debates have focused on the 
inter-state competitive conditions and the implicit changes in the federal dynamics, a more 
sub-national level of analysis, focusing on local factors and players has been relatively less 
forthcoming. But intra-state or intra-region analysis can be equally illuminating, as “despite 
common motivations...the pattern of liberalization in any given state is shaped by institutional 
capacities, the dynamics of its political economy and the societal responses to policy 
changes” (Sinha, 2004:72). 
Unfortunately, compared to the plethora of literature on the Left Front’s land reforms and 
democratic decentralization initiatives, very limited assessment of its pattern of liberalization 
have taken place. Most discussions on industrialisation in West Bengal limit themselves to an 
evaluation of investment/employment, hardly recognising the interplay among ideas, interests 
and institutions (ibid.). Sinha’s comparative analysis on West Bengal, Gujarat and Tamil 
Nadu (2004, 2005) is the most comprehensive account of both the institutional and political  
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  Table A7.13: Fiscal Indicators of 13 States with Maximum Revenue Deficit: 1990-2000
284
 
Indicators (in 
Rs. Crores or %) 
States 
WB UP KRL RTN MH GJRT PN TN AP KNTK BHR MP ORS 
Revenue 
Deficit  
23675 32213 9717 9405 13880 9532 11817 15707 9506 4942 10140 8797 8460 
Total revenue 
receipt  
71028 142874 50989 66547 160505 84769 47386 102901 101706 80297 74526 85528 37564 
Own revenue 
receipt  
40864 75003 36251 44591 143857 76714 44492 78526 73426 63988 30454 53199 16247 
Net devolution 
and transfer of 
resources from 
centre 
35525 75914 15203 28056 30508 17212 6758 29138 39073 22048 45934 35207 23313 
% of central 
transfer in total 
revenue receipt 
42.47
% 
47.50% 28.90% 32.99% 10.37% 9.50% 6.11% 23.69% 27.81% 20.31
% 
59.14% 37.80
% 
56.75% 
Total 
outstanding 
liability 
19856
4 
410154 111422 150713 282944 163979 144049 155307 181252 11510
6 
190420 14668
3 
107438 
Total 
outstanding 
liability as a % 
of total 
revenue receipt  
279.5
6% 
287.07% 218.52% 226.48% 176.28% 193.44% 303.99% 150.93% 178.21% 143.3
5% 
255.51
% 
171.5
0% 
286.01
% 
Total 
outstanding 
liability as a % 
of own revenue 
receipt  
485.9
1% 
546.85% 307.36% 337.99% 196.68% 213.75% 323.76% 197.78% 246.85% 179.8
9% 
625.27
% 
275.7
3% 
661.28
% 
Total revenue 
expenditure 
94704 175087 60705 75952 174383 94300 59202 108609 111211 85240 84665 94324 46023 
total capital 
expenditure 
18346 40382 10329 21911 41082 22870 13110 16629 28146 17727 13849 15894 11512 
% of total 
capital 
expenditure in 
total revenue 
expenditure 
19.37
% 
23.06% 17.02% 28.85% 23.56% 24.25% 22.14% 15.31% 25.31% 20.80
% 
16.36% 16.85
% 
25.01% 
Administration, 
Pension & 
Interest 
Payments  
32845 60321 20647 23984 46491 26600 24444 32465 32681 23029 30695 25611 15028 
% of 
administration, 
interest & 
pension in total 
revenue 
expenditure 
34.68
% 
34.45% 34.01% 31.58% 26.66% 28.21% 41.29% 29.89% 29.39% 27.02
% 
36.25% 27.15
% 
32.65% 
Calculated from the Handbook of Statistics on the State Government Finances, RBI:2010 
Note: The abbreviations for the states are as follows- WB =West Bengal, UP= Uttar Pradesh, KRL= Kerala, 
RTN= Rajasthan; MH= Maharashtra, GJRT= Gujarat, PN = Punjab, TN= Tamil Nadu, AP= Andhra Pradesh, 
KNTK= Karnataka, BHR= Bihar, MP= Madhya Pradesh, ORS= Orissa. 
                                                          
284 For average population figures see Table A7.8 
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capacities explaining the investment patterns in these states. Recently, RayChaudhuri and 
Basu (2007), and Chakravarty and Bose (2009) have also studied the nature and extent of 
institutional capabilities of West Bengal extensively, particularly from a transaction-cost 
based perspective. The primary conclusions from these studies- which go a long distance in 
illuminating the causes behind the halted industrialisation initiatives in the state- can be 
summarised as follows: 
 (a) Poor infrastructural conditions, low labour productivity and bureaucratic 
inefficiency 
The institutional initiatives of the Left Front following the 1994 policy can certainly be 
credited for whatever growth trends were visible in the following years. However, the 
impasse that had gradually clouded the industrial future of the state, according to some 
observers, was due to the government’s inability to attract large scale investments on account 
of extremely poor infrastructural conditions (Chakravarty and Bose, ibid.:14). In a widely 
cited study by Ghosh and De (2004) on infrastructural conditions and regional development 
in India, the authors observe: “Punjab, Tamil Nadu, Kerala, Gujarat, Haryana and 
Maharashtra have substantially consolidated their positions in economic infrastructure during 
the last quarter century. On the other hand, Assam, Jammu and Kashmir, Uttar Pradesh, 
Bihar, West Bengal, Orissa and Madhya Pradesh have consistently represented the lowest 
profile of economic infrastructure. The most dramatic change has occurred in case of West 
Bengal- the state that attained the position of most-developed status under British rule [and] 
till mid 60s has ultimately come down to the 14
th
 position out of the 18 states by 1997-98” 
(1022). This ranking is based on the formulation of a composite index of infrastructure 
services for all states (EOCI- Economic Overhead Capital Index), which comprises of six key 
areas: transportation (both road and rail networks), gross irrigated area, per capita 
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consumption of electricity, telephone main line per 10000 population bases, credit/deposit 
ratio in nationalised banks and the states’ own tax collection levels. The general message 
from several business houses over the years has also been that an immediate and significant 
improvement in physical infrastructure, particularly in roads and ports is extremely 
necessary. Also, while West Bengal on paper has been a power-surplus state, the quality of 
power in most parts- particularly in the rural areas- is extremely poor, and needs significant 
augmentation both in power-supply capacity and transmission and distribution systems 
(Chakravarty and Bose, ibid.). In their study, Ghosh and De (ibid.) also developed a Social 
Infrastructure Index (SOCI) comprising key social development indicators such as literacy 
rate, infant mortality rate, proportion of people with access to pucca (concrete) housing 
facilities and number of post offices per 10000 population bases. The SOCI rankings largely 
mirrors the EOCI list, with West Bengal showing a marginal improvement, occupying the 
10
th
 position out of 18 states by 1997-98.  
Dipankar Chatterjee, ex-Chairman CII (Eastern and North-Eastern regions) describes the 
hurdles faced by investors due to infrastructural inadequacies in the state as follows:  
Creating infrastructure testifies a state’s willingness to facilitate industrialisation. But   the 
track record of the Left Front on this count has not been good. West Bengal seriously lacks in 
power transmission and distribution capacities. Earlier, because there were not many 
industries here, the demand for power was not much and therefore there was no visible crisis, 
although the quality and delivery of power has always been very bad. Now with increasing 
demand for power, this has become a critical issue. Secondly, the condition of roads and ports 
are also hardly encouraging, particularly the latter. Of the only two ports, Haldia has serious 
dredging and draft problems, while Calcutta port has productivity problems. The other major 
problem in West Bengal is the Calcutta-centric development. For example, in Maharashtra, 
apart from Mumbai there are other industrial hubs in Pune, Nasik, Aurangabad and Jalgaon. 
But in West Bengal it is very difficult to venture out of Calcutta. The quality of life in other 
towns is also quite poor. While it is possible to establish agro based industries in Malda or 
Dinajpore districts, the standard of life in those areas makes it impossible for an entrepreneur 
to persuade his employees to go and stay there. None of the other planned industrial hubs in 
Asansol, Durgapur, Haldia, Kharagpur etc. could ever really take off for these reasons. The 
load is thus almost entirely on Calcutta, which has made the city highly congested and 
overcrowded.
285
  
                                                          
285
 Source: Interviews 
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Secondly, there is the issue of low labour productivity in the organised manufacturing sector. 
In fact, when compared to industrially advanced states such as Maharashtra, Gujarat and 
Tamil Nadu (the labour productivity levels were quite similar for all fours states during the 
1980s), West Bengal displays the worst results. In explaining what might have caused this 
divergence, Chakravarty and Bose (ibid.) show that there has been a continuous deceleration 
of real fixed assets per worker in West Bengal, indicating a lack of technological 
modernisation as compared to the other states. Labour productivity in the unorganised 
manufacturing sector was also extremely poor, lower than not only the industrially developed 
states but also than that of the national average. Furthermore, the wage rates prevailing in the 
unorganised sector was also one of the lowest in the country. On the basis of these data, 
Chakravarty and Bose raise an important question- “is it then the cheapest labour that is 
dragging the output to the unorganised sector in this state?”, and go on to observe that “this 
also opens up the possibility of using contract/casual labour within the organised sector and 
farming out production to the unorganised ones. This, in turn, is likely to lead to expansion of 
outputs in unorganised manufacturing” (ibid.:17).       
Finally, in spite of the much talked about image and policy makeover, there has been hardly 
any improvements in the often criticised bureaucratic inefficiencies that continued to plague 
the industrial prospects of the state. The immense amount of paperwork, bureaucratic 
procedures and associated delays were among the major hurdles that businesses, particularly 
small start ups, found extremely difficult to overcome. The most difficult task for an 
entrepreneur was obtaining the various departmental clearances. Dipankar Chatterjee 
illustrates the painstaking nature of the process in the following observation:          
As far as obtaining clearances is concerned, it is a nightmarish situation. Firstly, obtaining 
land clearance is always a major hurdle. Not only is land a limited commodity, but it is also 
extremely fragmented in West Bengal, and in many cases no proper records exist. Other 
clearances such pollution control is also highly difficult to obtain. For example, if someone is 
trying to set up an industry in Bardhaman, he will need some clearances from Bardhaman 
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itself and some from Calcutta. Now he will not get the clearances from Bardhaman as the 
officer posted there considers it a punishment posting, and he is to be found in his office only 
on Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday and half of Friday. He will not be there for the rest of the 
week, or at least avoid being at office if possible. If the permission is to be obtained from 
Calcutta, then the investor will have to continuously commute between Bardhaman and 
Calcutta, and it is a painful process. These types of persisting ground level problems would 
never allow West Bengal to become an attractive industrial destination- particularly for 
medium scale labour intensive industries- in spite of all the statements of intent declared by 
the government.
286
 
 
An additional problem is the multitude of clearances that are necessary for any project. 
Figure 1 presents a flow chart of the process to set up an industry in West Bengal. There are 
at least 18 different kinds of clearances to be obtained between IEM acknowledgment (step 5) 
and tax registration (step 25). Compare this to the scenario in Gujarat, where (1) the number 
of clearances necessary is far less (about 12- see table A7.14) and (2) a single window service 
exists to process the different clearances together (the INDEXTB- see next section).  
(b) Sticky institutional practices 
Sinha (2004) highlights another important area- the existing investment management 
practices in West Bengal as compared to other states. After 1991, while the approval 
administration at the central levels was substantially streamlined and many licensing 
regulations were abolished, its counterparts at the state-level rose in importance. But despite 
this enhanced role, the effectiveness of these investment-promotion organisations after 1991 
continued to be determined by their pre-1991 institutional capacities and skills. Sinha 
(ibid.:89-93) uses Gujarat and West Bengal as two contrasting examples. Gujarat had 
developed its own regulatory agency- the Industrial Extension Bureau (INDEXTB)- as early 
as 1970, in order to effectively monitor central licences from the stage of allotment to actual 
production. Starting from maintaining a register for the Letters of Intent (LOI) allotted for the 
state, the agency invited prospective investors to come and visit possible sites, continuously 
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 Source: Interviews 
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monitored the ‘application status’ of proposed projects, traced and solved pending 
queries/licenses, and periodically updated ‘implementation status’ of all ongoing projects. 
These pre-existing skills and capacities to monitor investment proved extremely beneficial 
for Gujarat even after 1991, when the targets of attention were expanded to include foreign 
and domestic private investors, thus accounting for the very high proportion of proposed-to-
implemented ratio compared to most other states.     
In West Bengal, on the other hand, no such investment promotional agency or any 
mechanism to monitor the status of proposed projects ever existed before 1991. The WBIDC 
took up similar promotional activities only after its own reorganisation in 1994, but following 
the deep-rooted trends of the license-raj era, practices such as updating implementation status 
of ongoing projects were hardly ever carried out. While there was some limited degree of 
follow up actions, these were heavily biased towards a few large scale flagship projects, and 
mostly ignored mid-sized and smaller projects. Even the revamped single-window service, 
the Silpabandhu, helped only those investors who actually came to it with problems, unlike 
the institutionalised practices in states like Gujarat and Maharashtra of proactively seeking 
investors even before any problem might have surfaced. Sinha goes on to argue that these and 
other practices of the two states’ bureaucratic performance (including the capacity of relevant 
agencies to collect and disseminate information to investors, in which Gujarat once again 
vastly outperforms West Bengal) “demonstrates that institutional differences pre-dating the 
Centre’s 1991 reforms persist. Once liberalization became a feature of the national policy 
landscape, these institutional differences continued to influence investors’ decisions, and this 
helps to explain the variations across the two states in terms of the investment flows each has 
received...Institutions are sticky in both Gujarat and West Bengal, and this accounts for the 
greater divergence across these two states that models based on policy alone would predict” 
(ibid.). 
  
355 
 
Figure A7.1: Procedure to set up an industrial project in West Bengal 
 
 
Source: Quarterly Bulletin of Investment Industry & Trade in West Bengal, 2004-05  
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Table A7.14: Approvals Required for Establishing an Industrial Project in 
Gujarat  
 Approval Type Authority 
1.0 
1.1 Entrepreneurship Memorandum 
(EM) 
District Industries Centre 
1.2 Industrial Entrepreneurship 
Memorandum(IEM) 
Secretariat For Industrial Approval(SIA), New 
Delhi 
1.3 Letter of Intent(LOI) -Do- 
1.4 100% Export Oriented Units(EOU) & 
SEZ units 
Development Commissioner 
2.0 
2.1 Registration as Firm Registrar of Firms 
2.2 For approval of Name of 
Private/Public Limited Company and 
incorporation thereof 
Registrar of  Companies 
2.3 Cooperative Society Registrar of Cooperatives 
3.0  
3.1 Allotment of plot/shed in Industrial 
Estate 
Gujarat Industrial Development Corporation 
(GIDC) 
3.2 Allotment of Government land District Collector 
3.3 Agricultural Land Purchase through negotiation 
4.0  NA Permission  Collector/District Development Officer 
5.0  
5.1 No Objection Certificate Gujarat Pollution Board 
5.2 Environmental  Clearance (EC) Ministry of Environment and Forest (MOEF) 
5.3 Consent and Authorization Gujarat Pollution Control Board 
6.0  
6.1 Plan Approval in Industrial Estate GIDC 
6.2 Plan Approval in other area Local Authority 
7.0  
7.1 In Industrial Estate GIDC 
7.2 River/Public Service Department of Narmada & Water Resources,  
8.0  
8.1 Power requirement Gujarat Urja Vikas Nigam Ltd.-Distribution 
Company or respective agencies 
9.0  
9.1 Capital Issue Securities and Exchange Board of India 
(SEBI) 
9.0  
9.2 Term Loan Financial Institutions or Bank 
9.3 Working  Capital Banks 
10.0  
10.1 SME District Industries Centre 
10.2 Large Units SIA 
11.0  
11.1 Registration under Shops & 
Establishment Act 
Local Authority/Municipal  Corporation 
11.2 Registration as Factory Chief Inspector of Factories 
12.0  
12.1 VAT Registration Commercial  Tax Officer 
Source: Gujarat Industries Commissionerate (http://ic.gujarat.gov.in/?page_id=427 ); accessed 5
th
 December 
2012  
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 (c) Fragmented political response   
Sinha goes on to argue that the effectiveness of institutional capabilities can be reinforced or 
undermined by the responses of key social groups, viz. political leaders and party members, 
business actors, labour leaders etc. As any policy shift engenders a range of political 
responses from these groups, the different patterns and outcomes of policy implementation in 
different regions/states are a function of such societal responses. In West Bengal, despite 
sincere efforts from the top leadership and even after reaching an ideological consensus, the 
reform trajectory could never take off due to the multiple dilemmas that the CPIM was 
confronted with in the face of the existing balance between various societal groups and 
electoral compulsions. These compulsions were primarily threefold: 
1. In what can be viewed as a classic collective action problem, the party was unable to 
create potential winners of the liberalisation process in the countryside. The pattern of 
industrialisation in West Bengal has always been spatially concentrated in and around 
Calcutta, whereas the party’s political support base has traditionally been in the rural 
areas, the urban areas usually being the focal points of the opposition. Furthermore, 
the agriculture-industry divide was also a direct corroboration of the rural-urban 
divide in the state- as historically only the urban districts have been industrially 
developed, while rural industrialisation has been virtually non-existent. Traditionally, 
the urban industrialists and consumers have been the only direct benefactors of the 
industrialisation initiatives. Not only did this spatial nature of industrialisation failed 
to generate enough political support for the liberalisation process by creating potential 
winners in the countryside, but the visible concentration of benefits on a few urban 
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centres actually created an opposition to the (however limited) reformist agenda of the 
government
287
.  
2. Secondly, the lack of cohesion within the Left Front members and across the party-
union structures on policy issues pertaining to the involvement of the private sector 
(and particularly foreign firms) limited the CPIM’s opportunities to pursue its 
industrialisation initiatives to the fullest extent. The party’s own trade union wing- the 
CITU- along with the other major coalition partners- the CPI, Forward Block and 
RSP- managed to reign in the CPIM over many policy decisions favouring the private 
sector. For example, in 1995, CITU leaders were able to suspend the government’s 
decision to privatise the Great Eastern Hotel and the construction of several multiplex 
cinemas by Warner Brothers. Jyoti Basu was increasingly being seen both by the 
industrialists as well as the political class to have control neither over his own 
party/union leadership nor over other coalition member parties.  
 
3. These problems were compounded further by the electoral compulsions of the CPIM 
in the late 1990s, particularly in the face of rising opposition from the newly formed 
Trinamool Congress (TMC). Although the TMC was formed only in 1998, it managed 
to win 26% of the state’s seats in the 1999 Parliamentary elections and 31% in the 
2001 state assembly elections. In fact in the 1999 elections, the TMC and the 
Congress together captured 39.3% of the seats, higher than that of the CPIM’s share. 
The TMC had become particularly strong in the industrial belts of the state, and the 
ruling coalition was staring at a gradual loss of power in the key urban/industrial 
constituencies. For example, before the formation of the TMC, the Left Front had 
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 Between 1991-95, 74% of new industrial applications and 60% of proposed investment was meant for five 
districts- Calcutta, Howrah, Hooghly, North and South 24 Parganas- all clustered around Calcutta. On the other 
hand, 75% of assembly seats are located in rural districts. In the 2001 state assembly elections, 57% of the 
seats won by the Left Front came from the rural districts (Sinha, ibid.:95).   
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managed to win 65 out of 75 seats from the south Bengal industrial belt (excluding 
Calcutta) in 1991 and 45 seats in 1996. In the 2001 elections, while they managed to 
hold on to a majority of 40 seats, the TMC- barely within three years of its formation- 
had managed to capture 32 seats. The political conflict between the parties were often 
spilling over into violent agitations, and the leader of the TMC, Mamata Banerjee 
(who also served as the railway minister at the centre from 1999 to 2001) managed to 
draw an increasing national attention over the law and order issues in the state.  
In effect, despite its rhetorical and institutional commitments towards a pro-market economic 
transition, the CPIM was confronted with “serious challenges arising from the spatial 
dimensions of the state’s political economy, intra-organizational conflict...and the electoral 
challenges that began to emerge in the late 1990s. The result is that the politics of 
liberalization becomes fragmented, the multiple sites of contestation leading to incoherence 
between economic policies and the way in which they get implemented” (ibid.:103). As a 
result, contrary to claims of the party and the government, the industrialisation agenda 
continued in its halted mode, never taking off as expected.             
 
------------------ 
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